LLC v. Mary Taylor et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The court heard this matter as a hearing in damages on June 24, 2011, and again on December 1, 2011.   Mary Taylor has been a resident at the plaintiff Laurel Woods Health Care Center since about November 20, 2008.   According to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 the charge for her residence and care has been about $415.00 per day.   Exhibit 1 reveals that between the dates of 5/1/09 and 3/31/10 Mary was billed for $138,110.00 and, as of 6/6/11 a “total due of $248,448.00.”   The evidence disclosed, however, that the plaintiff has received additional payments on said owed sum in the form of social security payments received each month well as the proceeds from the sale of Mary's condominium unit.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 page 3, reveals that social security payments of $351.00 monthly are received by the plaintiff pursuant to an assignment of same made to the plaintiff.   However, as to Mary Taylor's bill, beginning 7/8/10, the outstanding balance owed is only credited with monthly payments of $281.00.   That is, approximately $70.00 per month is retained by the plaintiff to cover “personal expenses” incurred by Mary. As to what those total expenses each month are, the court has no evidence.

Lawrence Taylor, Sr., Mary's son, was appointed conservator of Mary's Estate by the Probate Court of East Haven in January 2009.   At this time Mr. Taylor was gainfully employed.   While conservator, Mr. Taylor, with the aid of the defendant, arranged for the transfer of Mary Taylor's monthly social security payments to the plaintiff and, further did not object to the sale of Mary's condominium which resulted in the proceeds of sale in the amount of $28,278.60 going to the plaintiff which was applied to reduce Mary's debt to the plaintiff.   According to the plaintiff this amount was applied first to the oldest balance owed by Mary to the defendant for her care.   These condominium proceeds were received by the plaintiff in May of 2011.

According to the testimony and resulting transcript, the plaintiff is claiming a bill in the amount of $324,794.40.   Of this amount, the claim against Lawrence Taylor is from the “day after he filed bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, up until the day that he was removed as the conservator on December 30, 2010.”   This claim against Lawrence is in the amount of $248,448.

“By the common law there is no legal duty resting on a son to support a parent.”  Condon v. Pomeroy–Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 612, 48 A. 756 (1901).   Although Sec. 17b–81, entitled “Investigation of legally liable relatives ․,” gives the welfare commissioner the duty to “investigate the financial condition of each legally liable relative, ․” [and] make a determination as to the financial ability of each such relative ․,” nevertheless, the plaintiff in this case is not a welfare Commissioner, and the court finds that this statute does not empower the plaintiff to enforce a support order or contribution from the defendant in this case as Lawrence Taylor is not a “legally liable relative.”

It appears to the court that the assigning of social security checks as well as condominium sale proceeds to the plaintiff accomplished in depleting Mary Taylor's assets so as to enable the plaintiff to apply and receive Title 19 benefits for her account.   The amount of such benefits, however, is unknown to the court.

While conservator of his mother's estate, Lawrence Taylor wrote four (4) checks to himself from his mother's account between the dates of February 17, 2009 and April 26, 2010.   These checks had the following designations on them:  “costs”;  “Time and money reimbursement”;  “personal accounting spending”;  and “reimbursement for time.”   The checks totaled $7,320.   There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Taylor received probate court approval for these checks.   As a conservator of an estate the court believes that a conservator is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in fulfilling his duties as conservator.   However, the court believes that the amount of said claimed compensation must be submitted to and approved by the probate court, which was not done in this case.

Accordingly, judgment shall enter for the defendant as against the plaintiff together with taxable costs.

David W. Skolnick

Judge Trial Referee

Skolnick, David W., J.T.R.