Alexander S. Langer v. Nora Szeibert et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS:

The plaintiff, (hereinafter “Alexander”), met the defendant, Gyongyi E. Langer, now known as Gyongyi E. Kristof, (hereinafter also known as “Gyongyi”), on a Hungarian chat site.   They allegedly fell in love and were married on May 15, 2004.   She came to the United States with her daughter, Nora Szeibert, (hereinafter also “Nora”) now known as Nora Szeibert Kristof, having later married Stephen Kristof's son.   Gyongyi and Nora entered this country on April 11, 2005.   The three of them lived in an apartment leased by Alexander in Shelton, Connecticut.   Everything seemed to proceed normally until on or about April 2008.¹  Upon arrival in the United States Nora and Gyongyi applied for and were granted a green card for approximately two years by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).   On or about April 2, 2008, Gyongyi received another green card from the INS for a ten-year period.²  Shortly thereafter, on April 12, 2008, Nora and Gyongyi complained to the Shelton police that Alexander had asked Nora to watch a pornographic movie with him on his computer.   They claimed that Alexander was intoxicated, had become very argumentative, and started yelling at them;  that Alexander then made insulting comments to the two women.   Gyongyi claimed that Alexander had a serious drinking problem and was very abusive to her and Nora. They both stated that they wanted Alexander arrested for his actions.   He was then arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and was given a domestic violence court date of April 14, 2008, at Derby, Connecticut, and was held on a $500 bond.   Eventually a protective order was issued against Alexander prohibiting him from having any contact with Nora and Gyongyi and prohibiting him from going to the residence where the three lived in Shelton.   See Defendant's Exhibits F (the police report) and G (the protective order).

At the police station the plaintiff was strip searched, fingerprinted, his mug shot was taken and he was placed in a jail cell.   Since he was prohibited from going back to the residence, Alexander was unable to access his computers which generated income for him, and several other personal possessions.   Plaintiff remained incarcerated and on April 14, 2008, was transferred to the Superior Court in Derby, Connecticut, where he had to appear in handcuffs, foot shackles, which he claims embarrassed him in full view of the public in front of at least sixty locals and neighbors like a common criminal.   Later in the day he was transferred in chains, he claimed, to the Bridgeport Correctional Center (“BCC”) and kept there overnight in a jail cell.   On April 15, 2008, plaintiff was released from jail on a bail bond which Nora and Gyongyi had refused to post but was posted by Alexander's son.   Alexander moved in with his son in Wallingford, Connecticut.   In May 2008, Nora and Gyongyi went to the Victim's Advocate Office at Derby and filed brand new charges as a result of which the plaintiff was forced to attend anger management meetings or his bail bond would be raised or he would be rearrested.   Plaintiff claims that he had to appear at the Derby courthouse not less than thirty-two times.   Because of all of this he then moved to the Manchester, Connecticut area.

On or about September 7, 2008, Gyongyi filed new charges against the plaintiff for violation of a protective order, demanded at the Shelton Police station the rearrest of the plaintiff.   On October 7, 2008, the plaintiff was arrested by the South Windsor, Connecticut police where he was strip searched, handcuffed, his vehicle searched and towed, in full public view.   He was then transported to the Shelton, Connecticut police and bond was set at $5,000.   He was incarcerated overnight because of his inability to raise such a high amount of bond.   Plaintiff was transported in handcuffs to the Derby court and underwent the same difficulties as his first appearance and was later taken to the Bridgeport Correctional Center where he was kept overnight.   The plaintiff then claims that his arrest in South Windsor was witnessed by a business client who contacted the plaintiff's employer, as a result of which the plaintiff was discharged from his employment, and he could not find employment for the following nineteen months.   Because of the pending criminal felony charge he could not get a Public Service License from the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles resulting in his inability to drive a truck or a limousine which he had done in the past.   According to the plaintiff, Nora demanded that he receive a lifetime jail sentence and that he be deported back to where he came from.   The plaintiff has claimed that these charges made by Nora and Gyongyi were false and the plaintiff was forced to attend a family violence course at a cost of $200 for nine sessions.

Nora was married on July 12, 2010, to Brian Kristof, the son of Stephen Kristof.   Plaintiff has brought this action in seven counts essentially claiming false arrest, malicious prosecution and harassment.   Trial was held before this Court on March 7 and 8, 2012.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

“The plaintiffs in a civil case sustain their burden of proof as to any essential element in their cause of action if the evidence, considered fairly and impartially, induces in the mind of the trier, a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the facts involved in that element are true.”  Busker v. United Illuminating Co., 156 Conn. 456, 458 (1968).   This is also known as proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

In addition, this Court evaluates the credibility of the witnesses upon their appearance and demeanor on the witness stand, the consistency or inconsistency of their testimony, their memory or lack thereof of certain events, whether they were candid and forthright or evasive and incomplete, their manner in responding to questions and their interest or lack of interest in the case as well as the exhibits in the case.

Also, the Court evaluates general credibility on the basis of other testimony in the case, as well as documents in evidence as to their consistency or inconsistency with other evidence.

The burden is on the plaintiff to prove his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.

“ ‘A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him ․ To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement;  (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person;  (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person;  and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.’  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004);  see also M. Taylor & D. Krisch, [Encyclopedia of Connecticut Causes of Action (2009), p. 14].   For a claim of defamation to be actionable, the statement must be false and truth is an affirmative defense.  Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., supra, at 228, 837 A.2d 759.”  Rafalko v. University of New Haven, 129 Conn.App. 44, 53, 19 A.3d 215 (2011).

b. Qualified Privilege

“Our Supreme Court has held that statements made to the police in connection with a criminal investigation ․ are entitled to protection by a qualified privilege ․ Therefore, for [a plaintiff] to prevail on [a] defamation claim, [the plaintiff] must prove that the defendant made [his or] her statement with malice ․ [T]he malice required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases is malice in fact or actual malice ․ Actual malice requires that the statement, when made, be made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false ․ A negligent misstatement of fact will not suffice;  the evidence must demonstrate a purposeful avoidance of the truth ․ Malice in fact is sufficiently shown by proof that the publications were made with improper and unjustifiable motives.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mara v. Otto, 127 Conn.App. 404, 409, 13 A.3d 1134 (2011).

c. Defamation Per Se

“ ‘Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander.   Defamation is that which tends to injure “reputation” in the popular sense;  to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.   W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984), p. 773.   Slander is oral defamation.   This court has delineated specific categories of speech deemed actionable per se where the defamatory meaning of [the speech] is apparent on the face of the statement.  Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn.App. 486, 491–92, 523 A.2d 1356, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 802, 803, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  DeVito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn.App. 228, 234, 784 A.2d 376 (2001).

“ ‘Slander is actionable per se, if it charges incompetence or dishonesty in office, or charges a person with general incompetence in a trade, business or profession.  Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 384 (1972);  Zeller v. Mark, 14 Conn.App. 651, 655 (1988).   Slander is also actionable per se, if it charges a crime of moral turpitude, or accuses a plaintiff of theft.  (Emphasis added.)  Porto v. Bridgeport Herald Corporation, 136 Conn. 557, 567 (1980);  Yavis v. Sullivan, 137 Conn. 253, 259 (1950);  Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn.App. 584, 602 (1987).

“When the defamatory words are actionable per se, the law conclusively presumes the existence of injury to the plaintiff's reputation.   He is required neither to plead nor to prove it ․ The individual plaintiff is entitled to recover, as general damages, for the injury to his reputation and for the humiliation and mental suffering which the [defamation] caused him.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lyons v. Nichols, 63 Conn.App. 761, 768, 778 A.2d 246 (2001).'  Id. at 234–35.”   Lamson v. Farrow, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 4029172 (January 10, 2012, Young, J.) [53 Conn. L. Rptr. 298].

2. Malicious Prosecution

a. In General

To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, “it is necessary to prove want of probable cause, malice and a termination of suit in the plaintiff's favor.”  Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, 131 Conn.App. 223, 237, 26 A.3d 682 (2011).

b. Damages

“Damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution are not limited to easily determined special damages such as attorneys fees or loss of time from work.   Damages are also designed to compensate for intangible injuries such as mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, mortification, shame, fear, and damage to reputation.   See McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926).   Indeed, commentators have emphasized that these ‘are the real consequences to the Plaintiff ․’ Satter & Kalom, “False Arrest:  Compensation and Deterrence,” 43 Conn. B.J. 598, 614 (1969).  ‘Many of the factors upon which our rule for the assessment of damages rest are, at best, rather indefinite and speculative in nature.’  McKirdy v. Cascio, 142 Conn. 80, 84, 111 A.2d 555 (1955).   Monetary awards for the intangible injuries resulting from false imprisonment or malicious prosecution cannot be readily ascertained.   There may be no express accounting that reflects the anguish and turmoil suffered by the person unjustly restrained or prosecuted.   All the jury can do is listen and weigh the credibility of the plaintiff recounting his or her emotional trauma.   It is especially important in those areas where damages compensate for a state of mind to give deference to the jury, where a number of individuals have unanimously agreed that a specific dollar figure best reflects the injury suffered.”  Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 588–89, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984).

ISSUES AND FINDINGS:

1. CREDIBILITY:

The Court found with few exceptions the plaintiff to be credible in his testimony.   In contrast, the Court found Nora and Gyongyi to be less credible.   Conveniently, Nora was able to remember the details of the dealings with the police but could not remember more recent statements she made exonerating the plaintiff.   Gyongyi remembered details of the charges she made against the plaintiff but did not remember details of her statement exonerating the plaintiff.   These statements and contradictory emails will be described hereafter.

2. Were the charges made against the plaintiff by Nora and Gyongyi false?

The short answer is yes.

In sharp contrast to the allegations made to the Shelton police to support the plaintiff's arrest on April 12, 2008, a review of plaintiff's Exhibit 1 which is a letter to the public defender in Derby from Nora, here are some excerpts:  “the fact of the matter was that he (Alexander) never bothered me in any way.   It wasn't clear to me what ‘protective order’ meant.   If I had understood what a ‘protective order’ meant at the police station, I would not have signed it ․ It must be truthfully that there was a noisy argument in the family but I do not feel it was significant or deserving of a protective statement against my stepfather.   My solid position on this issue is that the police took advantage of my limited English skills and had me sign something I did not understand ․ I am not a ‘victim’ I was never victimized or harmed by my stepfather at any point in time.”  (Emphasis in the original.)   It should be noted that she spoke with perfect English at the trial.

“I did not want to charge my stepfather with any accusations at all.   I feel this entire issue is an untrue reflection of the true facts due to my limited understanding of the English language.   By way of this petition, I wish to retract any documents or statements that were communicated at the Shelton Police Department ․ I Nora Z. Szeibert respectfully request that the protective order and any other documents I signed at the Shelton Police station be nullified immediately.   I wish for Alexander to return to our home as soon as possible.”

In plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Gyongyi wrote a letter dated April 21, 2008, to the public defender of a similar nature.   She stated, in pertinent part, “I did not understand what they (the police) were talking about.   My mental state was very stressful and I felt totally confused.   Looking back I feel that I was no cognoscente (sic) of what was going on at the time, what I told the officers was that we had a family argument.   I would to emphasize (sic) that have only a limited command of the English language.   I vaguely remember signing something but I don't know what it was and to this day what it is, the police told me this will protect me against my husband.   It wasn't clear to me what that meant.   I did not know what a ‘protective order’ meant either.   In my old country there is no such phrase.   When I received a copy in the mail a few days later, I was totally shocked.   I would to declare that I am not a victim in this issue.   If I had understood what a ‘protective order’ meant at the police station I would not have signed it period.”

“It is my rock solid irreversible statement that there was NEVER ANY KIND OF VIOLENCE OR ABUSE PHYSICAL OR VERBAL BETWEEN MY DAUGHTER, MY HUSBAND AND I.” (Emphasis in the original.)

“There was a mere noisy argument, nothing more.   My solid position on this issue is that the police took advantage of my limited English skills and had me sign something I did not understand.   I feel like I did not understand the charge brought against my husband.   I would like to repeat that my mental state was very stressful.   I am very sensitive to high pressure situations and stress and consequently felt totally confused at the time of signing any statements ․ ‘I am not a victim’ I was never victimized or harmed by my husband at any point in time.”  (Emphasis in original.)

“I did not, and still do not, want to charge my husband with any accusations.   I feel this entire issue is an untrue reflection of the actual facts caused by my grave misunderstanding of the English language.   By the way of this petition, I wish to retract the ‘protective order’ statement and remedy our family's well being ․ I Gyongyi E. Langer respectfully request that the protective order and any other documents I signed at the Shelton police station be nullified immediately.   I wish for Alexander to return to our home as soon as possible.”

Both statements were both acknowledged by the town clerk of the Town of Shelton, which acknowledgment is attached to these exhibits.³

Also devastating to Gyongyi is an email (plaintiff's Exhibit 10) from her to Alexander dated April 21, 2008, which states in pertinent part:  “my dearest!

Today, I felt from you, in every aspect and detail, the feelings why I am here in the USA (a red heart sign) And is getting worse and worse to sleep without you.   Come home ASAP (I know it is not up to you).   Your Gyongyi.”   Another email dated April 20, 2008, from Gyongyi to Alexander “kiss.   Gyongyi”

An email from Gyongyi to Alexander dated April 22, 2008, which states as follows:  “this very true My Dearest, the flame did not disappear.   Sure!!! (a red heart sign) now I feel much stronger and will conquer together all of the obstacles!!! (a sun sign).   Your love (a red mouth sign).”

Another email from Gyongyi to Alexander dated April 22, 2008, which states as follows:  “my sweet dearest!

I understand your feelings.   I would like everything in order, again, tomorrow you'll sleep with me, you'll see!   I fully agree with your last sentence, to a maximum.   I trust you and you trust me.   This is the way it should be.   At time I got to the email, I automatically inserted “Alexander.”   Guess why?   Imagine my Dear, that I am there and I sit deep in your lap.   Your Gyongy.”

On April 27, 2008, another email from Gyongyi to Alexander, “I'm kissing you Sweetheart” (a red heart's sign is attached).

Another email from Gyongyi to Alexander dated April 27, 2008:  “I my opinion, Dear, if we start again, we'll make good income.   That's why I fight strongly.   Gy.”

During the trial there was no credible evidence offered by the defendants other than that she was under stress when she sent these emails.   There are one or two reasons, or both, for these emails:

1. She really wanted him back, and this supports here retraction of the allegations made to the Shelton police department;  or

2. She was inducing him to come back to the apartment which would have been a violation of the protective order of which she was aware and was trapping him into being accused of violation of a protective order.

Based upon all of the above including a false arrest on the original charge of April 12, 2008, the Court hereby draws a reasonable inference that when Alexander was in Manchester, the complaints that led to his arrest by the South Windsor police and other arrests and attempts to arrest for violation of protective order were all as a result of false claims by Nora and Gyongyi.

For these reasons, and the testimony of the parties, the Court finds that the two defendants, Nora Szeibert Kristof and Gyongyi Langer Kristof, made false statements about the plaintiff and sought false arrests of him which were made and they are liable for that and malicious prosecution.

3. Is the plaintiff entitled to have his belongings returned?

The short answer is no.

Although the Court has no doubt that the plaintiff was deprived by at least two of these defendants, the women, of his personal property, during the subsequent divorce of Gyongyi and Alexander, the plaintiff, Alexander, made a written motion for the return of his personal property and verbally requested it as well and Judge Edward Dolan who presided over the divorce case denied his request and did not permit him to obtain any of his personal property from Gyongyi.   When a previous court has ruled on an issue such as the return of personal property the decision in a subsequent lawsuit is res judicata since the issue was the same and the parties were the same.   Once a court has ruled on an issue between the same parties, another superior court judge cannot change that decision.⁴

4. Is Steven Kristof liable for being part of a conspiracy with Gyongyi and Nora?

The short answer is no.

There was insufficient evidence for this Court to conclude otherwise, and it should be noted that Alexander in his testimony did not press or make any strong argument for Steven Kristof being part of any conspiracy with Nora and Gyongyi.

DAMAGES:

The Court finds that the two defendants, Nora Szeibert Kristof and Gyongyi Langer Kristof, are liable for defamation because they published by their statements, a defamatory statement, said statements identified Alexander to third persons including the prosecutor, the police, etc.;   the statements that were false about the plaintiff's alleged actions were published to third persons, namely, the police, the prosecutor and others, and the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statements.   The statements were false.   Although there is a qualified privilege made to the police, it is clear to this Court that said two defendants made their statements with malice, that they made them with actual knowledge that they were false and that the malice was based upon improper and unjustifiable motives.   There is no question that the defamation injured the reputation of the plaintiff.   The statements made by said two defendants are actionable, per se, because they charged crimes of moral turpitude and the law conclusively presumes the existence of injury to the plaintiff's reputation and he is entitled to recover as general damages for the injury to his reputation and for the humiliation and mental suffering which the defamation caused him.

The two defendants are liable because of a lack of probable cause for their false statements and malice as indicated and damages are designed to compensate for intangible injuries such as mental anguish and humiliation The plaintiff, Alexander, clearly suffered mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment and damage to his reputation, the latter in particular because of his being arrested by the South Windsor police when a business client witnessed it.   Alexander clearly suffered emotional trauma as a result of Gyongyi and Nora's actions.

The damages are as follows:

1. Six nights in jail @ $600/night $ 3,600

2. Bonds for $500 and $5,000 $ 1,000

3. Security Deposit $ 1,450

4. Emotional distress (humiliation, etc.)

and loss of reputation $23,000

TOTAL:  $29,050

Judgment is entered for the plaintiff, Alexander S. Langer, against the defendants, Nora Szeibert Kristof and Gyongyi Langer Kristof in the amount of $29,050.

Judgment is entered for the defendant, Stephen Kristof.

Rittenband, JTR

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Gyongyi, after a subsequent divorce from Alexander in September 2009, later married defendant Stephen Kristof and is now known as Gyongyi Langer Kristof..  FN1. Gyongyi, after a subsequent divorce from Alexander in September 2009, later married defendant Stephen Kristof and is now known as Gyongyi Langer Kristof.

FN2. Did they then have what they wanted?.  FN2. Did they then have what they wanted?

FN3. It should be noted that Gyongyi claimed that she was pressured or forced to sign this statement by Alexander.   However, she admitted that he was not present at the town clerk's office when she signed the statement before the town clerk and that any threat may have been over the telephone.   However, she did not elaborate on the threat, and this Court is not persuaded that Alexander made a threat to pressure her to sign the aforementioned statement..  FN3. It should be noted that Gyongyi claimed that she was pressured or forced to sign this statement by Alexander.   However, she admitted that he was not present at the town clerk's office when she signed the statement before the town clerk and that any threat may have been over the telephone.   However, she did not elaborate on the threat, and this Court is not persuaded that Alexander made a threat to pressure her to sign the aforementioned statement.

FN4. This Court is well aware that Gyongyi and Alexander at the divorce case exchanged statements that if Gyongyi would agree to have the pending case in Derby against Alexander nolled, he would agree to not contact her.   These statements were based upon the understanding that neither party would violate these statements.   However, the Court believes Alexander that contrary to the agreement, Gyongyi went to the prosecutor in Derby on several occasions demanding that the case against Alexander not be nolled.   Based upon that, Gyongyi broke the agreement and, therefore, Alexander was free to proceed with this trial.   It should be noted that Gyongyi in her testimony did not deny that she had urged that the nolle not be given.   The Court believes Alexander on this issue..  FN4. This Court is well aware that Gyongyi and Alexander at the divorce case exchanged statements that if Gyongyi would agree to have the pending case in Derby against Alexander nolled, he would agree to not contact her.   These statements were based upon the understanding that neither party would violate these statements.   However, the Court believes Alexander that contrary to the agreement, Gyongyi went to the prosecutor in Derby on several occasions demanding that the case against Alexander not be nolled.   Based upon that, Gyongyi broke the agreement and, therefore, Alexander was free to proceed with this trial.   It should be noted that Gyongyi in her testimony did not deny that she had urged that the nolle not be given.   The Court believes Alexander on this issue.

Rittenband, Richard M., J.T.R.