Thomas Kane v. Metlife and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS

The Plaintiff, Thomas Kane, brings this action in two counts against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and MetLife (hereinafter Metropolitan), and Quest Diagnostics, Inc. and Quest Diagnostics, LLC (hereinafter Quest).

Count One, as against all Defendants is a negligence claim, while Count Two concerns a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

In 2009, the Plaintiff, Thomas Kane, applied for a life insurance policy from Metropolitan.   According to his complaint, Metropolitan directed Thomas Kane to undergo a urine test, utilizing the services of Quest.

The Plaintiff alleges that Quest failed to perform the test with reasonable care and diligence, and that an erroneous lab report was issued.   The lab report by Quest, according to the Plaintiff, incorrectly noted the presence of a methamphetamine in the urine.

It is alleged that Metropolitan, as a result of the report, refused to issue a life insurance policy to Thomas Kane.

The Plaintiff claims that he made repeated requests to both Metropolitan and Quest to correct the inaccurate report, but that no action was taken until January of 2010, when Quest admitted the error.

The Plaintiff claims that he sustained damages as a result of the error, coupled with the failure of either Defendant to correct the error.   He claims to have sustained damages, “ ․ including but not limited to headaches, stomach aches, estrangement from his family, and severe emotional distress.”

The Defendant, Metropolitan, has moved to strike the Plaintiff's complaint, as to the allegations of both negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.   Metropolitan claims that Quest was acting at all times as an independent contractor, and that one who engages an independent contractor cannot direct or control the manner in which the independent contractor carries out its tasks.

It claims that it owed no duty to the Plaintiff, notwithstanding his allegation that Quest was acting as the “agent” of Metropolitan, when the test was performed, and the inaccurate report was generated.

MOTION TO STRIKE—STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to strike, filed pursuant to § 10–39 of the Connecticut Practice Book, is designed to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading, Faulkner v. United Technologies, 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997);  Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 190 Conn. 528, 530 (1983).   The motion assumes all well pleaded facts to be true, and if the facts as deemed proven in the complaint would support a cause of action, then the motion to strike must be denied.  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2000).

In ruling upon a motion to strike, a court's inquiry is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.  King v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 90, 93 (1985);  Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285–86 (1982).   All facts alleged must be construed in the manner most favorable to sustaining the complaint.  Novametric Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215 (1992).   The allegations should be construed broadly, rather than in a narrow hypertechnical manner.  Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347 (2006).

Although the motion to strike assumes all well pleaded facts, it does not admit legal conclusions, or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.  Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392, 394 (1998);  Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 545 (1980).

COUNT ONE SETS FORTH A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST METROPOLITAN

In Count One, the Plaintiff maintains that Metropolitan is vicariously liable for the actions of Quest, because Quest was its “agent,” when performing the test, and reporting the results.

He claims that Metropolitan directed him to undergo the urine test, and that he was directed to utilize the services of Quest laboratories.   He further alleges that both Quest and Metropolitan refused to correct the inaccurate results, despite repeated requests from the Plaintiff.

The Defendant, Metropolitan, correctly argues that if Quest is determined to be an independent contractor, Metropolitan cannot be subject to vicarious liability for Quest's negligence.   One who employs an independent contractor, and exercises no control over the manner in which the assigned task is performed, is not liable for the negligence of the independent contractor.   Gazo v. Stamford, 256 Conn. 245, 256 (2001);  Douglas v. Peck & Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 627 (1918);  Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn.App. 660, 663–64 (1988).

However, Thomas Kane does not maintain that Quest was either an employee of Metropolitan, or an independent contractor.   Instead, he contends that Quest was the agent of Metropolitan.

An agent is ordinarily defined as a person who undertakes to transact some business or to manage some affairs for another, pursuant to the authority given by the principal.  State v. Boreno, 156 Conn. 233, 214 (1968).   An agency relationship exists only if there has been a manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent may act on his or her account, and if there has been consent by the agent to so act.   Restatement (Second) Agency S.1. Agency is a fiduciary relationship resulting from the manifestation of one person to another that the other shall act on his or her behalf, and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act.  Long v. Schull, 184 Conn. 252, 256 (1984).

Whether a person is an agent, and whether, as an agent, his or her actions are within the scope of the authority granted, are questions of fact.   Botticello v. Stefanovicz, 177 Conn. 22, 26 (1979).

The Plaintiff, Thomas Kane faces a titanic challenge, in order to prove the elements of an agency relationship, based upon the allegations in his complaint.

However, although Count One may not survive a motion for summary judgment and the discovery process, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that no agency relationship existed between Metropolitan and Quest.   Construing all facts, as alleged, most favorably to the Plaintiff, the motion to strike Count One must be denied.

ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE PROPERLY PLED

In Count Two, Thomas Kane alleges a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress as against the Defendant, Metropolitan.

In order to set forth a valid claim for emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege:  1) the conduct of the Defendant created an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress, 2) the Plaintiff's distress was foreseeable, 3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm, and 4) the Defendant's conduct was the cause of the distress.  Carroll v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444 (2003).   There must be a breach of a duty owed by the defendant, to the plaintiff.  Gomes v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 258 Conn. 603, 519 (2001).

The Plaintiff claims that one or both of the Defendants refused to correct the erroneous test results, following his numerous requests.

Furthermore, he claims that Metropolitan was indifferent to his repeated pleas, and that damage was incurred as a result.

An examination of the Plaintiff's complaint reveals that each of the elements have been alleged.   While Count Two may also fail, if subjected to discovery, and the standard of review applicable to a motion for summary judgment, the motion to strike must be denied.

CONCLUSION

The motion to strike Count One is DENIED.

The motion to strike Count Two is DENIED.

RADCLIFFE, J.

Radcliffe, Dale W., J.