Carabetta Management Co. v. Taisha Sealy (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

The defendant, Taisha Sealy, brings this motion for attorneys fees pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb and Connecticut Practice Book § 11–21, following the plaintiff's July 18, 2011 withdrawal of the action based, it can be assumed, on the defendant's motion to dismiss filed June 2, 2011.   On August 17, 2011, the defendant filed her motion for attorney's fees.   On September 13, 2011, this court took evidence on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees and the plaintiff's oral objection thereto.

Findings of Fact

On March 4, 2011, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint seeking possession of certain premises occupied by the defendant.   As to Ms. Sealy, the complaint alleged nonpayment of her portion of rent for certain months pursuant to a written lease agreement.   On March 14, 2011 Attorney Cecil Thomas, of Greater Hartford Legal Aid, filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant.   The parties engaged in the discovery process pursuant to the Rules of Court.   On May 10, 2011, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses.   On June 2, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with certain applicable federal regulations.   On July 18, 2011, the plaintiff filed its withdrawal of this summary process action.   On August 17, 2011, the defendant filed the instant motion.   On September 12, 2011, Attorney David Pels, also of Greater Hartford Legal Aid, filed an appearance in this matter and directed the examination of Attorney Thomas in support of the instant motion.   Attorney Thomas was cross-examined by counsel for the plaintiff.   Attorney Thomas was the sole witness to testify in this matter and the sole exhibit in this matter was a copy of the operative lease and billing records submitted by the defendant's counsel.

Attachment No. 6 to the rental agreement between the parties specifically allows for the plaintiff to recover “all costs, including marshal fees and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the Landlord in any legal proceeding as the result of a default under the terms of this Agreement as may be determined and rendered as a judgment by the Court” (Defendant's Exhibit A).

Attorney Thomas testified to his training and experience related to the defense of summary process actions.   The defendant seeks an award based on an hourly rate of two-hundred ($200.00) dollars per hour.   He also testified to the number of hours (18.4) dedicated by his office to the defense, ultimately successful, of this action.   Attorney Thomas was cross-examined as to the specificity and accuracy of the billing records, as well as the number of hours billed for certain legal work.

The Defendant's Argument

The defendant asserts that she is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb, which provides for the award of attorneys fees as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim based upon a contract or lease that provides for attorneys fees.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The defendant further asserts that the instant motion, brought pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 11–21, is the proper mechanism by which a successful “consumer,” in this instance a residential tenant, brings a postjudgment claim for attorneys fees pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The defendant essentially relies, as to the applicability of this statutory scheme for the postjudgment recovery of attorney's fees in the landlord-tenant context, on Figueroa v. FAH Redstone Ltd. Partnership, as well as a recent case from this Court, Malcom v. Diaz. Malcom v. Diaz is discussed later in this decision.

In Figueroa, the plaintiffs/tenants brought a separate civil action for attorneys fees pursuant to C.G.S. § 42–150bb after the defendant/landlord withdrew a summary process action initiated against them.   Figueroa v. FAH Redstone Ltd. Partnership, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. CVN–0702–2096 (November 29, 2007, Peck, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 639].   In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment, the court made several findings, some of which are unique to the summary process context, the most important of which specifically finds that C.G.S. § 42–150bb applies to tenants who successfully defend summary process actions involving a written lease agreement with an attorneys fees provision.   Id. at 3. The Figueroa court's application of the aforementioned statute is based on the presence of the term “lease” in the statute.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The Plaintiff's Argument

The plaintiff argued orally that Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb does not create a statutory cause of action allowing for an award of attorneys fees to a tenant who successfully defends a summary process action involving a lease with an attorneys fees provision.   In the landlord-tenant context, the most recent case on point is Plainville Housing Authority v. Galka [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 839].   Although not specifically cited by the plaintiff, this court considers that decision herein.

In Galka, the defendant brought a postjudgment motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 11–21, seeking an award of attorneys fees after the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.   The complaint was dismissed on the defendant's motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction based on the validity of the notice to quit.  Plainville Housing Authority v. Robert Galka, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP–053968 (December 17, 2010, Gilligan, J.).

The court in Galka focused on the varying definitions and contextual applications of the word “lease” as it appears in C.G.S. § 42–150bb.   The court concluded that Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb does not allow for an award of attorneys fees in the landlord-tenant context as the term “contract or lease” as used in that statute is not meant to include rental agreements (leases) in summary process actions.

Discussion

“A lease is simply a type of contract and ordinary rules of contract interpretation and general rules of contract law apply to leases.”  Warner Associates v. Logan, 50 Conn.App. 90, 94–95 (1998) (action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a commercial lease).   Additionally, the Connecticut General Statutes state that an agreement in which the consumer leases any residential dwelling falls within the ambit of a “consumer contract.”  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–151(b)(2)(c).

This court finds no ambiguity in the words of Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb as it relates to summary process actions.   This court finds, as it did in Malcolm v. Diaz, that based on the plain language of the statute, it does indeed apply to appropriate summary process actions involving written leases with attorneys fees provisions.   Malcolm v. Diaz, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP–156276 (March 3, 2011, Oliver, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 528].

In Malcolm v. Diaz, this Court, in awarding a prevailing tenant attorneys fees, discussed the reciprocal application of these provisions through C.G.S. § 42–150bb and how this application should encourage thoughtful, well prepared pleading on the part of landlords, which would be less susceptible to successful legal challenges.   Also, such an application would likely encourage good-faith discussions between the parties and timely pre-trial settlements by putting landlords and their counsel on notice that failure to adequately and timely assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their cases might have additional financial consequences.

Withdrawals of actions would not be discouraged as the context within which the withdrawal is made would determine whether or not the action was “successfully” defended or whether, for example, a defendant/tenant vacated the premises and turned over the keys, limiting the court's ability to grant practical relief.   An oral or written statement or stipulation as to the reason for the withdrawal would likely address the majority of landlord concerns regarding being “punished” for certain withdrawals.   Further, the basis for the withdrawal would be relevant as to what sum of attorneys fees are a “reasonable” award, under the totality of the circumstances.

ORDER

This court finds the defendant has established all of the prerequisites for recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.   In this matter, the withdrawal of the action constitutes a successful defense of the summary process action.   Further, the attachment to the written lease agreement provides for the plaintiff's recovery of attorneys fees.

Additionally, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the court finds 18.4 hours of Attorney Thomas' time at a rate of $200.00 per hour to be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case.

Accordingly, the court awards the defendant reasonable attorney's fees of $3,680.00 for the successful defense of this summary process action.

BY THE COURT

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.