Noel Cusanelli et al. v. Paul Cuozzo et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

In their revised complaint in this probate appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the admission to probate the April 20, 2007 will of Jeanette C. Cuozzo on two grounds.   In Count One, the will is challenged on the basis that Jeanette Cuozzo lacked the testamentary capacity to execute her will.   In the Second Count, the plaintiffs allege that the will was the result of undue influence by the testator's husband, John Cuozzo, one of the named defendants in this action.   The defendants John Cuozzo and Paul Cuozzo have moved to strike each of these counts of the revised complaint on the grounds that they contain insufficient facts to legally support the claims made.   For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion to strike.

Discussion

The standard of review on a motion to strike is well established.  “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ․ [The court takes] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and [construes] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ Moreover ․ [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ․ It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

Applying these standards to the issues presented here, the court concludes that the plaintiffs' factual allegations, though not particularly detailed or extensive, are nevertheless minimally sufficient so as to survive the motion to strike.   See Sills v. Spinner, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 084033288 (February 19, 2009, Lager, J.).   The defendants are correct, of course, that conclusions of law, without factual support, are not enough to survive a motion to strike.  Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 565, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009) (holding that the trial court was correct in granting the motion to strike a count in the complaint, which “failed to allege any fact” in support of stated claim) (emphasis added).   It cannot be said here, however, that the complaint is devoid of “any” facts.   To the contrary, the plaintiffs have alleged in each count of the complaint specific facts and circumstances.   The plaintiffs contend that the allegations in paragraph five of the first count support their claim that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.   Likewise, they also contend that allegations contained in paragraph five of the second count support their claim that she was unduly influenced.   Indeed, it is the existence of these specific factual allegations that serve to distinguish the complaint here from that found legally insufficient in Debus v. Comp, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 10 6002356 (March 9, 2011, Wiese, J.), the single case relied upon by the defendants in support of their motion to strike.

Moreover, to the extent that the defendants assert that the plaintiffs' factual allegations are legally insufficient because they leave unanswered a number of questions that may bear on the ultimate merit of the plaintiffs' claims, the court rejects the defendants' suggestion that these alleged shortcomings warrant the granting of the motion to strike.   In the court's view, by identifying these questions in their motion to strike and by positing possible responses to them in their motion and at oral argument, the defendants are attempting to import facts from outside the pleadings and to benefit from a “speaking” motion to strike—a pleading which has long been prohibited by our practice and will not be granted here.  Mercer v. Cosley, 110 Conn.App. 283, 292 n.7, 955 A.2d 550 (2008).

For these reasons, the court therefore concludes that each of the counts of the revised complaint contains allegations which meet the minimal test for legal sufficiency.   Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike is hereby denied.

THE COURT

Gold, J.

Gold, David P., J.