Geraldine Scalia v. Concentra Health Services, Inc. (2011)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 110

FACTS

The plaintiff, Geraldine Scalia, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Concentra Health Services, Inc. on March 3, 2009.   The plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts in her complaint.   On July 25, 2000, the plaintiff was employed by the United States Postal Service (postal service) in North Haven, Connecticut when she injured her back while moving heavy sacks of mail.   The plaintiff's supervisor directed her to seek medical assistance from the defendant that day because it provides contracted medical services to postal service employees at its facility in Wallingford, Connecticut.   The defendant delivered medical services to the plaintiff but thereafter made a notation or typographical error and informed her employer that her injury occurred on May 12, 2001 and that she was to return to regular duty on that date.   Due to the defendant's violation of its contract with the postal service, the plaintiff was denied workers' compensation benefits by the federal government.   As a result, the plaintiff paid for legal assistance to acquire the benefits, received delayed medical care, and was diagnosed with permanent medical conditions.

On January 29, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment, which was granted on February 16, 2010.   On March 1, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations on written contracts.   The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law.   In response, on June 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.   As a result of Judge Blue's request at short calendar on February 28, 2011 to provide additional memoranda, both parties submitted reply memoranda.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ․ The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough ․ for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

The defendant argues that as a matter of law, the plaintiff's action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52–576, on written contracts.¹  The defendant further argues that the statute of limitations began to toll in 2001 when the plaintiff asserts that it made a notation error and incorrectly dated her July 25, 2000 injury as occurring on May 12, 2001.   It is the defendant's position that because the plaintiff's action sounds in contract, the fact that it has not provided a contract or claims that there was no contract between the parties is irrelevant for purposes of the statute of limitations analysis.   Accordingly, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff therefore had until 2007 to file a complaint against it but waited until 2009 when the statute of limitations had lapsed.   In the alternative, the defendant argues that even if the court deemed the plaintiff legally incapable of bringing the action in 2001, she was legally capable no later than in 2005 when she became aware of the typographical error and had three years thereafter to bring her action or file her complaint by 2008.

In the plaintiff's objection and without providing any authority, the plaintiff counters that the “defendant had a contract with the ․ [p]ostal [s]ervice which will be presented at trial and [she] will testify [that] her compensation benefits were not made available to her until she learned that [the] defendant admitted its error.”   Further, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's “actions were the result of a ‘typographical error’ which will require evidence” and lastly that she is “seeking production of [her] contract with the ․ [p]ostal [s]ervice.”   In the additional memorandum, the plaintiff maintains that the defendant has not stated when it provided the erroneous information to either her employer or the compensation division of the United States Department of Labor and therefore, if there is a violation of § 52–576, the time period would not have started to run until 2005 when the defendant informed the plaintiff of its notation error in her medical records.²

“Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.”  Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).   A statute of limitations prevents “the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and ․ to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Navin v. Essex Savings Bank, 82 Conn.App. 255, 260–61, 843 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 902, 859 A.2d 563 (2004).   Furthermore, the law concerning the time when a breach of contract action accrues is well settled.   See Torringford Farms Assn., Inc. v. Torrington, 75 Conn.App. 570, 577, 816 A.2d 736, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 924, 823 A.2d 1217 (2003).  “[I]n an action for breach of contract ․ the cause of action is complete at the time the breach of contract occurs, that is, when the injury has been inflicted ․ [I]gnorance of the fact that damage has been done does not prevent the running of the statute ․” (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. Additionally, “[w]here there is no dispute as to the applicable statute of limitations, the only facts material to the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment are the date of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint and the date the action was filed.”  Shuster v. Buckley, 5 Conn.App. 473, 477, 500 A.2d 240 (1985).

In the present case, the defendant has read the cause of action in the complaint to be one of contract.   Yet in the complaint, the wrongful conduct alleged is the defendant's incorrect notation error that resulted in a denial of the plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits.   If this were a contract action, then based on the six-year statute of limitations, the plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the time her benefits were denied.   Significantly, however, the record is silent on when the plaintiff was refused her benefits.   Furthermore, in responding to the defendant's argument that the cause of action alleged is governed by § 52–576, the plaintiff merely states that, if there is a violation of a six-year statute of limitations, it would start running in 2005 when she learned of the error in her records.   Additionally, the plaintiff does not argue that the cause of action is anything other than the result of a typographical error by the defendant.   Therefore, because the plaintiff alleges conduct in her complaint that is the result of a typographical error which is a cause of action more akin to negligence, the applicable statute of limitations is based on the actions or conduct of the defendant.   Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact exist as to which statutory time period is relevant and whether there was a tolling of that time limit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

BY THE COURT

Richard E. Burke, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 52–576 provides in relevant part:  “(a) No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues ․ (b) Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action.”.  FN1. Section 52–576 provides in relevant part:  “(a) No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues ․ (b) Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action.”

FN2. The defendant has submitted no evidence in support of its motion.   The plaintiff has submitted an exhibit which purports to be a copy of the defendant's letter to the plaintiff dated July 19, 2005, her affidavit and what appears to be copies of her medical records.  “Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 116 Conn.App. 459, 467, 976 A.2d 23 (2009);  accord New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 679, 874 A.2d 849 (2005).  “Only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 436, 696 A.2d 1254 (1997).   Since only one party has submitted any evidence and the defendant has not raised an objection to the plaintiff's evidence, the court, in its discretion, may consider such evidence.   See Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006)..  FN2. The defendant has submitted no evidence in support of its motion.   The plaintiff has submitted an exhibit which purports to be a copy of the defendant's letter to the plaintiff dated July 19, 2005, her affidavit and what appears to be copies of her medical records.  “Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 116 Conn.App. 459, 467, 976 A.2d 23 (2009);  accord New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 679, 874 A.2d 849 (2005).  “Only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 436, 696 A.2d 1254 (1997).   Since only one party has submitted any evidence and the defendant has not raised an objection to the plaintiff's evidence, the court, in its discretion, may consider such evidence.   See Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006).

Burke, Richard E., J.