Ingrid Shannon v. Christina Nichols Carter et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS SEVENTH COUNT (103.00)

I. Background

The plaintiff is the long-time caregiver to Arthur B. Nichols, III (Nichols) who died on May 14, 2011.   The defendants are Nichols' daughter and two sons who have been appointed executors of the Estate of Nichols.   The defendants have moved to dismiss the seventh count of the amended complaint which asserts a wage claim against the Estate pursuant to General Statutes § 31–72 on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss is the appropriate means to contest the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  Practice Book § 10–31(a)(1);  St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545 (2003).   Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the controversy before it.  Bagg v. Town of Thompson, 114 Conn.App. 30, 38 (2009).   In deciding a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, including facts necessarily implied by the allegations, and construe those facts in a manner most favorable to the pleader.   Cogswell v. American Transit Insurance, Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516 (2007).

III. Facts

In her amended complaint the plaintiff alleges that she presented her claim for $7,500 in wages to the executor defendants, and that the claim for wages was allowed in full.   Amended Complaint, ¶ 22–24.

IV. Discussion

The defendants' motion relies almost entirely on General Statutes § 45a–363(a) which states in full:  “No person who has presented a claim shall be entitled to commence suit unless and until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in Section 45a–360.”  General Statutes § 45a–360 establishes procedures for executors to deal with claims against an estate;  i.e., rejecting claims, allowing claims and paying claims.   The defendants contend the language of Section 45a–363(a) is straight forward in providing that no suit may be commenced if a claim has not been rejected.

The plaintiff makes several arguments against this interpretation.   First, she contends that numerous Appellate Court cases have described Section 45a–363 as “purely procedural in nature,” citing Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn.App. 608, 620 (2001), and Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, 131 Conn.App. 223, 231 (2011).   However, as the full quotations from these cases found in plaintiff's memorandum of law distinctly show, the Appellate Court has been referring to Section 45a–363(b) a provision not at issue in this case.   The full quotation is “45a–363 is purely procedural in nature, governing the time within which to file a suit against an estate when a claim has been rejected by an executor or administrator.” ¹  It is Section 45a–363(b) which sets those time limits, not Section 45a–363(a).²  Indeed, the statute heading describing Section 45a–363 reads:  “Suit against estate on rejected claim;  time within which to commence suit or file application.”   This perfectly describes the different purposes of first subsection (a) and then subsection (b).

The plaintiff also cites to certain Superior Court decisions holding that Section 45a–363 is a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional statute.   See e.g., DiBiase v. DiBiase, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, CV 10 6005302 (July 14, 2010, Gilardi, J.T.R.).   However, the focus of the inquiry and discussion in DiBiase are the time limitations in Section 45a–363(b), and the case itself involved a claim against an estate which had been rejected by the estate.   One of the cases cited in DiBiase was a case decided by this court, Mooney v. Murphy, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, CV 99 0335987 (March 14, 2001) [29 Conn. L. Rptr. 81].   That case also involved a rejected claim against an estate and contains a discussion of whether the time provisions of 45a–363(b) involved the court's subject matter jurisdiction.   This court found they did not and went on to say, referring to subsection (a) that Section 45a–363 “explicitly prohibits the commencement of a civil suit prior to the filing and rejection of [a] claim.”

The plaintiff also argues that the defendants' interpretation of Section 45a–363(a) thwarts the legislative policy of the Connecticut wage statute that wages earned must be paid and, among other things, provides for double damages and attorneys fees when an employer fails to pay wages in accordance with the law.  General Statutes § 31–72.   Plaintiff correctly notes that the definition of “employer” in the wage statutes includes executors of an estate.  General Statutes § 31–71a(1).   It is not altogether clear to this court that Ms. Shannon has ever been an employee of the defendants although the complaint alleges she was an employee of Nichols.   No matter how that question is answered, the court is not convinced that policy arguments in favor of the wage statutes should overcome the explicit statutory language of Section 45a–363(a) which itself evinces a legislative policy in favor of the expeditions and efficient settling of claims while still allowing time for an estate to marshal and collect assets in order to meet its responsibilities.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above the court determines that General Statutes § 45a–363(a) bars the filing of a lawsuit seeking to enforce a claim against an estate when that claim has not been rejected in whole or in part, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the seventh count is granted.

BY THE COURT

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The quotation actually comes from Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Milazzo, 44 Conn.Sup. 477,480 [17 Conn. L. Rptr. 241] (1996)..  FN1. The quotation actually comes from Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Milazzo, 44 Conn.Sup. 477,480 [17 Conn. L. Rptr. 241] (1996).

FN2. Section 45a–363(b) states:  “(b) Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a–364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as has not been rejected.   If such person dies within thirty days from the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced or an application is filed, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit or to file the application provided for in section 45a–364.   If such person dies more than thirty days but within one hundred twenty days from and including the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit.”.  FN2. Section 45a–363(b) states:  “(b) Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a–364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as has not been rejected.   If such person dies within thirty days from the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced or an application is filed, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit or to file the application provided for in section 45a–364.   If such person dies more than thirty days but within one hundred twenty days from and including the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit.”

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.