IN RE: Za'Mora S. et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Before this court is a termination of parental rights petition filed on July 15, 2010 by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in the interest of Za'Mora S. (d.o.b.5/2/00), Justin S. (d.o.b.6/22/01), Kelsey S. (d.o.b.6/22/01), Evan S. (d.o.b.12/20/04) and Bryce S. (d.o.b.3/29/07).   DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of the respondent, Sheena S., mother of all five children.   The court notes that the parental rights of the father, Curtis B., as to all five children were terminated on September 4, 2009 (Baldwin, J.).   In its decision, the court (Baldwin, J.) denied the petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, which was subsequently reversed by the appellate court in Zamora S., 123 Conn.App. 103 (2010).   The coterminous petition filed as to Bryce was also reversed, in that the trial court had ruled that the respondent did not neglect her son and had dismissed the termination of parental rights petition as to the respondent.  Id.

As a result, the July 2010 petitions before the court represent the second time DCF has sought to terminate the respondent's parental rights following a history with the respondent which dates back to May 2006.   The court takes judicial notice of the following procedural history in this case.   DCF filed neglect petitions as to the four oldest children on September 14, 2006 and subsequently sought and received orders of temporary custody (Trombley, J.) for the children on November 17, 2006.   On January 22, 2007, the four children were adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF (Taylor, J.).   On October 15, 2007, the court (Kahn, J.) ordered protective supervision as to Justin and Kelsey, and on November 14, 2007, an order of protective supervision also entered as to Evan and Za'Mora.   Bryce, who had been born on March 29, 2007, continued to be monitored by DCF but was not the subject of formal court intervention at that point.

On March 27, 2008, DCF again sought and received orders of temporary custody (Madin, J.) as to the four oldest children as well as for Bryce.   DCF concurrently filed a neglect petition as to Bryce and on April 2, 2008, it filed a motion to modify the dispositions of protective supervision to commitment for the four oldest children.

On October 14, 2008, DCF filed the first termination of parental rights petitions as to all five children.   Following four days of trial in June 2009, the court (Baldwin, J.), granted the termination of parental rights petition as to the father, Curtis B. and denied the petition as to the respondent.   The court found that the child Bryce was neglected as to Curtis B. but found that the respondent did not neglect Bryce and ordered that Bryce return to the respondent's care.   The court further denied the motion to modify to commitment and instead, ordered that Evan return to the respondent's care under protective supervision and that the three older children be placed in the temporary custody of the maternal grandmother.

DCF moved for an emergency stay of all orders, which was granted by the court (Esposito, J.);   subsequently, DCF filed an appeal.   Following the reversal by the appellate court in Zamora S., 123 Conn.App. 103 (2010), DCF filed a second set of termination of parental rights petitions as to the respondent on July 15, 2010.   On the first day of trial, the petitioner elected to proceed on the second set of petitions in lieu of the original petitions filed in 2008, which were withdrawn.

In its petitions, DCF has alleged that the respondent has failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) as to the four older children and pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(ii) as to Bryce.   The petitioner has also alleged that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with her children and in the alternative, has also alleged, pursuant to its motion to amend granted by this court on July 12, 2011, that the respondent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   Finally, the petitioner has alleged pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(2) that it is in the best interest of all five children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent.

Sheena S. appeared for trial and was represented by counsel throughout the course of the termination of parental rights proceedings This court notes that there is no claim of Native American affiliation and thus finds it has jurisdiction over these proceedings.   The court heard and accepted evidence on June 21, 22, 23, and 30, 2011.   This court granted the motion for judicial notice dated July 7, 2011, which was granted following the respondent's withdrawal of her objection on said date.   See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 852 A.2d 643 (2004), Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 136 A.2d 497 (1957) and In re David M., 29 Conn.App. 499, 615 A.2d 1082 (1992).

These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a–112 et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991);  Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b), 35a–7.   Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).

If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage.   Therein the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.   As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688–89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Having heard testimony and accepted documentary evidence on the above dates, this court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.   In so doing, this court concludes that the petitioner has met its burden of proof with respect to the termination of parental rights petitions as to the respondent to the extent that it is has alleged that:  1) DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with her children and in the alternative, that she is unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, 2) that the respondent has failed to rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time given the age and needs of all five children and 3) that it is in the best interest of all five children that the parental rights of the respondent be terminated.

DCF's involvement with this family began in May 2006 when its investigation revealed that the respondent was the victim of severe domestic violence.   On May 15, 2006, the respondent reported to police that she and her son, Evan, were assaulted by her boyfriend, Curtis B. Curtis B. had punched her numerous times on the head and body and accidentally punched Evan after he missed striking the respondent.   Police reports indicated that officers had responded to the same home two weeks before.   In that incident, on May 3, 2006, the respondent reported that Curtis B. had grabbed her by the neck and choked her until she nearly passed out.   He then punched her, threw an empty milk crate at her, and ripped out the phone to prevent her from calling the police.   In both incidents, all four of the couple's children were in the home.   In both incidents, the police officers issued to the respondent a victim services card and advised her to seek a restraining order or a protective order.

In its investigation, DCF learned from the respondent that domestic violence with Curtis B. had been ongoing for five months prior to the above incidents, which the children confirmed.   As a result, DCF offered to refer the respondent to shelters, or in the alternative, recommended that she go to her mother's home for safety.   DCF specifically talked with the respondent about domestic violence and safety issues and referred her to Safe Haven, a domestic violence program, to access information and safety resources.   DCF also advised respondent that Safe Haven could help her obtain a protective order, and DCF drafted a service agreement with the mother which outlined safety steps she could take in the event that Curtis B. returned to her home.   The respondent, however, refused DCF's recommendation for shelter and ultimately, failed to abide by the service agreement by consistently allowing Curtis B. to return to the home.   In fact, notwithstanding ongoing violence and repeated warnings from DCF, the respondent's pattern of re-engaging in a relationship with Curtis B. persisted for the next four years.

On July 11, 2006, DCF social worker, Shauna Figueroa, found Curtis B. in the home.   She confronted the respondent about the fact that she had previously agreed that she would not let him back in the home given that he had not complied with DCF's expectations.   Ms. Figueroa reviewed the service agreement with the mother and the steps she needed to take to ensure her safety and that of her children.   Ms. Figueroa also discussed with the respondent the children's fear of Curtis B. and the impact of domestic violence on the children.   These concerns were the first of many repeatedly expressed to the respondent over the next several years.

On July 22, 2006, the police responded to the mother's home after receiving a 911 call.   They heard a male voice yell, “who is it?”   When the door was finally opened, the respondent talked to the police and admitted that Curtis B. had been there but had left.   She denied any violence and instead claimed that her son had been playing with the phone.

On August 7, 2006, Ms. Figueroa and another DCF social worker arrived at the respondent's home for an unannounced visit.   According to the children, Curtis B. had been fighting with their mother and ran out the door when DCF arrived.   The children described their mother getting slapped and punched.   When the respondent talked with DCF, she admitted that Curtis B. had been there and that he had twisted her wrist and ankle.   She admitted that he abused her verbally and that he uses the fact that she cannot control the children to his advantage.   The respondent agreed with DCF that she could not stay in her apartment, and that she needed to call the police and follow through with securing a protective order and a warrant for the arrest of Curtis B. Although DCF found a shelter in Stamford for the respondent and for all of the children, the respondent ultimately decided that she did not want to go there.   Instead, she agreed to go to her mother's home until she could secure the protective order and request an arrest warrant.   At that time, DCF reviewed the service agreement once again with the respondent and reminded her that a failure to comply with DCF's expectations could result in the removal of the children from her care.

The respondent, however, never sought an arrest warrant or a restraining order.   Instead, she returned to her Waterbury home in less than a week and, as a result, DCF filed neglect petitions on September 14, 2006.   This, however, failed to impress the respondent, who made clear to DCF that she would allow Curtis B. back in the home because he was the father of her children.

The respondent did initially accept some services, including a referral for Intensive Family Preservation (IFP) through NOW, Inc. and a parent aide.   DCF also arranged for an evaluation with Dr. Diana Martinez which led to the recommendation that the respondent engage in out-patient treatment for depression.   Although the respondent participated in the evaluation and admitted that she was depressed, she failed to follow through with the recommendation for individual therapy at that time.

On November 17, 2006, DCF learned that Evan suffered first and second degree burns on his chest due to accidentally spilling coffee on himself and the respondent's failure to supervise.   Evan, who was two years old at the time, was hospitalized for five days.   At the same time, the respondent was being evicted from her home.   DCF sought and received orders of temporary custody (Trombley, J.) for all four children.

On January 22, 2007, the children were adjudicated neglected (Taylor, J.) and committed to DCF. The respondent began individual counseling with Family Services of Greater Waterbury and denied that she continued to be involved with Curtis B. By the time Bryce was born on March 29, 2007, the respondent had completed the DOVE program for domestic violence at Safe Haven and was completing the 15–week parenting program.   In April 2007, DCF helped the respondent secure an apartment, providing her with the first month's rent and security deposit, and referred her to the Intensive Family Reunification (IFR) program, Connections, Inc. for supportive housing services and Healthy Choices for Bryce.   In particular, Intensive Family Reunification through Family Services Greater Waterbury would provide intensive support services in the home to prepare the mother for reunification with the children.

On June 15, 2007, the respondent asked about whether or not Curtis B. could jeopardize her reunification with the children.   DCF social worker, Heather Howard, assured the respondent that, as long as she followed through with services and did not allow Curtis B. to return to the home or to re-engage in a relationship with her, Curtis B. could not interfere with reunification.   The respondent was adamant that she would never resume her relationship with Curtis B.

Despite DCF's clear requirements for reunification, the respondent's attendance with individual therapy began to decrease and she demonstrated no improvement in her parenting skills.   Case workers from the Intensive Family Reunification program reported on June 19, 2007 that the visit between the children and the mother “was really crazy.”   They reported that the children were out of control and the respondent was not keeping them safe.   Although the IFR case worker attempted to role-model parenting techniques to help the respondent appropriately engage with the children, the respondent admitted she had never had any rules or imposed consequences when parenting her children.

On June 30, 2007, Ms. Howard received a voicemail message from Curtis B. at 2:34 a.m. in which he stated that he had been living with the respondent for the entire time.   Also heard on the voicemail recording was the voice of the respondent, screaming “no, don't say it!” and crying in the background.   As a result of this phone call, Ms. Howard visited the home during a supervised visit and spoke to the respondent about the call and her concerns that the respondent was re-involved with Curtis B. The respondent denied this and refused Ms. Howard's recommendation that she consult with DCF's domestic violence liaison.   When Ms. Howard walked through the house, she noted that there was men's clothing in the bedroom closet as well as a pair of men's boots.

Although reunification continued to be the goal, DCF had significant concerns in light of these developments.   In addition, while the respondent had complied with the DOVE program and accepted Intensive Family Reunification services, some questions began to surface regarding her ability to benefit from parenting programs.   In particular, the IFR team could not recommend reunification because it did not see progress in mother's ability to parent the children safely and appropriately.   As a result, IFR discharged the respondent from the program.   It recommended instead additional intensive parenting education so that the respondent could acquire parenting skills and could demonstrate an improved ability to manage the children.   IFR agreed to reinstate its services, which apparently are offered to facilitate the imminent return of children to their homes, once the respondent began to benefit from a more intensive parenting education program and when DCF deemed reunification likely within a reasonable period of time.

DCF continued to provide referrals for services, including Healthy Choices through the Department of Public Health, the supportive housing program through Connection, Inc., and referrals to the Boys and Girls Village for domestic violence services, specifically, Intensive Safety Planning.   DCF also encouraged the respondent to participate in individual counseling and made referrals to a hands-on in-home parenting education program through Catholic Charities and the PIP program of Easter Seals.

As a result of these efforts, DCF ultimately began reunification of the children over the course of several months in the fall of 2007.   Justin and Kelsey were reunified with the respondent on September 25, 2007 and an order of protective supervision was entered on October 15, 2007.   Za'Mora was returned home on that same date and by November 14, 2007, Evan was also returned home and both Za'Mora and Evan were subject to an order of protective supervision.   Six days after all children were reunified, however, Curtis B. returned to the respondent's home, beat the respondent, bit her head and pulled her hair out with his teeth.   He threw rubbing alcohol in her face and threatened to hit her while she was carrying the baby.   When the police arrived, they found clothing belonging to Curtis B., as well as a package with his name and the respondent's home address.   The respondent denied that Curtis B. lived there, insisting that he had staged the scene and that he had gotten the key from her mentally limited landlord.   The respondent agreed to leave her home and take the children to her mother's home temporarily while DCF looked for a shelter for her and the children.

Although DCF could not find a shelter for all five children and the respondent, they found a better alternative.   Within one week of the incident, DCF, working with the Connections Supportive Housing program, found a large apartment in New Britain which was near the respondent's work and school in Bristol and would keep her away from Waterbury.   The respondent, however, refused this offer even though DCF would have provided the security deposit and one month's rent.   Notwithstanding DCF's concern for her safety and for the children, the respondent insisted on an apartment in Waterbury and advised that she would stay in the maternal grandmother's home until a Waterbury apartment was found.

The living arrangement with the maternal grandmother proved problematic.   In late December, the respondent began to complain about living with the maternal grandmother and wanted to leave.   During this time, Bryce fell down a flight of stairs in the home while the maternal grandfather, who was supposed to be supervising, had locked himself in a bathroom so he could smoke.   DCF continued to assist with housing and provided the respondent with a list of over eight apartments in and outside of the Waterbury area, as well as the first month's rent and security deposit.   Eventually, the respondent agreed to a home in the Waterbury area and moved into the new home on March 1, 2008.

Since the reunification process began in the fall of 2007 until the second removal of the children on March 27, 2008, DCF referred the respondent to numerous services for herself and the children.   In addition to services to address domestic violence and housing issues, DCF continued to have ongoing concerns with the respondent's parenting problems and the children's specialized needs and mental health issues.   After the respondent was unsuccessfully discharged from the Intensive Family Reunification program in June 2007, DCF referred her to the Catholic Charities PEAS program, another in-home parent education program in October 2007.   While Justin and Kelsey were in foster care, DCF provided them with individual therapy with Julie Genicini at the Child Guidance Clinic in Waterbury.   DCF engaged a mentor for Za'Mora and made a referral for services for Bryce for Birth to Three.

By November 20, 2007, however, both Justin and Kelsey were discharged unsuccessfully from their therapeutic work with Ms. Genicini due to lack of attendance.   Although Ms. Genicini's referral for Kelsey to be seen for a psychiatric evaluation resulted in a recommendation for medication, the respondent refused to administer the medication, claiming that DCF was “trying to make [her] kids look crazy.”

In fact, all of the services set up by DCF either lapsed or never began while the children were in the respondent's care from the fall of 2007 until they were removed on March 26, 2008.   Ms. Howard testified that in March 2008, she and the various service providers all had difficulty making contact with the respondent.   The respondent had no working telephone and DCF resorted to leaving notes with the respondent at the home and with the maternal grandmother.

Unable to make home visits to check on the children, Ms. Howard met with the three older children at school on March 26, 2008.   The children ultimately disclosed that their father, Curtis B., whom they call “Darnell,” was sleeping in the new apartment.   They admitted that he beat them, hit them in the back of their head and swore at them.   Za'Mora said that Justin and Kelsey copied his behaviors and that she was afraid to go home with Darnell there.   Za'Mora asked if she could return to live with her foster mother, or at least sleep there at night.   When asked why, Za'Mora said Darnell was hitting her mother and them in the new apartment.

As a result of these latest disclosures, DCF removed the four older children a second time on March 27, 2008 pursuant to an order of temporary custody (Madin, J.), filed its first neglect petition, and procured an OTC with respect to Bryce as well.   Although DCF confronted her with their concerns that the children were young and had no reason to lie about Curtis B. and the violence in the home, the respondent adamantly denied that he was back in the home.   Notwithstanding the respondent's denials, DCF renewed its efforts to provide services to the respondent, re-referring her to the DOVE program, which was the educational and support group for domestic violence victims which she had supposedly successfully completed one year before in March 2007.   The respondent was also re-referred for mental health treatment and specifically for individual therapy with a focus on domestic violence.   The respondent, however, did not agree to mental health treatment, saying that she had already participated in treatment and got nothing out of it.   Nevertheless, DCF continued to attempt to impress on the respondent the need for individual therapy, specifically to understand trauma, mental health and the impact of her relationship with Curtis B. on her children.

In the summer of 2008, the respondent began to comply with the individual domestic violence counseling at the Safe Haven but abruptly stopped after six weeks and continued adamantly to deny involvement with Curtis B. Her denials notwithstanding, the respondent clearly had ongoing contact with Curtis B. On July 12, 2008, the police responded to another incident in which the respondent reported that her ex-boyfriend had come to her home and began arguing with and harassing her.   Although there was no restraining order on file, and Curtis B. had fled the apartment before the police arrived, the officers noted that Curtis B. was on probation with orders to stay away from the respondent.   The respondent, who admitted that Curtis B. had come to her home, was advised to apply for a restraining order and arrest warrant which she did not do.   She also refused shelter at that time.

On July 29, 2008, Curtis B. was arrested at the respondent's apartment on charges of violating his probation.   He subsequently made bond and was released.   At the end of August 2008, Ms. Howard observed the respondent near her vehicle, while Curtis B. was standing ten feet away from her talking with another individual.

In September 2008, Ms. Howard again discussed services with the respondent.   Aware that the respondent had stated that the services at DOVE were not helpful to her and that she had abruptly stopped attending individual counseling at Safe Haven during the summer, Ms. Howard referred the respondent to the Susan B. Anthony program for individual therapy for domestic violence.   Ms. Howard also set up an appointment for the respondent with a domestic violence consultant.   The respondent, however, again failed to follow through with this set of referrals for services.

Ms. Howard also urged the respondent to utilize her individual therapist to address domestic violence issues.   Whether the respondent was actually complying with individual therapy, however, was unclear.   Ms. Howard was aware that, prior to reunification with her children in the fall of 2007, the respondent had been attending individual therapy at Family Services at Greater Waterbury.   During that period of time, from January 2007 through October 2007, the respondent had missed twelve sessions.   When the children were returned to her care in the fall of 2007, she stopped attending altogether.   When the children were removed in March 2008, the respondent claimed that she was in fact attending, but she refused to sign releases so DCF could verify her attendance.

Given the respondent's lack of progress with respect to mental health treatment, parenting, the extensive and persistent problems with domestic violence, and her ongoing relationship with Curtis B., DCF filed termination of parental rights petitions as to all five children in October 2008.

Notwithstanding the filing of TPR petitions, Ms. Howard continued to press the respondent to engage in services.   The respondent, however, did not resume therapy until January 2009, when she began with Lisa Archie, just months before the trial on the termination of parental rights petition.   Having learned of a new “parent coach” parenting program through Connect–to–Kids, Ms. Howard had also made a referral for the respondent in December 2008.   Although there was a long waiting list, this program would give the respondent one-on-one parenting support before and/or after visits as well as during supervised visits.   That service was in place from July 2009 through October 2009, but had limited benefit to the respondent who had failed to cooperate and did not consistently participate.

On September 4, 2009, the court (Baldwin, J.) granted the termination of parental rights petitions as to Curtis B. but denied the petitions as to the respondent.   Just days before the issuance of the decision, however, the respondent had acknowledged to the Waterbury police in an investigation involving Curtis B. that she was in fact his girlfriend.   On September 3, 2009, Waterbury police executed a search and seizure warrant at her home.   During the search, the respondent physically blocked the police from entering her home.   The police took the respondent into custody and found Curtis B., who was also detained.   In their search of the respondent's home, the police found and seized cocaine.   Curtis B. was charged with drug-related offenses and the respondent was charged with interfering with a search warrant.

Based on this information, the court (Esposito, J.) granted DCF's motion for an emergency stay of execution of the prior court's orders 1) to return Bryce and Evan to their mother's care and 2) to place the older three children with the maternal grandmother.

These events, however, did not dissuade the respondent from continuing her relationship with Curtis B. Records from corrections facilities indicate that the respondent visited Curtis B. in prison nine separate times from October 2009 through to December 2009.   In March 2010, the respondent dropped all pretense of denying a relationship with Curtis B. and asked the current social worker, Nina April, why she could not maintain her relationship with him.   Ms. April reviewed with her DCF's longstanding concerns, encouraged the respondent to move out of the Waterbury area and offered to help with moving expenses.   Again the respondent refused.   In July 2010, when Ms. April made an unannounced home visit to the respondent's home, she was not allowed in the home, although she saw a men's fitted cap and heard a door close and someone walking down the steps.   Finally, in September 2010, the respondent admitted that she considered Curtis B. a support to her, that she has had five children with him and that, notwithstanding the termination of his parental rights, they are his children as well, and therefore, she would never be able to give up her relationship with him.

When this court heard the evidence in this second termination of parental rights trial, it became clear that the respondent's participation in individual counseling with Lisa Archie beginning in January 2009 at Family Services of Greater Waterbury was not only too late in starting, given the needs of these children, but inadequate.   When Ms. Howard received releases to communicate with Ms. Archie, she learned that the respondent's treatment goals in therapy consisted of “reunification not termination, decrease depression and panic, and increase self-esteem.”   Ms. Howard responded by writing a letter to Ms. Archie expressing DCF's concern that the respondent “doesn't appear to have a good grasp of what her treatment goals are and action steps needed to address them.”   In the letter dated March 4, 2009, DCF recommended that the respondent address her relationship with the children's father and “the impact that relationship has had on her, her mental health, mood and ability to parent, as well as her children.”   The social worker further expressed concern that the respondent has “often victimized herself, while not taking accountability or responsibility for the actions and decisions she has made to compromise the safety and wellbeing of her children, minimizing the impact abuse and neglect has had on them.”  (Emphasis added.)   Ms. Howard cited excerpts to psychological assessments performed in 2006 and then 2008 which underscored significant concerns with the respondent's mental health and the degree to which she was strongly attached to her abusive and highly destructive relationship with Curtis B.

This court finds nothing inappropriate in the fact that DCF shared these concerns with Ms. Archie, the respondent's therapist.   Indeed, this court finds that DCF's communication is an entirely accurate statement of the respondent's difficulties which have impeded her reunification with her children.   At trial, the therapist claimed that she had concerns only with the statement in which DCF shared “some recommendations that [it] believe[s] will help with treatment planning and [the therapist's] ability to further assess whether [the respondent] is actually meeting treatment plan goals.”   She testified that she found these comments offensive and patronizing.   Otherwise, she agreed that the information provided in the rest of the letter was appropriate and relevant.   Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, the respondent, through her counsel, revoked DCF's release to talk with her therapist.   Direct communications did not resume until after October 2009, when the termination petition was denied and the case was transferred to the current social worker.

While the court understands why Ms. Archie might be sensitive to the tone of the letter and recognizes the importance of professionals respecting appropriate boundaries in their work, the court finds that the respondent's decision to revoke releases is an overreaction to legitimate concerns by DCF. DCF's mandate to provide reasonable efforts to reunify includes ensuring that parents and providers understand, from DCF's perspective, those treatment issues which have triggered DCF's involvement.   Once advised, the parties and their providers are always free to dispute or even ignore DCF's concerns.   Such information may also trigger the need for a therapist to explain to DCF that its treatment modality does not encompass a direct and/or confrontational approach to addressing a parent's treatment goals.   In that event, DCF can evaluate, as it did in April 2010, whether or not a referral for supplemental and more targeted services, such as domestic violence counseling with John Went, is appropriate.   The wholesale breakdown of communications, however, runs the risk that the respondent and her therapist will work on issues which might be helpful to the respondent, but do not address the core issues which impede reunification.

In this case, the respondent continued to ignore DCF's longstanding concerns while Ms. Archie, given the revocation of releases, remained oblivious to the nature and extent of her client's ongoing relationship with Curtis B. For example, in the months before the termination trial in June 2009, Heather Howard had at least two sightings of Curtis B. driving the respondent's car.   As this court has already found, when the Waterbury police executed a search warrant of the respondent's home in September 2009, not only was Curtis B. there, but the respondent also attempted to physically block the officers' entry into her home.   Subsequently, and after the TPR petition as to her was denied, the respondent made numerous visits to the corrections facility where Curtis B. was housed following his arrest.

Ms. Archie acknowledged that even after the raid and arrest in the respondent's home, she had no information that the respondent was in an ongoing relationship with Curtis B. She characterized the incident as unfortunate and involved some poor decisions by the respondent, but as to this incident, they discussed how the respondent had hurt her foot and what it felt like for her house to be raided.   According to Ms. Archie, her therapeutic work with the respondent is limited by issues the respondent identifies and addresses in therapy.   Ms. Archie offered little evidence that her therapeutic work helped the respondent better deal with underlying issues that might be related to her problems with domestic violence.   Based on the respondent's conduct and decisions relative to rehabilitation and reunification with her children, this court sees no evidence that she has benefited from therapy such that reunification is warranted.

Undaunted by the respondent's resistance to specific domestic violence services, DCF once again referred the respondent in April 2010 and then again in September 2010 for domestic violence counseling, this time with John Went. The respondent eventually began sessions with Mr. Went in late September.   At trial, Mr. Went also testified that he believed that the respondent had made a lot of progress in her work with him.   Mr. Went stated his belief that the respondent had, in the last six months, recognized that Curtis B. was a victim of life and that she had “gotten tired of taking care of him.”   The respondent was also angry at Curtis B. for setting her up to lose her children and for the violence he had inflicted on her.   Mr. Went expressed his belief that the respondent had “given up the idea that Curtis B. needed to be taken care of by her.”

When asked whether he thought that the respondent believed that Curtis B. had any role in her life, Mr. Went was ambivalent, testifying that he was not sure he could answer this question.   He testified that the respondent spoke with Curtis B. sometime between Thanksgiving 2010 through to the new year.   He was aware that the respondent visited Curtis B. in prison because she was lonely without him.   Mr. Went also acknowledged that the respondent had vague plans to relocate to North Carolina, a significant issue in light of evidence that Curtis B. is now either in North Carolina or South Carolina.   Mr. Went also agreed that the respondent rationalized her tendency to lie and mislead others about her relationship with Curtis B., premised on her claim that the children asked about him.

The court finds Mr. Went a credible witness, but that his testimony is inadequate to undermine the overwhelming evidence before this court that the respondent cannot safely and appropriately raise her children.   This court finds it troubling that the respondent apparently finds Curtis B. wholly to blame for the loss of her children.   For a period of more than five years, the respondent has known or should have known the ramifications of being in a violent relationship with Curtis B. She has been repeatedly and severely beaten by Curtis B. Suggesting an inexplicable lack of empathy and sensitivity to her children, the respondent should have known what the children have made clear to everyone else;  they are extremely frightened of Curtis B. and were clearly traumatized by his violence and their mother's inability to protect them.   Curtis B.'s viability as a father was long ago obvious, given that he engaged in no services to address his violence and substance abuse, and accordingly, his rights were terminated.   As a result, DCF has consistently made clear that the respondent's ongoing relationship with him would impede her reunification with her children.   Her decision to continue in relationship with Curtis B. resulted in her being twice deprived of custody and twice subject to petitions to terminate her parental rights.   Yet none of these factors has prompted the respondent to take responsible action to free herself from Curtis B. Even if the court could credit Mr. Went's opinion that the respondent has made progress, which it does not, it is far too little and far too late.   This court cannot credit the respondent's assertion of her right to parent her children when she cannot accept or fulfill her fundamental obligation and responsibility to protect them.

In 2008, the children were transitioned to their current legal risk foster home.   The foster father, whose home was initially identified for Justin and Kelsey, requested placement of all five children in the home.   Once their placement was stabilized, each of the children began receiving therapy at the Institute of Living.   In addition, Bryce, who finally received Birth to Three evaluation and services following his removal from the respondent's care, was found to have significant developmental delays.

All five children have a desperate need for permanency and have a variety of specialized needs.   The specialized needs of Justin and Kelsey are extreme.   Born on June 22, 2001, the twins are ten years old.   Both have been diagnosed with asthma and PICA, a condition in which individuals eat non-edible items.   Ms. Howard testified that the twins have eaten placemats, Venetian blinds, paint on the walls, toys, crayons, markers, their shoes and their clothes.   They have both chewed their fingers and eaten the nails off their fingers.   En route to and during visits, when their anxieties are exacerbated, their behavior has been described as completely out of control.   During transport to visits with the respondent, the twins have chewed on their seatbelts and the collars of their shirts, chewed their flip flops to bits and eaten pens and pencils.   When they arrive at visits, they will run outside of the visitation room, jump up and down on tables, cursing.   Both boys have limited verbal skills and are easily frustrated when they are not understood.   Both boys have had severe dental problems and tooth decay.

Since their placement in foster care, both Kelsey and Justin have demonstrated some improvements in their behavior and educational goals.   They are both extremely attached to their current pre-adoptive foster family and Kelsey has said he never wants to return to “Sheena and Darnell,” nor does he want to live with his grandparents.   He has said that “he wanted to go to the Judge's house and talk to him or her himself and tell the Judge he didn't want to go home.”   Similarly, Justin has said that he wants to live with his pre-adoptive family until he is “18 ․ 19 ․ 100” and he constantly tells his foster father that he loves him.   Both boys refuse to hug or kiss their mother and often walk out or run away from her when they leave visits.

The boys' hostility toward visits has been extreme at times.   When the social worker has attempted to pick them up at school, they refuse to come and run away, cursing, screaming and yelling, “No, I'm not coming with you!”

Since the beginning of DCF's involvement, Za'Mora has expressed extreme fear of her father.   She has reported extensive violence between her parents and has expressed her fear that “Darnell” will return to her mother's home and hurt them all.   After the second removal from her mother's care when she was returned to her first foster home, Za'Mora said “I dreamt of this day for a long time.”   She also said that she couldn't wait to run into “mommy Agie's arms.”   She has since thrived in foster care and is active in school activities;  she is quiet, well-behaved and seeks to please.   She is also parentified in her interactions with her siblings.   She feeds and holds the youngest ones and tells her siblings how to behave.   She and her brother, Evan, enjoy a particularly close bond.   She scolds the twins when they swear and say they want to smoke “weed” and drink beer, which she says they learned from their father.

Za'Mora's birth date is May 2, 2000 and she is currently eleven years old.   She joined all of her siblings in their current pre-adoptive placement on December 29, 2008 and is extremely bonded to her foster family.   She is not affectionate with her mother, rarely has physical contact with her, and refers to her as “Sheena.”

Evan was born on December 20, 2004, is now six and a half years old and has been in three foster placements.   He was placed in his current, pre-adoptive home with his siblings on October 15, 2008.   He receives special education services for his speech.   He still has extensive scarring to his chest and abdomen as a result of the burns he sustained while in his mother's care;  otherwise he has no significant medical concerns.

Bryce was born on March 29, 2007.   He was removed from his mother's care, when he was one year old and is described as big for his age and aggressive.   He uses his size to grab toys and push, pinch, bite and growl at other children.   Although he was referred for Birth to Three Services while in the respondent's care, she did not follow through with these services.   Once Bryce was in foster care, DCF secured a Birth to Three evaluation and services, which determined that Bryce had delays in speech/communication and in his fine motor skills.

All of the children have been exposed to significant domestic violence and neglect, both in the respondent's home and while the family lived with the maternal grandparents.   The respondent has used Bryce to shield her from physical abuse by Curtis B., to which Curtis B. responded by saying “I don't care.   I will hit you with him in your hands.”   The children describe violence between the parents and the grandparents which has involved beatings with baseball bats, 2” x 4” wood pieces, and violence involving knives.   The maternal grandfather has also hung Kelsey and Justin outside a second story window for punishment.   The children have been left alone and/or with the maternal grandfather who would lock himself in his room to smoke marijuana.   During one of these unsupervised incidents, Bryce fell down a flight of stairs.

This court heard compelling testimony from Laurie Landry, a licensed therapist with a master's degree in family therapy who has seventeen years experience specializing in attachment and trauma issues in families.   Ms. Landry testified that the recent research reveals that certain aspects of brain development, even in the pre-natal stage, is inhibited by trauma such as domestic violence, chaos and starvation.   Children exposed to chronic and severe trauma can be set back developmentally and are often socially and emotionally behind.   With respect to domestic violence in particular, children frequently manifest the effects of trauma by being hyper-vigilant and exquisitely sensitive to their surroundings.   They have extreme difficulty trusting their caregivers because they have learned that their caregivers cannot feed them, keep them safe or meet their needs.   Ms. Landry testified that instead, these children live in constant fear, which she likened to having fifty wolves in front of them.   In a chronic state of fear and vigilance, children cannot learn or develop normally and instead, their brain development is impeded as a result of being in a highly stressed state of survival mode.

According to Ms. Landry, a critical precondition to treatment is that a child be in an emotionally and physically safe environment.   From there, a child needs to learn that he can trust and then attach to his caregiver and experience reciprocal relationships.   In Ms. Landry's therapeutic work, she requires that the child be in treatment with a primary caregiver, someone who is trusted in that child's life.   Ms. Landry explained that this is because the therapeutic process of dealing with trauma is incredibly painful.   As a result, the presence of a long-term, permanent caretaker whom the child trusts is a crucial source of support in the process of therapy.   At the same time, unresolved permanency is another source of chronic trauma for children.   The lack of permanency can be a huge impediment to treatment, and in fact, Ms. Landry testified that her therapeutic work can only go so far when a child is not assured of a permanent home and caregiver.

Ms. Landry was the therapist for Justin initially and then became the therapist for Kelsey, who was having significant difficulties with stress after visits.   His PICA condition would become exacerbated, and he would eat his shirts, parts of his wood bedframe and would bite his fingernails all the way down to the quick.   Her working diagnosis for Kelsey was Reactive Attachment Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.   Ms. Landry testified that children with these diagnoses tend to feel unsafe everywhere and have an extreme need to be in control at all times.   For children like Kelsey, if they are not in control, their brain tells them they will either die or get hurt and they act in primal ways to survive.   Ms. Landry's work with Kelsey required that she first meet with the foster parents, determine what symptoms were apparent at the home and implement strategies to address them.   Only after those symptoms stabilize will Kelsey be able to participate in treatment.

Ms. Landry testified that she believed that Kelsey was making some progress in the foster home.   One indicator is that Kelsey, who is anxious at night, began sleeping on the floor hallway near his foster parents' bedroom.   Ms. Landry viewed this as progress in that it reflects Kelsey's growing trust that his foster parents will keep him safe.   Their work with Kelsey then evolved to getting him to move, six inches a day, back into his bedroom, where he is now sleeping at nights.

Ms. Landry testified that Kelsey has no ability to talk about his mother.   When she has asked him about visits, he has instead expressed an intensely physical reaction and becomes very stiff.   She believes that Kelsey is very uncomfortable and cannot relax when the topic of his mother comes up.   In her opinion, Kelsey does not feel safe even to talk about his mother.

Nina April, the current DCF social worker, has described the foster parent as being extremely competent in meeting the needs of all five children.   The children have a myriad of doctors' appointments, therapists, therapeutic day care and specialists whom they see on a regular basis.   Their foster father has diligently ensured that the children attend all of their appointments.   In vivid testimony, Ms. April described how she was engaged in a conversation with the foster father while he was supervising all five children on the playground.   Saying it was like he had “eyes in the back of his head,” she testified that he knew exactly where each one was at all times, ensuring they were safe and deftly managing all of them.

III. ADJUDICATION

A. REASONABLE EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[The] court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2005).   See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).   Moreover, “such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).

“The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 48.   Although “[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ․ defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).   The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed, in this case, July 15, 2010, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made.  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.

In this case the petitioner has alleged that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent and that in the alternative, the respondent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   This court finds that the petitioner has met its burden as to both grounds by clear and convincing evidence.   The court specifically finds that the petitioner has been unrelenting and persistent in its attempt to engage the respondent in services for domestic violence, mental health treatment, supportive housing and parenting.   The petitioner has presented overwhelming evidence establishing its repeated efforts to refer the respondent to those services that would have enabled her to keep herself and her children safe.   DCF has offered to pay for one month's rent and a security deposit to facilitate the respondent's physical move to another residence in New Britain, near where she worked and went to school.   It has urged the mother to move outside of Waterbury to limit Curtis B.'s access to her and the children.   These efforts, as well as repeated efforts to engage the respondent in domestic violence counseling, have not been successful.   The respondent has not shown a consistent or sustained willingness to address seriously the domestic violence which has led to her children's permanent removal.   She has repeatedly allowed Curtis B. back into her life over the years this case has been tragically before the courts;  that evidence itself establishes how she has also failed to benefit from reunification services.

Our case law recognizes that time is critically important for children.   For these children, the effects of trauma from their exposure to domestic violence have been profound.   These children have long ago given up on their mother as someone upon whom they could rely for safety and nurturance, and they desperately need this court to give them the opportunity to move forward.   Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

B. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

“General Statutes § 17a–112(j) provides in relevant part, that the court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights ‘if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (B) the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․’ ‘Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jordon T., 119 Conn.App. 748 (2010), citing In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

Subsection (ii) of 17a–112(j)B is alleged as to Bryce which if proven, requires that this court find that he was neglected and in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and that the respondent was provided specific steps to facilitate the return of the child to her.   Like subsection (i), this court must also find that with respect to Bryce, the respondent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering his age and needs, that the respondent could assume a responsible position in his life.

The court finds that all four older children were previously adjudicated neglected on January 22, 2007, and that since birth until his removal, Bryce was neglected while in the care of his mother.   She exposed Bryce to extreme incidents of domestic violence, even using him as a shield to protect herself from Curtis B. Although DCF repeatedly attempted to get Birth to Three services into the home to provide evaluation and support for Bryce, the respondent did not cooperate.   Only after Bryce's removal was Birth to Three able to determine the extent of his developmental delays and provide the appropriate services to address them.

In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her life, but rather whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.   In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 157, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).   However, “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

This court finds that the petitioner has met its burden as to this adjudicatory ground as to all five children.   Since January 22, 2007 and again on April 4, 2008, the respondent has been subject to specific steps that outlined the requirements for reunification;  there is no credible claim that DCF did not make reasonable efforts to reunify.   In fact, its efforts to refer the respondent to appropriate services began in May 2006, when it first opened its case and signed a service agreement with the respondent.   Since then, DCF has been persistent and unrelenting in its efforts to engage the respondent in services to protect herself and her children.

The respondent's failure to achieve rehabilitation is most evident in the severity and chronicity of violence in her relationship with Curtis B., combined with her inability to recognize its traumatic impact on her children.   By having remained in a violent relationship with Curtis B., she has undermined her ability to offer her children an environment which they can trust will keep them safe.

Throughout her years with DCF, the respondent was well aware that her relationship with Curtis B. would impede reunification with her children.   At times, she disputed the significance of his presence in her home, claiming that he staged this and set her up.   The children, however, made clear that Curtis B. had moved into the new apartment which DCF secured for the respondent in March 2008, complete with first month's rent and security deposit.   The evidence was replete with instances in which police arrived at the respondent's home and either found Curtis B. present or were told that he had just left.   On several occasions, DCF social workers saw Curtis B. driving the respondent's car, or in the respondent's presence.   Just before the decisions were issued on the first termination of parental rights petitions, the respondent was found blocking the entry of police who were in the process of executing a search warrant.   Not only did they find Curtis B. in the mother's home, but they found crack cocaine as well.   During Curtis B.'s subsequent incarceration, the respondent visited him nine times at the corrections facilities from the end of October 2009 through December 2009.   These series of incidents over the years culminated in the respondent's admission to Nina April in September 2010 that she would never be able to give up her relationship with Curtis B.

All five children have a critical need for permanency.   Except for the trial reunification starting in September 2007 through the end of March 2008, the oldest four children have been in temporary care since November 17, 2006.   Bryce has been in foster care since March 2008.   As our courts have long observed, the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care is well known.   In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).   For these children in particular, this court finds that they have lived with fear and anxiety for almost all of their young lives, first, to the extent that they have lived with the terror of violence in their home, and then in foster care, fearing the prospect of returning home to the respondent who has repeatedly shown that she cannot or will not protect them.   This contrasts starkly with the respondent's total and abject failure to recognize the impact of her violent relationship on her children.   Even Mr. Went conceded that the respondent rationalized her tendency to lie and mislead others about her relationship with Curtis B. because she claims the children asked about him.   For this court, it matters little whether the respondent is either lying about whether the children inquired about the father or whether she simply has a distorted view of the reality of their deeply disturbed relationship with him.   Either way, the respondent is profoundly wrong and this exemplifies the degree to which the mother is unable to meet her children's needs.   The children have been in temporary care well past the federal and state mandates regarding permanency.¹  In addition, Justin and Kelsey have highly specialized needs which cannot be fully addressed without the security and assurance of permanency.   Given the respective ages and individual needs of each of the children and their protracted time in temporary care, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a–112(j).

IV. DISPOSITION

This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of all five children to terminate the parental rights of the respondent.   The evidence overwhelmingly proves that the children have an acute need for permanency, safety and security, after suffering severe trauma from exposure to violence and spending almost five years in foster care.   While they have made great strides in the nurturing care of their foster family, they need to be freed from the prospect of returning to the violence they knew while in their mother's care.   As Ms. Landry testified, the children's therapeutic and developmental progress is inherently limited if they cannot be assured of their fundamental need to know who is their parent, their family and their home.

In arriving at this conclusion, the court also considers the seven factors outlined in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  The court notes, however, that under In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863 (2000), the seven factors set forth in § 17a–112(e) serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

As this court has already found, the respondent was offered services throughout the duration of this case for domestic violence services and counseling, mental health counseling, parenting education, visitation and housing.   If the respondent was resistant to services from one agency, DCF made referrals to another agency.   When the respondent failed to participate in services specifically for domestic violence, DCF made attempts to have these issues specifically addressed with her individual therapist.   DCF has made numerous referrals for parenting programs, including many intensive programs with one-on-one support.

2. Finding regarding whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

Given the above findings, this court concludes that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite all five children with the respondent pursuant to its obligations under federal law.   The respondent was also unable and unwilling to benefit from services offered.

3. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

Final specific steps were ordered in this case.   With the exception of visitation, the respondent failed to engage effectively with many critical services in a timely manner.   DCF has consistently offered services to the respondent.

4. Findings regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to their parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

The three older children uniformly fear the prospect of returning to their mother's care, do not seem to be bonded to her and do not regard her as a parenting figure in their lives.   They recognize her as their biological mother, but understand that she otherwise cannot or will not meet any of their basic needs.   In contrast, all five children are very bonded to their foster family, with whom they were placed continuously since 2008.   They look to their foster parents for affection, love, emotional support, structure and safety.   The children are engaged in an array of mental health and medical services, as well as extracurricular activities;  their foster family ensures that all of these needs are consistently met.   Except for legal permanency, which cannot be assured in the absence of the termination of parental rights and adoption, the foster family has met the needs of these children, including their need for each other.

5. Finding regarding the age of the child.

Za'Mora S. (d.o.b.5/2/00) is eleven years old;  Justin S. (d.o.b.6/22/01) and Kelsey S. (d.o.b.6/22/01) are ten years old;  Evan S. (d.o.b.12/20/04) is six years old and Bryce S. (d.o.b.3/29/07) is four years old.

6. Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to:  (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

As her conduct over the past five years demonstrates, the respondent has been largely ambivalent in her efforts toward reunification.   The court credits the respondent for consistently visiting with her children.   The bulk of her work in individual therapy began just before the first trial to terminate her parental rights and ultimately, had limited benefit given that the respondent chose not to be candid with her therapist regarding the extent and fact of her ongoing relationship with Curtis B. The respondent has participated in some domestic violence counseling and services but she did not demonstrate motivation and consistency throughout the critical first years of reunification.   The recent consistency she has shown with John Went has come at time that is far too little and too late, given the number of years she has allowed the children's distrust of her as a parenting figure to be ingrained.   As this court noted, in mother's work with Mr. Went, she rationalized her relationship with Curtis B. by saying that the children were asking for him.   Her relationship with Curtis B., however, goes to the core of her children's total lack of faith in her as a parent.   Her inability to take responsibility for the impact of her relationship on her children is a significant weakness.

Finally, the respondent made no authentic, sustained effort to end her relationship with Curtis B., who long ago made clear he had no intention of participating in reunification services.   Notwithstanding substantial assistance and support from DCF which referred her to services for safe shelter and permanent housing, the respondent repeatedly allowed Curtis B. back into her life.   Her visits to Curtis B. when he was incarcerated, after his rights were terminated, and after the petition as to her rights was denied, are powerful evidence of her inability and unwillingness to end domestic violence in her life.

7. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

This court finds no evidence that the respondent was prevented from maintaining a relationship with her five children by the unreasonable act of others or by her economic circumstances.

In accordance with the best interests of the children pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Sheena S. as to all five children is in their best interests.

It is accordingly ORDERED that the parental rights of Sheena S. are hereby TERMINATED as to Za'Mora, Justin, Kelsey, Evan and Bryce S. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed statutory parent.   The agency is directed to facilitate the adoption of all five children as expeditiously as possible.   The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over the subsequent adoptions shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Waterbury of the date when each adoption is finalized.

A case plan shall be submitted within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment, and further reports shall be timely presented to this court as required by law.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

ELGO, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. “These federal mandates have been adopted and codified in Connecticut statutes, notably in § 46b–129 wherein wholesale changes have been made to comply with the federal law.   Specifically in point, § 46b–129(k) requires DCF to file with the court within nine months of placement a motion for review of a permanency plan for children in state care.   Further, the Commissioner is directed to file for termination of parental rights not later than 60 days after the permanency plan of adoption has been approved. (§ 46b–129(k)(4)).   This timetable is not optional.   It is the law of the land and reflects a sense of Congress and the will of the people as expressed by our legislature that permanency decisions should be made within one year.   Presumably, this is a reasonable period to wait for parental rehabilitation when weighed against the child's need for a permanent placement.”   Articulation of Denial of Stay, In re Zion R., Superior Court Child Protection Session at Willimantic, Docket no.   W10–CP06–015070 (Foley, J. August 11, 2008)..  FN1. “These federal mandates have been adopted and codified in Connecticut statutes, notably in § 46b–129 wherein wholesale changes have been made to comply with the federal law.   Specifically in point, § 46b–129(k) requires DCF to file with the court within nine months of placement a motion for review of a permanency plan for children in state care.   Further, the Commissioner is directed to file for termination of parental rights not later than 60 days after the permanency plan of adoption has been approved. (§ 46b–129(k)(4)).   This timetable is not optional.   It is the law of the land and reflects a sense of Congress and the will of the people as expressed by our legislature that permanency decisions should be made within one year.   Presumably, this is a reasonable period to wait for parental rehabilitation when weighed against the child's need for a permanent placement.”   Articulation of Denial of Stay, In re Zion R., Superior Court Child Protection Session at Willimantic, Docket no.   W10–CP06–015070 (Foley, J. August 11, 2008).

Elgo, Nina F., J.