Luis Ocasio v. Warden, State Prison (2012)

HABEAS DECISION

DECISION

THE COURT:  All right.   And the court's prepared ․ I am prepared to rule.

I note for the record again, in addition to the testimony of the people that were presented here, the court also prior to opening today did take the opportunity to review the exhibits that had been admitted previously;  namely, and most importantly, the court reviewed the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing, as well as the court's memorandum of decision in that matter.

Again, as we know, the standard on cases like this, Strickland v. Washington, requires a two-prong finding.   One, which is that counsel's performance fell below that of a reasonable defense attorney under the circumstances and, two, assuming that there's a finding in the first, that the petitioner was prejudiced, again, meaning that there would have been a different outcome in the proceeding more favorable to the petitioner but for counsel's errors, and that there needs to be a finding in favor of the petitioner on both.   A failure of the petitioner to prove either is fatal to the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

In the present matter, as to the claim that counsel's performance was substandard, the court finds that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden.   Counsel, as the law is, has the right, looking at the potential of multiple legal theories, to attack any particular issue.

Counsel here testified, and I think competently, that counsel has the right to make a reasoned decision to attack one legal theory and forego another as long as that is based on a rational legal decision.

Here I think counsel put it succinctly that in his experience in 37 years, to try to put the petitioner's credibility, even if the claim had been made, his credibility, as the gravamen of the case against that of two police officers, would have been ridiculous, I think was his testimony, and instead he went after what he thought was the viable legal issue which, according to the testimony and to the memorandum, was not simply that there was no probable cause, he went after the theory that there was no legal basis to stop the car in the first place;  that there was no legal basis based on the way the Wolcott Police got the information.   His claim was that there was no legal basis to stop the car even for investigative purposes.

If that had proved successful, the police don't even get to the opportunity to where they can see the drugs.   The mere fact that the theory proved unsuccessful is not how we judge counsel's performance, but, again, counsel has the right and here testified that he made like a ․ sounds like a rational legal decision to attack what he thought was the best possible legal issue to obtain success for his client.

The court, again, reviewed the transcript of the hearing.   The court is familiar with the law on investigative stops, probable cause, as well as the nuance legal theory of police obtaining information from confidential informants and whether or not that creates an issue of probable cause or the ability to stop for investigative purposes, and in reading all it appears that counsel did a thorough job at trying to discredit the police officers as to where they got the information, how they got the information, whether the information between the two police officers was accurate or not.   Again, in all it looks like counsel made a good faith effort and performed valiantly on behalf of his client and, again, ultimately it did not succeed, but that is not the standard.

So for all those reasons I find that the petitioner has failed to prove that his counsel was in any way ineffective.   Again, I also find that based on the evidence presented the petitioner has not presented anything to lead this court to believe that had he testified and simply claimed that the version of events that he had was different from the police, there is nothing from which this court could find credibly that a judge would have believed differently or would have found differently in his favor merely because he testified against the potential evidence of at least two police officers that it was not possible for them to have seen the drugs on the floor of the car, that, again, it's a matter of credibility, and I don't find that there's anything that's been presented to show that the court, it's more likely than not, or it's even likely that hearing the petitioner's testimony the court would have been willing to modify its position on this matter.   The court, again, looked at all the evidence thoroughly and believed that there was reason to stop, found the officer credible, again, although counsel appeared to have done a pretty good job at cross-examining him.

So for all those reasons the court finds that the petitioner has failed to prove either ineffective performance or that he was prejudiced and for those reasons the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

The record will reflect that the marshal is presenting the petitioner with notice of his rights to appeal, and if the petitioner does plan to appeal, counsel is required to prepare and provide a judgment file to the clerk's office within thirty days of today's date.

Anything additional for the record before we adjourn?

ATTY. TODDY:  Your Honor, can I just request a transcript of the decision and can I request ten days within receipt of the transcript within which to determine if I'm going to file a petition for certification to appeal on consultation with the petitioner?

THE COURT:  All right.   Well, I would imagine there'd be sufficient time.   I'll grant that.   So I'll grant you ten additional days from whenever the transcript is prepared.

ATTY. TODDY:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  I'll order a memorandum of my comments here, which will stand as the court's memorandum of decision, and, again, the petitioner will be granted ten days from the receipt of transcripts within which to file their notice of intent to appeal.

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Newson, J.

Newson, John M., J.