Lisa C. Hilger v. Steven E. Hilger (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

This dissolution of marriage action between the plaintiff wife, Lisa Hilger, and the defendant husband, Steven Hilger, came before the court by a writ, summons and complaint, returnable to the court on September 14, 2010.   The case was tried to the court on August 16 and 17, 2011.   The plaintiff was represented by attorney Melissa Buckley and the defendant was represented by attorney Maria Dornfried.

Both parties submitted claims for relief.   Regarding financial support, the plaintiff proposes that the defendant pay child support in accordance with the child support guidelines in the amount of $170 per week and share equally the cost of unreimbursed expenses and extracurricular activities.   The plaintiff further proposes that neither party pay alimony, that the parties retain their respective retirement accounts, and that, following the subdivision of their real property she retain sole ownership of the marital home on lot 1 and the parties share equally in the proceeds from the sales of lots 2 and 3, if their sales price exceeds $30,000 and $124,000, respectively.

By way of financial orders, the defendant proposes that neither party pay alimony or child support, that he retain all the excess proceeds, if any, from the sale of lots 2 and 3, and that the parties equally divide their deferred compensation plans.

In rendering this decision and making the ensuing orders, the court has carefully considered the statutory criteria in General Statutes § 46b–56c, as to educational support orders, General Statues § 46b–66a, as to the conveyance of real property, General Statutes §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82, regarding the assignment of the marital estate and alimony, respectively, General Statutes § 46b–84, as to support and medical insurance for the minor children, General Statutes § 46b–62, regarding attorneys fees, the case law as it has developed regarding these matters and other relevant federal and state laws regarding the issues that confront the court.   The court has considered the credible evidence, the parties' arguments and the proposed orders.¹  Additionally, the court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and the witnesses at the time of trial.   The court has also carefully examined the exhibits admitted during the hearing.

A

Jurisdictional Findings

The court makes the following findings.   On July 18, 1998, the parties were married in Westbrook, Connecticut.   The plaintiff resided in the state of Connecticut for more than one year prior to the commencement of the action.   Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction.

Three children, Austin, age eleven, and twins, Logan and Garrett, age nine, were born to the plaintiff.²  The family has never received public assistance.

The court finds that the allegations of the complaint are proven in truth.   The marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably, and, for the reasons articulated below, there is no hope for reconciliation of the parties to their marriages.

B

Parties

The plaintiff, now forty-eight years old, earned a bachelor of arts degree in special education at St. Joseph's University in 1985, and earned a masters degree in learning disabilities at Southern Connecticut State University in 1996.   Other than taking time off to attend to her newborns, she has worked since September 1, 1985, as a special education teacher in the Haddam–Killingworth middle school.   She earns approximately $78,000 per year.   The plaintiff provides health insurance for herself and the children through her employer.   The court finds that the plaintiff's net weekly wage is $1,147.

The defendant is forty-five years old and has a bachelor of science degree in science and geology.   He works as a kitchen and bath designer.   He has been employed by Rings End Lumber since 2003, and earns a base salary of $29,000 per year, plus commission.   The defendant also participates in a profit-sharing plan.   In years past, the defendant has had an average income of approximately $80,000 per year.   In recent years, however, his earnings have suffered with the economy.   In 2011, he expects to earn approximately $43,000.   Health insurance is available to him at no cost.   He is presently earning approximately $823 per week.   The court finds that his net weekly wage is $652.

The defendant is in excellent health.   The plaintiff suffers from hypertension, anxiety and allergies.   Neither party has any health issues that substantially impede their capacity to earn a living.

C

Marital Property

Throughout the marriage, both parties made contributions to the acquisition, maintenance and preservation of the marital assets, including real estate.

D

Real Estate

At the time of the marriage, the plaintiff was the owner of a home at 7 Lookout Hill Road in Old Saybrook, which had a value of $210,000.   Anticipating the birth of their twins, the parties purchased land at 63 Obed Heights in Old Saybrook, on February 26, 2002, for $162,004.³  They utilized $95,095 of equity from the home at 7 Lookout Hill ⁴ and $79,555 from the contemporaneous sale of a portion of the land at 63 Obed Heights.   The defendant borrowed $75,000 from his brother as a bridge loan to cover the time which passed between the purchase of 63 Obed Heights, the sale of the extra lot on 63 Obed Heights and the sale of 7 Lookout Hill on March 1, 2002.⁵  In December 2002, the parties took out a construction loan in the amount of $255,000 and built a modular home on the Obed Heights property.   On August 2009, the parties refinanced with a second mortgage in the amount of $68,000.⁶

The parties have started the process of obtaining approval for a subdivision of the property at 63 Obed Heights to make the following three lots:  (a) lot 1 with a total area of 114,111 square feet (2.620 acres), (b) lot 2 with a total area of 72,731 square feet (1.67 acres) and (c) lot 3, the “Remaining Land of Hilger to be combined with Land N/F of Peter T. Labriola,” consisting of 1.76 acres, all as more particularly shown on a map entitled “Record Subdivision Map, Land of Steven Hilger and Lisa Hilger, 63 Obed Heights Road, Old Saybrook, Connecticut, dated December 6, 2010, 1”= 40', David A. Annino, Licensed Surveyor.” ⁷

The court finds the value of lot 1, on which the marital home is sited, is $400,000.   The property is subject to a first mortgage in the amount of $220,000 and a home equity loan in the amount of $60,771 for a total of $280,771.   Lot 1, including the marital home, has total equity of $119,229.   The court finds the value of lot 2, a 1.67 acre building lot, is $124,000, and the value of lot 3, a slice, is $30,000.⁸

E

Additional Assets and Liabilities

The plaintiff owns and operates a 2007 Honda Odyssey with a value of $12,000, a loan balance $670 and equity of $11,393.   She also owns a 1997 Dodge Neon with a value of $300.   The defendant owns and operates a 2006 Subaru Wagon with a value of $12,885, a loan balance of $1,200 and equity of $11,685.

The plaintiff has a Bank of America savings and checking account, with a value of $701, and a Seasons Federal Credit Union account, with a value of $675.   The defendant has a Bank of America checking account with a value of $200.

The parties have no significant short term liabilities held in their joint names.   The plaintiff has short term liabilities totaling $68,256, including, notably, obligations to Chase, in the amount of $12,513, U.S. Air, in the amount of $3,987, Kohls, in the amount of $151, Sallie Mae, for student loans, in the amount of $32,000 and outstanding legal fees in the amount of $19,605.

The defendant has short term liabilities totaling $126,634, including obligations to USAA Visa, totaling $23,079, Discover, totaling $7,377, Citibank, totaling $1,677, and his brother Jeffrey Hilger, for unsecured loans in the amount of $74,600 and $31,000.⁹

The parties have retirement accounts as a consequence of current and prior employment.   The plaintiff, through her employment, has a 403–b tax sheltered annuity (TSA) with Great American, valued at $8,191.   She is a participant in a contributory defined benefit plan with the state of Connecticut Teachers Retirement Plan (CTRP) with 23.3 years of vested service.   The retirement benefit has a present value of $350,324.   Approximately half, 49.75 percent, of the vested service took place during the marriage.¹⁰  The benefit is an asset of the marital estate.   See Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 745, 785 A.2d 197 (2001).   The plaintiff does not contribute to social security as a teacher.   She had minimal social security earnings prior to becoming a teacher.

The court is mindful of the unique characteristics of, and challenges presented by, the CTRP. The CTRP is a governmental retirement plan and, as such, is exempt, under Section 1003 of Title 29 of the United States Code, from the federal requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and the Retirement Equity Act, as they pertain to a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).¹¹  Benefits cannot be paid to the alternate payee until the member is in pay status.   The member must be receiving a monthly benefit or apply for a refund following termination of service in order for the alternate payee to begin receiving benefits.   If the member remarries and dies before retirement the new spouse receives monthly survivorship benefits.   The alternate payee may receive a lump sum only if benefits to new spouse terminate and a balance is remaining.   From the record, it is unclear whether the CTRP provisions allow the plaintiff to elect a survivor beneficiary for her retirement benefits before she retires ¹² or, if plaintiff is remarried when she retires, whether the new spouse must consent to the designation of the defendant as a survivor beneficiary.

The defendant has a profit-sharing plan through his employment valued at $36,560 and a Wells Fargo retirement account with a value of $6,424.   He has continued to contribute to social security since 1986.   The present value of the social security retirement benefit is $117,559.   Approximately 36.45 percent of the earnings accrued during the marriage.¹³  Both the plaintiff and the defendant carry term life insurance in their names with a face value of $50,000 and $268,000, respectively.   The court accepts the values of these accounts and retirement assets as set forth by the parties on their financial affidavits.

F

Causes for the Dissolution of Marriage

The plaintiff painted an unflattering picture of the marriage over the last five to six years.   She decided in the fall of 2009 that she wanted to terminate the marriage, but chose to wait until the boys finished school so as not to disrupt their lives.¹⁴  She contends that, throughout the course of the marriage, the defendant engaged in patterns of deception, both large and small.   In 2009, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had opened a post office box and had redirected the family mail to that box.   This action was taken to hide the fact that he had applied for and utilized credit cards and lines of credit without the plaintiff's knowledge.   When confronted, the defendant initially denied his actions.   He later wrote the plaintiff an apology and disclosed additional deceptions concerning moneys he had “borrowed” from his brother.   The plaintiff contends that the totality of these behaviors led to the breakdown of the marriage.

The defendant testified that all of the money he borrowed and charged went to the expenses of the family.   He acknowledged that he should have been forth right with the plaintiff when it came to their financial affairs, but he feared that if he confronted her with the truth she would leave him.   He contends that he borrowed and incurred debt to continue to allow the plaintiff to live in the lifestyle she enjoyed in a misguided attempt to take care of his family and keep his wife happy.   The defendant asserted that he loved his wife and was devoted to their marriage.   He noted that she started a relationship with another man a full year prior to filing for divorce.¹⁵  Moreover, she did not file for divorce until September, after the commencement of a new school year, and only after the defendant learned about the relationship and moved out of the marital home.

The defendant's pattern of lying and deception go beyond an earnest attempt to shield his family from their financial difficulties.   The defendant's testimony before the court lacked candor and honesty.   At trial, the defendant represented that an $8,000 deposit in his checking account, made in early 2011, was from moneys loaned by his brother, that there was no written agreement with Labriola, documenting the transfer of lot 3, and that he had not received any funds from Labriola.   He was confronted on cross-examination with a written agreement he executed with Labriola, dated January 30, 2011, which had been recorded on the land records, documenting the receipt of an $8,000 refundable deposit.   Thereafter, the defendant acknowledged that his testimony was false, that he had perjured himself at an earlier deposition when he was questioned on the same subject areas, and that the $8,000 deposit in his checking account did not represent moneys received from his brother.¹⁶

The court finds both parties contributed to the breakdown of their marriage and neither should be held more culpable or responsible than the other.

II

ORDERS

Based on the foregoing, the court orders the following:

1. The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the basis of an irretrievable breakdown.

2. Child Support.   The defendant, father, will pay to the plaintiff, mother, child-support in the amount of $100 per week by way of wage garnishment, which is a deviation from the child support guidelines.¹⁷  In addition, the defendant will pay 50 percent and the plaintiff 50 percent of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses.   The definition of a medical and dental expense is to be broadly construed to include, but not be limited to, medical, dental, orthodontic, hospitalization, optical, pharmaceutical, and psychological and/or psychiatric counseling and/or treatment.

The plaintiff and the defendant shall share equally the cost, including supplies and transportation, of activities for the minor children, including, but not limited to:  extracurricular activities, summer camp, tutoring, sports, travel, field trips, etc., so long as such activities and costs are reasonable.   Each party shall reimburse the other within five days of a submission of a proof of the payment.

3. Health Insurance.   The plaintiff shall continue to carry the children for so long as the plan is available to her through her employer at a reasonable cost.   In the event that the plan is no longer available to the plaintiff at a reasonable cost, and the defendant has a plan available to him through his employer at a reasonable cost, then defendant shall carry the children under such plan.   In the event that neither party has a plan available to them through their employers at a reasonable cost, the parties shall share the costs of such coverage for the minor children.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own health insurance.

4. Alimony. Neither party shall pay alimony to the other except as specifically set forth in paragraph six below.

5. Real Property.

(a) The defendant will proceed with the process of obtaining subdivision approval, time being of the essence.

(b) Upon the approval of the subdivision and all ancillary work required to be done (pinning and mylars and other work to conform with and complete the requirements of the subdivision approval), the defendant will quitclaim his interest in the property to the plaintiff.

Simultaneous with the quitclaim to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall quitclaim back to the defendant a parcel of the land from 63 Obed Heights, Old Saybrook, as follows:  On a map entitled “Record Subdivision Map, Land of Steven Hilger and Lisa Hilger, 63 Obed Heights Road, Old Saybrook, Connecticut, dated December 6, 2010, 1” = 40,' David A. Annino, Licensed Surveyor,” the Parcel consisting of the designated “lot 2” and the designated “Remaining Land of Hilger to be combined with Land N/F of Peter T. Labriola.”   There shall be no reservation of any rights, easements or rights of way on lot 1 to the benefit of the property being conveyed to the defendant, except for a utility easement to the benefit of lot 2. The plaintiff will fully cooperate and promptly execute whatever documents are necessary to facilitate said property division.

The conveyances will result in the plaintiff retaining the designated lot 1 on said map, with a total area of 114,111 square feet (2.620 acres).

(c) Until such time as the properties are subdivided, conveyed and the Town of Old Saybrook reassesses the separate parcels, the parties shall equally share the real estate taxes due and/or refund made on the premises.   The parties shall each be entitled to claim 50 percent of the real estate taxes deduction for the jointly held property for the period that they both equally share such payments.   The plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the mortgage interest deduction for the year 2011 and thereafter.   After the property is conveyed between the parties and the parcels reassessed, each party will be responsible for the taxes on his or her parcel and shall be entitled to deduct the real estate taxes, based on his or her own payment.

(d) Responsibility for costs after conveyance.   The plaintiff shall be responsible for all the costs of the premises retained by her, including the mortgage, home equity loan, insurance, taxes and utilities, and shall hold harmless and indemnify the defendant as to such costs.

The defendant shall be responsible for all the costs of the premises conveyed to him, including the taxes and insurance, and shall hold harmless and indemnify the plaintiff as to such costs.

(e) Responsibility for the costs of subdivision.   The defendant shall be responsible for all costs of development of the properties conveyed to him, regardless as to the source, nature and amounts, and shall pay all sums immediately upon presentation and shall, at the time of payment, obtain waivers of mechanic's liens.

(f) The plaintiff shall have exclusive possession of the marital home.   In the event that the parties or their agents and servants need to enter onto the property of the other, they shall provide notice at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance.

(g) In the event that the purchase price for the lot to be conveyed to Labriola is in excess of $30,000, the amount in excess of $30,000 shall be divided equally between the parties, less the increase in town and state conveyance taxes caused by the increased sales price.   The defendant shall provide the plaintiff with all documents from the closing, including, but not limited to, the settlement statements, HUD–1's, contracts and copies of checks, both received and paid out.   The plaintiff shall not be required to give an access easement over her property.

(h) Refinance of Premises.   After the properties are conveyed from one to the other pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiff shall refinance the first and second mortgages to remove the defendant from the loans and will pursue such with all due diligence.   The defendant will obtain a full release of the Labriola encumbrance.

(i) Labriola Encumbrance.   The defendant shall be solely responsible for the Labriola encumbrance—the document recorded on the land records at Vol. 558, Page 1082—and any costs, fees, attorneys fees, payments, etc., associated both with the encumbrance and the removal of the encumbrance.   The defendant shall have thirty (30) days to remove such encumbrance from the premises at 63 Obed Heights.   If the encumbrance is not removed within thirty days from the date of judgment and the plaintiff retains an attorney to obtain removal of such encumbrance, the defendant shall be solely responsible for the plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs associated with any activities undertaken by the plaintiff to cause the encumbrance to be removed.

(j) The court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter.

6. Deferred Compensation.

a) The defendant shall retain his Wells Fargo retirement account.

b) The plaintiff shall retain her 403b Great American TSA.

c) The defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff 50 percent of his profit sharing plan as the same is valued on date of dissolution, plus or minus gains and losses from the date of dissolution of marriage to the date of distribution, to be accomplished by a qualified domestic relations order;  with costs to be divided equally between the parties.

d) The court enters the following orders pursuant to the state of Connecticut Teachers' Retirement System, § 10–183b et seq., for the division of the plaintiff's pension benefits:  the defendant, as alternate payee, by domestic relations order (DRO), shall receive, and the plaintiff is directed to pay benefits to the defendant, as alternate payee, as a marital property settlement, the amount determined by the following formula:  25 percent of the gross monthly benefit payable at the date of distribution to the plaintiff (Member) multiplied by the “service factor.”   The numerator of the service factor is the number of years accumulated during the marriage period and the denominator is the Member's total years of service covered by CTRS and used in calculating the Member's benefit.   The payment plan to be selected is not specified.   The defendant's benefits will be actuarially reduced if the plaintiff chooses an optional payment plan for which the defendant will be the recipient of such payments.   The amount payable to the defendant shall include a proportionate share of any cost-of-living adjustments payable to the plaintiff.

This award of 25 percent of the gross monthly benefit payable at the date of distribution to the defendant (Member) multiplied by the “service factor” entitles the defendant to rights of joint survivors benefits, which are herewith ordered as his, and the plaintiff is ordered to so continue that designation to his benefit.   The plaintiff's retained right of designation of the alternate payee is limited by this Order.   The court has considered the possibility that if the plaintiff has remarried at the time of her retirement, her spouse may be able to object to the designation of the defendant as an alternate payee, and, under the provisions of the plan, such objection may prevent the plan from permitting the defendant's designation as an alternate payee and hereby orders $1 per year alimony to the defendant.

The plaintiff shall not make any election to receive any lump sums from her pension plan, or to roll over sums from his pension plan into an individual retirement account.   The court further orders that, in the event that the plaintiff predeceases the defendant, and lump sum payments are payable under the plan for the plaintiff's accumulated contributions and interest the defendant shall receive a proportional interest.

The parties shall participate in the preparation of a DRO, and seek court approval of said orders to effectuate said division.   The cost of the preparation of the DRO shall be paid equally by the parties.   This court will retain jurisdiction to amend this order only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining its validity and enforceability under the plan.   Both parties and their counsel are ordered to sign all documents required to effectuate the forgoing orders.

7. College. The court shall reserve jurisdiction under General Statutes § 46b–56c and make orders with respect to the educational expenses for the children.¹⁸

8. Bank Accounts and Personal Property.   The parties will retain their own bank accounts.

9. Motor Vehicles.   Each party will retain their own motor vehicle(s).  The parties shall be responsible for all costs and expenses associated with said vehicles, and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless with respect thereto.

10. Personal Property.   The parties shall retain whatever personal property they currently have, except that the defendant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of judgment to remove from the marital residence the following items:  (1) portable generator, (2) piano, (3) two end chairs from the dining room, (4) pine trestle table, (5) sideboard and (6) lumber, tools and related supplies from his woodworking business and hobby.   The defendant will notify the plaintiff and schedule a mutually convenient time for the movers to remove the items.

11. Liabilities. Each party will be responsible for the debts on their respective financial affidavits.

12. Taxes. The plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the parties' minor child, Logan, as a dependent for federal and state income tax purposes.   The defendant shall be entitled to claim the parties' minor child, Garrett, as a dependent for federal and state income tax purposes.   The parties shall alternate claiming Austin as a dependent, with the defendant to claim Austin in odd years and the plaintiff to claim Austin in even years.   The parties shall execute all forms required under existing or future law which shall permit the parties to claim such dependents in this matter for tax purposes.

13. Life Insurance.   The parties shall maintain the life insurance they currently have for the benefit of the children so long as they have a child support obligation and until all of the children have reached the age of twenty-three or left college with no intention of returning.   They may appoint a trustee as beneficiary for the benefit of the children.   They may reduce such amount provided the remaining balance is sufficient to pay the then remaining present value of payments that may be due.

15. Liabilities. Each party shall be responsible for the remaining liabilities listed on their respective financial affidavit and will indemnify and hold the other harmless therefrom.

16. Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees.

17. The plaintiff's maiden name of Castlevetro is restored.

18. Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are necessary and are presented to them by the other party to effectuate these orders

These orders are effective immediately.

It is so ordered.

HARRY E. CALMAR, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although this was a limited contested matter (as the court noted at the commencement of the trial) and no evidence was presented concerning modifications to the December 21, 2010, order, both parties submitted post-trial proposed orders addressing the parenting schedule.   This decision does not address access issues..  FN1. Although this was a limited contested matter (as the court noted at the commencement of the trial) and no evidence was presented concerning modifications to the December 21, 2010, order, both parties submitted post-trial proposed orders addressing the parenting schedule.   This decision does not address access issues.

FN2. On December 18, 2010, the parties entered into a written parenting plan addressing custody, primary residence and access to the minor children.   The agreement was entered as an order on December 21, 2010..  FN2. On December 18, 2010, the parties entered into a written parenting plan addressing custody, primary residence and access to the minor children.   The agreement was entered as an order on December 21, 2010.

FN3. The real estate consists of 6.05 acres that have been surveyed to establish three proposed lots..  FN3. The real estate consists of 6.05 acres that have been surveyed to establish three proposed lots.

FN4. The $95,095 was secured by way of a refinance in the amount of $51,096 and a home equity loan in the amount of $44,000..  FN4. The $95,095 was secured by way of a refinance in the amount of $51,096 and a home equity loan in the amount of $44,000.

FN5. The sale of 7 Lookout Hill Road resulted in net proceeds of $21,122..  FN5. The sale of 7 Lookout Hill Road resulted in net proceeds of $21,122.

FN6. The plaintiff was previously married and had a daughter, Ariana, from that union, who is presently in college.   Of the funds received from the second mortgage, $34,000 was used to pay for her first year of college..  FN6. The plaintiff was previously married and had a daughter, Ariana, from that union, who is presently in college.   Of the funds received from the second mortgage, $34,000 was used to pay for her first year of college.

FN7. The court accepts the property descriptions as set forth by the parties in their proposed orders as accurate..  FN7. The court accepts the property descriptions as set forth by the parties in their proposed orders as accurate.

FN8. On January 30, 2011, the defendant entered into a written agreement with his neighbor Peter Labriola to sell, upon approval of the subdivision, a slice of land consisting of 1.76 acres and identified as lot 3 for $30,000.   The defendant received an $8,000 refundable deposit.   While the plaintiff was generally aware of the plan to sell lot 3 to the neighbor she had no knowledge of the written agreement or the deposit.   The defendant denied the existence of such an agreement..  FN8. On January 30, 2011, the defendant entered into a written agreement with his neighbor Peter Labriola to sell, upon approval of the subdivision, a slice of land consisting of 1.76 acres and identified as lot 3 for $30,000.   The defendant received an $8,000 refundable deposit.   While the plaintiff was generally aware of the plan to sell lot 3 to the neighbor she had no knowledge of the written agreement or the deposit.   The defendant denied the existence of such an agreement.

FN9. There are no promissory notes or other written evidence of the debt or terms of repayment.   The brother has not requested or demanded repayment..  FN9. There are no promissory notes or other written evidence of the debt or terms of repayment.   The brother has not requested or demanded repayment.

FN10. The present value of the coverture portion of the plaintiff's retirement plan is $174,301..  FN10. The present value of the coverture portion of the plaintiff's retirement plan is $174,301.

FN11. The CTRP is established and maintained by the state of Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 10–183b et seq.   It is a “governmental plan” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 414(d) and is, therefore, exempt from the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 411.Because it is exempt from the provisions of § 411, the CTRP is not governed by 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13), and, therefore, it is not governed by 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) as well..  FN11. The CTRP is established and maintained by the state of Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 10–183b et seq.   It is a “governmental plan” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 414(d) and is, therefore, exempt from the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 411.Because it is exempt from the provisions of § 411, the CTRP is not governed by 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13), and, therefore, it is not governed by 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) as well.

FN12. Under ERISA, the alternate payee can commence benefits any time on or after the earliest date that the participant could retire, even if the participant chooses to continue working.   See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)..  FN12. Under ERISA, the alternate payee can commence benefits any time on or after the earliest date that the participant could retire, even if the participant chooses to continue working.   See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).

FN13. The present value of the coverture portion of the defendant's social security benefit is $42,855..  FN13. The present value of the coverture portion of the defendant's social security benefit is $42,855.

FN14. The minor children, Logan and Garrett, were the product of a monoamniotic gestation and born prematurely, with special needs throughout their infancy and childhood..  FN14. The minor children, Logan and Garrett, were the product of a monoamniotic gestation and born prematurely, with special needs throughout their infancy and childhood.

FN15. The plaintiff argues her relationship “such as it was” began after the breakdown of the marriage and was not sexual.   The relationship started a full year prior to her filing for divorce, while the plaintiff was still married to the defendant, and continued for six months before the defendant accidentally discovered e-mails on the home computer.   Sexual or not, the relationship was entirely inconsistent with the plaintiff's marital obligations..  FN15. The plaintiff argues her relationship “such as it was” began after the breakdown of the marriage and was not sexual.   The relationship started a full year prior to her filing for divorce, while the plaintiff was still married to the defendant, and continued for six months before the defendant accidentally discovered e-mails on the home computer.   Sexual or not, the relationship was entirely inconsistent with the plaintiff's marital obligations.

FN16. The defendant orally modified his proposed orders at trial and withdrew his claim that the plaintiff be partially responsible for any part of the debts to Jeffrey Hilger..  FN16. The defendant orally modified his proposed orders at trial and withdrew his claim that the plaintiff be partially responsible for any part of the debts to Jeffrey Hilger.

FN17. Based on a review of the party's financial affidavits, the court finds that the presumptive child support payment from the father is $160 per week and that the mother's and father's share of unreimbursed medical expenses is seventy-three percent and twenty-seven percent, respectively.   The court finds that it would be inappropriate to order the presumptive payments in light of the fact that the parties have a schedule which approaches a shared physical custody arraignment and the father will share a greater responsibility for the children's expenses..  FN17. Based on a review of the party's financial affidavits, the court finds that the presumptive child support payment from the father is $160 per week and that the mother's and father's share of unreimbursed medical expenses is seventy-three percent and twenty-seven percent, respectively.   The court finds that it would be inappropriate to order the presumptive payments in light of the fact that the parties have a schedule which approaches a shared physical custody arraignment and the father will share a greater responsibility for the children's expenses.

FN18. The court finds it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the children for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact.   See General Statutes § 46b–56c(c)..  FN18. The court finds it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the children for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact.   See General Statutes § 46b–56c(c).

Calmar, Harry E., J.