David Parrott v. Charles Gunn (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT (# 138)

STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 16, 2011, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, David Parrott against the defendant, Charles Gunn in the amount of $8,129.   The jury awarded $3,129 in economic damages and $5,000 in non-economic damages.   The jury awarded some of the plaintiff's claimed medical bills but not all.   See Verdict for the Plaintiff and Jury Interrogatories form (# 146).   On November 18, 2011, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 52–228b moved to set aside the jury verdict as to damages only and for additur.   The plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict as to damages is inadequate and is contrary to the evidence presented.   On November 23, 2011, the defendant, Charles Gunn, objected to the plaintiff's motion to set aside verdict on grounds that the jury's verdict is supported by the evidence and that it would be contrary to law for the court to usurp the findings of the jury.   Oral argument was heard on the motion on December 27, 2011.

In the plaintiff's two-count complaint, dated June 19, 2009, he alleged that on August 16, 2007, he was operating a vehicle proceeding in an easterly direction on Foxon Road (also known as Route 80), two-tenths of a mile from its intersection with Cedar Lake Road, both public highways in the Town of Branford.   The plaintiff further alleged that at that time and place a motor vehicle operated by the defendant, Charles Gunn, was driving in a westerly direction on Foxon Road and without warning or signal the defendant Charles Gunn made a left hand turn and crossed into the plaintiff's lane of traffic and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff alleged a number of ways in which the defendant, Charles Gunn was negligent which resulted in the collision.   The plaintiff further alleged that as a result of the accident he sustained injuries to his neck, low back and right knee.   The plaintiff alleged that he suffered persistent low back pain as well as headaches, pain and sleep difficulties.

Count two of the complaint is against the defendants, Melissa and John Delsole.   The plaintiff alleged that on August 16, 2007, at the time the plaintiff was operating his vehicle on Foxon Road, the defendant Melissa Delsole also collided with the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant John Delsole maintained his vehicle as a family car, and at the time of the collision the defendant Melissa Delsole was a member of John Delsole's family and the automobile was being operated by the defendant, Melissa Delsole within the scope of her general authority to do so.   The plaintiff alleged a number of ways in which the defendant, Melissa Desole was negligent and further claimed that as a result of the August 16, 2007 accident and Delsole's negligence he suffered injuries as alleged in the count against the defendant, Charles Gunn. On November 10, 2011, the plaintiff amended his complaint to add to his damages, emotional distress and a diminution in his ability to enjoy life's activities.   The plaintiff further claimed that his injuries were permanent and that he would experience future pain and suffering and, in addition to past medical expenses, would incur future medical expenses as a result of the accident.

Liability was contested as between the defendants, Melissa and John Delsole and the defendant, Charles Gunn. In addition, the defendants, Melissa and John Delsole raised the special defense of comparative negligence against the plaintiff, claiming that if the plaintiff was injured, not only were the injuries the result of the negligence of the defendant, Charles Gunn, but were also the result of the plaintiff's own negligence.   In addition, the issue of damages was hotly contested in light of the plaintiff's prior injuries and injuries he sustained subsequent to the accident.   The court charged the jury that they could return a verdict for the plaintiff or defendants or a verdict based on comparative negligence.   There were special interrogatories propounded to the jury on the issue of liability and damages.   As previously discussed, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against Charles Gunn and a defendants' verdict in favor of Melissa and John Delsole.   The jury did not find any comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff.   The jury awarded the plaintiff $3,189 in economic damages and $5,000 in non-economic damages.

DISCUSSION

Although in his motion to set aside, the plaintiff cites to his treating physician, Dr. Richard Matza's testimony, records and bills which were presented at trial, and references the defendant's expert, Dr. Patrick Carolan's testimony as to causation, he does not provide any legal analysis in support of the relief which is sought.   The Supreme Court “repeatedly ha[s] stated that [it is] not required to review issues that have been improperly presented ․ through an inadequate brief ․ Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertions, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly ․ Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith v. Andrews, 289 Conn. 61, 80, 959 A.2d 597 (2008).   Since the plaintiff has provided no analysis, his motion is deemed to be abandoned.   However, since the defendant briefed the issues, the court addresses them below.

The legal standard for setting aside a jury verdict is well-settled.   The trial court possesses the inherent power to set aside the jury's verdict if the court is of the opinion the verdict is against the law or the evidence.   Howard v. MacDonald, 270 Conn. 111, 126, 851 A.2d 1142 (2004).  “[The trial court] should not set aside a verdict [when] it is apparent that there was some evidence [on] which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside [when] the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles ․ Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church, 286 Conn. 152, 159, 943 A.2d 391 (2008).  “[I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work their will.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 189, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).

“In passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict.   The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motive which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and tender his verdict accordingly ․ The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same ․ and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict and grant a new trial.”  Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 329–30, 789 A.2d 459 (2002).   The ultimate test is whether given the evidence offered at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict;  Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 140, 459 A.2d 521 (1983);  the jury reasonably could have concluded as it did.  Id. “A motion to set aside the verdict should be granted if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached the determination that [it] did in fact reach ․ [Put differently], [i]f the jury, without conjecture, could not have found a required element of the cause of action, it cannot withstand a motion to set aside the verdict ․ Thus, the role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror, but rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did ․ As a corollary, it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is palpably against the evidence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 130 Conn.App. 502, 506, 23 A.3d 100 (2011).

The Supreme court has also established “the parameters of a trial court's discretion in ruling on a motion for additur.  [It has] considered whether:  (1) the jury award shocks the conscience;  ․ (2) the plaintiff, who has proved substantial injuries, is awarded inadequate damages;  ․ and (3) the verdict is inherently ambiguous.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 114–15, 663 A.2d 398 (1995).

Here, the jury did not award the full amount of the plaintiff's claimed medical expenses.   Of the approximately $11,686 in medical bills the jury awarded the plaintiff $3,189.  (See Verdict for Plaintiff and Jury Interrogatory form. (# 146)) As previously discussed, the jury awarded the plaintiff $5000 in non-economic damages.   The plaintiff submitted medical reports and testimony from his treating physician, Dr. Richard Matza, who causally related the plaintiff's injuries and medical treatment to the August 16, 2007 accident.   The defendants' introduced evidence from their expert witness, Dr. Patrick Carolan, who opined that the plaintiff did not suffer any residual impairment as a result of the August 16, 2007 accident.   In addition, the jury had evidence of medical records showing that the plaintiff had a significant history of low back pain and right knee pain.   The defendants also introduced evidence of multiple incidents of subsequent injuries to the same body parts.   Therefore, given the evidence provided at trial, this court cannot find the verdict of the jury to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence so as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality.   It is the jury's province of weighing and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, which is what they did.   In light of the evidence submitted, the jury's award of damages does not shock the conscious, is not inadequate and is not inherently ambiguous.  Childs v. Bainer, supra, 235 Conn. 114–15.   In summary, the evidence provided a basis for the jury reasonably to conclude that the plaintiff did not prove substantial injuries resulted from the August 16, 2007 accident.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict as to damages only and for additur is denied.   It is so ordered.

Wilson, J.

Wilson, Robin L., J.