Joseph Siwek, Jr. v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (No. 103)

The motion for summary judgment now before the court raises an issue of fundamental importance in underinsured motorist (UIM) law.   The problem is this.   A plaintiff, covered by a UIM policy, is injured by an underinsured motorist.   The plaintiff sues the motorist.   The case against the motorist goes to arbitration and, after a hearing, the arbitrator makes a finding as to the plaintiff's damages.   Dissatisfied with the damages he has recovered from the motorist, the plaintiff subsequently sues his insurance company seeking UIM benefits.   Does the arbitrator's determination of damages in the first action against the motorist have preclusive effect in the UIM action?   For the reasons stated below, the answer to this question is Yes.

The relevant facts, described in the submissions of the parties, are not contested.   The plaintiff, Joseph Siwek, Jr. (“Siwek”), holds a UIM policy with the defendant, Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Metropolitan”).  On February 21, 2008, Siwek was injured by a motor vehicle operated by Medina Snipes (“Snipes”).

In 2009, Siwek commenced an action against Snipes, seeking damages for his injuries.  Siwek v. Snipes, No. CV09–5031976 (N.H.J.D.).   The matter was referred to arbitration.   On January 4, 2011, following a contested hearing in which Siwek participated, the arbitrator determined that Siwek's total damages were $25,129.66.

Snipes was covered by an insurance policy with a $25,000 limit.   This amount has been paid to Siwek.

In February 2011, Siwek commenced the present action against Metropolitan.   His complaint consists of a single count seeking UIM benefits “for the total amount of damages sustained as a result of said incident.”

On September 15, 2011, Metropolitan filed a special defense claiming that, “The plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues [sic] of damages.”

On the same date, Metropolitan filed the Motion for Summary Judgment now before the court.   The Motion claims that, “the issue as to fair, just and reasonable damages was decided by [the] arbitrator ․ Therefore, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating damages in this action.”

The Motion was argued on February 6, 2012.   Supplemental briefs were filed on February 21, 2012.

The substantive point at issue is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Siwek from relitigating the amount of his damages.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action ․ For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action.   It must also have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment ․ The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991).  (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  Jones abandoned the mutuality of parties rule, reasoning that, “To allow a party who has fully and fairly litigated an issue at a prior trial to avoid the force of a ruling against him simply because he later finds himself faced by a different opponent is inappropriate and unnecessary.”  Id., at 302.

The issue of whether a prior arbitration award has the same collateral estoppel effect as a prior judgment of a court has not been conclusively determined by a Connecticut reviewing court, although the Appellate Court has suggested in dicta that such preclusive effect exists.  Young v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 60 Conn.App. 107, 118–19, 758 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 906, 762 A.2d 912 (2000).   This conclusion comports with Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 196, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996), holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to “the claims that were actually decided” in a prior arbitration proceeding, and Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 84(1) (1982) (ditto).

Siwek does not dispute the general principle that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to claims actually decided in a prior arbitration.   He conceded, at argument, that if the arbitrator had found that he had run a red light, that decision would be preclusive on the question of which motorist had run the red light in his subsequent UIM litigation against Metropolitan.

Siwek's claim is that the issue of damages is different.   In this regard, he relies on Atlas v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 622 (2009), which reasons that the amount of damages is “an issue that is less susceptible to a yes-or-no, up-or-down determination than other issues in a personal injury claim proceeding.”  Id., at 624.

Atlas, however, cannot be reconciled with Gionfriddo v. Gartenhouse Café, 15 Conn.App. 392, 546 A.2d 284 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 211 Conn. 67, 557 A.2d 540 (1989).   Gionfriddo's decedent was killed by a drunk driver.   He initially brought a wrongful death action against the tortfeasor and was awarded a judgment satisfied in full by the defendants in that first action.   Gionfriddo next brought an action against the vendor that had provided alcoholic beverages to the tortfeasor.   Under these circumstances, the Appellate Court held that, “the plaintiff is estopped from relitigating the issue of compensatory damages.”  Id., at 405.   The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed on the ground that “litigant may recover just damages only once.”  211 Conn., at 72.   The Supreme Court did not reach the collateral estoppel issue;  id., at 76 n. 11;  leaving the Appellate Court's reasoning on that issue undisturbed.   Given this precedent, it is apparent that, under established Connecticut law, a prior determination of damages has the preclusive effect as the prior determination of any other issue.   There is no special quality to the determination of damages that takes it out of the collateral estoppel rule.  Atlas 's holding to the contrary must give way to this precedent.

Under these circumstances, the resolution of the issue presented is clear.   Siwek had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question of damages before the arbitrator.   The arbitrator made a clear finding as to this contested issue.   Although Siwek contends that damages are different, he does not contest the principle that an arbitrator's prior determination of a contested issue ordinarily has preclusive effect.  Gionfriddo makes it clear that a prior determination of damages has the same preclusive effect as the determination of any other issue.   It logically follows that the arbitrator's prior determination of damages has preclusive effect here.   See Miles v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 589 N.E.2d 314 (Mass.1992).

The motion now before the court, filed by Metropolitan, asks for summary judgment.   At the hearing, however, it turned out to be common ground that summary judgment, at least in the traditional sense, cannot enter for Metropolitan here, even if it is correct on the merits of the issue presented.   This is because, even under its own theory, Metropolitan still owes Siwek money.   The arbitrator found Siwek's total damages to be $25,129.66.   The parties agree that Siwek has been paid $25,000.   Therefore, even under Metropolitan's theory, Metropolitan still owes Siwek $129.66.

Given these circumstances, Metropolitan has abandoned its request that summary judgment enter for the defendant.   Instead, it suggests that summary judgment should enter for the plaintiff in the amount of $129.66 plus costs.

The Court invited Siwek to file a supplemental brief opposing Metropolitan's suggestion if he was, in fact, opposed.   Siwek has not done so.  (He has instead filed a supplemental brief focusing exclusively on other matters.)   Under these circumstances, the Court will consider Metropolitan's suggestion as to the form of the judgment to be unopposed.

The Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in that judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $129.66 plus costs.

Jon C. Blue

Judge of the Superior Court

Blue, Jon C., J.