IN RE: Harley Jayne D. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This unfortunate and somewhat unusual matter involves a motion by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to revoke the neglect commitment of 17–year–old Harley–Jayne D., who was born on April 3, 1994.   The child's mother, respondent Gail L., objects to the motion.

A contested hearing was held before the undersigned on November 3, 2011.   The court has carefully considered all of the evidence presented at trial, and the thoughtful arguments of all counsel.   The court has taken judicial notice of pertinent portions of the court file, including the neglect judgment, certain court orders, sworn affidavits previously filed with the court, and hearing memoranda.   The court has also considered the provisions of C.G.S. § 46b–129(m).¹  The court finds that the facts set forth below were proven by a preponderance of the evidence at hearing.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

Harley Jayne D. was born to Gail L. on April 3, 1994.   Her biological father, Jay G., is deceased.   Harley Jayne will attain majority on April 3, 2012.

The family has an extensive history with DCF. Gail L. and Harley–Jayne have both been diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  (Mother's Exhibit 2, page 1;  Testimony of Philip Brown, MSW.) In May 2006, Harley–Jayne was committed by the court as a neglected child to DCF's care and custody.   She was placed at the Learning Clinic, a residential treatment facility.  (Mother's Exhibit 3, page 4.) In November of 2007, Harley–Jayne was placed by DCF with her maternal grandmother.  (Id.) She remained with the maternal grandmother until June 2009, when she ran away.  (Id.) After the runaway, Harley–Jayne was admitted to the Institute of Living in Hartford.  (Id.) Upon discharge from the Institute of Living, the petitioner placed her in the New Dawn Group Home. (Id.) That placement was disrupted when Harley–Jayne ran away again in November 2009.   (Id.) On November 14, 2009, Harley–Jayne was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in New York, where she stayed until her discharge from treatment in January 2010 (Id.) DCF next placed Harley Jayne in the Connecticut Children's Place.   Harley–Jayne remained at the Connecticut Children's Place for a number of months until DCF determined that she should be transferred to a therapeutic group home known as the Justice Resource Institute's (JRI) Paine Road Group Home. Gail L. objected to Harley–Jayne's placement at the JRI facility and requested an administrative hearing.   The mother contended that her daughter required placement in a residential treatment facility and not a group home.   (See:  Respondent's Exhibit 3.) In a decision dated May 26, 2010, DCF Hearing Officer Dale H. King determined that the agency's proposed treatment plan of placement in a therapeutic group home was “appropriate to the needs of the child.”  (Id., page 6.) DCF subsequently sent Harley–Jayne to live at the JRI group home.

On August 11, 2010, the court (Foley, J.) granted DCF's motion to revoke commitment.   Judge Foley revoked the commitment and restored Harley–Jayne to the guardianship of her mother, Gail L., under a period of three month's protective supervision by DCF. On October 27, 2010, the court (Graziani, J.) extended protective supervision until February 11, 2011.   On December 8, 2010, Judge Graziani further extended the period of protective supervision until May 11, 2011.  (See court file and memoranda of above hearings on dates indicated.)

On February 17, 2011, DCF sought an ex parte order for Harley–Jayne's temporary custody that was granted by Judge Graziani on that date.   The court found that Harley–Jayne was in “immediate danger from her surroundings” and vested DCF with her temporary custody.   That OTC was subsequently sustained.   Also on February 17, 2011, DCF filed a motion with the court to reopen judgment and modify the protective supervision order to an order that once again committed Harley–Jayne's custody to DCF. This court has taken judicial notice of a sworn affidavit that DCF Social Worker Jessica Smith filed with the court on February 17, 2011.   In it, Ms. Smith wrote that Gail L.'s “ ․ considerable mental health issues have prevented her from effectively parenting Harley–Jayne's specialized mental health needs, as well as providing an emotionally safe home environment.”   Ms. Smith's sworn, eight-page affidavit detailed a pattern of risky and harmful behavior by Harley–Jayne, that included running away, use of alcohol and marijuana that was reported by the youth herself, and general non-compliance with treatment and school programs.   After a hearing on June 22, 2011, the court granted DCF's motion to reopen judgment and modified the disposition from protective supervision to commitment.

The evidence at trial proved that when DCF again sought commitment of Harley–Jayne in June 2011, the youth was not in DCF's physical custody, was living with her mother, and was overtly refusing to cooperate with the agency's attempts to provide other residential programs and services for her.   Ms. Smith testified credibly that after the temporary custody order was granted on February 17, 2011, DCF placed Harley–Jayne in a group home where she remained until May 27, 2011.   She left the group home on May 27th and has not been in any residential placement since that date.   There was evidence at hearing that Harley–Jayne claimed to feel uncomfortable and afraid around other residents of this group home who had more profound disabilities and were allegedly aggressive towards her.   However, the court did not find this evidence to be persuasive, particularly in light of Harley–Jayne's extensive past history of disrupting and/or running away from other facilities and placements.   There was also credible evidence at the hearing on November 3, 2011 that Gail L. bears some responsibility for undermining Harley–Jayne's most recent placement.   A DCF social study dated October 24, 2011, which the court credits, noted:  “However, on 5/27/11, [mother] supported and assisted Harley–Jayne in leaving the care and custody of the Department.  [Mother] arranged for Harley–Jayne to stay with a neighbor on the above referenced date and she refused to provide specific information as to Harley–Jayne's whereabouts.   Furthermore, she stated that she was willing and able to have Harley–Jayne return to care.”   (Petitioner's Exhibit B, page 4.)

Since May 2011, Harley–Jayne has consistently refused to cooperate with DCF in any effort to place her residentially, and she has also refused to accept any guidance from her mother.   In June 2011, Gail L. informed DCF that she could no longer care for the youth.   The DCF social study recounts:  “Shortly after Harley–Jayne's return home, [mother] realized that Harley–Jayne was unwilling to abide by the house rules and adhere to personal expectations.   It was at this time that [mother] began to state that she could not provide for and meet Harley–Jayne's needs.  [Mother] did not think of the consequences or the negative impact a change in placement would have on Harley–Jayne prior to agreeing to have her return home.   Once Harley–Jayne was home and she began to experience a new found freedom and the ability to do as she wished, she had no desire to return to the care of the Department.”  (Id.) The court also found the foregoing evidence to be credible, and accepts it as fact.   Commendably, despite the disrupted placement and the lack of cooperation from both Harley–Jayne and her mother, DCF sought and received the order of commitment this past June. Ms. Smith testified credibly that DCF hoped that it could subsequently persuade Harley–Jayne to accept placement and or services.   The court also infers from this evidence that DCF believed in June 2011 that Gail L. lacked the competencies to adequately parent Harley–Jayne.

The credible evidence introduced at this hearing proved that although Harley–Jayne sometimes stays at Gail L.'s residence, she comes and goes as she pleases, remains away from the residence overnight without parental permission, and is not amenable to her mother's guidance and control.   She also steadfastly refuses to cooperate with her legal guardian, DCF. (See:  Petitioner's Exhibit A, pages 4, 5, and 6.)

Phillip Brown, MSW, testified at this hearing.   Mr. Brown is a licensed therapist who in the past individually treated both Harley–Jayne and Gail L., and also engaged in family counseling with the mother and daughter.   Mr. Brown presently treats Gail L., but has not recently engaged in therapy with Harley–Jayne.

Mr. Brown testified that Gail L. has “mixed, moderate” bipolar disorder.   He testified also that the mother is at present “more depressed” and is unable to adequately parent Harley–Jayne.   He testified that the mother's inability to set boundaries for her daughter has been an ongoing problem, and he would be very concerned if the court issued an order restoring Harley–Jayne to the mother's guardianship.   The court found Mr. Brown's testimony to be credible.

CONCLUSIONS

Unfortunately, this case demonstrates the problems that DCF, and the Court, occasionally encounter when dealing with severely troubled older teenagers who are legally committed to DCF's custody, but who intransigently refuse to cooperate with placements, or other well-intended offers of treatment and service.²  In such cases, the Court sometimes lacks the legal authority to compel compliance by youths who need and would benefit from placements and therapeutic services, but who stubbornly rebuff them.   This case may possibly suggest the need for legislative review of the present revocation statute, and its possible revision to permit DCF to seek revocations of commitment in cases involving 16– and 17–year–olds who could still benefit from DCF services, but adamantly refuse them.

The court commends DCF for what it believes were appropriate past efforts to assist Harley–Jayne.   Sadly, it appears to the undersigned that due to her mental illness, substance abuse, defiant attitude, and the neglect and trauma that she has experienced in the past, Harley–Jayne is unwilling to accept any help from DCF. However, under the current revocation statute, the court is legally required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that the revocation is in the best interests of the child.   Based on the evidence presented, this court cannot make either finding in this case.   This troubled youth obviously still has the needs that brought her into state care last June, and the evidence proved that it would be particularly ill-advised to restore Harley–Jayne's guardianship to Gail L., who is unwilling to accept that responsibility, and incapable of assuming it.   The court recognizes that DCF's role during the coming five months may be limited to that of a “standby” guardian—waiting in the wings until Harley–Jayne changes her mind about accepting services, or until her situation deteriorates further to the point that other DCF action might become necessary.   Nonetheless, the court finds as a matter of law that Harley–Jayne must remain committed to DCF until she attains the age of majority next April.

For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner's Motion to Revoke Commitment is hereby DENIED.

Dated at Willimantic, Connecticut this 16th day of November 2011.

BY THE COURT:

Dyer, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The statute provides:  “The commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth.   No such motion shall be filed more often than once every six months.”.  FN1. The statute provides:  “The commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth.   No such motion shall be filed more often than once every six months.”

FN2. At hearing, DCF's counsel indicated that he did not believe that Harley–Jayne D. would satisfy the statutory criteria for legal emancipation of a minor.   See:  C.G.S. § 46b–150c..  FN2. At hearing, DCF's counsel indicated that he did not believe that Harley–Jayne D. would satisfy the statutory criteria for legal emancipation of a minor.   See:  C.G.S. § 46b–150c.

Dyer, Richard W., J.