IN RE: Elijah D.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This decision terminates the parental rights of the unknown and unidentified father, designated in these proceedings as John Doe, of the minor child Elijah D., born on October 16, 2009, to Brandee D. On July 27, 2011, the department of children and families (DCF) brought the pending petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Brandee D. and John Doe to this minor child.   The mother had previously told DCF that she could not identify Elijah's father because at the time of his conception she had been having sexual relations with a man named “Chase” in the Bridgeport area and also been engaged in prostitution.   DCF thereafter obtained permission from the court to provide notice of the proceedings to John Doe by publication in the Connecticut Post pursuant to Practice Book Section 33a–4 ² and General statutes Section 45a–716.³  On November 15, 2011,⁴ this court confirmed notice to John Doe in accordance with that order for him to appear on that date to answer to the petition.   As no person appeared then, the court entered a default against John Doe for failing to appear and enter a plea and then took evidence on the petition.   See Practice Book §§ 34a–1,⁵ 10–18,⁶ and 35a–8.⁷  Certain exhibits were received into evidence and the matter was continued for decision.   The facts found herein were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I

ADJUDICATORY DECISIONAStatutory Grounds for Termination

As grounds for terminating the parental rights of Elijah's unknown father John Doe, the TPR petition alleges abandonment and no on-going parent-child relationship, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3).⁸  Practice Book § 32a–2(a) establishes that child protection proceedings, including these petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.⁹  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, the entry of a default constitutes an admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and conclusively establishes that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.   Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has considered the petitioner's evidence on the particular adjudicatory grounds alleged.

B

Reasonable Efforts

Terminations of parental rights on non-consensual grounds under § 17a–112(j), as was pleaded here for the respondent putative father, require the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.10

On these matters, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

1. Reasonable efforts to locate

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, by publishing for John Doe in the Connecticut Post, DCF made reasonable efforts to identify any unidentified possible father of Joshua and to notify him of these proceedings.

2. Reasonable efforts to reunify

Since the mother and DCF were unable to identify the putative respondent father, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that John Doe, the biological father of Elijah, was unable to benefit from reunification efforts.

C

Adjudicatory Findings

Each of the statutory grounds under § 17a–112(j)(3) asserted in the petition for terminating the parental rights of Elijah's father is an independent basis for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail DCF must prove at least one of them by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).

Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of a TPR proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   The TPR petition was filed on July 27, 2011, and amended on September 27, 2011, by adding a count that the respondent mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights and withdrawing previously pled counts as to her.   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to July 27, 2011, on the allegations of abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship.   In view of the mandate of Practice Book § 35a–7(a), however, and despite the fact that the amendments on September 27 did not affect the substantive rights of the respondent father, the court has also made a separate determination as to whether the adjudicatory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence as of the date the petition was amended.   Since the allegation of no ongoing parent-child relationship requires a court to look forward past the adjudicatory date, the court has also considered the evidence on that count through the date of the default trial on November 15, 2011.

1. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

“In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”  In Re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).

A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   For the reasons stated below, the court finds this ground proven as to the respondent.

The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date of July 27, 2011 the unknown respondent “John Doe” had abandoned Elijah within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Although the September 27, 2011, amendments to the petition did not affect any of his substantive rights, in an abundance of caution the court has also separately considered the evidence through that date;  and the clear and convincing evidence also establishes that as of that second date the respondent putative father had abandoned Elijah within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   As of both dates, he had never met, attempted to meet, contacted or attempted to contact his son.   He not met a parent's duty of supplying Elijah with financial support, an adequate domicile, necessary food, clothing, and medical care.   He had not attempted to provide Joshua with social or religious guidance.   He had not provided DCF or the mother with cards, letters or gifts for Elijah.   He has never shown any interest, concern or responsibility as regards Elijah.

2. No ongoing parent-child relationship— § 17a–112(j)(3)(D)

The second statutory basis alleged by the petitioner for terminating the parental rights of John Doe to Elijah is lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  For the reasons stated below, the court finds this ground proven as to John Doe by clear and convincing evidence.

The statute defines an “ongoing parent-child relationship” as meaning “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.   The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.   Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.

(Citations omitted.)  In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 795 (2001).   The term “ ‘no ongoing parent-child relationship’ ․ contemplate [s] a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced.   In either case the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979);  In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645–46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980);  In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 23, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).   In the case of a very young child, whose feelings are not readily discernible, “the inquiry must focus, not on the feelings of the infant, but on the positive feelings of the natural parent.”  In re Valerie B., 223 Conn. 492, 532, 613 A.2d 748 (1991).   To satisfy the second prong of the statutory criteria, the court must determine

whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship.   The “best interest” standard, therefore, does not become relevant until after it has been determined that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists.

The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in Kezia's best interest to permit further time for a relationship with her father to develop include (1) the length of stay with her foster parents, (2) the nature of her relationship to her foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent, and (4) the nature of her relationship to her natural parent.   In addition, the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.

(Citations omitted.)  In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. 22.

Since Elijah has never seen or had any contact with his biological father, there obviously was no ongoing parent-child relationship between Elijah and his father as of July 27, 2011, or September 27, 2011.   As of each of these dates, neither Elijah nor his father had any positive feelings toward each other.   Moreover, based on the evidence as of each of those dates and on events and circumstances through the date of trial, it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to Elijah's best interest, as of each of those dates and at the time of trial, to allow further time to establish such a relationship since the identity of his father is unknown and, absent some bizarre and unpredictable fluke of circumstance, unknowable.   This ground for terminating the parental rights of John Doe has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

II

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including November 15, 2011, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was concluded.

A

Required Statutory Findings

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).¹¹  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’   “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings, which the court has considered in determining whether it is the best interest of each of these children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent putative fathers.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1)

Since DCF was unable to identify John Doe, DCF was unable to provide either of him with services to facilitate reunion with their child.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2).

DCF was unable to offer reunification services to the respondent putative father, as he could not be located or identified.

(3) The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations— § 17a–112(k)(3).

As the actual name, identity and whereabouts of Elijah's father “John Doe” cannot be ascertained, no orders were entered with regard to them.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

Elijah does not know or have any feelings toward his unknown putative father.   Instead, he has close emotional ties with the foster parent Francis R., who has cared for Elijah since he was three days old.

(5) The age of the child— § 17a–112(k)(5)

Elijah was born on October 16, 2001, and turned two years old a month ago.   He is now 25 months old.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child—17a–112(k)(6).

The respondent putative father John Doe never contacted DCF, sought contact with his child, or did anything to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interests of Elijah to be placed in his home, either now or in the foreseeable future.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).

John Doe has not been prevented from having or maintaining a meaningful relationship with his son by any act or conduct on the part of DCF. The fact that Elijah may have been conceived during an act of prostitution was conduct on his mother's part that prevented Elijah's father from having a meaningful relationship with Elijah, but there was no evidence that any act on the mother's part after the event of conception further contributed to the inability of Elijah's father to have a meaningful relationship with his son.   Although one reason a person engages in prostitution may be that individual's financial straits, there was no evidence that such was the case here, and there is thus no evidence that the economic circumstances of either parent affected John Doe's ability to have a meaningful relationship with Elijah.

B

Best Interest of the Child

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child.   In determining whether terminating the respondent father's parental rights would be in Elijah's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including Elijah's interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of his environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  his age and needs;  the length and nature of his stay in foster care;  the nature of his relationship with his biological and foster parents;  the contact maintained with the biological parents and the potential benefit or detriment of their retaining a connection with his biological parents;  his genetic bond to each parent, In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and, with regard to the respondent putative father, the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced Elijah's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).   The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.

The credible and reliable evidence establishes clearly and convincingly that terminating the parental rights of Elijah's biological father John Doe is in Elijah's best interest.   Under the circumstances of Elijah's conception, the identity of his father is virtually unknowable.   Elijah never has had and almost certainly never could have any relationship with his father, who equally certainly does not and would never know of his son's existence and has no way of ever learning that Elijah is his child.

Elijah has been living with his foster parent Francis R. since he was three days old, except for six weeks when he was briefly reunified with his mother before being removed and returned to the Ms. R. after a drug relapse on the mother's part.   Ms. R. has consistently met his physical, emotional, and social needs, and a strong attachment has developed between Elijah and Ms. R., who wants to adopt him and whom DCF has identified as an adoptive foster parent.   At two years of age, Elijah needs stability and permanence.   His mother has a long history of substance abuse and unaddressed mental health issues and a brief effort to reunite her with Elijah failed after she relapsed.   She has since then consented to termination of her parental rights knowing that Elijah will be placed with Ms. R., who was initially identified by the mother as a placement resource because Ms. R. had long been a close and trusted friend of the mother's family.   The identity of Elijah's father is unknown and will probably never be capable of being ascertained.   Elijah's needs can only be met, on the facts of this case, by terminating the parental rights of his biological parents and permitting his adoption.   The court thus finds by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of John Doe is in Elijah's best interest.

C

Orders of Termination

The court having considered all the statutory criteria, having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights and having further found by clear and convincing evidence, upon consideration of all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Elijah's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent father, it is hereby ORDERED:

The department's petition for termination of parental rights is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of John Doe to Elijah.

Pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m),¹² the commissioner of children and families is appointed Elijah's statutory parent so that he may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parent.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) ¹³ and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g),¹⁴ the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for Elijah and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before December 15, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. A written status report on implementation of the plan will be due by March 19, 2012.   A motion to review the permanency plan for Elijah, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(k), shall be filed on or before April 24, 2012, and a hearing to review such plan shall be held on June 5, 2012 at noon.

Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan for Elijah will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the children's adoptions are finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any adoption of this child is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Practice Book Section 33a–4 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(a) If the identity or present location of a respondent is unknown when a petition is filed, an affidavit shall be attached reciting the efforts to identify and locate that respondent.   Notice by publication to unidentified persons shall be required in any petition for termination of parental rights.”.  FN2. Practice Book Section 33a–4 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(a) If the identity or present location of a respondent is unknown when a petition is filed, an affidavit shall be attached reciting the efforts to identify and locate that respondent.   Notice by publication to unidentified persons shall be required in any petition for termination of parental rights.”

FN3. General Statutes Section 45a–716(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “If the address of any person entitled to personal service or service at the person's usual place of abode is unknown, or if personal service or service at the person's usual place of abode cannot be reasonably effected within the state, or if any person enumerated in subsection (b) of this section is out of the state, a judge or the clerk of the court shall order notice to be given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by publication at least ten days before the date of the hearing.   Any such publication shall be in a newspaper of general circulation in the place of the last-known address of the person to be notified, whether within or without this state, or, if no such address is known, in the place where the petition has been filed.”.  FN3. General Statutes Section 45a–716(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “If the address of any person entitled to personal service or service at the person's usual place of abode is unknown, or if personal service or service at the person's usual place of abode cannot be reasonably effected within the state, or if any person enumerated in subsection (b) of this section is out of the state, a judge or the clerk of the court shall order notice to be given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by publication at least ten days before the date of the hearing.   Any such publication shall be in a newspaper of general circulation in the place of the last-known address of the person to be notified, whether within or without this state, or, if no such address is known, in the place where the petition has been filed.”

FN4. On an earlier date the respondent mother entered her written consent to termination of her parental rights, was canvassed by the court, Wollenberg, J.T.R., and had her parental rights were terminated..  FN4. On an earlier date the respondent mother entered her written consent to termination of her parental rights, was canvassed by the court, Wollenberg, J.T.R., and had her parental rights were terminated.

FN5. Practice Book Section 34a–1 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) The provisions of Sections 8–2, 9–5, 9–22, 10–12(a) and (c), 10–13, 10–14, 10–17, 10–18, 10–29, 10–62, 11–4, 11–5, 11–6, 11–7, 11–8, 11–10, 11–11, 11–12, 11–13, 12–1, 12–2, 12–3, 13–1 through 13–11 inclusive, 13–14, 13–16, 13–21 through 13–32 inclusive, subject to Sections 34a–20, 17–4 and 17–21 of the rules of practice shall apply to juvenile matters as defined by General Statutes § 46b–121.”.  FN5. Practice Book Section 34a–1 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) The provisions of Sections 8–2, 9–5, 9–22, 10–12(a) and (c), 10–13, 10–14, 10–17, 10–18, 10–29, 10–62, 11–4, 11–5, 11–6, 11–7, 11–8, 11–10, 11–11, 11–12, 11–13, 12–1, 12–2, 12–3, 13–1 through 13–11 inclusive, 13–14, 13–16, 13–21 through 13–32 inclusive, subject to Sections 34a–20, 17–4 and 17–21 of the rules of practice shall apply to juvenile matters as defined by General Statutes § 46b–121.”

FN6. Practice Book Section 10–18 provides as follows:  “Parties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the judicial authority may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.”.  FN6. Practice Book Section 10–18 provides as follows:  “Parties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the judicial authority may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.”

FN7. Practice Book Section 35a–8 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”.  FN7. Practice Book Section 35a–8 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”

FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․”.  FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․”

FN9. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN9. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․ unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”.  FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․ unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”

FN11. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”.  FN11. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”.  FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests.”

FN13. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”.  FN13. General Statutes Section 17a–112(o) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court not later than thirty days after the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan.   The court may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129 for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b–129, whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child remains in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families.”

FN14. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”.  FN14. Practice Book Section 35a–14(g) provides in pertinent part as follows:  “Where a petition for termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian or statutory parent of the child or youth shall report to the judicial authority not later than thirty days after the date the judgment is entered on a permanency plan and on the status of the child or youth.   At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the judicial authority on the implementation of the plan, or earlier if the plan changes before the elapse of three months.   The judicial authority may convene a hearing upon the filing of a report and shall convene and conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of reviewing the permanency plan for the child no more than twelve months from the date judgment is entered or from the date of the last permanency hearing held in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(d), whichever is earlier, and at least once a year thereafter while the child or youth remains in the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.