Terrell Staton v. The Warden, State Prison (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

It's well-established that in order to establish claim of ineffective assistance counsel the petitioner has the burden to show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, had it not been for the counsel's deficient performance.

To satisfy the performance prong the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Under the second prong of the test, prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.

Ultimately, the bench mark for judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be whether the conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process, that the trial cannot be relied on to having produced a just result.

When assessing trial counsel's performance the Habeas Court is required to indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

In the petitioner's complaint the petitioner essentially makes two claims:  One is premised on whether the petitioner's attorney, Attorney Tunnard, failed to properly cross-examine certain witnesses.   There was no testimony on this claim, so this claim the court finds for the state.

With respect to the primary claim in this case, which is that Attorney Tunnard was ineffective because she failed to call Warren Battle to the stand and/or failed to seek a capias against him, the court finds for the state.

With respect to a claim involving whether to call or not call a witness, there is a strong presumption that the trial strategy employed by the criminal defense counsel is reasonable as a result of the exercise of professional judgment.

The failure of defense counsel to call a potential witness does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless there's some strong showing that the testimony would have been helpful in establishing the asserted defense.

With respect to the first prong of the test, the court finds that Attorney Tunnard knew from reports in her own discussion with Mr. Battle that his testimony would not be helpful to the petitioner's case, and in effect would hurt the petitioner's case;  she, therefore, chose not to call him.   That was appropriate and legitimate trial strategy on her part and therefore the court finds the petitioner has not met his burden on that first prong.

With respect to the second prong, the court finds that the petitioner has not shown that there's a reasonable probability of the outcome of—that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different in view of Officer Michael Peterson of the Danbury Police Department's testimony identifying the petitioner as the person who left the scene of the crime, who he saw personally, and then chased through the neighborhood and ultimately arrested.

Accordingly, the court finds all the issues for the state of Connecticut.   Judgment shall enter for the state.

THE COURT:  Is there anything else?

ATTY. LEDFORD:  No, Your Honor.

(Indiscernible)—appropriate appeal paperwork.

THE COURT:  Okay.

THE CLERK:  I'm handing to the marshal the appeal papers.

THE COURT:  All right.   Anything else?

ATTY. MACCHIARULO:  No, Your Honor.   Thank you.

THE COURT:  All right.   Thank you.   And have a good afternoon.

Cobb, J.

Cobb, Susan Quinn, J.