IN RE: Deasia G.1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On May 4, 2011, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq., to terminate the parental rights of Natasha G., and Ronald S. as to the minor child Deasia G., born September 10, 2009.   The parents have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Neither biological parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

On October 12, 2011, the mother presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights to Deasia.   Having canvassed the mother, this court (Dyer, J.) found that she has been represented by competent counsel who was present with her when she executed the consent form.   The court further found that the consent has been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her action.   The consent has been accepted by the court.

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) through counsel has moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual grounds and to change the grounds to consent § 17a–112(I) of the mother.   Without objection, the motion was granted.

On January 3, 2012, the date set for the trial regarding the father's parental rights, he failed to appear in court.   For the second time in this case the father is defaulted for failure to appear.   Ronald had been defaulted on May 24, 2011 for failure to appear.   Subsequently counsel was appointed for him and he did appear, although it does not appear on file that the default was ever actually vacated.   The court received numerous documents as full exhibits.   After considering the documents in evidence, the court makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner's Exhibit A, the social study, and Exhibit E the addendum to the social study filed on December 27, 2011 fully capture the essence of this case.   A reading of the studies indicates that Ronald S., has never served as a competent parent to any of his ten children and has severe personal limitations.

While Ronald has frequently told DCF he was prepared to consent to the termination of his parental rights he has not done so.   He is aware of the pendency of this action and of the assignment of the case for trial on this date.   His lawyer was present in court.

Ronald is thirty-seven years of age.   His parents are divorced.   His mother, with whom he spent much of his youth, reported that she had been in 18 foster homes as a youth.   His mother spent more time focused on her boyfriends than she did on her son, according to Ronald.   He describes his childhood as not very good.   At age 13 he went to live with his father in Massachusetts.   His father was described as a long haul truck driver and was frequently absent.

Ronald became involved with the juvenile justice system in Massachusetts on drug related charges.   He told the DCF worker that he sold marijuana, cocaine, crack, acid and prescription pills such as Oxycontin and Percocet.   He was ordered to reside in a foster home and then in a group home for developmentally disabled teens.   While in school he received special education services.   Ronald left school in the tenth grade and has not received his General Equivalency Diploma.

Ronald is frequently unemployed, accepting work as a day laborer when he can get it.   His principle source of support is Supplemental Social Security Income due to his developmental disability;  mild mental retardation.   He has never been married, though he has fathered ten children, none of whom are in his care.   Three of his children have had their parental rights terminated, and the other children are living with their various mothers or persons who have acquired legal guardianship.   Ronald has never been in the military service.   In Connecticut, Ronald has a prodigious criminal history of ten arrests, including felony convictions and prison sentences.

Ronald acknowledges, as indeed he must, that he was in a relationship with Deasia's mother, Natasha.   Paternity tests confirmed that fact.   He was aware that she was pregnant.   After Deasia's birth, and while the child was still with Natasha, the mother had conversations with Ronald about the child, yet he never attempted to establish a relationship with the child.   Deasia was in her mother's care from birth, September 10, 2009, until removal on May 25, 2010.   While they lived in the same vicinity, Ronald took no interest in the child.

Ronald was historically unwilling to reunify.   He had conversations with the court, the Department, the foster mother and his counsel whereby he stated he did not wish not [sic] to reunify.   Ronald attended an Administrative Case Review on January 24, 2011, where he indicated that he was not in a position to try to reunify with Deasia and would consent to the plan of adoption.   On February 16, 2011, at the Willimantic Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Ronald reported to the Department that he wishes to consent to the plan of adoption but would like to have some type of relationship with Deasia.   On March 11, 2011, at the Neglect trial, Ronald stood silent with respect to the allegations in the petition and informed the court that he did not wish to reunify with Deasia nor have specific steps entered on his behalf.   Ronald did not object to the permanency plan of adoption at the April 13, 2011 hearing.   Ronald failed to appear for the Termination of Parental Rights hearing scheduled on May 24, 2011 and was thus defaulted.   On July 27, 2011, at the Willimantic Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Ronald requested a three week continuance on the Termination of Parental Rights trial so that he might negotiate a postadoption agreement with the foster family.   It was not until his child was over two years old that he, in November 2011, reported that he would like to reunify with his child.   Exhibit E, p. 4.

As previously indicated this action for termination of the parental rights of Ronald was filed on May 4, 2011.   To that point Ronald had no interest in reunification with the child.   Indeed, the social study indicates that he had only met the child on one occasion prior to the institution of these proceedings.

The grounds in the petition allege:

§ 17a–112(j)(3)(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;

All the evidence before the court establishes that Ronald has serious personal limitations due to developmental, educational and social dysfunction in his life.   He has never developed any parent-child relationship with Deasia although there were no known impediments to his ability to do so.   He has failed to meet even the most modest of parental duties to the child.   The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  In re Adoption of Webb, 14 Wash.App. 651, 653, 544 P.2d 130 (1975), In re Juvenile Appeal, (No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 15 (1981).   Ronald has never attended to even one of those parental obligations.

Deasia is nearly two and a half years of age.   Even considering the visitation that DCF has provided to Ronald since the institution of these proceedings, he has been unable to establish even a cordial, non-parental relationship with this child.

The court finds, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to Ronald and the child, Deasia, that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.

The petitioner has established this ground by clear and convincing evidence.

DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence related to the circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.   In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings: ²

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondent, the court finds that father has never expressed interest in the child and has specifically indicated he had no interest in reunification with the child until two months before the trial.   The court finds that the male biological parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from such services.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF offered to provide services but Ronald had no interest.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds that specific steps were offered to Ronald at the time of the neglect plea.   He indicated he did not wish to have specific steps ordered and was not interested in reunification.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does not have a parental emotional bond with the male biological parent.   The child has adjusted very well in the foster home and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the child needs.   The foster parents are committed to the care of Deasia and would like to adopt her.

(5) As to the age of the child, Deasia is two and a half years old.   The child's attorney recommends permanency which can only be achieved in this case through termination of the parents' rights.³

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court has previously addressed this issue.   The mother has consented to the termination of her rights, and the male biological parent was specifically intent upon consenting to the termination but never followed through.   His interests are much more selfish, his concerns are in satisfying his own needs.   He has demonstrated none of the selfless, devotion expected of a real parent.   His parental interest expired at conception.   Giving Ronald additional time would not likely enable him to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited with him within a time-frame suitable for Deasia.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989);  In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Natasha, by her consent, and Ronald S. Jr. to the child is in the best interest of the child.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for children.   The child is now in a foster home where she is very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to her.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment;  the length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship with foster parents and biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents;  and their genetic bond to respondents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Natasha G. and Ronald S. Jr. are hereby terminated as to the minor child Deasia.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for this child.

With regard to any outstanding permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Willimantic, 81 Columbia Avenue, Willimantic CT 06226 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, J.T.R. # 398

FOOTNOTES

FN2. No such findings are necessary as to the consenting parent..  FN2. No such findings are necessary as to the consenting parent.

FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

Foley, Francis J., S.J.