Nicholas J. Caruso v. Yale University (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 102)

FACTS

This action arises out of the affiliation between the plaintiff, Nicholas J. Caruso, as a student with the defendant, Yale University, and the subsequent termination of that relationship.   The plaintiff, on December 16, 2010, filed an eight-count complaint, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statues § 42–110a, et seq.  (“CUTPA”).  The complaint contains the following factual allegations which are common to all counts at issue in the defendant's motion to strike.

In 2007, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant in which the plaintiff was awarded a fellowship as a student at the Yale Urban Design Workshop of the Yale School of Architecture.   Pursuant to that contract, the defendant was obligated to educate the plaintiff, permit the plaintiff to complete the term to realize the benefits of the fellowship position, and effectively and fairly handle student complaints and grievances.   In 2008, fellow students went to the defendant with claims that the plaintiff “was the next Virginia Tech killer and planned to attack the school.”   The defendant, in response, denied the plaintiff the opportunity to defend himself against these outrageous false statements, file a grievance, or review the accusations made against him.   Instead, the defendant forced the plaintiff to choose between expulsion or involuntary leave of absence, with the plaintiff choosing to take a leave of absence.   The defendant knew or should have known that the outrageous accusations made against the plaintiff were false.   The defendant, after placing the plaintiff on involuntary leave of absence, acknowledged the falsity of the allegations yet refused to immediately reinstate the plaintiff to his fellowship position.   Further, Alan Plattus, an employee, agent, or officer of the defendant, informed the plaintiff's previous employer of the false claims, resulting in that employer refusing to permit the plaintiff to work as an employee.   The defendant breached its contractual promises by failing to safeguard the plaintiff from these false accusations of misconduct, investigate and deal with the charges of misconduct, failed to educate plaintiff and permit the plaintiff to complete the term and realize the benefits of the fellowship position.   As a result of the defendant's breach of contract, the plaintiff was subjected to outrageous false accusations, subjected to involuntary leave from school, subjected to medical scrutiny without basis, loss of his fellowship position, and irreparable harm to his academic record, and personal and professional reputation.   The defendant's breach constitutes a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   Further factual allegations will be set forth as necessary pursuant to each count.

On February 24, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts two, three, and four.   The defendant also moves to strike the portion of the claim for relief in count one seeking punitive damages and attorneys fees.   The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike on November 4, 2011.   Oral argument on the motion to strike was heard on November 7, 2011.   The defendant, with permission of the court, subsequently filed a memorandum in reply to the objection to the motion to strike on November 14, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   A motion to strike shall also be used when a party challenges “the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint ․” Practice Book § 10–39.   The motion to strike “shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency.”  Practice Book § 10–41.  “We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotations marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).

The defendant moves to strike on the ground that counts two, three, and four fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.   Count two asserts a claim for breach of contract by way of arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct.   Count three alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress.   And count four sets forth facts alleging a CUTPA violation.   Specifically, the defendant moves to strike count two “because it is nothing more than a second breach of contract claim.”   Count three should be stricken “because the plaintiff has failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant ․” And count four should be stricken “because the plaintiff has not alleged substantial aggravating factors that transform his breach of contract claim into a CUTPA violation.”   The defendant also moves to strike the portion of the claim for relief in the breach of contract claim in count one which seeks punitive damages and attorneys fees “because such damages are unavailable in a breach of contract action.”   The plaintiff counters that the allegations of the challenged counts are sufficiently pled.

I

Count Two:  Breach of Contract (Arbitrary, Capricious, or Bad Faith)

The plaintiff, in count two, incorporates his allegations from count one alleging breach of contract, and further alleges that the “actions of the defendant were arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith.”   The defendant moves to strike count two on the ground that “it is nothing more than a second breach of contract claim.”   Thus, the defendant has moved to strike count two because it is duplicative of count one which asserts breach of contract.

“[T]here is no explicit appellate authority on the issue of the proper vehicle for the elimination of duplicative claims ․ A split of authority exists within the Superior Court regarding how the duplication of claims should be addressed ․ [A] majority of Superior Court cases ․ [have] held that [a] request to revise, and not a motion to strike, is the proper procedural device for deletion of duplicative pleadings ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Wirth v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5012844 (January 14, 2010, Swienton, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 211, 214) (collecting cases).   Furthermore, Practice Book § 10–35 provides, in relevant part, that “Whenever any party desires to obtain ․ (2) the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party's pleading ․ the party desiring any such amendment may file a timely request to revise that pleading.”

This court follows the majority view that a motion to strike is an improper procedural vehicle for the elimination of duplicative or repetitive counts.¹  Connecticut case law, along with the plain language of § 10–35, makes clear that the motion to strike is improper because a challenge based upon needless repetition in pleadings merely seeks clarification of the complaint, more appropriate for a request to revise;  it does not, however challenge the inherent legal sufficiency of the allegations.   See Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 279, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988) (“the proper way to cure any confusion [regarding the complaint] is to file a [request] to revise, not a motion to strike”).   Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike count two.

II

Count Three:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In count three, the plaintiff has alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff relies on the basic factual allegations, and further alleges in the third count that the actions of the defendant were:  “extreme and outrageous;” “intentional;” “likely to cause severe emotional distress;” and, “caused the plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional distress.”   The defendant has moved to strike count three on the ground that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support that the conduct was extreme and outrageous.

There are four elements which the plaintiff must plead and prove to prevail on his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  “It must be shown:  (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;  (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;  and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).  “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind ․ [I]t is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).

“[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function.   In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ․ set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous.   In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).  “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.   Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!  ․ Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).

In particular regard to the present action, two cases are illustrative of the level of conduct that has been found to be insulting or offensive, yet insufficient to rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   In Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 211–12, the facts alleged that a school principal made condescending comments about a plaintiff teacher in front of her colleagues, including questioning her vision and ability to read.   Further, the plaintiff was subjected to two psychiatric examinations at the school board's request.   The plaintiff was forced to take an involuntary leave of absence and the principal called the police to escort her out of the school building.   Although the court stated it did not condone the treatment of the plaintiff, the court found that “the defendants' actions in the present case were not so atrocious as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” and, as a result, “insufficient to form the basis of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Id., 213.   Similarly, in Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn.App. 230, 22 A.3d 697 (2011), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in prolonged conduct intending to inflict emotional distress on the plaintiff.   The alleged conduct included that the defendant:  deliberately misinformed the plaintiff about a directive from his superior, thereby placing him at risk of violating work rules;  falsely reported to others that the plaintiff engaged in outbursts and irrational behavior;  became “violently angry” at the plaintiff such that he feared for his physical safety and on one occasion looked directly at the plaintiff and said:  “Bang. Bang.” Id., 232–33.   Despite these alleged acts, which the court acknowledged were distressing and hurtful to the plaintiff, the conduct alleged by the defendant was found to be “not so atrocious as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” so as to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id., 237.

In the present case, reasonable minds would not differ regarding the conclusion that the conduct the plaintiff alleges does not rise to the level of outrageousness “so atrocious as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Indeed, the conduct alleged here, which in many ways typifies a strained relationship between a student and university administration, does not rise to the level of acts described above in Appleton or Cassotto;  both cases in which the conduct was found to be insufficient to support a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff's claim arises from allegations that fellow students went to the defendant and accused the plaintiff of being “the next Virginia Tech Killer and planned to attack the school.”   Importantly, it was not actually the defendant that made this inflammatory claim, which is seemingly the allegation with the most potential for outrage and distressful impact.   The plaintiff's allegations of the defendant's conduct primarily concern the school's unsatisfactory response to the accusation, such as its refusal to permit the plaintiff the opportunity to defend himself, file a grievance, or review the accusations and learn the names of his fellow student accusers.   The plaintiff alleges that instead, he was forced to take an involuntary leave of absence and subjected, without basis, to medical scrutiny, and was not reinstated to his fellowship position, despite the defendant acknowledging the falsity of the accusations.

These allegations are insufficient to form the basis of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as they do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as defined in Connecticut case law.   In addition to Appleton and Cassotto, our Supreme and Appellate Courts have consistently found allegations of an even more severe level of conduct to not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.   See, e.g., Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, supra, 101 Conn.App. 568–70 (conduct not outrageous where supervisor conspired with superintendent in pattern of harassment of school custodian including denial of position, initiating disciplinary actions without proper investigation, defamation of character and intimidation);  Dollard v. Board of Education, 63 Conn.App. 550, 552–53, 777 A.2d 714 (2001) (supervisors engaged in concerted and successful plan to force plaintiff to resign by hypercritically examining her professional and personal conduct, transferring her involuntarily, placing her under intensive supervision and publicly admonishing her).   Our courts have reasoned that “plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Davis v. Davis, 112 Conn.App. 56, 67, 962 A.2d 140 (2009).   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the third count of the complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress is granted.

III

Count Four:  CUTPA

In count four, the plaintiff sets forth a claim that the defendant violated CUTPA, and incorporates its allegations of breach of contract, and further asserts the following.   The actions of the defendant were “unfair or deceptive, offend public policy, as established by statute, common law, or other established concepts of unfairness.”   The actions were taken in “the course of trade or commerce ․ a private educational institution providing services in return for a fee.”   The acts of the defendant are “immoral, unethical, oppressive and unscrupulous” and “caused substantial injury to consumers” and “constitute a violation of Connecticut General Statutes Section 42–110a.”   The defendant moves to strike the fourth count on the ground that “the plaintiff has not alleged substantial aggravating factors that transform his breach of contract claim into a CUTPA violation.”

“It is well settled that in determining whether [an act or] practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when [an act or] practice is unfair ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Normand Josef Enterprise, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn. 486, 522, 646 A.2d 1289 (1994).   Courts in Connecticut consider “(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;  (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;  (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers ․ Thus, a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice ․ or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 424, 433–34, 849 A.2d 382 (2004).

In the present case, the plaintiff bases his CUTPA claim on the same set of alleged facts as he asserts for his breach of contract claim.   It is well settled that a CUTPA cause of action may arise from a breach of contract, however “not every contractual breach rises to the level of a CUTPA violation.”  Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 228, 990 A.2d 326 (2010).   Our Supreme Court, in Lydall v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 247–48, 919 A.2d 421 (2007), in reversing a trial court's finding of a CUTPA violation based upon a breach of an employment agreement, cited approvingly of the general rule that “absent substantial aggravating circumstances, [a] simple breach of contract is insufficient to establish [a] claim under CUTPA.”  Id., 248, citing Lawrence v. Richman Group Capital Corp., 358 Sup.2d 29, 42 (D.Conn.2005).   Consequently, in order to sufficiently allege aggravating factors to bring a breach of contract claim into the auspices of CUTPA, the aggravating factors alleged must “constitute more than a failure to deliver on a promise.”  Greene v. Orsini, 50 Conn.Sup. 312, 315 (2007).

Connecticut case law demonstrates that the aggravating factors present must involve bad faith conduct or violation of some concept of fairness in order to sufficiently plead a CUTPA claim by way of breach of contract.   Compare Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC, 125 Conn.App. 678, 708, 10 A.3d 61 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 914, 13 A.3d 1100 (2011) (upholding finding of aggravating factors sufficient to prove a violation of CUTPA where, in addition to a breach of an employment contract, the defendant engaged in multiple false misrepresentations and other acts exhibiting “a pattern of bad faith conduct, seeking to escape its contractual obligations unfairly while negotiating a more favorable offer with ․ a third party”), with Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp., supra, 295 Conn. 227–29 (upholding finding of no aggravating factors where defendant performed unworkmanlike construction per the contract, but its conduct “lacked the unethical behavior” necessary for a CUTPA claim since the defendant attempted to remedy problem and “[i]n the absence of aggravating unscrupulous conduct, mere incompetence does not by itself mandate a trial court to find a CUTPA violation”), and IN Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Realgy, LLC, 114 Conn.App. 262, 274–75, 969 A.2d 807 (2009) (upholding finding that no aggravating factors accompanied breach of contract so as to constitute CUTPA violation where plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's “conduct in failing to pay commissions [pursuant to the contract] was unethical, unscrupulous, wilful or reckless”).

Thus, the issue for the court is whether the plaintiff has alleged substantial aggravating circumstances demonstrating bad faith or unethical conduct which accompanied the breach of contract so as to set forth a cognizable claim for violation of CUTPA.   In the present case, the plaintiff has not met its burden to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendant's alleged conduct in breaching the contract was accompanied by substantial aggravating factors.   This case more appropriately fits into the line of cases where it has been found that the conduct was a simple breach of contract, rather than a tortious act of bad faith or unethical business practice which would violate CUTPA.   The underlying allegations, at their core, set forth a straightforward dispute based upon an alleged breach of contract due to the revocation of the plaintiff's educational fellowship.   The plaintiff simply claims that the defendant failed to live up to its promise of providing an education through the awarded fellowship, and to guard against false accusations by other students.   There are insufficient factual allegations to support that the defendant's conduct met any of the criteria of the cigarette rule, such as being offensive to public policy or unethical, or that there were any other substantial aggravating circumstances present in the circumstances surrounding the alleged breach of contract.   Given the lack of allegations that the defendant's conduct constituted anything other than the failure to deliver on a promise, the facts underlying the breach of contract cannot show a violation of CUTPA.   Accordingly, the motion to strike count four is granted.

IV

Claim for Relief:  Punitive Damages and Attorneys Fees in Count One

In the first count, the plaintiff brings a breach of contract action, and in the last paragraph of that count, claims “economic and noneconomic damages, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys fees, costs of this action and such other damages as permitted in law and equity.” ²  The defendant moves to strike that portion of the claim for relief seeking punitive damages and attorneys fees on the ground that “such damages are unavailable in a breach of contract action.”   The defendant specifically argues that because count one is a cause of action for breach of contract, Connecticut law does not allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages or attorneys fees for such a claim.   Furthermore, the defendant contends that the plaintiff does not allege any statutory or contractual provision that would provide for attorneys fees in this case.   The plaintiff responds that he alleges sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages because malicious and wanton misconduct is alleged on the part of the defendant.   The plaintiff thus argues that he could viably recover punitive or exemplary damages.

Thus, the issue for the court is whether the plaintiff has set forth sufficient alleged facts to support a claim for relief of punitive damages and/or attorneys fees.  “Practice Book ․ § 10–39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).   As the defendant is moving to strike the plaintiff's claim for relief requesting both punitive damages and attorneys fees, the legal standards for obtaining an award of each of these two forms of remedies will be addressed separately.

A

Punitive Damages

“It is well settled that punitive damages generally are not recoverable for breach of contract.”  Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, supra, 282 Conn. 244 n.24. The reasoning underlying this general rule is that “punitive or exemplary damages are assessed by way of punishment, and the motivating basis does not usually arise as a result of the ordinary private contract relationship.   The few classes of cases in which such damages have been allowed contain elements which bring them within the field of tort.”  Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220 (1966).  “The flavor of the basic requirement to justify an award of punitive or exemplary damages has been repeatedly described in terms of wanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence ․ [P]unitive damages may be awarded only for outrageous conduct, that is, for acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, supra, 282 Conn. 245.   In short, punitive damages may be awarded in a breach of contract action such as this only when the allegations of breach of contract merge with, and assume the character of, a wilful tort.   See L.F. Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 9 Conn.App. 30, 48, 514 A.2d 766 (1986) (“[b]reach of contract founded on tortious conduct may allow the award of punitive damages”).   No such conduct has been alleged in the present case.

The plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged “malicious and wanton misconduct which would justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages” and refers to the following allegations:  (1) fellow students made statements to the defendant likening the plaintiff to a mass murderer who had recently killed a number of his fellow students;  (2) the defendant prevented the plaintiff from defending himself against these false charges, and instead required that the plaintiff take a leave of absence, or be expelled from the program;  (3) the plaintiff was forced to undergo medical scrutiny without basis;  (4) the defendant knew or should have known the claims were false, and that one of the students making the claims had lost the fellowship to the plaintiff;  (5) shortly after taking these actions, the defendant admitted its knowledge of the falsity of these allegations, yet refused to reinstate the plaintiff as a student and to his fellowship position, and;  (6) an employee of the defendant thereafter related the false claims to the plaintiff's employer.³

Although some of the allegations implicate intentional conduct on the part of the defendant, none of the alleged facts rise to the level of such an outrageous nature as to justify the awarding of punitive damages.   Even construed in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff, the conduct in count one merely alleges inadequacies in handling the student's dismissal from the fellowship, or, at worst, ordinary misfeasance or nonfeasance.   Indeed, the plaintiff has arguably alleged conduct of a more malicious nature against his classmates than against the defendant;  asserting that fellow students falsely equated the plaintiff with the gunman responsible for the Virginia Tech massacre in order to inherit the plaintiff's revoked fellowship position.   However, these grievous allegations of evil motive as to his fellow students is not inextricably bound with the defendant's subsequent alleged response.   While the plaintiff may take issue with the way in which the defendant handled the fellow students' accusations, there are insufficient facts to allege that the investigation or subsequent dismissal from the fellowship was done with such malicious intent, evil motive, or bad faith necessary for the recovery of punitive damages in this breach of contract count.   For these reasons, the claim for punitive damages as to count one is stricken.

B

Attorneys Fees

Connecticut courts adhere to the “American rule,” which provides that “attorneys fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Trugreen Landcare, LLC v. Elm City Development & Construction Services, LLC, 101 Conn.App. 11, 14, 919 A.2d 1077 (2007).   Our Supreme Court previously “has recognized a bad faith exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the other party's attorney.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582, 923 A.2d 697 (2007).   Additionally, “[a]ttorneys fees may be awarded ․ as a component of punitive damages.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 646, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005).

In the present case, the plaintiff's complaint fails to cite any statutory authority or contractual provision that would permit an award of attorneys fees to the plaintiff if he were successful on his breach of contract claim.   Further, the bad faith exception is inapplicable as it applies to bad faith litigation practices such as bringing vexatious litigation taken “for reasons of harassment or delay” or “a party's use of oppressive tactics or its wilful violation of court orders;” thus, focusing upon “the conduct of the party in instigating or maintaining the litigation.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotations marks omitted.)  Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 845–47, 850 A.2d 133 (2004).   Furthermore, as the claim for relief for punitive damages has been stricken, attorneys fees cannot be awarded as any component of punitive damages.   Consequently, no exception to the American Rule works to apply here.   Accordingly, the claim for relief requesting attorneys fees in count one is also stricken.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike count two is denied.   The motion to strike counts three, four, and the claim for relief for punitive damages and attorneys fees in count one is granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. It should be noted that this court has previously applied the majority view as to the proper vehicle for challenges based upon repetitive pleadings.   See Pereira v. North Carolina Granite Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Nos. CV 09 5031427, CV 09 6004639 (August 5, 2011, Wilson, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 417, 422) (denying motion to strike because if defendant “thought that counts six and eight were duplicative of counts five and seven and superfluous it should have filed a request to revise before filing its motion to strike”)..  FN1. It should be noted that this court has previously applied the majority view as to the proper vehicle for challenges based upon repetitive pleadings.   See Pereira v. North Carolina Granite Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Nos. CV 09 5031427, CV 09 6004639 (August 5, 2011, Wilson, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 417, 422) (denying motion to strike because if defendant “thought that counts six and eight were duplicative of counts five and seven and superfluous it should have filed a request to revise before filing its motion to strike”).

FN2. The guidelines for properly setting forth a claim for relief are well established.  General Statutes § 52–91 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain ․ on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for the relief, which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought.”  (Emphasis added.)   See also Practice Book § 10–20.   The “prayer for relief must articulate with specificity the form of relief that is sought ․ A party who fails to comply with this rule runs the risk of being denied recovery.”  (Citations omitted.)  Stern v. Medical Examining Board, 208 Conn. 492, 501, 545 A.2d 1080 (1988).Here, the plaintiff has stated in a separate page entitled “Prayer for Relief” his demand for money damages by way of an ad damnum clause specifying that the demand is equal to or greater than fifteen thousand dollars.   However, the plaintiff did not articulate in the prayer for relief any other forms of relief sought, such as punitive damages, costs, attorneys fees, or any other equitable relief.   Instead, these specific forms of relief are articulated in the body of the complaint under each asserted count.   Thus, the complaint does not comply with pleading requirements as it fails to specifically articulate the forms of relief sought in the separate page containing the prayer for relief.   However, the defendant does not challenge the claim for relief, and as it is evident that the paragraph contains the complete forms of relief the plaintiff seeks, this memorandum analyzes the claim for relief as set forth in the plaintiff's complaint..  FN2. The guidelines for properly setting forth a claim for relief are well established.  General Statutes § 52–91 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain ․ on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for the relief, which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought.”  (Emphasis added.)   See also Practice Book § 10–20.   The “prayer for relief must articulate with specificity the form of relief that is sought ․ A party who fails to comply with this rule runs the risk of being denied recovery.”  (Citations omitted.)  Stern v. Medical Examining Board, 208 Conn. 492, 501, 545 A.2d 1080 (1988).Here, the plaintiff has stated in a separate page entitled “Prayer for Relief” his demand for money damages by way of an ad damnum clause specifying that the demand is equal to or greater than fifteen thousand dollars.   However, the plaintiff did not articulate in the prayer for relief any other forms of relief sought, such as punitive damages, costs, attorneys fees, or any other equitable relief.   Instead, these specific forms of relief are articulated in the body of the complaint under each asserted count.   Thus, the complaint does not comply with pleading requirements as it fails to specifically articulate the forms of relief sought in the separate page containing the prayer for relief.   However, the defendant does not challenge the claim for relief, and as it is evident that the paragraph contains the complete forms of relief the plaintiff seeks, this memorandum analyzes the claim for relief as set forth in the plaintiff's complaint.

FN3. The plaintiff's memorandum of law further argues for the allowance of punitive damages in count one because the plaintiff “alleges that these actions were arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith.”   This mere conclusory language is insufficient.   It is well settled that a motion to strike “does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 694, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).   Moreover, the first count does not even actually contain this conclusory allegation;  it is in the second count..  FN3. The plaintiff's memorandum of law further argues for the allowance of punitive damages in count one because the plaintiff “alleges that these actions were arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith.”   This mere conclusory language is insufficient.   It is well settled that a motion to strike “does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 694, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).   Moreover, the first count does not even actually contain this conclusory allegation;  it is in the second count.

Wilson, Robin L., J.