IN RE: Alexi J.A.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and father of Alexi J.A. (hereinafter referred to as “Alexi J.A.”, “Alexi” or “child”).   The biological mother of this child is Melissa F. (hereinafter referred to as “Melissa F.” or “Mother”) and the biological father is Alexi O.A. (hereinafter referred to as “Alexi O.A.” or “Father”).

On 1/24/11 abode service was made on Mother with regard to the coterminous petition concerning the TPR and on the neglect and uncared for petition;  and in-hand service was made with regard to Father, as such petitions were filed with the court on 1/21/11.

On 5/10/11 Mother and Father entered pleas of nolo contendere to the neglect petitions as to conditions injurious.

On 6/14/11 a trial date of 8/29/11 was set for Mother and Father for the TPR and on 8/29/11 the trial commenced as to Father with regard to the petition for Termination of Parental Rights.   As the trial progressed, the Department advised that it was not pursuing a termination of parental rights of Mother at that time, but as an alternative, would pursue a reunification with Mother.

At the time of trial counsel for DCF submitted eight exhibits, A–H.

DCF called two witnesses, Dr. Michael J. Soltis, a licensed physician in the State of Connecticut, employed by Connecticut Children's Specialty Group at Connecticut Children's Medical Center with the SCAN (suspected child abuse and neglect) program;  and social worker, Jaime Alamo.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds of the Petition for TPR as to the biological Father are acts of Commission or Omission.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights and Neglect Petitions, has reviewed the Neglect and the Co–Term petitions, and the social studies and the exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background/Present Situation/Reason for Petition/Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination

On 1/13/11, DCF received a referral from the Connecticut Children's Medical Center reporting that infant, Alexi J.A., had been brought to the emergency room via ambulance with injuries that were consistent with non-accidental trauma.   He had multiple bruising and scratches and a CT scan revealed chronic subdural hemorrhages on both sides of his head, as well as acute subdural bleeding over his right frontal lobe.   He had extensive multilayer retinal hemorrhages consistent with non-accidental trauma.   Additionally, it was determined that the chronic bilateral subdural hematomas were likely between six weeks and three months old, while the acute subdural blood over the right frontal lobe was likely one day to one week old.   On 1/19/11, Alexi J.A. was diagnosed with Abusive Head Trauma, otherwise known as Shaken Baby Syndrome, based upon the presentation of chronic and acute subdural hematomas, bilateral retinal hemorrhages and multiple areas of facial bruising.   Dr. Michael Soltis reported to the Department that the child suffered a “life threatening event,” and further stated that he was at risk for long-term disabilities.   On 1/13/11, and 1/14/11, Mother and Father denied any knowledge of how Alexi J.A. could have sustained such injuries.   On 1/17/11, Father reported to the East Hartford Police and later to DCF that he had shaken the infant on 1/12/11 in an effort to make him stop crying but that he did not intend to harm him.

B. Mother, Melissa F.

Melissa F. is the second born child of her parents.   Although her parents divorced when she was about a year old due to her father's alcoholism, they had a friendly relationship after the divorce.   Her father died in 2009 from complications of alcoholism.   Melissa F. had a good relationship with both parents growing up, although she was closer to her mother who she considered her best friend.   Growing up, she and her brother, who is five years her senior, got along well together.   He moved to Connecticut with Melissa F. and their mother in 2000 but only stayed a few weeks and then moved back to Florida to live with their father.   Maternal grandmother remarried after moving to Connecticut and Melissa F. gets along well with her stepfather.

Melissa F. attended Tolland Middle and Tolland High School and graduated with her class.   She was a “B” and “C” student in regular education classes, and when she switched to the afternoon school she got “A's” because she found classes easier.   Melissa F. completed 1,300 of the 1,500 hours needed to graduate from the Brio Academy of Cosmetology.

Melissa F. had a night cashiering job at the Price Right in Windsor, CT. She and Alexi O.A. were receiving food stamps when they lived together.   Prior to having her baby, she worked for three years at a Cost Cutters Salon as a receptionist but left the job.

Melissa F. met Alexi O.A. when she was sixteen years old and working at a McDonald's restaurant and dated on and off.   Alexi O.A. would smoke marijuana occasionally and try to keep her from seeing her friends.   After Father confessed to the police that he shook Alexi O.A., Mother packed up her belongings and left the apartment.

Melissa F. claims that there was no domestic violence between her and Father.   However, it appears that there have been instances of disagreement leading to physical contact.

Mother struggled with depression after giving birth to Alexi J.A. and was prescribed the medication Zoloft for about a month but stopped taking the medication when she felt she no longer needed it.

Melissa F. has a criminal history in the State of Connecticut dating back to 2008 with convictions for Assault 3, Possession of Drugs/Marijuana and Interfering/Resisting arrest.

Mother has never been married and reports that she is in good health.

C. Father, Alexi O.A.

Alexi O.A. is of Puerto Rican decent on both his father and mother's side of the family.   He is very close to his mother and speaks to her daily although they only see each other twice a year as she moved to Puerto Rico four years ago.   Alexi O.A. did not know his father growing up, as he was incarcerated;  the man he knew as his father was his mother's boyfriend, with whom she began a relationship when Alexi O.A. was a year old.   His stepfather is a father to his siblings, a half sister who is 18 years old and a younger half brother who is 10.   He has a positive relationship with his siblings.

Alexi O.A. attended an elementary school on Park Street in Hartford, but he does not recall the name of the school.   He required the support of a Spanish translator in elementary school as Spanish was his native language.   He attended East Hartford Middle School and was a regular education student.   Alexi O.A. was transferred to the Synergy Alternative High School in East Hartford and then transitioned back to East Hartford High School where he dropped out in the ninth grade.   He has had various jobs over the past few years.

Alexi O.A. has known Melissa F. for four or five years.   They had friends in common and dated on and off for about four years.   They lived together in an apartment in East Hartford, CT with their newborn son.   Father explained that Melisa F. broke up with him and moved out, “because of what happened with the baby.”

Father has two other children, Ciomari A., who is three years old and lives with her Mother, Ciara C. and Adriana A.-M., who is fourteen months old.   Adriana lives with her Mother, Shauntel M. Father did not know his daughters' exact dates of birth.   He used to visit with Ciomari A. every weekend until recently when DCF informed her mother that unsupervised visits with Ciomari A. and Father would not be advisable.   Father has one other child who died at birth on 12/27/06.   Alexi O.A. has never been married.

Father claims that he smoked marijuana once a week but has stopped.   He is in good physical condition and has never been treated for mental or emotional problems, nor has he ever been prescribed medication.

On 01/31/11, Alexi O.A. reported that he was arrested in 2009 for Driving Under the Influence as he was high on marijuana.   He had to participate in a drug education program and his charges were eventually nolled.   He was arrested in 2009 for Possession of Marijuana and this case is currently pending in criminal court.   He was required to participate in a drug education program.   Alexi O.A. has a criminal history in the State of Connecticut dating back to 2010 with an arrest for Possession of Marijuana.   This case is pending.   He was arrested on 1/28/11 for Illegal Operation of a Motor Vehicle Under Suspension and Failure to Display Plates.   He is currently incarcerated.

D. Child, Alexi J.A.

Alexi J.A., who is of Hispanic and Caucasian heritage, was born on 9/8/10.   On 01/13/11, he was transported via ambulance with both Mother and Father to the Emergency Department at Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) after being found unresponsive at home.   He was examined and had some bruising that was consistent with forceful handling.   A CAT scan revealed that he had chronic subdural hemorrhages on both sides of his head, as well as acute subdural bleeding over the right frontal lobe.   He was examined by a opthalmologist and found to have extensive multilayer retinal hemorrhages that were considered the result of non-accidental trauma.   Alexi J.A.'s doctors at CCMC determined that some of his brain injuries were likely between six weeks and three months old, while other injuries were likely one day to one week old.   He was diagnosed with Abusive Head Trauma, otherwise known as Shaken Baby Syndrome and his doctor added that his condition should be considered a “life threatening event” and that he would be at risk for long-term disabilities.   On 1/18/11, Father admitted to shaking Alexi J.A. on 1/12/11.

On 1/27/11, Alexi J.A. had a skeletal x-ray and on 2/3/11, Dr. Soltis of SCAN reported that after review there were no concerns to report.

On 2/11/11, Alexi J.A. was seen at CCMC for a head ultrasound and a follow-up with his neurosurgeon.   Dr. Martin reported that the child's head circumference was in the 97th percentile, but his weight was also in the 95th percentile, indicating that Alexi J.A.'s head was not dysmorphic.   Dr. Martin explained that the child needed to be seen in another six weeks in order to check for signs of hydrocephalus or fluid build up in the brain.

On 2/11/11, Alexi J.A. was seen by his ophthalmologist, Dr. Mitchell.   The doctor reported that there was an overall improvement of the hemorrhages in his eyes.   His left eye had cleared more significantly than the right, however, the hemorrhages in both eyes were located in front of the macular which presented a more serious outlook for his eyesight long-term.   The doctor also reported that he was showing no preference in the use of his eyes for close-up vision which was a positive indication.

Alexi J.A. is living in a DCF foster home that is licensed to provide medically sensitive care to children.   Mother sees him twice a week, for two-hour visits that are supervised at the DCF office.   Father had weekly supervised visits at the DCF office prior to his Father's arrest and incarceration.   Alexi J.A. had been assessed by Birth to Three and was to begin receiving services in his foster home.

E. Present Situation

On 5/29/11 at 7:46 p.m., Vernon Police Department pulled over Melissa F.'s car because it had illegally tinted windows.   Melissa F. had picked up three friends and a child earlier that night after she got out of work.   The male, seated in the back seat, had a bag of assorted alcohol on his lap and he admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the evening.   One of the women, also in the back seat, had her two-year-old daughter unrestrained on her lap and when asked why her daughter was unrestrained she explained that she did not own a car seat big enough for her toddler.   The officer smelled marijuana and asked to search the car.   Melissa F. gave him permission and the officer found a partially smoked marijuana “blunt” in the glove box.   She denied knowledge of how this got in her glove box.   The woman in the back seat stated that the blunt was hers and that she had smoked it earlier in the day with her mother's boyfriend when she was at her mother's home.   The officer stated that the “blunt” smelled like it had been freshly lit.   The woman in the back seat of mother's car was arrested for possession of less than 4 ounces of marijuana and no other arrests were made.

Following the above-referenced incident, DCF referred Melissa F. to CHR for random urine screens.   She was called on 6/14/11 and the drug screen was negative.   She has been called weekly since that time but she has not come in or returned calls.   She denies receiving any calls from DCF but CHR confirmed that they were using the correct phone number as it had not been changed since the referral was processed.

Derek Franklin, Psy.D., the author of Melissa F.'s psychological evaluation, recommended that she engage in a structured parenting “class” and in “family therapy” with Alexi J.A. Dr. Franklin also suggested that the clinician providing this service monitor Mother's interactions with the child and offer strategies in addressing the inherent difficulties typically associated with caring for an infant.

On 5/5/11, Mother was referred to the Parenting Piece by Piece class at Kidsafe CT. She began the class on 5/16/11, and had perfect attendance, completing her eight classes on 7/18/11.   In a closing letter dated 7/18/11, Lynn Webber, Mother's parent educator, reported that Mother had asked appropriate questions, was open to learning and seemed to understand the techniques discussed in the group.

Melissa F. was referred to Barbara Breen, MA, LFMT, for the family therapy that was suggested by Dr. Franklin.   DCF also asked Ms. Breen to address issues surrounding judgment and to help Mother understand what constitutes good and bad judgment.   Ms. Breen reported that her work with Mother was progressing.   She explained that judgment is not something that can be taught but that experience in making decisions and then reviewing and evaluating those decisions would be beneficial to Mother.

Melissa F. has done well in her services, as all of her service providers report her dedication to the subject matter and her perfect attendance, with the exception of complying with random urine screens as requested by CHR.

DCF is concerned about Mother's lack of judgment in allowing a two-year-old to ride in her car unrestrained in addition to having someone with a bag of open alcohol containers in her vehicle.   The issues surrounding Mother's judgment are of primary concern to the Department given the fact that many of the original issues that brought Alexi J.A. into DCF's care had to do with Mother's judgment in standing by Father after he confessed to having shaken her son.

Father is incarcerated at MacDougall–Walker Correctional Institute where he is being held on charges of assault in the 1st degree and risk of injury to a child, illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under a suspended license, and failure to display plates/inserts.

On 3/28/11, Alexi J.A. had an appointment at CCMC with his neurosurgeon.   The doctor reported that Alexi J.A. looked good and noted that although his head is large, the fontanel is soft and not bulging and the child tracks well with his eyes;  he does not believe the size of his head is related to the child's injuries.   The child eats and sleeps well.

On 5/11/11, Alexi J.A. was seen by his ophthalmologist, who found that the blood that had pooled in front of the macula had completely dissipated and there was some minimal scarring of the macula.   Dr. Mitchell noted astigmatism and a minimal far sightedness which is normal for the child's age.   Dr. Mitchell explained that there are two sources of visual difficulties, one is the eye and the other is the brain.   Alexi J.A. has escaped any serious eye impairment but the doctors will not know if he has any neurological issues until he is approximately 3 years old.

On 6/8/11, Alexi J.A. attended his 9–month pediatrician appointment.   He is in the 90th percentile for weight, the 50th for height and the 100th for head circumference.   He had his immunizations and was found to be healthy overall.

Alexi J.A. lives in a DCF licensed foster home for medically sensitive children.   He receives weekly Birth to Three services and his therapist, MaryAnn Delaney Tuttle, PT, MS, PCS, is concerned with her observations.   She reported that his play is extremely primitive in that he pats and shakes toys.   He does not engage in any motor imitation (i.e. pat-a-cake, itsy bitsy spider) nor does he pass any toy past the midline from one hand to the other.   These are skill levels that are observed in 6–8 month old babies and Alexi J.A. had not yet displayed these skills.   Ms. Delaney Tuttle expressed concern that Alexi J.A. would sit for long periods of time staring at shadows made by the window and at shadows cast on the floor by a chair.   He does not display any caution when he is falling backwards and he will let go of supporting structures with no concern of falling.   His language skills are also very delayed.   The therapist understands that it is too soon to diagnose a cognitive problem but feels that his delays are indicative of a more global concern rather than a problem with a specific area of development.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Father, Alexi O.A.'s parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify Alexi J.A. with his parents, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(j)(1).  “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

DCF has offered or provided the following services to Mother:  A referral to a substance abuse evaluation and treatment through Genesis in Manchester;  domestic violence education and therapeutic services through Pamela McGuire, MSW, LCSW;  parenting classes through Restoring the Strength of the Family;  and supervised visitation.   Father was offered a referral for substance abuse evaluation and treatment at CADC in Manchester;  domestic violence education and treatment through NoVA in Manchester;  parenting education services at My People Clinical Services and supervised visitation.   Alexi J.A. was provided with a DCF licensed foster care home that is specifically trained to care for children with medical needs;  transportation to and from his visits and doctor's appointments.   DCF also provided assessment and case management services.

With respect to reasonable efforts, see also Factual Findings, Paragraphs B, C, D, and E, above.

In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan.

B. Grounds for the Termination:  Act or Acts of Parental Commission or Omission—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C)—as to biological Father, Alexi O.A.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that Father has committed an act or acts of commission or omission after his child had been adjudicated as neglected.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and an act or acts of commission or omission, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a–112(j)(3)(C) authorizes the termination of parental rights where “the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including, but not limited to ․ severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except that nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights.”

“There is no requirement in General Statutes § 17a–112 that there must be a finding of immediate physical danger to the child before parental rights can be terminated.”  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 62, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 600 A.2d 1028 (1991).   The court must determine whether the requisite injury has befallen the child as a result of actual acts of commission or omission by the parents.  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 0 (1993).   Direct evidence of causing serious physical injury is not required.  “The phrase prima facie evidence means evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.”   In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App. 151, 158, 756 A.2d 303 (2000) “The law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative force is concerned.”  In re Cheyenne A., supra, 59 Conn.App. 150, citing State v. Cimino, 190 Conn. 210, 211, 478 A.2d 1005 (1984).

Where termination is based on claim of serious physical injury, the department must prove two elements:  the injury must be serious and the cause of such injury must be non-accidental or inadequately explained.

Ground C—Act or Acts of Commission or Omission as to biological Father, Alexi O.A.

The evidence presented to the court in both the exhibits of the Department and others, as well as the testimony of Dr. Michael J. Soltis was extensive.   Dr. Soltis' assessment was that Alexi J.A. experienced significant injuries for which there was no explanation.   While Father belatedly admitted to possibly somewhat rough treatment of Alexi J.A. on occasion, his rationale would not allow him to believe such extensive harm to the child could have resulted.   Any admission he may have made was an extremely faint explanation in view of the significant serious injuries identified by Dr. Soltis.   The evidence is clear and convincing that the cause of the serious physical injuries was nonaccidental and inadequately explained.

Dr. Soltis testified that although the injuries of the bruising, bilateral subdural hematomas, and bilateral multilayer retinal hemorrhages were not temporarily related, the only common cause for both sets of injuries would have been inflicted injury.

The evidence is clear and convincing that if Alexi O.A. was allowed to remain in a position of parenting Alexi J.A., this would not be consistent with providing a safe and trauma-free home for the child.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Alexi J.A. has suffered serious physical injuries which were non-accidentally inflicted, or accidentally inflicted and inadequately explained and that is sufficient for the termination of parental rights as Alexi J.A. has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, the care necessary for his physical well-being.   For all the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence that Father, Alexi O.A. has committed an act or acts of commission or omission with regard to child, Alexi J.A.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof, the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a–112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Alexi O.A.'s parental rights, as he did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k).  In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 212–13, 903 A.2d 246 (2006);  In Re Ashley M, 82 Conn.App. 66, 70, 842 A.2d 627 (2007).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify Alexi J.A. with his Father.   Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent Father to facilitate his reunification with his child and made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258–60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Alexi O.A. is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a–112(j)(1).   His serious issues clearly and convincingly make him unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535–36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that Alexi O.A. is presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as were contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered services to the respondent Father.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Alexi O.A. has failed to fully comply with orders of the court.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has been unable to exhibit only limited bonding with his Father based on a condition that was due to Father's incarceration and reluctance to accept his role as a parent.

The court finds that the child has positive feelings and emotional ties with his Mother.

5. “The age of the child.”

Alexi J.A. was born on 9/8/10 and is 13 months old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Alexi O.A. has not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform his conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that he has continued to abuse substances, has refused to co-operate with DCF or programs presented, and remains involved with criminal matters.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Alexi O.A. has not made the changes necessary in his lifestyle that would indicate that he would be a safe, responsible and nurturing parent for Alexi J.A. To permit the child to return to Father's care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, Department of Corrections or third parties prevented Alexi O.A. from maintaining a relationship with Alexi J.A., nor did hiseconomic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

B. Best Interest of the Child—C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Alexi O.A.'s parental rights to Alexi J.A. would be in his best interests.²  Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Alexi O.A.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environments;  his length of stay in foster care;  the nature of his relationship with his biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents.⁴  In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 85, 10 A.3d 100 (2011);  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance Alexi J.A.'s intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his father.  In re Katia M, 124 Conn.App. 650, 658, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Alexi J.A.'s best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with his Father.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that Alexi O.A. has failed to gain insight into becoming a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for Alexi J.A. The clear and convincing evidence shows that since his child was taken into DCF's care, his judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved.

Father's performance clearly and convincingly shows he lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role.   His recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, and without a commitment to complying with the laws of the State of Connecticut, it is likely that he has extinguished what little chance he ever had to able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates Alexi J.A.'s pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Father to show that he has forsaken substance abuse, addressed his issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established himself in the community and shown that he was capable of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent to his child.

Alexi J.A. cannot delay his need for permanence and stability for his Father's uncertain future.

Based upon Father's behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee him ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize his abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for Alexi O.A. to attempt to rehabilitate himself and establish himself in the community as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent, if that were possible, is time that his son cannot afford.

Alexi O.A.'s parental performance clearly and convincingly shows that he lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role.   His conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that he will ever be able to conform his behaviors to appropriate norms or be able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for Alexi J.A.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 658, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010);  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 221, 15 A.3d 184 (2011);  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Alexi J.A. is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parent as a caretaker.

Having balanced Alexi J.A.'s individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Alexi O.A., the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to his parent.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313–14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Alexi O.A. as to Alexi J.A. is in the best interests of the child in question.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for ternination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Alexi J.A.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Alexi O.A., the biological Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that his parental rights to Alexi J.A. are hereby terminated.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․

FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.