Earl Grant v. Jo Ann Sulik (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This matter is before the court concerning the defendant Jo Ann Sulik's motion to strike (# 108) the plaintiff Earl Grant's complaint.   The plaintiff filed a response (# 110), in which he objects to the motion.   Oral argument was not requested.   After considering the parties' arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision.

I

Background

In his complaint, the plaintiff sues the defendant, a prosecutor, in her individual and official capacities, alleging that she is a state employee.   He premises his action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   He alleges that, acting under color of state law, the defendant, at a habeas corpus proceeding, tampered with evidence by presenting forged documents.   He alleges that the defendant altered the medical records of the alleged victim.   He also alleges that the defendant conspired with the prosecution in his original case by falsifying documents.

The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the defendant in her individual capacity.   He also seeks injunctive relief in her official capacity:  (1) that she be ordered to refrain from unjust procedures, such as tampering with evidence;  and (2) that she be removed from her position.

In her motion, the defendant asserts that she is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for all actions taken during the court proceeding which gave rise to the complaint.   She seeks to strike the complaint in its entirety.

II

Standard Of Review

The standard of review on a motion to strike is well established.  “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ․ We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ Moreover, ․ [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ․ It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition For Justice In Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   Legal conclusions in a complaint are not deemed to be admitted.   See Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Association, Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 476, 823 A.2d 1202 (2003).

III

Discussion

“The plaintiff has brought a[n] ․ action pursuant to § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.¹ See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (‘[e]very person who, under color of [law] ․ custom, or usage, of any [s]tate ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ․ to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [c]onstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law’);  ․ (‘[t]he purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails').”  (Citation omitted.)   Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 126, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).

“The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a state prosecutor's amenability to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ․ in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ․ ‘The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.   These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.’  Id., 422–23 ․ Because the court stated in Imbler that the immunity of prosecutors derived from that of judges, some discussion about the contours of the latter type of immunity is necessary.   The court explained this immunity, as well as its connection with that of prosecutors.  ‘The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law ․ Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials—judge, grand juror, and prosecutor—exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them ․ It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in ․ prosecutors being referred to as ‘quasi-judicial’ officers, and their immunities being termed ‘quasi-judicial’ as well.'  (Citations omitted.)  Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. 423 n.20.

‘[T]he court in Imbler explained:  ‘If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of § 1983 suits would undermine performance of his duties no less than would the threat of common-law suits for malicious prosecution.   A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court.   The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own personal liability in a suit for damages.   Such suits could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate ․ Further, if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.’  (Citations omitted.)   Id., 424–25.   The court concluded:  ‘[T]he considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under § 1983 that the prosecutor enjoys at common law.   To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor [who acts] malicious[ly] or dishonest[ly] ․ But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest.   It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.   Moreover, it often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice.’  (Emphasis added.)   Id., 427–28.   The court also noted:  ‘[W]e find ourselves in agreement with Judge Learned Hand, who wrote of the prosecutor's immunity from actions for malicious prosecution:  ‘As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative ․ [I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.’  ․ Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. 428 ․

‘In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Imbler, which set forth the contours of prosecutorial immunity, the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to fill in the outline set forth in Imbler.   Summarizing Imbler a decade and a half later, the United States Supreme Court stated:  ‘[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability ․ for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case ․ insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process ․ It was recognized. that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.’  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991).”  (Citations omitted;  footnote omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Barese v. Clark, 62 Conn.App. 58, 61–65, 773 A.2d 946 (2001).

The holding in Imbler was limited:  “We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. 431.   Thus, the holding in Imbler did not address actions for injunctive relief.

Subsequently, in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736–37, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980), the court stated, “Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), but they are natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state officers who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), is only one of a myriad of such cases since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), decided that suits against state officials in federal courts are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.   If prosecutors and law enforcement personnel cannot be proceeded against for declaratory relief, putative plaintiffs would have to await the institution of state-court proceedings against them in order to assert their federal constitutional claims;  This is not the way the law has developed ․” (Footnote omitted.)

More recently, in Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 535 (2d Cir.1993), the court stated, concerning a § 1983 claim against a prosecutor, “as to a valid claim for prospective injunctive relief, Rettler would not have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, ․ nor would he be entitled to a defense of absolute immunity ․ or qualified immunity ․” (Citations omitted.)  “[A]n official's entitlement to absolute immunity from a claim for damages ․ does not bar the granting of injunctive relief [.]”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 239 (2d Cir.2005) (claims against assistant district attorneys).

A motion to strike a prayer for relief may be granted.   See Practice Book § 10–39(a)(2).   Here, the defendant's motion and memorandum do not address the plaintiff's demand for injunctive relief.   In the absence of argument addressed to these aspects of the complaint, the motion to strike is denied as to them.

Since, as discussed above, the defendant is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983, the motion is granted as to the plaintiff's demands for compensatory and punitive damages.   Those aspects of the complaint are stricken.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the defendant's motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part.   The plaintiff's demands for compensatory and punitive damages are stricken.   It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”.  FN1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Shapiro, Robert B., J.