Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Joseph E. Brown et al. (2011)

RULING RE DEFENDANT BROWN'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS (DOC. NO. 166.00);  MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 167.00);  MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 169.00) AND COUNTERCLAIMS (DOC. NO. 171.00)

The court entered judgment in this foreclosure action on June 21, 2011, ordering a foreclosure by sale of the defendant Brown's property in Brooklyn, CT. The defendant appealed the matter to the Appellate Court on July 11, 2011.   Pending before the court are the defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 166.00) filed on October 18, 2011, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 167.00) filed on October 18, 2011, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 169.00) filed on October 27, 2011, and Counterclaims, (Doc. No. 171.00) filed on October 28, 2011.   Procedurally, these pre-judgment type motions and efforts are too late.   See Practice Book §§ 10–8, 17–4(a).   However, the defendant is self-represented.  “It is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hill v. Williams, 74 Conn.App. 654, 655–56, 813 A.2d 130, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 918, 822 A.2d 242 (2003).   Defendant's arguments are not always clear, but, in these motions, it is clear that he seeks to raise or reargue reasons to prevent the foreclosure of his property.   Accordingly, the court treats his motions as motions to open the judgment.   See Tiber Holding Corp. v. Greenberg, 36 Conn.App. 670, 671 n.1, 652 A.2d 1063 (1995).   Nevertheless, for the following reasons, the motions are denied.

A motion to set aside or open a civil judgment is governed by General Statues § 52–212a and Practice Book § 17–4.   Ordinarily, it must be filed within four months of the notice of judgment.  Id. With regard to the Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss filed on October 18, 2011, these were filed within four months.   The decision whether to grant or deny a timely motion to reopen is discretionary.  Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 214–15, 487 A.2d 197 (1985);  accord Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins., 240 Conn. 799, 809, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997).  “While a motion [to open or set aside] should not be readily granted nor without strong reasons, it ought to be when there appears cause for which the court acting reasonably would feel bound in duty so to do.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710–11, 461 A.2d 1037 (1983);  Baris v. Southbend, Inc., 68 Conn.App. 546, 522 n.6, 791 A.2d 713 (2002).   “Practice Book [§ 17–4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation.”  Hirtle v. Hirtle, 217 Conn. 394, 398, 586 A.2d 578 (1991).   Defendant's grounds for blocking the foreclosure primarily concern his complaint that the wrong sale sign was mistakenly put on his property, which he promptly removed;  and concern the failure of the court to be persuaded to bar the foreclosure due to this and other perceived, but similarly unpersuasive, procedural errors.   None of the matters concern the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage or note and are, therefore, not grounds for preventing the foreclosure.   See Southbridge Assoc., LLC v. Garofalo, 53 Conn.App. 11, 19, 728 A.2d 1114, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 919, 733 A.2d 229 (1999).   After hearing the parties and reviewing the claims, the court finds that all other arguments are, similarly, repetitive of earlier, unpersuasive claims, are too late to raise now or are not legally viable, or were previously resolved on motion for summary judgment.   Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss in Doc. Nos. 166.00 and 167.00 filed on October 18, 2011, are denied.

The Motion to Dismiss filed on October 27, 2011 and the Counterclaims filed on October 28, 2011, were both filed after the four-month deadline.   If a motion to open a judgment is filed after the four-month limit, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the motion unless (1) the judgment winner waives the time limit requirement or otherwise submits to the court's jurisdiction, Misinonile v. Misinonile, 190 Conn. 132, 134, 459 A.2d 518 (1983);  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 291, 618 A.2d 1 (1992);  (2) the alleged error is a clerical one, Misinonile v. Misinonile, supra;  Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567, 571, 392 A.2d 440 (1978);  (3) the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake, Celanese Fiber v. Pic Yarns, Inc., 184 Conn. 461, 466, 440 A.2d 159 (1981);  Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 180 Conn. 129, 131, 429 A.2d 837 (1980);  or (4) the judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Misinonile v. Misinonile, supra, 190 Conn. 134–35;  Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463, 467, 435 A.2d 1016 (1980);  Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 177, 413 A.2d 819, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801 (1979);  but see, Urban Redevelopment Commission v. Katsetos, 86 Conn.App. 236, 243, 860 A.2d 1233 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919, 866 A.2d 1289 (2005).   After hearing the parties and reviewing the claims, the court finds no persuasive evidence that any of the exceptions are applicable here.   Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over the motions and, therefore, they, too, must be denied.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 166.00) filed on October 18, 2011, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 167.00) filed on October 18, 2011, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 169.00) filed on October 27, 2011, and Counterclaims, (Doc. No. 171.00) filed on October 28, 2011, are denied.

THE COURT

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge, Superior Court

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.