Harry Kollengode v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this case, the plaintiff, Harry Kollengode appealed from the denial of his application for unemployment benefits.   The plaintiff worked for GimaSport in Hartford, CT as a printer until November 11, 2010, when he stopped working.   According to the employer, he did not show up for work after that date, and did not respond to inquiries about his absence, but he did apply for unemployment benefits.   His application for benefits was denied by the unemployment compensation board of review because he failed to attend several scheduled proceedings.   Now, on further appeal to this court, the plaintiff nevertheless argues that he should be found eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.   The defendant has filed a motion for judgment seeking judgment in its favor.   For the following reasons, the court upholds the decision of the board of review.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion for judgment is granted, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

The record discloses the following facts:  The plaintiff worked for GimaSport in Hartford, CT as a printer until November 11, 2010, when he stopped working.   According to the employer, he did not show up for work after that date, and did not respond to inquiries about his absence, but he did apply for unemployment benefits.   By decision dated December 14, 2010, the administrator ruled the plaintiff ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to the employer.   On December 16, 2010, the plaintiff appealed the administrator's decision to the appeals referee.   The referee scheduled a hearing for June 1, 2011, which the employer attended, but the plaintiff did not attend.   By decision dated June 1, 2011, the referee dismissed the appeal because the plaintiff failed to attend the scheduled hearing, and the referee affirmed the denial of benefits.   On June 8, 2011, the plaintiff filed a document which was treated as a timely motion to reopen.   He said that he could not go to the hearing because his new employer would not let him take a day off.   The referee offered to reschedule another hearing by telephone, and asked the plaintiff to suggest a hearing date.   The plaintiff did not respond.   Accordingly, on July 6, 2011, the referee denied the motion to reopen.

Plaintiff appealed to the board of review, and, on August 19, 2011, the board remanded the matter to the referee to conduct a further hearing and to issue a new decision.   The matter was duly scheduled for another hearing for September 7, 2011, in which the employer participated, but the plaintiff did not attend or communicate.   Thereupon, the referee again denied the motion to reopen and reinstated his June 1 decision.

The plaintiff appealed again to the board of review without explanation.   By decision dated October 28, 2011, the board ruled that Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 31–237g–26(b)(1) provides that if the appealing party fails to timely appear at the referee's scheduled hearing, the referee may dismiss the appeal due to the appealing party's failure to prosecute the appeal if there is no error apparent on the face of the record.   The board found that plaintiff did not show good cause for his failing to participate in the hearings, and that the referee did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's appeal for lack of prosecution.   Accordingly, the referee's decision denying benefits was affirmed.   The board also denied a motion to reopen.   The plaintiff thence appealed to this court.

In his court appeal, plaintiff repeats the arguments that he earlier presented, unsuccessfully, to the board and other administrators at the agency in support of his application for benefits.

The court's standard of review in an unemployment compensation appeal is limited.  “To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31–249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review.”  Latina v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159, 733 A.2d 885 (1999), quoting Mattatuck Museum–Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 276, 679 A.2d 347 (1996).   Both the findings of subordinate facts and the reasonable conclusions of fact made by the agency are binding on this court.  Id. Should the issue involve a question of law, however, the court's review responsibility is broader.   The court must determine “whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts.”  Id. While a court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.  Id.

In the present case, the court is bound by the findings of subordinate facts and reasonable conclusions of the board.   The plaintiff never sought to correct the board's factual findings and, thus, he is precluded from attacking the factual findings.   See, Practice Book § 22–4;  JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422–23, 828 A.2d 609 (2003) (court cannot review evidence in record when plaintiff failed to file motion to correct the findings of the board).

The court finds that the board's conclusions were supported by the findings of fact, and are reasonably drawn from those facts.   The court further observes that the plaintiff offers no new grounds for reversal on appeal.   This court finds that the board ruled fairly and within its authority, and it will not reverse that determination.   The case turned on the credibility and persuasiveness of the witnesses.   This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency on those points.   It is generally the province of the agency, as trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence.  Howell v. Administrator, 174 Conn. 529, 532, 391 A.2d 165 (1978).   The agency acted fairly within the scope of its adjudicatory powers.   The board's decision correctly applies the law to the facts found, and it is rational and logical and not unreasonable or arbitrary.   The decision is upheld.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for judgment is granted, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed accordingly.

THE COURT

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge, Superior Court

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.