Jason Czar et al. v. Gary Ruot et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS # 170

The court granted permission for the third-party plaintiffs, Gary Ruot and Jennifer Ruot, to implead the third-party defendant, William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. (Raveis).  On December 5, 2011, Raveis filed a timely motion to dismiss claiming lack of personal jurisdiction on two grounds:  insufficient service of process and insufficiency of process.   On January 6, 2012, the Ruots filed a memorandum in opposition.   The court heard oral argument and evidence at the short calendar on January 17, 2012.

Raveis maintains that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because service was not made upon the proper person pursuant to General Statutes § 52–57(c).  The statute provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n actions against a private corporation, service of process shall be made either upon [listed officers] ․ or upon any person who is at the time of service in charge of the office of the corporation in the town in which its ․ place of business is located.”   Service was made on Christine Allard, a receptionist and backup administrative assistant in Raveis' Milford office on November 21, 2008.   The court heard testimony from Allard and from the marshal, William Stuart.   Neither Allard nor Stuart had a specific recollection of that day.   Stuart's return indicated that Allard was the “person in charge and person authorized to accept service.   Testimony established that it was possible that Allard was the person in charge of the office, if her supervisor was out of the office;  that Allard's duties and responsibilities made it “reasonably certain that the corporation [would] be apprised of service made upon [her]”;  Nelson v. Stop and Shop Companies, Inc., 25 Conn.App. 637, 642, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 924 (1991);  that, based on his usual practices, Stuart would not have served her if she were not the person in charge, and that there is no question that Raveis received actual notice of the suit.   The court finds that Allard was the person in charge and was therefore authorized to accept service on November 21, 2008.   The motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

The other ground asserted in Raveis' motion is that the process was insufficient because the Ruots served “William Raveis Real Estate” and not “William Raveis Real Estate, Incorporated.”   It is well settled that such a defect is a misnomer, which does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.   General Statutes § 52–123;  see also Rock Rimmon Grange # 142, Inc. v. The Bible Speaks Ministries, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 410, 414–15 (2005).   As the court indicated at argument, the motion to dismiss on this ground is also denied.   The Ruots motion for permission to amend the pleadings is granted.

The motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.

The Court

By Hiller, J.

Hiller, Arthur A., J.