Nancy Meyer v. Post Road Auto Body Shop, Inc. et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this case the plaintiff, Nancy Meyer, sues her former employer, Post Road Auto Body Shop, Inc. (“Post Road”), and its principal, Joseph Castellana, (“Castellana”) claiming that her employment was terminated in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(8) ¹ and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.²  In her complaint dated October 28, 2010 the plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Post Road as an office assistant from February 2008 to February 20, 2010.   She claims that for nearly two years prior to her hiring she was engaged in a sexual relationship with Castellana and that they eventually began cohabiting.   The plaintiff claims she terminated her romantic relationship with Castellana when she discovered that he was dating other women and that he immediately terminated her employment.

In the first count of her complaint the plaintiff alleges that her termination by Post Road violated General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(8).   In her second count the plaintiff alleges that her termination by Post Road violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).   In her third count the plaintiff alleges constructive discharge by Post Road in violation of General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(8).   In her fourth count the plaintiff alleges constructive discharge by Post Road in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).   In her fifth through eighth counts the plaintiff asserts parallel allegations against Castellana.

Presently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment dated February 21, 2012 directed against all eight counts of the plaintiff's complaint.   With respect to the claims founded on violations of General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(8) the defendant claims that the evidence shows that there is no issue of material fact, that neither Post Road nor Castellana required her to submit to Castellana's advances as a condition of her employment.   With respect to plaintiff's Title VI claims the defendant claims that there is no issue of material fact that Post Road did not have a sufficient number of employees to meet the jurisdictional standards set forth in that legislation.   The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2012.   The motion was heard on short calendar of March 26, 2012.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210 (2010).

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way ․ [A] summary disposition ․ should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party ․ [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815 (2003).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11 (2008).

CLAIMS UNDER GENERAL STATUTES § 46a–60(a)(8)

General Statutes § 46b–60(a)(8) provides:

“(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  (8) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, for an employment agency, by itself or its agent, or for any labor organization, by itself or its agent, to harass any employee, person seeking employment or member on the basis of sex or gender identity or expression.  “Sexual harassment” shall, for the purposes of this section, be defined as any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment;”

The defendants claim that there is no issue of material fact that Castellana never made “unwelcome sexual advances or requests” to the plaintiff.   The defendants rely on an affidavit signed by Castellana and extracts from the plaintiff's deposition to show that all sexual contact between the parties was consensual, that the relationship between the plaintiff and Castellana antedated her hiring by Post Road and that the plaintiff was not terminated because she refused Castellana's sexual advances.

In their motion the defendants exhibit an unduly myopic view of the scope of the statute.   The definition of “sexual harassment” set forth in the statute includes not only “any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors,” but also “any conduct of a sexual nature” when “submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment.”   In this case the evidence shows that there is a material issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff's continuation of her sexual relationship with Castellana was either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of her continued employment with Post Road. Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the first, third, fifth or seventh counts of the plaintiff's complaint.

CLAIMS UNDER Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)

In their motion for summary judgment the defendants correctly point out that the application of Title VI is limited to employers meeting the jurisdiction requirements of the statute.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) provides:  “(b) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ․” In his affidavit attached to his motion for summary judgment Castellana states:  “During 2008, 2009 and 2010, I managed and operated Post Road on a daily basis;  and the number of employees during that time never exceeded thirteen (13).”   In an affidavit filed by the plaintiff in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff addresses the jurisdiction issue by stating:  “During my time there, I observed that more than 15 part-time and full-time employees worked for the Defendants.”

The court finds that Castellana's affidavit shows that at no time during the relevant period did Post Road employ fifteen or more employees.   This statement negates the possibility that the Post Road met the jurisdictional requirement of fifteen or more employees for twenty or more months in a year.   In contrast the plaintiff's affidavit does not, on its face, even state that fifteen or more people were employed by Post Road at any given time.   At best the plaintiff's affidavit states that during her two years of employment at Post Road, more than fifteen different individuals were employees.   The court finds that the plaintiff's affidavit is insufficient to demonstrate that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Post Road is an “employer within the meaning of Title VI. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment with regards to the second, fourth, sixth and eighth counts of the plaintiff's complaint.

David R. Tobin, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Incorrectly cited in defendants' motion and brief as “General Statutes § 46a–60(8).”.  FN1. Incorrectly cited in defendants' motion and brief as “General Statutes § 46a–60(8).”

FN2. Incorrectly cited in defendants' motion and brief as “Title VII.”.  FN2. Incorrectly cited in defendants' motion and brief as “Title VII.”

Tobin, David R., J.