Edwin St. Germain v. Camilla Ross et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE FROM JURY DOCKET (# 210)

FACTS

On November 18, 2011, the defendants, Camilla Ross and Jack Ross,¹ filed a motion to strike this case from the jury docket.   The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law.   The defendants also filed an objection to the motion for a jury trial on December 16, 2011.   On January 17, 2012, the plaintiff, Edwin St. Germain, filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike.   On January 27, 2012, at the request of the court, the plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum detailing the nature of relief sought with regard to each count of the complaint as well as support for his entitlement to a jury trial on each count.   On January 31, 2012, the defendants filed a reply.

On September 8, 2009, the plaintiff filed a twenty-three-count revised amended complaint, which is the operative complaint in this matter.   In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   In August 1997, “the plaintiff, through his company Connecticut Homes, LLC,” purchased the premises located at 276 Washington Street in Norwich, Connecticut (the premises) from a foreclosing bank for approximately $90,000.   On the same day, Connecticut Homes sold the premises to Ross for approximately $203,000.   Before Connecticut Homes purchased the premises, the plaintiff and Ross entered into a verbal agreement whereby Ross would hold the premises in name only and in trust for the plaintiff, and that Ross would transfer the premises back to the plaintiff or one of his companies upon his request.   The parties also agreed that the plaintiff or one of his companies would make all mortgage payments and pay for the maintenance of the premises.   The plaintiff and Ross lived on the premises together.

The plaintiff and Ross eventually had a falling out and Ross moved off the premises.   Ross relinquished her ownership interests in the plaintiff's companies in exchange for $11,000 and a potential future payment of $89,000.   The latter payment was contingent on the future sale of the premises along with Ross's promise not to make any claims against the premises and to transfer it to the plaintiff upon his request.   The plaintiff continued living on the premises, paying the mortgage and paying for the maintenance and upkeep of the premises.   Ross never requested that the plaintiff pay rent.   On November 3, 2003, the plaintiff and Ross agreed to transfer the premises to the plaintiff “through the St. Germain Group,” one of the plaintiff's companies, but the deal never went through.   At some point between 2003 and 2004, Ross married Jack Ross. By November 2004, the plaintiff had fallen behind on mortgage payments, but was able to prevent foreclosure through a lump sum payment and a loan from Jack Ross. On July 1, 2005, the plaintiff placed the St. Germain Group into bankruptcy, and on July 29, 2005, Ross “filed a proof of claim in the St. Germain Group bankruptcy proceeding based upon the agreement to transfer the [p]remises back to the plaintiff through the St. Germain Group.”

In the summer of 2005, the plaintiff told Ross that the plaintiff needed to rent rooms in the premises in order to continue making mortgage payments.   The plaintiff subsequently rented rooms on a weekly basis to six tenants.   On November 20, 2005, the plaintiff and one of the tenants got into a physical altercation, which led to several tenants obtaining a protective order effectively preventing the plaintiff from returning to the premises.   The plaintiff told Ross to collect rent from the tenants so that the plaintiff could continue making the mortgage payments.   Although Ross did begin to collect rent, she did not turn the payments over to the plaintiff.   On November 27, 2005, the plaintiff met with the Rosses to demand that they turn the rental payments over and to transfer the premises to the plaintiff in accordance with their agreement.   By the end of 2005, Ross changed the locks on the premises, commenced an eviction proceeding against the plaintiff and refused to transfer the premises back to the plaintiff.

Counts one through nineteen of the plaintiff's revised amended complaint are brought against Ross, Jack Ross or both of the Rosses.²  These counts sound in:  breach of agreement;  unjust enrichment;  fraud;  conversion;  constructive trust;  breach of constructive trust;  resulting trust;  quantum meruit;  breach of fiduciary duty/constructive fraud;  theft of income;  statutory civil theft;  tortious interference with business expectations;  violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act;  negligence;  negligent infliction of emotional distress;  nuisance;  breach of implied contract and quiet title.³  The following chart outlines the claims of relief for each count.

Count 1:  Breach of Agreement as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 2:  Unjust Enrichment as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 3:  Fraud as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 4:  Conversion as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 5:  Imposition of a imposition of a Constructive Trust as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  constructive trust;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 6:  Breach of Constructive Trust as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  imposition of a constructive trust;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 7:  Imposition of a Resulting Trust as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  imposition of a resulting trust;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 8:  Quantum Meruit as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 9:  Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Constructive Fraud as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 10:  Theft of Income as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 11:  Statutory Civil Theft as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  double or treble damages;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 12:  Tortious Interference with Business Expectations as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 13:  CUTPA Violations as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 14:  Negligence as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 15:  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 16:  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as to Jack Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 17:  Nuisance as to Camilla Ross and Jack Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  costs;  interest;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 18:  Breach of Implied Contract as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  monetary damages;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  costs;  interest;  punitive damages;  attorneys fees;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Count 19:  Quiet Title as to Camilla Ross. Relief Claimed:  determination of the relative rights of the parties to the subject premises;  imposition of a constructive trust;  imposition of a resulting trust;  any other relief, legal or equitable, the court deems just and proper

Thus, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to money damages, common-law and statutory punitive damages, double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52–564, costs, interest, attorneys fees, the imposition of constructive and resulting trusts and a determination of the relative rights of the parties to the premises.

DISCUSSION

The defendants argue that equitable issues cannot be tried to the jury unless ordered by the court, and a mere claim to the jury docket is not the equivalent of such an order.   Additionally, the defendants argue that the equitable issues predominate in this case.   Even the plaintiff's claims for damages, the defendants argue, require him to prevail on his equitable claims as a condition precedent to recovery.   The defendants argue that, while the court has discretion to have some of the issues tried by a jury, exercising such discretion would be inappropriate in this case because of the likelihood of jury confusion.   Instead, the defendants argue that the court should either hear the case entirely, or decide the equitable issues first and have the jury decide the remainder of the issues.

The plaintiff counters that the essential basis of the action is cognizable in law and, therefore, he is entitled to a jury trial as to all of his claims.   The plaintiff argues that one of the main issues in this case is the legal title to the premises, which is a legal issue.   Additionally, the plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a jury trial on several of his other claims that are legal in nature.   Moreover, the plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages under General Statutes § 52–219, and that the court should allow the issues of fact in his equitable claims to be tried to a jury under General Statutes § 52–218.⁴

General Statutes § 52–219 provides:  “Whenever an action brought to recover damages and also to obtain equitable relief has been placed upon the docket as a jury case, the determination of the equitable issues raised by the pleadings shall not prevent a jury trial of the claim for damages, unless both parties agree in writing to waive a jury, or unless the determination of the equitable issues has necessarily adjudicated all the facts upon which the claim for damages rests.”  “Section 52–219 applies in cases in which the action is properly on the jury docket.”  Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 183 n.7. In this case the parties have not agreed to waive a jury trial and the defendant relies upon the last clause of this statute and asks the court to determine that a court side trial of the equitable issues in this case will necessarily adjudicate all the facts upon which the claim for damages rests.

“Article first, § 19, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article four of the amendments, provides in relevant part:  ‘The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ․’ The provision guarantees the right to a jury trial in all cases for which such a right existed at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1818 ․ The fundamental right to a jury trial, however, is subject to certain limitations ․ One limitation is that the right does not extend to equitable claims.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 532, 4 A.3d 288 (2010).

“In a case that involves both legal and equitable claims, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims ․ [W]here the essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it in order to make that relief complete, the whole action is one in equity and there is no right to a jury trial ․ A jury trial is required on legal claims that are joined in the same action with equitable claims only if the essential basis of the action is such that the issues presented would be properly cognizable in an action of law ․ even though equitable relief is [also] asked ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175, 182–83, 629 A.2d 1116 (1993).  “This analysis must be performed in the context of the pleadings when read as a whole ․ The form of the relief demanded is not dispositive.”  (Citation omitted.)  Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 229 Conn. 634, 641–42, 642 A.2d 1194 (1994).

In National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 309, 22 A.2d 773 (1941), the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover upon the guaranty of a note and attached certain real estate as belonging to the defendant.   Subsequently, the defendant's daughter intervened on the ground that she was the sole owner of the property.  Id. The defendant's daughter argued that, since she was the sole owner of the property when the note was given,⁵ the attachment should be set aside or the plaintiff should be ordered to release it.  Id. The defendant's daughter filed a counterclaim and claimed the case for the jury docket.  Id., 309–10.   The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the case from the jury docket, and the case was tried to the court.  Id., 310.   On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that “where the controlling issue is based upon a claimed legal title to real estate and that is contested, equity will not ordinarily adjudicate the issue but will leave the question of title to be determined as an issue at law, and such is of right triable by jury ․” (Citations omitted.)  Id.;  see also Burnell v. Willis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0429432 (July 7, 2000, Silbert, J.).

“To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Franchi v. Farmholme, Inc., 191 Conn. 201, 214, 464 A.2d 35 (1983).  “Ordinarily when we refer to a person as having title to land we mean that he has both the legal and beneficial interests in it ․ He who has the possession, the right of possession and the right of property has a perfect title ․ But the legal and beneficial interests are not one and the same ․ When one person has legal title and the other claims to have equitable title which the first person denies, there is a dispute about ownership but that dispute does not necessarily involve legal title especially if legal title is admitted.   It is only when legal title is in dispute that the issue of fact in that dispute is triable by jury.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 215.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that after Connecticut Homes purchased the premises from the foreclosing bank, it sold the premises to Ross. The plaintiff does not allege that he was ever the legal owner of the premises after that transaction.   Instead, he alleges that the parties agreed that the premises would be held “in trust” for the plaintiff, and that Ross would transfer the premises back to the plaintiff upon his request.   In count nineteen, the plaintiff alleges that he “is claiming title to the [p]remises through the equitable [principles] of a constructive trust, a resulting trust, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit and/or an implied contract” and that “[t]he defendant is the title holder of record to the [p]remises.”   Moreover, in his answer to the counterclaims asserted by the Rosses, the plaintiff “admits that on or about August 29, 1997, Camilla Ross became the title holder of record to the [premises], but with the agreement that she would hold the title to the property in trust for the plaintiff ․” There is no dispute as to who holds legal title to the premises;  rather, the dispute centers on an alleged equitable interest the plaintiff has in the premises.   Thus, Howland is distinguishable, as the controlling issue is not “based upon a claimed legal title to real estate.”

The court finds that the essential right asserted by the plaintiff is equitable in nature.   Cf. Dzubin v. Dzubin, 121 Conn. 646, 648–49, 186 A. 652 (1936) (“[T]he complaint was one in equity, the remedy sought being a reconveyance or transfer of property, with an accounting of mesne profits, and a claim for damages as incidental and supplementary relief.   Such a cause of action is not of right triable by jury, although the court has a discretion to submit issues arising in it to a jury”).   The predominate issue in this case is whether there was an agreement between the plaintiff and Ross that Ross would hold the premises in trust for the plaintiff and would transfer it back to the plaintiff upon his request.   The plaintiff has alleged individual legal claims that would normally entitle him to a jury trial—e.g., fraud, conversion, theft of income, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress.   However, viewing the complaint in its entirety;  see Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 641–42;  these claims are incidental to and stem from the primary dispute concerning the plaintiff's alleged equitable interest in the premises.   A jury trial is only required on legal claims joined in the same action with equitable claims “if the essential basis of the action is such that the issues presented would be properly cognizable in an action of law ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 183.   Because the essential basis of the plaintiff's complaint is equitable, the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial with respect to counts one through nineteen.

This conclusion is buttressed by an examination of the claims of relief that the plaintiff seeks with regard to each count.   In counts one through nine, count eighteen and nineteen the plaintiff alleges facts he claims support the imposition of a species of equitable trust over a parcel of developed real estate.   In count nineteen he seeks a determination of the relative rights to the property as between the plaintiff and the defendants.   The gravamen of these counts is that the conduct of the defendants vis a vis the plaintiff has created in the plaintiff equitable rights that ought to be enforced by the court in equity and appropriate relief fashioned.   Count ten (theft), count eleven (statutory theft), count twelve (tortious interference), count thirteen (CUTPA), count fourteen (negligence), count fifteen and sixteen (negligent infliction of emotional distress), and count seventeen (nuisance) seek primarily monetary damages.   Each of these counts is premised on substantially the same allegations of conduct of the defendants that the plaintiff relies upon to support his claims for equitable relief.   The adjudication by the court of the contested facts to determine the plaintiff's entitlement to equitable relief will necessarily determine the contested facts that the plaintiff relies upon to support his claims for monetary damages under the counts not seeking equitable relief.

“Under these circumstances a jury trial is a matter of the court's discretion, which should be exercised to promote the expeditious disposition of the cause consistent with a legal and just determination of the issues presented.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Jordaan v. Wayland, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5004384 (April 2, 2008, Rittenband, J.T.R.).   This result is more likely to follow from a court trial than from a jury trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike this case from the jury docket is hereby granted.

Cosgrove, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In this memorandum, “Ross” will be used to refer to Camilla Ross, and “the Rosses” will be used to refer to Camilla and Jack Ross collectively..  FN1. In this memorandum, “Ross” will be used to refer to Camilla Ross, and “the Rosses” will be used to refer to Camilla and Jack Ross collectively.

FN2. The plaintiff also brought this action against nine other defendants:  Ken Zuch, Gary Labrie, Scott Lichtman, Larry Lizzotte, Matthew Bergeron, Richard Barber, Patricia Startz, “John Doe” and “Jane Doe.” Counts twenty through twenty-three are brought against some combination of these defendants.   Only Zuch and Lichtman have filed appearances in this matter.   On August 19, 2010, the Rosses filed a motion for a finding of misjoinder and placement on the trial list.   On December 15, 2010, this court ordered that counts one through nineteen be separated from counts twenty through twenty-three, and that after the pleadings closed on the first nineteen counts they could be placed on the trial list..  FN2. The plaintiff also brought this action against nine other defendants:  Ken Zuch, Gary Labrie, Scott Lichtman, Larry Lizzotte, Matthew Bergeron, Richard Barber, Patricia Startz, “John Doe” and “Jane Doe.” Counts twenty through twenty-three are brought against some combination of these defendants.   Only Zuch and Lichtman have filed appearances in this matter.   On August 19, 2010, the Rosses filed a motion for a finding of misjoinder and placement on the trial list.   On December 15, 2010, this court ordered that counts one through nineteen be separated from counts twenty through twenty-three, and that after the pleadings closed on the first nineteen counts they could be placed on the trial list.

FN3. On September 29, 2009, the Rosses filed an answer, special defenses and counterclaims.   The plaintiff filed a reply to the Rosses' special defenses and an answer and special defenses to the Rosses' counterclaim on July 14, 2010.   On July 19, 2010, the Rosses filed an amended answer and special defenses, as well as a reply to the plaintiff's special defenses to their counterclaim..  FN3. On September 29, 2009, the Rosses filed an answer, special defenses and counterclaims.   The plaintiff filed a reply to the Rosses' special defenses and an answer and special defenses to the Rosses' counterclaim on July 14, 2010.   On July 19, 2010, the Rosses filed an amended answer and special defenses, as well as a reply to the plaintiff's special defenses to their counterclaim.

FN4. In their supplemental briefs, the parties addressed whether each claim asserted in the plaintiff's revised amended complaint existed prior to 1818 and was entitled to a jury trial, as well as the damages being claimed for each count..  FN4. In their supplemental briefs, the parties addressed whether each claim asserted in the plaintiff's revised amended complaint existed prior to 1818 and was entitled to a jury trial, as well as the damages being claimed for each count.

FN5. The court described the daughter's claimed interest as follows:  “[T]he controlling issue was the claim of [the defendant's daughter] that she was sole owner of the attached property by reason of a deed delivered by her father, who then owned the property, to her mother, to be delivered to [the defendant's daughter] after his death;  that a certain agreement between her and her mother for the mutual distribution of her father's estate was made upon a condition which was not met and was therefore ineffective;  and, at least impliedly, that, though the deed was not recorded until after the attachment was made, the plaintiff could take no benefit from the omission because it was not in fact misled thereby.   The primary issue to be determined was whether [the defendant's daughter] acquired the legal title to the property under the facts alleged.   If she did not prevail upon this issue, she could not recover judgment.”   National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, supra, 128 Conn. 310–11..  FN5. The court described the daughter's claimed interest as follows:  “[T]he controlling issue was the claim of [the defendant's daughter] that she was sole owner of the attached property by reason of a deed delivered by her father, who then owned the property, to her mother, to be delivered to [the defendant's daughter] after his death;  that a certain agreement between her and her mother for the mutual distribution of her father's estate was made upon a condition which was not met and was therefore ineffective;  and, at least impliedly, that, though the deed was not recorded until after the attachment was made, the plaintiff could take no benefit from the omission because it was not in fact misled thereby.   The primary issue to be determined was whether [the defendant's daughter] acquired the legal title to the property under the facts alleged.   If she did not prevail upon this issue, she could not recover judgment.”   National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, supra, 128 Conn. 310–11.

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.