IN RE: Judith Fusari (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

Judith Fusari has filed applications for waiver of fees to initiate at least three cases in the judicial district of Hartford.   Of these cases, two purport to be against “Blackeyed Sally's Bar.” Fusari alleges that two friends of her daughter became ill as a result of poisoned drinks served at the bar and that Fusari's daughter had to take care of the friends overnight while they were ill.   In two complaints, she asserts causes of action labeled “pre-meditated drugging,” coercion, force, mental cruelty, “pre-meditated possible murder,” ethics, reckless endangerment, negligence, threatening and drug use and abuse.   She alleges that the injuries sustained were temporary insanity, vomiting, inability to stay awake all night, confusion, mental and emotional dysfunction, among other things.   Nevertheless, Fusari seeks damages for herself.

In another proposed complaint, Fusari attempts to bring an action against the claims commissioner.   From her attached pleadings, it seems that Fusari sought to bring an action in New Britain on behalf of Gary Liebler who was allegedly denied a scooter chair from the Scooter Store.   The proposed pleadings were returned to Fusari pursuant to a permanent injunction that the court, Pittman, J., entered against Fusari on May 17, 2011.¹  See In re Judith Fusari, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 5015339 (May 17, 2011, Pittman, J.).   Fusari then sought to initiate an action against Judge Pittman.   The claims commissioner's office returned Fusari's proposed pleadings stating that she cannot represent Liebler.   These two proposed sets of pleadings are attached to a complaint against the claims commissioner for returning the proposed complaint against Judge Pittman.   Fusari labels the causes of action as negligence, “breach of the Hippocratic oath,” obstruction of justice, aiding and abetting, discrimination, force, coercion, incompetence, risk of endangerment, risk of injury, abandonment and mental cruelty.   She seeks $50 million, tax-free, in damages—a third of which would be allotted to her for mental, physical, emotional, physiological and psychological dysfunction, depression, post-traumatic stress, loss of enjoyment and physical injury, among other things.

On February 3, 2012, this court issued an order to show cause why these actions should not be dismissed because they are frivolous, because Fusari lacks standing to assert them and because Fusari may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of General Statutes § 51–88.   This court scheduled a hearing for February 27, 2012.   Fusari received notice of this hearing by certified mail, return receipt requested.   The court received the return receipt signed by her on or around February 8, 2012.   She did not appear in court.

II

As to the first two actions against “Blackeyed Sally's Bar,” the complaints obviously fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted.   Fusari's alleged damages are based on events that allegedly impacted third parties ² who are not named as plaintiffs.   Through her pleadings, it is evident that Fusari mistakenly believes that she can represent third parties pursuant to General Statutes § 51–88(b).

“Any person who is not an attorney is prohibited from practicing law, except that any person may practice law, or plead in any court of this state in his own cause.  General Statutes § 51–88(d)(2).   The authorization to appear pro se is limited to representing one's own cause, and does not permit individuals to appear pro se in a representative capacity.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn.App. 750, 756, 851 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 915, 859 A.2d 568 (2004).  “The purpose of § 51–88 is, presumably, to protect members of the public from having their rights prejudiced by relying on the legal advice of persons who are untrained and unskilled in the law and are not bound by any professional code of ethics.   See In re Application of R.G.S., 312 Md. 626, 638, 541 A.2d 977 (1988) (‘[t]he goal of the prohibition against unauthorized practice is to protect the public from being preyed upon by those not competent to practice law—from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation’).   Because the public policy underlying § 51–88 is implicated if a nonattorney provides legal advice or represents another person in court on a single occasion, such conduct may constitute the practice of law under § 51–88.”  Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 777 n.25, 6 A.3d 726 (2010).

Section 51–88(b) provides an exception for “any employee in this state of a stock or nonstock corporation, partnership, limited liability company or other business entity who, within the scope of his employment, renders legal advice to his employer or its corporate affiliate and who is admitted to practice law before the highest court of original jurisdiction in any state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a territory of the United States or in a district court of the United States and is a member in good standing of such bar ․” It would appear from her applications for waiver of fees that Fusari is not employed as her only source of income is social security disability.³  She had the opportunity to come to court and prove otherwise, but she did not show.

“[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ․ Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 861, 859 A.2d 934 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).   Because the cases that Fusari attempts to file fail to state causes of action upon which relief may be granted and do not comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law, they are dismissed.

III

As part of the order to show cause, Fusari was ordered to show why she should not be enjoined from filing any further frivolous civil actions in the judicial district of Hartford against any and all defendants for money damages or injunctive relief.   She has initiated dozens of cases in Hartford and well over 100 cases m New Britain since 2008.   Because Fusari is indigent, each proposed action has been initiated through an application for waiver of fees that this court is compelled to grant pursuant to General Statutes § 52–259b.⁴

Most actions have been dismissed as frivolous.   See, e.g., Fusari v. Goodusky, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 11 5035355 (March 17, 2011).   After her actions are dismissed, Fusari often attempts to initiate yet another action alleging that she previously won a judgment against the proposed defendant.   See, e.g., Fusari v. Middletown Area Transit, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 11 5035400 (April 18, 2011).   Despite the dismissal of her actions, the findings that her actions are frivolous and the observation that her multiple filings create an onerous burden on scarce judicial resources, her filings continue and now expand to include actions purported to be brought on behalf of others.   As stated above, this is impermissible.

“The power of a court to manage its dockets and cases by the imposition of sanctions to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases is of ancient origin.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In the Matter of Presnick, 19 Conn.App. 340, 347, 563 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d 833 (1989).  “[T]he Court waives filing fees and costs for indigent individuals in order to promote the interests of justice.   The goal of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests.   Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources, because they are not subject to the financial considerations—filing fees and attorneys fees—that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions.”  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991).

Based upon the court's inherent authority to manage its docket, this court adopts the order of the court in In re Judith Fusari, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 11 5015339.   This court will continue to review Fusari's proposed filings.   If the court deems them to contain frivolous allegations or they obviously fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted, any proposed actions will be rejected by the clerk at the direction of the court and returned to Fusari.   The court will not open a file as an official record within the judicial branch as it has been done in the past.   In the event that the proposed filing is not frivolous and states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court will process the filings in the usual manner.

It is so ordered.

Berger, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The injunction states that the court will review any proposed filing and not open a court file if the court deems the proposed filings frivolous or if the action obviously fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted..  FN1. The injunction states that the court will review any proposed filing and not open a court file if the court deems the proposed filings frivolous or if the action obviously fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

FN2. Insofar as Fusari may be trying to assert causes of action on behalf of her daughter, there are no facts to indicate that her daughter is a minor.   Indeed, Fusari alleges that her daughter was drinking with her two friends in the bar.   Regardless of age, Fusari may not represent her daughter.   See Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn.App. 750, 756–59, 851 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 915, 859 A.2d 568 (2004)..  FN2. Insofar as Fusari may be trying to assert causes of action on behalf of her daughter, there are no facts to indicate that her daughter is a minor.   Indeed, Fusari alleges that her daughter was drinking with her two friends in the bar.   Regardless of age, Fusari may not represent her daughter.   See Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn.App. 750, 756–59, 851 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 915, 859 A.2d 568 (2004).

FN3. Additionally, she is not an attorney in Connecticut and she does not appear, and does not allege, to be one from any other jurisdiction.   Moreover, she seeks to do more than render advice;  she seeks to represent others—something that attorneys in other jurisdictions could not do without local counsel.   See Practice Book § 2–16..  FN3. Additionally, she is not an attorney in Connecticut and she does not appear, and does not allege, to be one from any other jurisdiction.   Moreover, she seeks to do more than render advice;  she seeks to represent others—something that attorneys in other jurisdictions could not do without local counsel.   See Practice Book § 2–16.

FN4. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”.  FN4. Section 52–259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”

Berger, Marshall K., J.