Karlos Rodriguez v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this case, the plaintiff, Karlos Rodriguez, worked for Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC in Taftville, CT, from March 30, 2010 to September 23, 2010.   He disagreed with a medical examination that cleared him to return to regular duty following recovery from a work-related injury.   His employer required him to return to work, but he felt he had not yet fully recovered, so he quit.   His application for unemployment compensation was initially approved by an administrator on the grounds that he voluntarily left suitable work with good cause attributable to the employer.   The employer appealed, and the administrator's decision was affirmed by an appeals referee.   However, on further appeal to the Board of Review, the Board reversed the prior decisions and denied benefits, finding that the plaintiff left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause.   Now, on further appeal to this court the plaintiff again argues that he should be found eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.   The defendant has filed a Motion for Judgment seeking judgment in its favor.   For the following reasons, the court upholds the decision of the board of review.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion for judgment is granted, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

The record discloses the following facts:  The plaintiff was employed by Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC in Taftville, CT, from March 30, 2010 to September 23, 2010.   He sustained a work-related injury on May 25, 2010.   In July 2010, the employer sent him to its company doctor, Lisa N. Anderson, M.D., at Concentra Medical Centers.   Dr. Anderson diagnosed the claimant with an abdominal wall strain, and restricted him to light duty.   On September 20, 2010, Dr. Anderson reevaluated the plaintiff and released him for regular duty.   The plaintiff disagreed with Dr. Anderson's assessment.   He asked her to conduct some physical testing to determine whether he was capable of lifting, but she declined.

On September 21, 2010, the plaintiff told the employer's loss prevention assistant, Jasmin Gonzalez, that he disagreed with Dr. Anderson's opinion and that he believed he was unable to return to regular duty.   Gonzalez informed the plaintiff that the employer would not continue to keep him on light duty unless it had a doctor's note restricting him to light duty.   However, Gonzalez offered to send the plaintiff back to Dr. Anderson for that same day, before the plaintiff returned to regular duty.   The plaintiff declined Gonzalez's offer.   On September 22, 2010, the plaintiff attempted to perform regular duty work.   On September 23, 2010, the claimant told Gonzalez that he was resigning in order to attend to personal matters, and that he would like to be rehired when he was ready.

Based on its review of the record, the Board of Review disagreed with the earlier decisions finding that the claimant needed to leave the job because of his medical condition.   The only medical evidence in the record concerning the plaintiff's condition at the time of his resignation was Dr. Anderson's note releasing the plaintiff for regular duty on September 20, 2010.   While the claimant eventually sought treatment from a physician who restricted him to light duty for two weeks effective June 9, 2011, that doctor's note was dated nearly nine month after the claimant's resignation, and did not express an opinion regarding the claimant's ability to work in September 2010.   Essentially, the administrator did not accept the plaintiff's version of the events, and found that the plaintiff left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause.   It also found that the plaintiff did not explore reasonable alternatives to leaving the job.   To the contrary, it found that the plaintiff declined the employer's offer to have him reevaluated.

The Board ruled that General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits if it is found that the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer.   Good cause for leaving a job exists where the working conditions directly cause a health problem or where the conditions aggravate a preexisting condition.  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31–236–22(a)(1)(C).  A plaintiff is required to explore reasonable alternatives to leaving the job by expressing his or her dissatisfaction with the working conditions to the employer and seeking a remedy through reasonably available means.  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31–236–22(a)(2).   In this case, the Board found that the plaintiff left suitable employment voluntarily and without exploring reasonable alternatives.   The plaintiff thence appealed to this court.

In his court appeal, plaintiff repeats the arguments that he earlier presented, unsuccessfully, to the Board in support of his application for benefits.

The court's standard of review in an unemployment compensation appeal is limited.  “To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31–249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review.”  Latina v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159, 733 A.2d 885 (1999) quoting Mattatuck Museum–Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 276, 679 A.2d 347 (1996).   Both the findings of subordinate facts and the reasonable conclusions of fact made by the agency are binding on this court.  Id. Should the issue involve a question of law, however, the court's review responsibility is broader.   The court must determine “whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts.”  Id. While a court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.  Id.

In the present case, the court is bound by the findings of subordinate facts and reasonable conclusions of the board.   The plaintiff never sought to correct the board's factual findings and, thus, he is precluded from attacking the factual findings.   See, Practice Book § 22–4;  JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422–23, 828 A.2d 609 (2003) (court cannot review evidence in record when plaintiff failed to file motion to correct the findings of the board).

The court finds that the board's conclusion that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer is supported by the findings of fact, and is reasonably drawn from those facts.   The court further observes that the plaintiff offers no new grounds for reversal on appeal.   This court finds that the board ruled fairly and within its authority, and it will not reverse that determination.   The case turned on the credibility and persuasiveness of the witnesses.   The agency found the plaintiff to be not credible, and the employer's arguments to be persuasive.   This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency on those points.   It is generally the province of the agency, as trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence.   Howell v. Administrator, 174 Conn. 529, 532, 391 A.2d 165 (1978).   The agency acted fairly within the scope of its adjudicatory powers.   The board's decision correctly applies the law to the facts found and it is rational and logical, and not unreasonable or arbitrary.   The decision is upheld.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion for Judgment is granted, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed accordingly.

THE COURT

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge, Superior Court

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.