Laura Woodie v. New Haven Housing Authority (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (No. 108)

The Motion For Summary Judgment now before the Court contends that the plaintiff, Laura Woodie, a terminated employee of the defendant, New Haven Housing Authority (NHHA), is unable to establish the cause of action under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–51q set forth in the Second Count of her Complaint.   The Motion was argued on February 21, 2012.   For the reasons briefly stated below, the Motion must be denied.

The facts presented by the parties are exceptionally muddy.   Looked at in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Woodie told two NHHA supervisors that an Occupancy Specialist employed by NHHA was handling the file of a resident who was that employee's cousin.   NHHA admits in its brief that the asserted relationship was “extremely significant” because it is against NHHA's policy “for an Occupancy Specialist to handle a family member's file.”  (NHHA's Brief, at 2.)

The NHHA's Brief principally relies on an assertion that NHHA “investigated these accusations and determined that they were false.”  (Id.) NHHA, however, effectively abandoned the “falsehood” argument at the hearing when confronted with a State Employment Security Appeals Division decision finding that NHHA's own version of the events in question was not credible.

NHHA's attorney represented that she was unaware of the Employment Security Appeals Division decision when she filed her brief.   Nothing daunted, however, the attorney alternatively claimed that, even if everything Woodie said was true, her communication did not raise a matter of public concern.   The Court disagrees.   Woodie's communication involved more than an internal employment policy.   It involved what NHHA itself concedes is an “extremely significant” policy designed to prevent favoritism and corruption in the disbursement of public funds.

NHHA's fallback position is that Woodie cannot claim the benefits of § 31–51q because she was acting pursuant to her “official duties” when she made her communications.   Unhappily, neither party has submitted a shred of evidence—no job description, no contract, no employee handbook, no anything—as to just what Woodie's “official duties” actually were.   Given this vacuum in the evidence now before the Court, the Motion For Summary Judgment must be denied.

Jon C. Blue

Judge of the Superior Court

Blue, Jon C., J.