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IN RE: Elijah R.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS
The petitioner, Ann R. (“mother”), filed these petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent, Howard R. (“father”), to their two teenaged sons, Elijah R. and Edwin R. The petitions were filed in the New London Regional Children's Probate Court on July 28, 2010. Father was served, appeared, and was appointed counsel. Both boys were appointed the same attorney. Subsequently, the Probate court transferred this matter to this court, and vacated the appointment of all counsel. Notice was given again, and father failed to appear. The clerk's office received a call on the plea date from a man, who identified himself as father and who claimed an inability to attend court due to “hurricane damage.” New notice was given and father again failed to appear. He was defaulted for his failure to appear. His motion to set aside the default was filed untimely, but no objection was made on that basis, and this court denied the motion for a lack of good cause. New counsel was appointed for mother, and an attorney was appointed to represent both boys. Notice was also given to the Attorney General pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–716(b), who appeared on behalf of the department of social services. The department of children and families (“DCF” or “department”), which had done a study for the probate court was ordered to update its study for this court. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply. This court has jurisdiction.
Mother's sole ground for termination of father's parental rights is no ongoing parent-child relationship as set forth in General Statutes § 45a–717(g)(2)(C), which provides that the court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․ This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ․ Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only ․” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The matter was continued for trial, and father again failed to appear. The court heard testimony from the DCF worker who wrote the updated study; Dr. Vicki Carter, the boys' therapist; and mother. Four exhibits were entered into evidence, including the report filed in probate by the then attorney for the boys. Mother and the boys' current and probate attorney support termination. The department of social services opposes it on the grounds that it would remove from the boys and the state a financial resource.
The court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.
Mother was born in 1976. Father was born in 1971. They met when mother was eleven years old, and were married when mother was seventeen. Their son, Edwin, was born on April 11, 1997, and their son, Elijah, was born on August 23, 1995.
The family's home life was rife with violence initiated by father. He abused substances, and frequently would abuse mother. He dragged her across the room by her hair, and on occasion threw her down a flight of stairs. Elijah was forced to intervene physically to protect his mother. Father emotionally abused his boys as well. He made clear to them that his girlfriend and his addiction were his life priorities, not his sons. DCF investigated the family several times due to concerns that mother was not doing enough to protect herself or the boys from father. The department did not substantiate, presumably because father was not in the household or an active presence in his sons' lives. As a result of the exposure of the boys to father's abuse of mother and sons, both boys have been diagnosed with Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). They refuse to have contact with their father. Their last contact was at their paternal grandmother's home when father and his girlfriend arrived unexpectedly while the boys were present. Both boys observed father and his girlfriend abusing illegal drugs. This confirmed for the boys that father's addiction was a significant barrier to any positive relationship. Both boys assert that they want his parental rights terminated. They have no positive memories of him. They share only negative feelings for him. Edwin is afraid of his father and has attempted suicide as a result of his father's actions. Elijah hates his father, and threatens violence should he have contact with father. Both boys have expressed to father that they want him to terminate his parental rights, but in keeping with his history of emotional abuse, he has refused.
Mother has proven by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with either boy, as the result of father's physical and emotional abuse of his family, and that it would be detrimental to the point of danger to try to re-establish or establish such a relationship. This is more than a case where the absence of positive feelings connotes an absence of any feelings. The boys have a mutual antipathy for their father, and it would be harmful to them, per their therapist, to not countenance their feelings.
The boys strongly want their father's parental rights terminated, not just to have an absence of contact. The department of social services opposes. The department expresses no concern for the emotional or physical well-being of these boys, but instead opines that father may become a financial resource someday. This is untenable. Father is an addict, whose sole source of income is governmental benefits. He is thousands of dollars in arrears for support already provided to his sons. There is no reasonable prospect that he will ever be a viable financial resource for his sons. To require them to remain in a condition which their therapist testified would be detrimental to them, based upon an abstraction, is not in their best interest.
Dispositionally, the court must take into account the six factors set forth in General Statutes § 45a–717(h). In doing so the court considers and makes the seven statutory findings as follows.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.
DCF investigated the family on numerous occasions, and did two studies for the case, and attempted to engage father. No services were provided, in large part because father had no interest. Dr. Carter, the boys' therapist attempted to engage father in her treatment of the boys, but he dismissed her efforts with abusive language.
2. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.
No court orders issued with the exception of family court orders which apparently were not honored by the parents. It appears that no contempt actions were ever pursued.
3. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
Elijah hates his father, and wants nothing to do with him. Edwin wants to be left alone by his father, but can be manipulated by him to Edwin's detriment. Edwin has been hospitalized with suicidal thoughts as a result of father's contact, but this has no apparent effect on father. The boys remain in mother's custody, and she struggles to meet their needs. They are bonded with her.
4. The age of the child.
Elijah is sixteen years old, born August 23, 1995. Edwin is fourteen years old, born April 11, 1997.
5. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.
Father has done nothing to address his addictions or his abuse of his family. He has maintained sporadic contact with the boys to their emotional detriment. He gave them cell phones and then demanded their return when the boys refused to accept his calls. He rebuffed the efforts of the boys' therapist to engage father in her treatment of his sons. He does not maintain contact with the mother.
6. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
Father told DCF that the problems were caused by mother, but there was no evidence to suggest that this was anything more than father's continued emotional abuse of his family.
The court is well aware of our Supreme Court's holding that “[t]he termination of parental rights ․ is a drastic solution; it severs all ties between parent and child, including the parent's duty to support his or her children. As such, parental rights should not be terminated solely to advance the convenience and interests, either emotional or financial, of the parent ․ Such petitions seek judicial imprimatur on a parent's own, voluntary abandonment of his or her parental responsibility. This court cannot condone such actions without a careful consideration of the financial condition of the parents as part of judicial review. Therefore, trial courts should grant consensual petitions only in those rare situations where, after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the financial condition of the parents, granting that petition truly would be in the best interest of the child.” (Citation omitted.) In re Bruce R., 234 Conn.194, 214, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
This is not a consensual petition. The granting or denial of the petition will not change the state's financial relationship with the children. Mother is also disabled and as unlikely to be an independent financial resource for the boys as is father. The central issue is the emotional health of the boys. Both wish their father's rights terminated. One has threatened harm to himself if it does not happen; the other threatens harm to father. The court agrees with the expert opinion of the boys' therapist that, while a sad day, it is a necessary one for the well-being of these two young men. This position is espoused by DCF, the therapist for the boys, the attorney for the boys, and their prior probate attorney/guardian ad litem. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of Elijah and Edwin to grant the petition.
ORDER
Wherefore, after due consideration of the children's need for a secure, permanent placement, and the totality of the circumstances, and having considered all statutory criteria, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate father's parental rights, and that it is in the children's best interest to do so, the court orders:
That the parental rights of respondent father, Howard R., are hereby terminated as to his children, Elijah R., born August 23, 1995, and Edwin R., born April 11, 1997;
That the petitioning mother, Ann R., shall be the sole parent and legal guardian of the children;
That a written report of the plan for the children shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be filed with the court as required by law.
BY THE COURT
John C. Driscoll, J.
Driscoll, John C., J.
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Docket No: K09CP11012779A
Decided: April 02, 2012
Court: Superior Court of Connecticut.
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