Holly Upton v. John K. Slyman (2011)

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (Correction to Memorandum of Decision dated September 21, 2001 Correction made was re last paragraph of decision changing defendant to plaintiff)

The plaintiff, (hereinafter Upton) brings this second revised complaint in one count alleging that she has an express easement by virtue of a deeded right-of-way, over property owned by the defendant (hereinafter Slyman) in the town of Mansfield.   She further alleges that Slyman has wrongfully obstructed the right of way by placing bales of hay and farm equipment on said right-of-way.   Slyman has denied this allegation and by counterclaim, if such a right-of-way is found to exist alleges that Upton has wrongfully expanded the size and scope of such right-of-way.

The parties are abutting land owners of property located on Birch Road in Mansfield.   Upton acquired her property, located at 223 Birch Road, by deed from the estate of Katherine Shuttleworth, on April 15, 1999.

The deed (plaintiff's exhibit 1), after describing the property being conveyed, contains the following:

Together with a right of way in favor of the grantee for vehicles and pedestrian traffic over the driveway situated immediately west of the herein described premises and running in a general southerly direction from said Birch Road to the old barn herein before referenced.

Slyman's position is that the right-of-way was used in the past to access the barn and was no more than a cow path.   He further states that in the past it was used as a driveway to access what is now Upton's home.   The Court does not interpret the right-of-way language so narrowly.   It provides for “vehicles and pedestrian traffic to the old barn herein before referenced.”   Upton had no ownership interest in the barn.   It is owned by Slyman.

It seems reasonable to interpret the right-of-way language as providing access to Upton's home by crossing next to the barn.   It is a very short distance from the barn to the Upton property.   The right-of-way would be meaningless if Upton could drive to the barn, but no further.   The right-of-way deed language even predates the Upton purchase and is found in a deed dated February 6, 1973.   (Pl.Ex. 2.)

The Court concludes that the deed language established an express easement.   Pl.Ex. 6 depicts the location of the right-of-way.   It was done by Datum Engineering & Surveying, LLC, which was retained by the parties jointly to depict its location.

The plaintiff has established that Slyman has attempted to block her use of the right-of-way by piling hay bales and metal stakes therein.

The Court orders that Slyman be enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's access to and use of the right-of-way as shown in exhibit 6.

Turning to the counterclaim which alleges that Upton has wrongfully expanded the right-of-way and has exceeded the scope of said right-of-way, it is clear to the Court that she has, indeed, done so.

Her attitude that she is not responsible for the misuse of her right-of-way by others, including her boyfriend, or her daughter's boyfriend, and others does not excuse her from responsibility.

Without asking, her boyfriend laid gravel down and expanded the right-of-way.   He created parking spaces adjoining the right-of-way for the use of the plaintiff or her guests.   He parked trucks and vehicles both on the right-of-way and Slyman's property.   He parked heavy equipment there, i.e. trucks and excavators.

Upton is responsible for abuse of her right-of-way by herself, or her family members, or friends.   Her denial of having knowledge of what was going on is not credible.

The plaintiff Holly Upton is enjoined from using the right-of-way beyond the parameters as shown in exhibit 6, or for any use other than her deed allows.   She is also responsible for insuring that her guests, friends, or family members comply with the conditions of the right-of-way.

Klaczak J.T.R.

Klaczak, Lawrence C., J.T.R.