Edward Monsees v. Leonard Peta et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 110)

FACTS

The plaintiffs, Jackson and Avery Porter, by and through their parent and next friend Edward Monsees, and Edward Monsees individually, filed a twelve-count complaint on August 2, 2010, alleging the following facts.   Jackson Porter was born on December 27, 2004, and Avery Porter was born on August 7, 2007.   The defendants, Leonard and Nancy Peta, owned the property known as 11 Broadway in Stonington (the property), which was built in the nineteenth century.   The plaintiffs rented the property from the defendants from October 1, 2005, to September 10, 2008, “based upon Leonard Peta's representation and assurance [that] the property was in a fit and habitable condition,” and that the property was “safe” for a family with a child under the age of six.

While the plaintiffs resided at the property, the defendants contracted for Edward Monsees to renovate and repair the interior of the property, which involved “planing, sanding, and scraping of interior surfaces and paint ․” “Edward Monsees reported to Leonard Peta his personal concerns as to structural, environmental and sanitary conditions found on the property and asked whether there was a lead paint hazard to his children present on the property, but Leonard Peta represented in each response that there was no such lead paint hazard.”  “[T]he interior and exterior of [the] apartment and/or dwelling was covered with lead-based paint which was a hazardous substance and/or pollutant, some or all of which was cracked, chipped, blistered, flaking loose, peeling or chalking and thereby was being released into the environment of said apartment.”   Finally, the defendants failed to properly inspect the property for toxic levels of lead-based paint before or during the plaintiffs' occupancy of the property.   The plaintiffs' contact with lead, and the defendants' violation of certain state and federal statutes and regulations caused numerous injuries to the plaintiffs, including elevated blood lead levels in Jackson and Avery Porter.

The complaint alleges “statutory violation[s]” in counts one and two, “statutory liability” in count three;  negligence in counts four through six;  recklessness in counts seven through nine;  and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq., in counts ten through twelve.   On December 20, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts one through three, seven through nine, and ten through twelve, and certain prayers for relief, with a memorandum of law in support.¹  The plaintiffs filed an objection and a memorandum in opposition on November 2, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

Counts One through Three

In counts one and two, labeled “statutory violation,” and count three, labeled “statutory liability,” the plaintiffs allege that they were injured by the defendants' violation of several state and federal statutes and regulations.   The defendants move to strike on the ground that none of the statutes and regulations cited in the first three counts provide a private right of action in this court.   They also argue that the plaintiffs have failed to reference specific subsections of statutes that permit private causes of action.   The plaintiffs concede that the statutes do not provide for causes of action under strict liability, but they counter that they have alleged sufficiently negligence per se in the first three counts.   The defendants did not file a reply to the plaintiffs' objection, and they make no argument regarding the sufficiency of counts one through three as claims for negligence per se.   At short calendar, the defendants responded that the court should strike counts one through three because the plaintiffs failed to plead those counts as negligence per se claims.   Additionally, the defendants argued that if counts one through three state negligence per se claims, they should be stricken because they are repetitive of counts four through six.²

The parties' arguments require the court to interpret the plaintiffs' complaint.  “The interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court ․ In addition, [t]he allegations of the complaint must be given such reasonable construction as will give effect to [it] in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties ․ It is axiomatic that the parties are bound by their pleadings.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn.App. 379, 381, 726 A.2d 1164 (1999).

First, the court notes that even if the defendants are not strictly liable under the statutes cited by the plaintiffs, “the presence of lead paint in violation of [General Statutes] §§ 47a–8 and 47a–54f constitutes negligence per se ․” Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 372 & n.13, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995).   Although § 47a–8 has since been repealed;  id., 391–92;  the plaintiffs allege violations of §§ 47a–7 and 47a–54f, which can constitute negligence per se.   Mendez v. Rojas, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV 98 0166419 (January 24, 2000, Lager, J.) (denying motion to strike).

At short calendar, the defendants responded to the plaintiffs' negligence per se argument, asserting that counts one through three are legally insufficient because the plaintiffs failed to plead those counts as negligence per se claims.   It is well established that “[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.   Our Appellate Court has noted, in the context of a motion to strike, that “[t]he name the plaintiff chooses to attach to [the] cause of action is irrelevant ․” Pickering v. Aspen Dental Management, Inc., 100 Conn.App. 793, 799, 919 A.2d 520 (2007).   Consistent with that authority, the Superior Court has denied motions to strike when defendants argue that counts were incorrectly labeled.   See, e.g., Lattanzio v. WVIT NBC–30, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 5000082 (May 15, 2007, Martin, J.);   Stavola v. Costa, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 03 0350462 (January 18, 2005, Moraghan, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 530, 532).

Accordingly, it is irrelevant to the sufficiency of the complaint that the plaintiffs labeled counts one through three “statutory violation” or “statutory liability” without explicitly stating that they intended to allege negligence per se.   Accordingly, the court rejects the defendants' argument that the first three counts are insufficient because they were not pleaded as negligence per se claims.

Next, the defendants argue that if the first three counts state claims for negligence per se, they should be stricken because they are repetitive of counts four through six.   In counts four through six, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants were negligent in several ways, including their violation of the same statutes and regulations cited in counts one through three.

The Supreme Court has held that “the proper way to cure any confusion [regarding the complaint] is to file a [request] to revise, not a motion to strike ․” Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 279, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988).³  “While [t]here is no explicit appellate authority on the issue of the proper vehicle for the elimination of duplicative claims ․ a majority of the Superior Court decisions dealing with this dilemma have held that [a] request to revise, and not a motion to strike, is the proper procedural device for deletion of duplicative pleadings.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Vanstean–Holland v. La Vigne, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 08 5007959 (September 2, 2009, Martin, J.) see also Downing v. Yale University Health Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 94 0364862 (December 26, 1995, Zoarski, J.) (listing cases that reached the same conclusion).   But see Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 03 0348578 (January 10, 2005, Downey, J.) (striking “counts 4 and 5 as being unnecessarily duplicative of counts 2 and 3”), aff'd on other grounds, 285 Conn. 381, 941 A.2d 868 (2008).   The majority view is supported by Practice Book § 10–35, which provides in relevant part:  “Whenever any party desires to obtain ․ the deletion of any ․ repetitious ․ or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party's pleading ․ the party desiring any such amendment in an adverse party's pleading may file a timely request to revise that pleading.”

This court remains with the majority of superior courts in finding that a request to revise, not a motion to strike, is the proper procedural device for the deletion of duplicative pleadings.   Accordingly, the court declines to strike counts one through three as duplicative of counts four through six.

For these reasons, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike counts one through three.

Counts Seven through Nine:  Recklessness

The defendants move to strike counts seven, eight and nine on the ground that they are legally insufficient to support recklessness claims.   Specifically, the allegations do not demonstrate the extreme departure from ordinary care required for a recklessness claim.   Further, the defendants argue that the counts are insufficient because “the plaintiffs have merely repeated their negligence claims and relied upon alleged statutory and regulatory violations.” ⁴

The plaintiffs respond that they have alleged the conduct and state of mind required for a recklessness claim.   Specifically, the alleged conduct rises to recklessness because the property contained cracked, blistered, loose, peeling, chipping or flaking lead paint, the defendants were aware that Edward Monsees' young son and his then-pregnant wife resided in the rented property, and that Edward Monsees was removing the lead-based paint at the defendants' request.

The Supreme Court has adopted the following standard to determine whether allegations rise to recklessness:  “To determine whether the ․ complaint states a cause of action sounding in recklessness, we look first to the definitions of wilful, wanton and reckless behavior.   Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts ․ It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ․ The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct.   But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ․ Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ․ It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ․

“While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.   The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ․ It is at least clear ․ that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342–43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).

“Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ․ than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rubel v. Wainwright, 86 Conn.App. 728, 740–41, 862 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 919, 871 A.2d 1028 (2005).  “One is guilty of reckless misconduct when knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable [person] to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Craig v. Driscoll, 64 Conn.App. 699, 721, 781 A.2d 440 (2001), aff'd, supra, 262 Conn. 312.

The Superior Court has applied this standard to factually similar recklessness actions by tenants against landlords.   In Roache v. Rogers, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 98 0354114 (July 26, 1999, Skolnick, J.), the court denied the defendants' motion to strike when the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were warned of the dangerous condition, allowed it to exist “for a long period of time,” and “had a duty to maintain the property in a safe condition pursuant to the rental agreement and General Statutes § 47a–7(a).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   The court found that “[a]s the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the defective plumbing created a high risk of harm, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for recklessness.”   Id.

In Cruz v. Tosado, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 93 0531845 (May 22, 1995, Hennessey, J.) (14 Conn. L. Rptr. 272), the court denied a motion to strike a recklessness count when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had notice of a lead paint danger and failed to take steps to prevent exposure to lead paint.   In Clausell v. McEwen, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5008811 (August 7, 2007, Rittenband, J.), the court denied a motion to strike because the following allegation turned negligence allegations into a recklessness claim:  The defendant “concealed the dangerous defect, lead paint, from the plaintiffs, when he knew or had reason to know of the danger.”

In addition to the allegations recited above, the plaintiffs allege in counts seven, eight and nine that the defendants were reckless in the following ways.   The defendants “recklessly misrepresented” that the property was safe for renovation and repair, and that the defendants “knew or should have known that the plaintiffs] would rely upon [the defendants'] misrepresentation[s] to their detriment.”   The defendants “knew or should have known of the presence of lead-based and/or lead-containing paint or other lead-containing materials throughout” the property.   The defendants “failed to abate, contain, remove or dispose” the lead-based paint, and “concealed from the plaintiffs” that lead-based paint was present on the property.

Construing the allegations in favor of legal sufficiency, the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the defendants had the state of mind required for recklessness because they knew facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the plaintiffs were in danger of exposure to lead poisoning.   The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants committed highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, when the high degree of danger was apparent to them.

The defendants also argue that the allegations do not amount to recklessness because the plaintiffs “have merely repeated their negligence claims and relied upon alleged statutory and regulatory violations.”

In support, the defendants cite Alvarado v. Pavani Painting, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 09 5027658 (July 1, 2010, Tobin, J.).   That case is distinguishable from the present case.   The court in Alvarado struck the plaintiffs' recklessness count because “[t]he only allegations of recklessness [were] those of reckless disregard of unspecified Connecticut and Federal statutes.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. Here, the plaintiffs in their complaint specified the statutes and regulations that the defendants allegedly violated, the plaintiffs do not rely solely upon statutory violations, and, as stated above, the plaintiffs allege specific facts amounting to recklessness.

Contrary to the defendants' argument, our Supreme Court has held that a recklessness claim is not necessarily insufficient when it mirrors that party's negligence claim.   In Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. 341, the Supreme Court explained:  “The defendants ․ contend that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action for reckless infliction of emotional distress on a bystander.   Essentially, they contend that, because the plaintiffs use the same language to allege negligent and reckless conduct, the allegations are insufficient.   We disagree.”   The Court added:  “The defendants are mired in the fact that, aside from the addition of the words ‘willful, wanton and/or reckless actions,’ the plaintiffs' allegations in their reckless counts mirror their assertions in the counts charging the defendants with negligence.   Although there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted.”   Id., 343.  “We recognize that the allegations in the counts alleging the negligent and reckless infliction of bystander emotional distress essentially mirror one another.   Rather than adopting the defendants' conclusion that the allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action for recklessness, however, we suggest that the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence were overinclusive.”   Id., 343 n.22.

The Superior Court has followed the Supreme Court's precedent.  “[W]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Stepkoski v. City Carting, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV 09 5010522 (February 2, 2010, Brazzel–Massaro, J.);   see also Canny v. Mototown Properties USA, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 09 5026298 (February 5, 2010, Prescott, J.) (“[t]he recklessness counts are not insufficient because they incorporate the negligence allegations, since the language, and what may be implied therefrom, and organization of the amended complaint is clear enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and recklessness are being asserted”).   Accordingly, the court declines to strike the recklessness counts on the basis that they are duplicative of the negligence counts, because such duplication does not render the recklessness counts insufficient.

The plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to state claims for recklessness in counts seven through nine.   They use sufficiently clear language to inform the court and the defendants that they are alleging recklessness.   Accordingly, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike counts seven, eight and nine.

Counts Ten through Twelve:  CUTPA

The defendants raise two reasons why the court should strike the plaintiffs' CUTPA claims in counts ten, eleven and twelve.   First, the defendants argue that CUTPA provides a remedy for “unjustified consumer injury rather than a personal injury based upon negligence.”   The plaintiffs respond that CUTPA is a broad remedial statute that provides redress for any person subjected to unfair or deceptive practices in any trade or commerce, including violations of landlord-tenant statutes.   The plaintiffs also argue that CUTPA protects them from their landlords' violation of statutes that establish a public policy against hazardous lead exposure.

The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that CUTPA requires a consumer injury.  “[W]e previously have stated in no uncertain terms that CUTPA imposes no requirement of a consumer relationship.   In McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 473 A.2d 1185 (1984), we concluded that CUTPA is not limited to conduct involving consumer injury and that a competitor or other business person can maintain a CUTPA cause of action without showing consumer injury.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 643, 804 A.2d 180 (2002).

CUTPA provides, at General Statutes § 42–110b(a):  “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”  Section 42–110a(4) defines “[t]rade” and “commerce” as “the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state.”

Further, “[i]n Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 491, 464 A.2d 847 (1983), our Supreme Court held that a landlord may be liable under CUTPA for a violation of the statutes governing landlords and tenants.   Notably, in all of the cases holding a landlord liable for such a regulatory violation, the plaintiff has been a tenant of the premises on which the CUTPA claim was based.”  Pinette v. McLaughlin, 96 Conn.App. 769, 777, 901 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 929, 909 A.2d 958 (2006).   The allegations in counts ten through twelve, including the defendants' alleged agreements with Edward Monsees for the rental, renovation and repair of the property, therefore, fit within CUTPA.

Second, the defendants argue that CUTPA does not provide a remedy for “mere negligence,” and that the plaintiffs fail to plead additional facts to establish the defendants' unethical, unscrupulous, wilful or reckless behavior.   The plaintiffs respond that the defendants' alleged statutory violations and “affirmative representations” regarding lead bring their claims within CUTPA.

The defendants' argument is misplaced.   The Supreme Court provided in A–G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 217, 579 A.2d 69 (1990), that plaintiffs need only plead such additional facts “when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence.”  (Emphasis added.)   In A–G Foods, and in one case cited by the defendants, Kawanobe v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5004343 (June 23, 2009, Fischer, J.), the plaintiffs' CUTPA claims failed because they were based only on negligence.   In Cappellino v. People's United Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 6002124 (October 13, 2010, Pittman, J.), cited by the defendants, the court granted a motion to strike a CUTPA claim because it was based only upon negligence and breach of contract.   In Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn.App. 767, 788, 720 A.2d 242 (1998), the Appellate Court approved the plaintiffs' recovery under CUTPA because its claim was based not only on negligence, but also on breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.

Here, unlike the plaintiffs in A–G Foods, Cappellino and Kawanobe, and like the plaintiff in Thames River Recycling, the plaintiffs' CUTPA claims are not based solely upon negligence or breach of contract.   They are based upon the defendants' alleged recklessness.⁵  Therefore, the court rejects the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs must plead additional facts to show unethical, unscrupulous, willful or reckless behavior.

Accordingly, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike counts ten through twelve and the accompanying prayers for relief.

Prayers for Relief

The defendants move to strike the plaintiffs' prayers for punitive damages and attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(3).   The defendants state that the plaintiffs “are not entitled to claim relief under a statute they have not referenced in their [c]omplaint.”   In their prayers for relief as to counts one, two and three, the plaintiffs cite 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(3).

Practice Book § 10–42(a) provides:  “Each motion to strike must be accompanied by an appropriate memorandum of law citing the legal authorities upon which the motion relies.”   Further, the Supreme Court has stated that “we are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief ․ Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly ․ Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned ․ These same principles apply to claims raised in the trial court.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).

The defendants have neither cited legal authority nor adequately briefed the issue of why the prayer for relief is insufficient in this case.   Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants abandoned the issue.   Moreover, as noted by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have cited 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(3) in their complaint.   Accordingly, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike the prayers for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(3).⁶

The defendants also move to strike the plaintiffs' prayers for exemplary damages, punitive damages and attorneys fees as to counts seven through twelve, on the ground that counts seven through twelve of the complaint are legally insufficient.   Because counts seven through nine are sufficient to plead recklessness, and counts ten through twelve are sufficient to plead CUTPA violations, the defendants' motion to strike the corresponding prayers for relief is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' motion to strike is denied.

Martin, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Each count is brought by a single plaintiff against both defendants.   For example, count one is brought by Jackson Porter, count two by Avery Porter and count three by Edward Monsees..  FN1. Each count is brought by a single plaintiff against both defendants.   For example, count one is brought by Jackson Porter, count two by Avery Porter and count three by Edward Monsees.

FN2. Practice Book § 10–41 requires a party moving to strike to “distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each ․ claimed insufficiency.”   Furthermore, our Supreme Court requires that “grounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).   Accordingly, the court will restrict its analysis to whether counts one through three are legally insufficient for the reasons asserted by the defendants.   The court will not address whether counts one through three are legally sufficient to state negligence per se claims, as the defendants have not raised that issue in their motion to strike..  FN2. Practice Book § 10–41 requires a party moving to strike to “distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each ․ claimed insufficiency.”   Furthermore, our Supreme Court requires that “grounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).   Accordingly, the court will restrict its analysis to whether counts one through three are legally insufficient for the reasons asserted by the defendants.   The court will not address whether counts one through three are legally sufficient to state negligence per se claims, as the defendants have not raised that issue in their motion to strike.

FN3. This rule applies even after the court sustains an objection to the defendants' request to revise.   See Rowe v. Godou, supra, 279 n.9. Moreover, the defendants did not raise the issue of duplicative claims in their request to revise..  FN3. This rule applies even after the court sustains an objection to the defendants' request to revise.   See Rowe v. Godou, supra, 279 n.9. Moreover, the defendants did not raise the issue of duplicative claims in their request to revise.

FN4. The defendants also argue that the statutes and regulations cited by the plaintiffs cannot provide for statutory recklessness causes of action because they do not provide for private causes of action.   The court need not decide that issue because the plaintiffs allege sufficiently an action in common-law recklessness in counts seven through nine..  FN4. The defendants also argue that the statutes and regulations cited by the plaintiffs cannot provide for statutory recklessness causes of action because they do not provide for private causes of action.   The court need not decide that issue because the plaintiffs allege sufficiently an action in common-law recklessness in counts seven through nine.

FN5. In paragraph thirty-one of each CUTPA count, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' actions “were done with reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs herein.”.  FN5. In paragraph thirty-one of each CUTPA count, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' actions “were done with reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs herein.”

FN6. The court will not address the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for interest because the plaintiffs have withdrawn that prayer for relief..  FN6. The court will not address the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for interest because the plaintiffs have withdrawn that prayer for relief.

Martin, Robert A., J.