Jennifer Chappel Wheat et al. v. The Stamford Hospital (2012)

Memorandum of Decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reargue (No. 130), the Granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 119), and the Denial of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 123).

This is a probate appeal directed to a Decree of the Probate Court for the District of Stamford denying the motion of the plaintiff's Executors of the Estate of Mary Chappel Wheat, Deceased, for summary dismissal of two claims presented to the executors by the defendant Stamford Hospital for two hospital admissions of the decedent, and rejected by the executors.   The combined total of the claims is $179,136.64.   Each party moved for summary judgment.   By Memorandum of Decision of October 19, 2011 (No. 128) this court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, thereby upholding the underlying decree of the Probate Court, which declined summary dismissal of the hospital's two claims and scheduled them to be heard by a committee appointed pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 45a–123.   Now before the court is plaintiff's motion for reargument pursuant to Practice Book § 11–12.   The procedural/factual background is set forth in detail in the court's previous memorandum of decision.

“The purpose of a reargument ․ is to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which could have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts.”  Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn.App. 194, 202 (1995).   The plaintiff's motion fails to make any showing that would be grounds for reargument under those criteria.

Discussion

The motion now before the court raises two issues:  that the effect of the court's decision was:  (A) that plaintiffs were not given protection from liability as provided by statute [citing Conn. Gen.Stat. § 45a–363(b) ];  and (B) that plaintiffs were not given the benefit of Connecticut's public policy of prompt administration of decedent's estates [citing Conn. Gen.Stat. § 45a–375(c) ].

These arguments will each be addressed.

A. Section 45a–363(b)

Section 45a–363(b) provides, in part:

Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a–364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as not been rejected.

Section 45a–364 (referenced in § 45a–363(b)), provides, in subsection (a):

Whenever a claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in section 45a–360, the person whose claim is rejected may, within thirty days from and including the date of such rejection, make application to the Court of Probate to hear and decide such claim or, in the alternative, may apply to said court for the appointment of one or more disinterested persons ․ to be a commissioner or commissioners to hear and decide such claim.

The following facts are undisputed:  Mrs. Wheat died on February 10, 2007.   The Stamford Probate Court admitted her will to probate and appointed her son the plaintiff Clayton Wheat as the executor of her estate on October 27, 2012.   Notice to creditors was published on November 11, 2007.   The defendant Stamford Hospital appeared by counsel in the probate court and presented its claims on December 10, 2007.   The executor rejected the hospital's claims by a filing of April 11, 2008 and an amended filing of May 17, 2008.   On May 14, 2008 the executor filed in the Probate Court an Application/Declaration on Insolvent Estate, claiming that the Estate was insolvent.   Stamford Hospital filed suit in this court against the executor for collection of its claims, by process served on May 27 or May 30, 2008.   On June 14, 2008 the executor moved to dismiss the hospital's action on the ground that it was barred by Conn. Gen Stat. § 45a–382 which provides that “․ no suit shall be brought against the fiduciary of an estate in the course of settlement as insolvent.”   The motion to dismiss the suit was granted by this court (Downey, J.) on October 8, 2008, holding that the estate was “in the course of settlement as insolvent.” because of the representation made by the executor that the estate was insolvent.   On February 8, 2010 counsel for the defendant wrote to the probate court requesting a hearing on its claims.   The plaintiffs then moved in the probate court for summary dismissal of the claims on the ground that the defendant's claims were barred because the request for a hearing in the probate court was untimely under § 45a–363(b) and § 45a–364 because it was made more than thirty days following the rejection of defendant's claims by the executor in April and May of 2008.

The probate court held that the claims of the hospital were not barred, and this appeal followed.

This court in granting summary judgment for the defendant held that the claims were not barred under §§ 45a–363(b)/45a–364 because Stamford Hospital had complied with the first prong of § 363(b) by commencing suit against the executor on May 27/May 30, 2008 which was well within 120 days from the executor's earliest rejection of its claims on April 11, 2008.   Section 363(b) bars a the claim of a creditor which has been rejected by the fiduciary “unless ” the creditor (1) commences suit within 120 days of the rejection “or ” (2) within thirty days of the rejection makes application to the probate court to hear and decide the claim(s).  (Emphasis added.)   The saving acts are clearly expresses in the alternative.   The plaintiffs focus entirely on prong (2) but there is undisputed evidence that the hospital complied with prong (1), thereby saving its claims from being barred.   The situation is comparable to the Appellate Court's statement just last month in construing another statute (Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52–400a(b)) that:  “The text of [the statute] could not be construed to mean other than it explicitly states.”  Haworth v. Dieffenbach, 133 Conn.App. 773, 784 (2012).   Plaintiff has cited no authority for its apparent position that a dismissal of the lawsuit commenced within 120 days following rejection somehow sets the clock back to 30 days following rejection and places the impossible burden on the creditor to ask by a deadline long ago passed that its claim be heard and adjudicated in the probate court.¹  The court sees no controlling principle of law which has been overlooked, or no misapprehension of facts inherent in the court's decision on this point.

B. Section 45a–375(c)

Section 45a–375(c) provides:

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section no claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim ․ would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur.

There is no suggestion that the normal statute of limitations for defendant's breach of contract claims had expired, so the only issue is whether the claims are barred by the first prong of § 45a–375(c).  The decedent, Mrs. Wheat died on February 10, 2007 and suit was commenced by May 30, 2008.   The suit was timely brought.   The statute also imposes a two-year limitation on presentation of claims (“no claim may be presented ․,” etc.).   In this case, the court has found that the claims of the hospital were initially presented to the executor on December 10, 2007, less than a year following the decedent's death, and therefore were not barred by this statute.   Although their position is somewhat unclear, plaintiffs seem to be asking for reargument because of their interpretation that “presentation” of a claim as used in § 45a–375(c) is the same as “make application to the Court of Probate to hear and decide such [rejected] claim” as used in § 45a–364(a).   But there is no authority for that proposition.   Conklin v. DePino Estate, supra, fn.1, cited by plaintiffs, in discussing this two-year statute, characterizes the obligation to present the claim as “present their claim in compliance with § 45a–358.”   Section 358 in subsection (e) defines the term “present” as:

A claim shall be deemed presented on:  (1) The date on which the fiduciary actually receives the claim in the event the claim is presented by delivery to the fiduciary personally;  (2) the date of mailing in the event the claim is properly mailed to the fiduciary at the fiduciary's address as set forth in the newspaper notice given under section 45a–354, or in the notice given under section 45–357, or in the records of the Court of Probate;  or (3) the date of receipt by the court if the claim is presented in accordance with subsection (b) of this section [fiduciary residing outside of Connecticut].

There is no suggestion that one must make application for a hearing on the claim to avoid the operation of the two-year statute of limitations of § 45a–375(c).

Finally, plaintiffs request that “the Court give less weight to consideration of the Hospital's being barred ‘forever from any forum in which to present its claim for determination on the merits' than to the rights of the Plaintiffs to their statutory limitation of liability and prompt administration of Mrs. Wheat's estate.”  (Motion to reargue, p. 5.) The Court, however, is also “․ mindful of the policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court.”   Millbrook Owners' Association, Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 16 (2001).

The court sees no controlling principle of law which has been overlooked, or no misapprehension of facts inherent in the court's decision on this point as well.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Reargue the Granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Denial of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

Alfred J. Jennings, Jr.

Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Plaintiffs cite in their motion to reargue the case of Conklin v. Depino Estate, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV05–4013792S (December 11, 2006, Skolnick, J.), 2007 Ct.Sup. 22746, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 492, which is not applicable because in that case the creditor's claims were not at any time rejected by the executor.   But, in discussing that case, plaintiffs concede in their motion to reargue the alternative nature of the saving acts under § 45a–363 where they cite that statute with the parenthetical descriptor “(suit or application for hearing by the probate court).”  (Emphasis added.)   Motion to Reargue, No. 130, p. 6..  FN1. Plaintiffs cite in their motion to reargue the case of Conklin v. Depino Estate, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV05–4013792S (December 11, 2006, Skolnick, J.), 2007 Ct.Sup. 22746, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 492, which is not applicable because in that case the creditor's claims were not at any time rejected by the executor.   But, in discussing that case, plaintiffs concede in their motion to reargue the alternative nature of the saving acts under § 45a–363 where they cite that statute with the parenthetical descriptor “(suit or application for hearing by the probate court).”  (Emphasis added.)   Motion to Reargue, No. 130, p. 6.

Jennings, Alfred J., J.T.R.