Krystal Wilson v. Jarrett Morris (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 101)

The present action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred between the plaintiff, Krystal Wilson, and the defendant, Jarrett Morris.   In her two-count complaint, dated October 6, 2011, the plaintiff alleges a negligence claim in count one and a recklessness claim in count two.

In count two, the plaintiff specifically alleges a recklessness claim under General Statutes § 14–295.   In particular, the plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused by the recklessness of the defendant in that he was operating his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14–218(a) ¹ and in reckless disregard for the safety of others in violation of General Statutes § 14–222.   Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's recklessness was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.

The defendant moves to strike count two on the ground that the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a recklessness claim.

Discussion

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[I]n determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).   In doing so, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).

The defendant argues that § 14–295 requires specific allegations of reckless conduct beyond allegations of simple negligence.   In this regard, the defendant contends that the allegations in count two are identical to the allegations in count one and support a simple negligence claim as opposed to a recklessness claim.   The plaintiff counters that the pleading requirements under § 14–295 are plain and unambiguous and that she alleges sufficient facts to support such a recklessness claim.

Section 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.”

There is a split of authority within the Superior Court as to whether § 14–295 requires specific allegations of reckless conduct.   See Yates v. McKinley, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 08 6000778 (February 19, 2010, Agati, J.).

“The minority view holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory [violation] as set forth in § 14–295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. “Relying on the usual rules of pleading, these courts generally reason that a plaintiff who is alleging recklessness must allege specific facts that informs both the court and the defendant what conduct is relied upon.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Torres v. Siriphongsavath, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5013135 (January 7, 2010, Swienton, J.).  “To permit otherwise, these courts reason, would enable any negligence claim to be brought as a recklessness claim and thereby make it subject to double and treble damages, ․ effectively dissolv [ing] any distinction between [the two] claims ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Braumann v. Clavette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5027558 (April 27, 2010, Wilson, J.).

The majority view “distinguishes between pleading common law recklessness and statutory recklessness, thus holding that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14–295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.”   Torres v. Siriphongsavath, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5013135.  “The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14–295 itself.   These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14–295.”   Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 00 0509116 (October 11, 2001, Quinn, J.).

In count two the plaintiff has specifically alleged that the defendant operated his motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others in violation of General Statutes § 14–222.   This pleading meets the general requirements of the language of § 14–295 and therefore survives a motion to strike.   For that reason the motion to strike Count Two of the complaint is denied.

BY THE COURT

Denise D. Markle, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff has cited to General Statutes § 14–218(a) which has been repealed and, moreover, concerned negligent homicides.   The court believes it is likely that the plaintiff intended to cite General Statute § 14–218a.   Nevertheless, the plaintiff has further alleged recklessness under General Statute § 14–222 alleging reckless driving for the purpose of this analysis..  FN1. The plaintiff has cited to General Statutes § 14–218(a) which has been repealed and, moreover, concerned negligent homicides.   The court believes it is likely that the plaintiff intended to cite General Statute § 14–218a.   Nevertheless, the plaintiff has further alleged recklessness under General Statute § 14–222 alleging reckless driving for the purpose of this analysis.

Markle, Denise D., J.