Michelle Bobola v. Day Kimball Hospital (2012)

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFTER REARGUMENT

This case is an action by the plaintiff, Michelle Bobola, against the defendant, Day Kimball Hospital.   The complaint is in one count for negligent infliction of emotional distress.   Plaintiff alleges that the defendant wrongfully accused her of falsifying her time card, and terminated her from employment as a nurse, after she left work two hours early on Christmas Day in 2010.   The defendant has moved to strike the complaint, and to strike plaintiff's request for attorneys fees.   The court earlier granted the motion to strike, but granted reargument at plaintiff's request.   Following reargument and reconsideration, the court, nevertheless, reaffirms its earlier decision.   For the following reasons, the defendant's motion is granted.

I

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

“[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 252.   Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.

II

The plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the defendant as a registered nurse for ten years prior to her termination on January 6, 2011.   Three days before Christmas Day, 2010, the plaintiff had a discussion with her supervisor, Ralph Miro, R.N., clinical coordinator, about leaving early on holidays.   He said that his “goal” was to let people leave early to spend time with their families on holidays if the volume of patients was low and there were no departmental needs, and if the on-duty supervisory staff approved the early departure.   On Christmas Day, 2010, the plaintiff was working on a regular shift from 7:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. She asked Barbara Domaleski, RN, who was in charge of the shift, if it was okay to leave two hours early.   Ms. Domaleski said she didn't want to make the decision whether to let the plaintiff leave early, but it was okay to leave if plaintiff's supervisor gave permission.   Plaintiff then called her nursing supervisor, Lucile Guibault, who said it was okay to leave early if the other nurses said that it was okay.   Plaintiff then asked the other registered nurses on duty if they would mind if she left two hours early.   All agreed that the emergency room was slow that day, and that it was acceptable to them if plaintiff left at 5:30 p.m. Plaintiff left work at 5:30 p.m. On her time card, she wrote “home early OK'd by Ralph and NSA.”

On January 6, 2011, the plaintiff was terminated.   The reason given was that she intentionally falsified her time card.

Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully accused of falsifying her time card.   She alleges that the hospital knew or should have known that she followed instructions and procedures for obtaining permission to leave early, and that she received such permission.   She claims that the hospital should have realized that terminating her under these facts involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress, that such distress might result in illness or bodily harm, and that its negligent conduct caused her to suffer severe emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and depression.   She seeks money damages and attorneys fees.

III

ANegligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant argues, first, that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts stating a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in this matter.   The court agrees.

“To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff is required to prove that (1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress;  (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable;  (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm;  and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Szekeres v. Szekers, 126 Conn.App. 829, 844–45, 16 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 939, 17 A.3d 475 (2011).   “Thus, [t]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 490, 998 A.2d 1221 (2010).

“The foreseeability requirement in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is more specific than the standard negligence requirement that an actor should have foreseen that his tortious conduct was likely to cause harm ․ In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stancuna v. Schaffer, Id. “[T]he foreseeability of the precise nature of the harm to be anticipated [is] a prerequisite to recovery even where a breach of duty might otherwise be found.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 754, 792 A.2d 752 (2002).

In the employment termination context, our Supreme Court has added to these requirements.  “[N]egligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process.   The mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself, enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted;  emphasis added.)  Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 88–89, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).   There must be evidence that the “manner of the plaintiff's termination from employment was different ․ from the usual termination of employment or that it was done in any way that would cause anything more than the normal upset that would result from any termination of employment.”  Chieffalo v. Norden Systems, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 474, 481, 714 A.2d 1261 (1998).  “The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.”  Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. 89.

The plaintiff's complaint clearly challenges the reason for her termination, but it shows nothing unusual about the manner of her termination.  Chieffalo v. Norden Systems, Inc., supra, 49 Conn.App. 481.   There is no showing of “sufficiently wrongful” or “particularly egregious” conduct during the process.  Perodeau v. Hartford, supra, 259 Conn. 751, 555;  Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 571, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).   There is no showing of unreasonable conduct in the way she was terminated.   See, generally, S. Harris, 14 Connecticut Practice Series:  Connecticut Employment Law § 2:2 at p. 95 (2005).   Therefore, the complaint is ordered stricken in its entirety.

B

Attorneys Fees

Second, defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims for attorneys fees should be stricken because there is no legal authority for such an award under the allegations in this complaint.   The plaintiff does not dispute the point.   Accordingly, the motion is granted on that ground as well.

IV

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.

THE COURT

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge Superior Court

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.