Creeville Bradberry v. LQ LLC (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2008, the plaintiff, Creeville Bradberry, encountered Daryl Johnson, an acquaintance and known drug dealer at a local convenience store in New Britain, Connecticut.   Johnson observed that the plaintiff, who has a history of both dealing and using crack cocaine, had a large sum of money on his person, namely $8,000, which the plaintiff had received from a personal injury settlement.   The next day, June 20, 2008, the plaintiff, who was staying in Room 621 at the defendant's hotel, La Quinta Inn and Suites, in New Britain, spoke to Johnson on the telephone and asked him to bring him over some cigarettes, along with some other items.   At 3:38 p.m., Johnson arrived at the defendant's hotel with another person, Earl Underwood.   The two men proceeded directly through the lobby to the elevator, and then took the elevator up to Room 621.   The men knocked on the door, and the plaintiff himself opened his self-closing and self-locking door, equipped with a peephole and a deadbolt lock, thereby unlocking it and allowed the two men into his hotel room.   The two men than attempted to rob the plaintiff, but he refused to give them his money.   Underwood then shot the plaintiff.

On July 20, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against LQ Management, LLC, sounding in negligence.   The plaintiff claims that the defendant was negligent in that it failed to provide adequate security at its hotel.   Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to (1) make sure a door on the first floor was securely locked;  (b) inspect the door;  (c) warn the plaintiff of the unlocked door;  and (d) keep the premises in an otherwise safe condition.   The defendant has moved for summary judgment and contends that the undisputed material facts establish that the plaintiff cannot prove negligence because the shooting of the plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable, thus the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty and the alleged acts or omissions of the defendant were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

In support of its motion for summary judgment that the material facts to which it contends are not in dispute, the defendant submitted a certified copy of portions of the transcript of the plaintiff's testimony at the criminal trial of State of Connecticut v. Earl Underwood, Docket No. HHB CR 09 0241471–T on November 29 and 30, 2010;  two photographs taken by the New Britain Police Department in connection with their investigation in this matter;  and portions of the New Britain Police Department's 118–page Police Report regarding this incident.   The defendant also filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion.   The plaintiff filed a reply, but offered no evidence that any of the material facts are in dispute.¹

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553–54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.”  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

“Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984).  “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).

“The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury.”   Baptiste v. Better Val–U Supermarket, 262 Conn. 135, 138, 811 A.2d 687 (2002).  “The test for determining legal duty is a two-pronged analysis that includes:  (1) a determination of foreseeability;  and (2) public policy analysis ․ Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact and imperative to a negligence cause of action ․ The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised.”  Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 114–15, 869 A.2d 179 (2005).

In this case, the undisputed material facts and circumstances of this case establish that the plaintiff's injuries from a gunshot wound were not reasonably foreseeable and that the public policy considerations weigh against the plaintiff.   Underwood and Johnson entered the hotel through a lobby door, as do all other patrons at the La Quinta Inn and Suites.   There was no failure by the defendant to determine if any door was locked or unlocked, nor could the defendant have anticipated the criminal and intentional acts of Underwood.   The two men, who had no association with the defendant, were on the property for the sole purpose of robbing the plaintiff.   The plaintiff himself asked one of the men to come to his room to drop off cigarettes.   Neither man asked any employee of the defendant for directions to the plaintiff's room.   When they knocked on the plaintiff's door, the plaintiff himself undid the locks, and let them into the room, and when he refused to give them the money, he was shot.   It was not reasonably foreseeable for the defendant to anticipate this series or chain of events, particularly in light of the fact that the defendant had no knowledge that the plaintiff was even on its premises, since the room was taken under another name.   Therefore, there is no duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and no breach of any duty as a matter of law.

Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot establish causation, and more specifically, proximate causation.  “Causation consists of two components—cause in fact and proximate cause.”  Paige v. Saint Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24, 734 A.2d 85 (1999).  “Cause in fact, occasionally referred to as actual cause, asks whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury.”  Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 605, 662 A.2d 753 (1995).  “Proximate cause establishes a reasonable connection between an act or omission of a defendant and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”  Id., 606.

Even if the defendant had breached a duty to the plaintiff, a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that there is a causal connection between the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and any failure to provide adequate security.   The gunshot injury to the plaintiff by a third party, invited by the plaintiff to his room, could not be found to be within the scope of any risk created by any failure by the defendant.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff attached to his objection to the motion for summary judgment what appears to be an internet search relating to crime rates in the city of New Britain.   The defendant objected to the document as it was not properly authenticated.   See Practice Book § 17–46..  FN1. The plaintiff attached to his objection to the motion for summary judgment what appears to be an internet search relating to crime rates in the city of New Britain.   The defendant objected to the document as it was not properly authenticated.   See Practice Book § 17–46.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.