IN RE: Dillyan C. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Before this court is a termination of parental rights petition filed on August 10, 2010, by the Department of Children and Families [DCF] in the interest of Dillyan C. (d.o.b.4/25/02).   DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of David C., the father of Dillyan C. The parental rights of the mother, Jamie C.-H., were previously terminated on April 20, 2011 by the court (Cofield, J.).   As to David C., the petitioner has alleged the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   David C. appeared for trial via teleconference call pursuant to his counsel's motion for this accommodation which was filed and granted on December 5, 2011.   David C. was represented by counsel throughout the course of the termination of parental rights proceedings.   This court notes that there is no claim of Native American affiliation and thus finds it has jurisdiction over these proceedings.   The court heard and accepted evidence on December 5, and December 6, 2011.   This court also takes judicial notice of the file with respect to the prior orders and findings of the court in this matter, pursuant to the motion for judicial notice filed on December 5, 2011 which was granted by the court on that same date.   See also In re Jeisean M. 270 Conn. 382, 852 A.2d 643 (2004), Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 136 A.2d 497 (1957) and In re David M., 29 Conn.App. 499, 615 A.2d 1082 (1992).

These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a–112 et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991);  Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b), 35a–7.   Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).

If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider disposition and determine whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.   As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both the adjudicatory and the dispositional phases was heard at the same trial.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688–89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Having heard testimony and accepted documentary evidence on the above dates, this court makes the following findings of fact.   In so doing, this court concludes that the petitioner has met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence with respect to the termination of parental rights petition as to David C.

Dillyan C. was born on April 25, 2002.   DCF has had a long history of involvement with his mother, Jamie C.-H. and with Dillyan, since he was two months old.   Eventually, Dillyan was removed from the care of his mother and placed in the care and custody of DCF on September 15, 2006 pursuant to a 96–hour administrative hold and an order of temporary custody [OTC] which was subsequently confirmed on September 19, 2006.   Neglect petitions were simultaneously filed.   At that time, David C. had been residing in Maine with no plan of care at the time for Dillyan.¹

Following a trial held on various dates from June 2007 through October 2007, Dillyan was adjudicated a neglected child on January 9, 2008 and returned to the care of the respondent-father, David C., with an order of protective supervision for six months.

On August 11, 2009, a second neglect petition was filed on behalf of Dillyan.   On November 13, 2009, DCF sought an order of temporary custody, which was granted by the court (Gleeson, J.) and sustained on November 20, 2009.   On February 16, 2010, Dillyan was adjudicated neglected for a second time and committed to DCF. Final specific steps were ordered for David C. at that time.

The presenting issues relating to David C. included homelessness, substance abuse and Dillyan's significant medical needs which were not being adequately addressed while Dillyan was in his father's care.   David C. had been arrested on July 24, 2009 and ultimately convicted on December 9, 2009 for possession of narcotics.   Although David C. had a long history of abusing various substances, including alcohol, marijuana and cocaine, his addiction at that time was to heroin.   In his evaluation in August 2009, he admitted to intravenous use of up to ten or more bags of heroin.   Subsequent to that evaluation, David C. was recommended for treatment, was admitted, and then discharged for non-compliance, a pattern which he repeated several times during the fall of 2009.

During this period, David C. had been homeless and could give DCF only a mailing address.   In November 2009, he moved to Maine and continued to be transient.   When David C. eventually gave DCF his address in Maine, DCF researched available services and advised David C. by phone and mail about the services available to him in Maine.   David C., however, failed to follow through with recommended services in Maine, claiming at trial that those services were available only to Native Americans.   DCF disputes this claim.   Except for his testimony years later before this court, there is no credible evidence that David C. ever alerted DCF or the courts of this alleged reason for his failure to comply with substance abuse evaluation and treatment while in Maine.   Moreover, in the documents submitted by the petitioner, the treatment providers in Maine do not describe their programs as being limited to Native Americans.   This court, therefore, does not credit David C.'s claim, especially in light of his pervasive pattern of failing to follow through with services while here in Connecticut.

David C. returned to Connecticut in April 2010 and for the next few months, repeated his pattern of allowing DCF to refer and schedule substance abuse evaluations on his behalf but failing to cooperate with either the evaluation and/or treatment recommendations that followed.   By the time DCF filed its petition to terminate his parental rights on August 10, 2010, David C. had not completed any substance abuse treatment.

From the fall of 2010 until June 2011, DCF continued with its efforts to refer David C. for substance abuse evaluation and treatment.   During that period of time, David C. again continued his pattern of either cancelling the evaluation, failing to attend or attending and then failing to follow through with treatment recommendations.   In February 2011, he tested positive for opiates and marijuana.   When David C. announced in June 2011 that he was moving back to Maine, DCF again resumed its efforts to refer him to services in Maine, to no avail.

Throughout DCF's involvement, David C. continued to have a nomadic lifestyle, whether he was living in Connecticut or in Maine.   He sometimes lived with friends or family and often provided DCF only with post office box mailing addresses.   He has also been unable to provide DCF with proof of legal income.

While DCF social worker, Jessica Flemati, had the case from November 2009 through February 2010, David C. was entitled to weekly supervised visitation, which was also offered to him after he moved to Maine.   Once he was in Maine, however, David C. requested to visit only every three weeks.   At the same time, David C. was on notice as early as February 2010 how important it was for him to be consistent in visitation.   In a letter, Ms. Flemati advised David C. that “[i]n order to assist in stabilizing Dillyan, he needs consistency and a structured routine.   A necessary component to his routine needs to include visitation with you ․ This is important so Dillyan can be at ease knowing he will be seeing you regularly so he won't worry as much about where you are and what you are doing and when is the next time he will be seeing you again.   These are all very heavy concerns on Dillyan's mind constantly and having a set visitation schedule that Dillyan can rely on and look forward to will assist in alleviating some of Dillyan's stress.”   Notwithstanding DCF's concerns and despite the availability of regular visitation, David C. failed to visit Dillyan at all during this period.   In fact, with some exceptions, this pattern of inconsistent visitation or no visitation at all persisted throughout the case.

DCF social worker, Cynthia Black, was assigned the case in May 2010, and at that time, David C. had not been living in Connecticut, nor had he visited or engaged in any services.   David C. returned to Connecticut and on June 18, 2010, began visiting consistently.   For the most part, David C. was appropriate during those visits.

From September 2010 through June 2011, however, David C. missed one-third of his visits.   In June 2011, David C. moved to Maine again and then completely stopped visiting.   The last time Dillyan saw his father was in July 2011, when the paternal aunt and foster mother, Ellen C., brought Dillyan to Maine for vacation.   By the time this matter was tried to this court, David C. had called Dillyan only twice since June 2011.

Dillyan, who was born on April 25, 2002 with a cleft palate and cleft lip, has never had this condition medically addressed while in the care of his parents.   As a result, his speech can be difficult to understand.   While he has mixed success in getting along with peers, Dillyan also has been the victim of bullying and has had behavioral issues at school.   Dillyan was also exposed to significant violence and substance abuse while in the care of his parents.   In consultation with Dillyan's therapist and given his own observations during his evaluation on October 7, 2011, Dr. Stephen Humphrey, the court-appointed evaluator, diagnosed Dillyan with Adjustment Disorder, with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct.

Since his placement in foster care, Dillyan has had numerous appointments with orthodontists, cranial/facial specialists and dentists in preparation for multiple rounds of surgery to correct his condition.   In addition to medical appointments, Ellen C. brings Dillyan to individual therapy to address mental health and behavioral issues, including those specific to his exposure to trauma, as well as to group sessions to help him get along with peers.   Dillyan also participates in playing baseball, soccer as well as basketball.

In addition to David C.'s abrupt cessation of visitation in June 2011, Dillyan was faced with another challenge in the fall of 2011 when he was moved into a new school, a change necessitated because of the “no-nexus” status triggered by his father's transient lifestyle and the termination of his mother's parental rights.   Although services are in place, these changes have been difficult for Dillyan and he has exhibited many defiant behaviors in the new school.

Dillyan has compromised relationships with his biological parents.   With respect to his mother, Dillyan has no relationship and in the past, has told his mother that she is “dead to him.”   When Dr. Humphrey asked Dillyan about his mother, Dillyan “froze, as if frightened,” a reaction which Dr. Humphrey opined was suggestive of trauma.

Dillyan has experienced feelings of love for his father, especially before June 2011.   The evidence also reveals that when Dillyan has visited with his father, their relationship was warm and affectionate.   Dillyan has said in the past that he would like his father to “finish his homework” so he could return to his father's care.   In October 2011, however, Dr. Humphrey noted that Dillyan described his father as “nice” and that Dillyan appeared comfortable talking about his father, but said they do not have contact.   With his therapist, Mr. Kukolla, Dillyan will “shut down” rather than talk about his father.   As a result, it is unclear how Dillyan is handling his father's most recent absence.   This absence, however, represents the second, significant stretch of time since DCF's removal in November 2009 when David C. precipitously dropped out of Dillyan's life.   This court also notes that when DCF first became involved with Dillyan, he was removed from his mother's care and that David C., who was in Maine at the time, was in no position to assume care and custody of Dillyan.   Unfortunately for Dillyan, David C. has had a long history of being an unreliable parenting figure.

Buffering Dillyan from the persistent vicissitudes of David C.'s life is his network of nurturing relatives.   From September 2009 through November 2009, Dillyan was informally in the care of his paternal aunt and uncle, Renee and Gary C. When DCF received an order of temporary custody, Renee and Gary C. were subsequently licensed as relative foster parents so that Dillyan could remain in their care.   Dillyan has loving relationships with his paternal aunt and uncle, Renee and Gary C., and continues to have their support, although they were unable to adopt him.

In August 2010, Dillyan was placed with his other paternal aunt, Ellen C., who is committed to adopting Dillyan.   Dillyan enjoys an exceptionally warm and nurturing relationship with Ellen C. Ellen C. has a profoundly deep and authentic connection to Dillyan and he has the same relationship with her.   According to Daniela Siluzio, his therapist at Wheeler Clinic, Dillyan and Ellen C. are “a perfect match.”   Dillyan, who had some difficulties even with his aunt, Renee C., has virtually no significant behavioral issues which Ellen C. cannot effectively address.   This court was struck by the degree to which Ellen C. truly enjoys Dillyan, whom she describes as very bright, articulate, funny and warm.   In his evaluation, Dr. Humphrey described Dillyan as remarkably well adjusted and engaging.   Ms. Siluzio described Dillyan similarly and said he was charismatic, and a very caring, loving boy who has come a long way since she first met him.

III. ADJUDICATION

A. REASONABLE EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[The] court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2005) See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).   Moreover, “such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).

“The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 48.   Although “[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ․ defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).   The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made.  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.

“Our case law similarly recognizes that time is critically important for children.   Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․” In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).”  Id.

In this case, DCF has alleged that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify Dillyan with David C. and in the alternative, that David C. has been unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   This court finds that as of the adjudicatory date of August 10, 2010, DCF has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence.   The record is replete with evidence that the petitioner has made reasonable efforts to refer David C. to services for substance abuse evaluation and treatment.   The pattern throughout the years of DCF's involvement is that David C. is referred for substance abuse evaluation, which he may or may not attend, and/or which he cancels and/or reschedules.   On some of those occasions, David C. began treatment sessions, and then stopped attending and was discharged.   When David C. moved to Maine in November 2009, he also stopped visiting, even though he was offered weekly visitation.   Because he moved to Maine and was three hours away, David C. indicated that he could only visit every three weeks, however, David C. failed to visit at all.   David C.'s obligations to parent Dillyan responsibly and to work toward reunification are not mitigated by his move to Maine, but his choice to move to Maine, ostensibly to find employment, is an additional obstacle to reunification which David C. has imposed upon himself.   David C. has not credibly addressed his failure to visit or keep in touch with Dillyan or DCF;  he has not followed through with substance abuse services either in Maine or Connecticut;  and, he has not had a stable home or employment either in Maine or Connecticut.   For all of these reasons, this court finds that DCF has met its burden of proving that it has made reasonable efforts and that David C. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

B. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

“General Statutes § 17a–112(j) provides in relevant part, that the court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights ‘if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (B) the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․’ ‘Personal rehabilitation,’ as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jordon T., 119 Conn.App. 748 (2010) citing In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved his ability to manage his life, but rather whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.   In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 157, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).  “[I]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the caselaw interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to David C. Dillyan was found to be a neglected child on February 16, 2010.   This court reiterates its findings that David C., both before and after the adjudicatory date, was repeatedly referred for services for substance abuse evaluation and treatment throughout the course of DCF's involvement and he was offered weekly visitation with Dillyan.   David C. has consistently failed to follow through with substance abuse treatment services and has had no period of sustained treatment.   In his testimony before this court, David C. also admitted that his long-term girlfriend and current wife was arrested for possession of narcotics on March 7, 2011 while in Maine.   He denies, however, that her criminal case is still pending and claims that the case was dropped because she was merely the driver, suggesting that a passenger in her car possessed the narcotics instead.   At the same time, David C. also testified that his desire to raise Dillyan in Maine is motivated by his perception that there is no violence or drugs and that it is “a better place to raise your children all around.”   Given David C.'s own positive screen for opiates and marijuana in February 2011 and his wife's activities, this court cannot trust David C.'s choices and associations, irrespective of where he lives.

David C. has had brief periods of consistency in his visitation with Dillyan and has had periods of no visitation at all and virtually no contact with Dillyan.   David C. claims that he has had an apartment as of September 2011, although he did not inform DCF of this development until November 2011, shortly before the commencement of trial.   If this is in fact true, David C.'s failure to visit and to call Dillyan more than twice since June 2011 to December 2011 is inexplicable in light of David C.'s avowed desire to reunify with Dillyan.

This court concludes as a result, that while he may love his son, David C.'s failure to act responsibly and consistently, especially with respect to substance abuse treatment, visitation and contact, demonstrates ambivalence in his desire to actually raise Dillyan.   Given the demanding nature of Dillyan's medical needs, as well as the services he requires for past trauma and behavioral issues, Dillyan needs a parent who is able and committed to caring for him.   Although Dillyan is doing remarkably well in the care of Ellen C., he is struggling at school with behavioral issues and as the victim of bullying.   The surgery that he requires is a complicated series of procedures and he will undoubtedly need significant support throughout the process of surgery, recovery and healing.   Dillyan needs a parent who is fully engaged, advocating for all of his needs, and is physically and emotionally present for him.   This court concludes that given all of the above findings, in light of Dillyan's age and need for consistent care, David C. is unable to rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time.

IV. DISPOSITION

This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of Dillyan that the rights of David C. be terminated.   As the above findings reveal, Dillyan has flourished in the care of Ellen C. who wishes to adopt him.   This court finds that Dillyan's need for permanency and consistent, devoted care-giving far outweighs whatever feelings he may continue to have for his father.

The court is struck by the nurturing quality of Dillyan's relationship with Ellen C. Under General Statutes § 17a–112(j), the definition of “on-going parent-child relationship” ․ “is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as the result of a parent having met, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child.”   General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  While David C. has had, at best, a warm, but sporadic and inconsistent, visiting relationship with his son, it is Ellen C. who has met Dillyan's physical, emotional, moral and educational needs on a continuing, day-to-day basis for well over a year.   David C. has met none of the child's needs for over two years.   Ellen C., as a result, has developed with Dillyan the parent-child relationship that he desperately requires and which both parents have failed to do.

It is probably inevitable and not necessarily inconsistent with Dillyan's best interest that David C. will have contact with Dillyan by virtue of Dillyan's placement with his paternal aunt.   Indeed, and fortunately for Dillyan, there is no credible evidence that Ellen C. has a hostile relationship with her brother.   In fact, Ellen C. facilitated the last face-to-face contact Dillyan had with his father in July 2011 after David C., on his own initiative, stopped visiting.

If the adoptive parent, presumably Ellen C. in this case, deems that contact with David C. may be appropriate in the future, termination of parental rights and adoption ensures that she will be able to make that decision freely and without intervention by a state agency, the courts or David C., who, in the absence of termination, would retain the residual legal right to challenge the nature and extent of contact or custody.   While termination of parental rights does not negate David C.'s status as biological father, which Ellen C. is free to recognize and support, it does divest David C. of all parental rights and responsibilities, which he has effectively abandoned himself by failing to exercise them.   David C. may love Dillyan, but he has not been there for Dillyan;  his absence and inconsistency should not be added to Dillyan's already significant array of concerns.

Termination also assures that Dillyan will be able to realize his desire to stay with Ellen C. “forever.”   By taking the legal step of adoption, Ellen C. will be able to demonstrate to Dillyan that she loves him enough to make that commitment, and that no matter what, she will stand by him forever.   Given that his cleft lip and palate condition makes him particularly susceptible to bullying and painful peer relationships, Dillyan's need to have the security Ellen C. offers is invaluable.   In this court's view, adoption affords Dillyan this ultimate security that all children deserve and need in order to thrive.

In arriving at this conclusion, the court also considers the seven factors outlined in General Statutes § 17a–112(k) as to David C. The court notes, however, that under In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863 (2000), the seven factors set forth in § (e) serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

The court reiterates its findings that DCF has consistently provided services for substance abuse evaluation and treatment as well as visitation to assist in reunification, even when David C. made the unilateral decision to move to Maine, making the reunification process even more difficult.

2. Finding regarding whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended

The court finds that based on the above findings, DCF has also made reasonable efforts to reunite David C. with Dillyan, even attempting to refer David C. to services each time he moved to Maine.

3. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

David C. was subject to specific steps which outlined his responsibilities in order to reunify with Dillyan.   David C. failed to comply with nearly all of the steps identified on November 20, 2009.

4. Findings regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to their parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties

Dillyan has feelings and emotional ties with his father, although it is unclear how Dillyan currently feels as a result of David C.'s absence from Dillyan's life since June 2011.   Dillyan has a warm and nurturing, parent-child relationship with Ellen C., his paternal aunt, who is willing to adopt him.

5. Finding regarding the age of the child

Dillyan was born on April 25, 2002 and is nearly ten years old.

6. Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to:  (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

The court finds that David C. has failed to maintain regular contact with Dillyan or with DCF;  he is inconsistent in his interest;  and he has played virtually no role in supporting either DCF or Ellen C. in ensuring that his son's emotional, physical, medical, psychological, financial and educational needs are met.   David C has ignored and neglected his responsibility for Dillyan.

7. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

David C. has not been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Dillyan by the unreasonable act or conduct of any parent or other person or by his economic circumstances.   He has been offered a full opportunity to visit Dillyan every week and there is no indication that he has been limited in his ability to call Dillyan.

In accordance with the best interests of the child pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of David C. as to Dillyan is in his best interests.

It is accordingly ORDERED that the parental rights of David C. are hereby TERMINATED as to Dillyan C. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed statutory parent.   The agency is directed to facilitate the adoption of Dillyan C. as expeditiously as possible.   The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of Dillyan shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, New Britain, of the date on which the adoption is finalized.

A case plan shall be submitted within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment, and further reports shall be timely presented to this court as required by law.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

ELGO, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. David C. and Jamie C.-H. had a violent relationship at the time of Dillyan's birth, but shortly thereafter, their relationship ended and each became involved with different individuals in subsequent years..  FN1. David C. and Jamie C.-H. had a violent relationship at the time of Dillyan's birth, but shortly thereafter, their relationship ended and each became involved with different individuals in subsequent years.

Elgo, Nina F., J.