IN RE: Laniya G.1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On May 17, 2011, the petitioner, the commissioner of the department of children and families, (“DCF” or “the department”), filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112, et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Lea W.-S. and Levar G. as to their child, Laniya G.

The mother and father were duly notified of the filing of this petition.   Both have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Neither parent claims Indian tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceeding pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

Prior to the commencement of this contested action, the father presented to the court a properly executed form consenting to the termination of his parental rights to Laniya.   This court canvassed the father and found that he had been represented by competent counsel who was present with him when he executed the consent form.   This court further found by clear and convincing evidence that the consent of the father has been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of his action.   His consent was accepted on February 6, 2012.

DCF, through counsel, moved to amend the petition to withdraw the nonconsensual grounds alleged against the father and to allege the ground of consent of the father pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(i).   Trial was held on the nonconsensual grounds alleged as to mother and the dispositional phase on February 6, 2012.   The mother did not attend the trial.   Her counsel was present and indicated she was aware of the date but did not wish to attend.

Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages:  adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment.   See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010);  In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004);  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991);  Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b), 35a–7.   However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) or (E), “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d. 770 (2003);  In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008);  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000).  “What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.”  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231;  In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000).  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than ‘any’ rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.”  (Citations omitted.)  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500.  “[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children.”  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).   The issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her own life, but whether he or she has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the child at issue.   See In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 627, 5 A.3d 575 (2010);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest.   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007).  “In the dispositional phase ․ the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.   In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, 939 A.2d 16 (2008).   Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question.   See In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988);  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984);  State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172–73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979);  Practice Book § 35a–7.

As previously noted, the father has consented to the termination of his parental right.   The non-consensual statutory grounds alleged against the respondent mother are (1) that the child was found in a prior proceedings on December 7, 2010, to have been neglected and the mother has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   (General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i));  and (2) that the mother is the parent of the child, who is under the age of seven years and is neglected or uncared for, and the mother has failed or is unable to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time considering the age and needs of the child, the mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and the mother's parental rights in another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. (General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E)).

I. FACTS

The credible evidence admitted at trial, as well as the items judicially noticed by the court,² support the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

Respondent Mother:

“An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires ․ a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities.”  In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999);  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.

Leah W.-S. is a 30–year–old woman who has given birth to six children, none of whom are being raised in her care.   She has a lengthy history of experience with DCF dating back to 1998.   For years, various services have been offered to mother for reunification purposes with all of her six children yet she has never been able to rehabilitate to the point where she was able to reunify with any of them.   Her parental rights to other children have been terminated pursuant to petitions filed by DCF, including her rights to Dawood G., (D.O.B.7/26/04), on December 8, 2005;  Xavian W.-S., (D.O.B.12/9/05), on August 3, 2006, and Justice G., (D.O.B.4/24/07), on October 3, 2008.   Mother is not close to her biological family and was raised by an aunt until she was age 13.   She only lived with her mother, then her father, for a short period of time until she dropped out of high school.   She has never pursued a high school diploma.   Her work history has been sporadic in minimally compensating positions.   She suffers from bouts of depression for which she has not sought treatment and admits to struggling with substance abuse for the past 13 years.   Her drugs of choice are cocaine, marijuana and alcohol.

In 1999, mother was arrested after she stabbed her sister-in-law in the chest, although she served no prison time.   She was arrested again in 2002 and charged with possession of narcotics.   While awaiting disposition of these charges, she was charged with failure to appear.   Ultimately, she received a conditional discharge.   Since August 2010, mother has moved at least five times, staying with various friend and family members.   Currently, she resides with her sister in an apartment in Hartford.

When Laniya was born, despite mother's history with DCF, the infant was discharged to mother's care as mother then was being compliant with services.   A voluntary services case was opened for Laniya, and reunification of mother with Laniya's brother, Justice G., was still being considered.   Despite this ongoing assistance, prior to Laniya's removal from mother's care and custody in August 2010, Laniya's current foster mother, Senoria D., who then was Justice's foster mother, testified that she would retrieve Laniya from mother almost every weekend due to her concerns with mother's chaotic lifestyle and drinking to excess.   At one point, she found the baby, barely clothed, in a home with five male strangers;  mother was not around.   Senoria testified that mother would often appear intoxicated when Senoria went to pick up or drop off Laniya.   She indicated mother would leave Laniya “with anybody.”   Senoria D. later adopted Justice.

In August 11, 2010, an anonymous referral concerning Laniya was made to the DCF hotline alleging that mother was actively using illegal substances and that Laniya was being left with random persons who presented a risk to the child while mother was out late at night.   On August 12, 2010 DCF invoked a 96–hour hold on behalf of Laniya due to mother's substance abuse, father not having a plan for the child, and both parents' extensive history with DCF. On August 16, 2010, the court granted DCF's motion for an ex parte custody order, which both parents agreed to sustain at the preliminary hearing on August 20, 2010.   Several months later, on December 7, 2010, the parents pled nolo contendere to the court's adjudicating Laniya neglect for being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being and Laniya was committed to DCF's care.

The court issued both preliminary and final specific steps directed to both parents and the department on August 16, 2010 and December 7, 2010.   Mother signed the final steps on October 25, 2010, indicating that she would agree to cooperate with them if approved and ordered by the court, and that she understood that failure to follow any steps ordered could increase the chance that her parental rights would be terminated and her child would be placed for adoption.   The specific steps ordered for mother and her level of compliance since August 2010 are as follows:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

Mother did not participate in two scheduled administrative case reviews that were held on September 20, 2010 and March 1, 2011.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.

Mother has been transient, moving five times since August 2010.   She reported being evicted from her apartment, moving in with a neighbor in the same building, then moving in with her sister in Hartford, then moving to a “brother's” home, then back to her sister's home.

Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals, both parenting and individual.

Mother failed to follow through with parenting classes offered to her through New Life Family Center in Hartford.   She was referred on two separate occasions on December 7, 2010 and February 17, 2011.   She attended only two out of 10 required sessions.

Mother failed to engage in mental health services, although she was experiencing bouts of depression.   She was initially offered inpatient services at the Coventry House in October 2010, but she only stayed in the program for 6 days before leaving.   Mother was offered individual counseling and a psychiatric evaluation for medication management at ADRC between January and March of 2011.   She missed her scheduled individual sessions and three appointments scheduled with the psychiatrist.   She was discharged on March 10, 2011 for non-compliance.

Mother also was referred to mental health service providers at the Institute of Living and Hartford Behavior Health in 2010 and early 2011, but she needed to call and refer herself.   DCF offered to help her make the calls, but mother did not follow through.

On February 7, 2011, DCF referred mother to the Wheeler Clinic Life Line program, a dual diagnosis program which would have addressed her mental health, including the provision of medication management and her substance abuse.   Mother did not follow through with this service recommendation.

In sum, mother failed to attend and complete any parenting, substance abuse or mental health program.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendation regarding treatment.

Mother participated in a substance abuse evaluation at ADRC on September 15, 2010 and again on December 14, 2010.   At both intakes, ADRC recommended that mother participate in an intensive outpatient program three days per week.   On March 10, 2011, mother was discharged for non-compliance with ADRC's treatment.

Submit to random drug testing;  time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

Mother participated in random urine screens at ADRC from September 2010 through February 21, 2011.   On September 2, 2010, mother's hair test revealed she had been using cocaine and marijuana.   Mother had 12 random urine screens between September 23, 2010 and February 21, 2011, all of which were negative.   However, mother did not cooperate with any screens after February 2, 2011, when she stopped attending her outpatient counseling, and she failed to attend hair tests scheduled in May 2011, December 2011 and January 2012.

Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting/individual counseling, in-home support services and substance abuse assessment/treatment.

Mother did not successfully complete her parent education group, her substance abuse treatment or attend any mental health services.   She never reached a degree of compliance or verifiable progress which would have allowed for the referral of in-home services to promote reunification.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals.

Mother did sign releases of information for DCF.

Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.

Mother has not achieved stable income or housing.   She has remained transient since August 2010 and there is no evidence she has sought or obtained any employment or other source of income.

Do not engage in substance abuse.

On September 2, 2010, mother's hair test was positive for use of cocaine and marijuana.   Random urine screens conducted for the next six months were negative, but mother then stopped participating in services.   She was discharged from her outpatient substance abuse treatment for non-compliance and failed to attend hair tests scheduled after the discharge or to seek further treatment.   There is no convincing evidence that mother has remained substance-free or engaged in any aftercare or relapse prevention services.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Mother has had no involvement with the criminal justice system since the spring of 2008.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits.

DCF provided mother with weekly supervised visitation to see Laniya at My People Clinical Services from November 2010.   Mother missed 3 out of 4 visits in January and one in March 2011.   The DCF treatment worker, Michael Walsh, testified that her visits were somewhat inconsistent in the spring and summer of 2011.   She has recently been more consistent in visiting.

In sum, mother's compliance with her specific steps has been substandard.   After years of involvement with DCF and the loss of her rights to five other children, she undoubtedly knew what was expected of her in order to avoid losing custody of Laniya permanently.   Most of her other children are also in the care of paternal relatives.   She appears content to abdicate her parenting responsibility to whoever is available.   After years of no ascertainable, sustained improvement in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues and transient lifestyle, it is highly unlikely, without proof of a prolonged period of engagement in treatment, coupled with reliable proof of abstinence, that mother could be found to have rehabilitated sufficiently to safely return a child to her care.   She relayed to her attorney and the DCF worker that she knew the outcome of this case was a foregone conclusion and in fact, chose not to even attend the trial.

The Child, Laniya G.

Laniya G. was born on July 31, 2008, and spent the first two years of her life in the care of her mother.   After her removal from mother's care in August 2011, she was placed with her paternal aunt, Senoria D., on September 21, 2010, a caretaker with whom she was already familiar.   She has adjusted extremely well to her placement and is firmly attached to her aunt.   Both parents supported this placement decision.   Laniya resides in a six-bedroom home with her aunt, her older brother, Justice, who has been adopted by Senoria D., and Senoria's four biological children.   Laniya is able to visit with other extended family members, including two of her other brothers, who have been adopted by other paternal relatives.   She is able to see her paternal grandmother and cousins.

Laniya is medically up to date and already enrolled in a Community Renewal Team pre-school program.   She has been reaching all of her developmental milestones at appropriate stages and a recent evaluation concluded that she has no medical, behavioral or developmental issues.   The Birth to Three program also evaluated Laniya and reported that she did not need its services.   She loves reading and tries to write as she is already capable, at age 3, of writing her name and some letters.   She carries a pad and pencil with her to jot things down.   She loves singing and dancing, and is described as a loving, exuberant and beautiful child.   She sees her mother most weeks, sometimes calling her “Leah,” sometimes calling her “Mom.” She calls her foster mother “Mommy.”   Aunt Senoria is firmly committed to Laniya and willing to adopt her.   Senoria also is willing (albeit not required), to consider permitting some future contact between Laniya and her parents if it is non-disruptive, respectful and in the child's best interest.

II. ADJUDICATION

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1)

In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.” ³  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009);  In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005);  In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003).  “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001);  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

The department's efforts—numerous referrals to parenting, mental health and substance abuse services, the supervised visits provided, and the foster care and evaluations arranged for Laniya—are more fully set forth above in Section I. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that prior to the adjudicatory date of May 17, 2011, the department made reasonable and appropriate efforts, to the extent possible given the mother's lack of cooperation, to remain aware of mother's location and to promote reunification with her, and these efforts occurred despite years of prior unsuccessful engagement with mother that unfortunately ended with the termination of her parental rights in her older children.   The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, as she failed to complete a single referred service.

2. Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)

The first statutory ground alleged against the mother is that Laniya was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that the mother has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   The court finds that there was a prior adjudication of neglect on December 7, 2010, when Laniya was adjudicated neglected on the basis of being permitted to live under conditions, associations and circumstances injurious to her well-being and committed to DCF's care and custody.

With respect to the first ground alleged for the termination of mother's parental rights, set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i), the factual determination for this court is whether the parent has achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under the statute, that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to responsibly care for Laniya.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B) ] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date, [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the] child's life.”  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

Laniya is currently thriving in a suitable, pre-adoptive foster home, where she is lovingly cared for by her paternal aunt.   She is presently three years old and has been in foster care nearly 18 months.   Since the date of her removal, her mother's circumstances have not improved, and in fact, can be said to have worsened.   Mother no longer has an apartment and relies on frequent moves to the home of friends and relatives.   After Laniya was born and in the first few months after her removal from mother's care, mother was at least attempting to address her substance abuse and mental health issues.   She admitted to “bad decision-making” and agreed she needed to make healthier choices so she could make better choices when Laniya came home.  (Exhibit I.) Prior to Laniya's removal, she has admittedly relapsed, abusing both illegal drugs and alcohol, and has failed to fully and consistently engage in or progress with any form of treatment.   Despite an increase in her feelings of depression while attending her program at ADRC, she failed to follow through with a psychiatric evaluation so she could receive medication to alleviate her depressed state.   She failed to comply with many of her court-ordered specific steps.   Although able to acknowledge what her problems are and fully aware of the dire consequences her failure to address them may cause, mother still has not made the necessary changes in her life to improve in any meaningful way, let alone acquire the necessary skills and insight to accommodate the needs of a very young child.   Her conduct, and her prolonged history of refusing or failing to benefit from treatment for substance abuse and depression, which has resulted in the loss of the custody of all six of her children, do not suggest that it is likely mother will seek the mental health and substance abuse treatment she needs.   As noted in an ADRC progress note dated February 9, 2011, shortly before mother was discharged for non-compliance, mother's “prognosis is poor as client left treatment with ADRC without having connected with staff psychiatrist and had many missed appointment for group.   Client prognosis will be improved should client follow through with referral to Wheeler Clinic ․” (Exhibit I.) Unfortunately, mother did not follow through with services at Wheeler.   Even if she suddenly determined to participate, the course of treatment would require a great length of time for the court to be assured she had achieved a level of rehabilitation such that Laniya could safely be returned to her care, and Laniya has already waited in a state of uncertainty since August 2010 for some form of permanent placement.

On the basis of the factual finding noted above, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date, May 17, 2011, the mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time she will be in a position to assume parenting responsibilities for Laniya.   In light of her total rejection of services since the adjudicatory date, there is no basis for allowing mother any further time for rehabilitation as it would not likely restore her to a useful role as a parent within a reasonable time frame, considering the age and needs of Laniya and the time she already has spent in foster care.   The department has met its burden of proof on this ground.

3. Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E)

The second ground alleged for the termination of mother's rights in the petition is the failure to rehabilitate ground contained in § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).   The department has alleged that mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after Laniya, who is a child under the age of seven, has been previously adjudicated as neglected, and that the mother's parental rights of other children were previously terminated pursuant to petitions filed by DCF. This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E) states in pertinent part:  “[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected ․ is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:  (1) Laniya was adjudicated neglected on December 7, 2010;  (2) she was born on July 31, 2008 and is found to be less than seven years of age as of the adjudicatory date of May 17, 2011;  and (3) DCF successfully prosecuted three prior petitions in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford to terminate mother's parental rights with respect to Dawood G., Xavian W.-S., and Justice G., all of whom have been adopted.

In determining whether mother has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage a belief that she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children, the court adopts the definitions, meanings and findings set forth above in its factual findings where mother's inability or unwillingness to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation is extensively discussed, and the analysis that formed the basis for this court's conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department has proven the mother's failure to rehabilitate under the substantially similar ground set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   Mother has not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could, within any reasonable time, assume a responsible position in the life of Laniya.   Despite the elapse of nearly 18 months since Laniya's removal, she has not even begun to make a serious attempt at rehabilitation and has been unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   Although in the early stages of this case she acknowledged her substance abuse problem, and indicated she was willing to work with any services provided in order to be reunified with Laniya, her participation waned and since March of 2011 she has refused to participate in any services.   There is no point in making Laniya wait any longer for the reformation of one who is so unmotivated despite having endured the loss of multiple other children and the existence of a mother-child bond.   Laniya, a happy and loving child who is exhibiting great promise, has been in foster care far too long and deserves a permanent home.

The department has met its burden of proving ground § 17a–112(j)(3)(E) by clear and convincing evidence.

III. DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the father's consent and the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the trial in this matter was completed, February 6, 2012.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child.  In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 689.   However, the court must first address the seven findings mandated by § 17a–112(k).

1. Seven Mandated Findings— § 17a–112(k)

The court makes the following seven written findings: ⁴

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF repeatedly offered mother timely and appropriate services as contemplated in the specific steps, and that mother was unable or unwilling to engage in the services offered.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with Laniya to the extent possible given the mother's failure to cooperate with offered services.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds DCF offered mother and Laniya the services contemplated by the specific steps and that the mother did not engage in appropriate services and did not comply with the court ordered specific steps.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does have an emotional bond with her mother, who despite some periods of indifference, has fairly maintained contact with Laniya.   However, Laniya is equally, if not more fully bonded to her foster mother, whom she calls “Mommy,” and whom she depends on for care, affection and support.   Laniya has resided with her aunt since September 2010, and her aunt, who has already adopted Laniya's older brother, wishes to adopt her.   The foster mother, who testified at trial, is providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral, medical and educational support that Laniya needs.   The court was extremely impressed with the foster mother's care, knowledge and concern for the welfare of Laniya and her brother.

(5) As to the age of the child, Laniya is three years old.

(6) As to the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that for the past six months, the mother has maintained regular and consistent contact with the child.   The foster mother severed communication with mother due to mother's inappropriate demeanor during conversations with the foster mother.   The court further finds that the mother is unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life due to her unwillingness or inability to participate in offered services to address the deficiencies that have led to her poor parenting decisions.   Giving the mother additional time would not likely enable her to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited within a time frame beneficial to the child.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by DCF, the other parent, the foster mother or any other third party.   Mother's failures are self-created due to her lack of adaptability.

2. Best Interest Finding

With respect to the best interest of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Leah W.-S. and Levar G., by his consent, to Laniya G. is in her best interest.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for a child as young as Laniya.   She is now thriving in a foster home where she is very well cared for by her relative foster mother, who is fully committed to her.   For over a decade, mother has been consistently unable to execute a responsible parental role.   Father has not completed any programs or services since this case began and has not visited Laniya consistently.   Neither parent is in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child at this time or in the near future.   Laniya's aunt is willing to adopt her, and this placement will allow Laniya continued contact with some of her siblings and three of her sibling and other relatives.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care—nearly 18 months—and the nature of her relationship with her foster parent and biological parents.

IV. Permanency Plan

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.

CONCLUSION

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Leah W.-S. and Levar G., upon his consent, are hereby terminated as to Laniya G.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Laniya G.

A case status report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, on March 9, 2012 and quarterly status reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.   The next motion for review of Laniya's permanency plan shall be due on May 10, 2012 and a hearing on the plan will be held on June 21, 2012 at 12:00 P.M.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at 920 Broad Street, Hartford, CT 06106 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

KELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. DCF moved the court to take judicial notice of the fact that mother's rights to her five older children were previously terminated.   However, the location of the court that entered such judgments with respect to the two older children was not provided, and a computer check turned up no record of those children's files.   Accordingly, the court is taking judicial notice of the judgments of termination entered in the Juvenile Matters court at Hartford for Dawood G., Xavian W.-S., and Justice G., all pursuant to petitions filed by DCF..  FN2. DCF moved the court to take judicial notice of the fact that mother's rights to her five older children were previously terminated.   However, the location of the court that entered such judgments with respect to the two older children was not provided, and a computer check turned up no record of those children's files.   Accordingly, the court is taking judicial notice of the judgments of termination entered in the Juvenile Matters court at Hartford for Dawood G., Xavian W.-S., and Justice G., all pursuant to petitions filed by DCF.

FN3. This predicate finding is not required when a parent consents. § 17a–112(i)..  FN3. This predicate finding is not required when a parent consents. § 17a–112(i).

FN4. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Levar G..  FN4. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Levar G.

Keller, Christine E., J.