Elbert Best v. Francine L. Stanley et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

INTRODUCTION

These consolidated cases arise from an incident that took place at or about 2:12 p.m. on March 1, 2007, at or near the intersection of New Britain Avenue and Oliver Street in Hartford, Connecticut.   It began when Ms. Francine L. Stanley, an uninsured motorist who had been operating her Dodge Durango in a westerly direction on New Britain Avenue, attempted to move her vehicle from the left westbound lane to the right westbound lane of travel in that location to go around another vehicle that had stopped ahead of her at the corner of Oliver Street, signaling for a left turn.   When the Stanley vehicle started drifting to the right to initiate the lane change, Mr. Michael Manish, an employee of H.N.S. Management, Inc., d/b/a Connecticut Transit Company (“Connecticut Transit”) who was then operating a Connecticut Transit bus in the right westbound lane of New Britain Avenue, sounded his horn and swerved to the right side of the lane to avoid a collision.   Failing to hear and/or heed the bus driver's warning, Ms. Stanley turned her vehicle to the right, causing it to enter the right westbound lane and strike the left front corner of the bus with the right front corner of her vehicle.   Mr. Manish responded to the impact between the Stanley vehicle and the bus by turning the bus sharply to the right to avoid further contact with the Stanley vehicle.   By taking this action without first braking or slowing the bus, which was then traveling at or about the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour, Mr. Manish caused the bus to roll off the traveled portion of the highway, up and over a snow-covered curb and an adjacent icy sidewalk onto a snow-covered lawn, across which it skidded, despite braking, into a large tree.   The collision injured several paying passengers on the bus, including the three plaintiffs, Mr. Elbert Best, Ms. Norean Miller and Mr. Edward Semedo.

The plaintiffs now seek to recover money damages for their injuries and losses from two defendants:  Connecticut Transit, based upon the alleged negligence of its employee, Mr. Manish, in operating the bus in the course of the incident;  and Specialty Risk Services, LLC, the uninsured motorist insurance carrier for Connecticut Transit,¹ based upon the alleged negligence of the uninsured motorist, Ms. Stanley, at that time.²  The plaintiffs claim that Mr. Manish negligently caused the collision and their resulting injuries and losses, in several alleged ways, including:  (1) by failing to stop or turn the bus, although it was practical to do so, so as to avoid a collision with the other motor vehicle and/or the tree;  (2) by operating the bus at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway;  and (3) by failing to apply the brakes in time to avoid a collision.   Amended Complaint (9/15/11), Best v. Francine L. Stanley et al., Docket No. HHD CV 09 5027630 (“Best ”), Count II, ¶ 9(d)-(f);  Complaint (1/20/09), Miller v. H.N.S. Management Co., Inc. d/b/a Connecticut Transit Company et al., Docket No. HHD CV 09 5027910 (“Miller ”), Count I, ¶ 8(c), (e)-(f);  Amended Complaint (9/15/11), Edward Semedo v. H.N.S. Management Co., Inc., d/b/a Connecticut Transit Company et al., Docket No. HHD CV 09 5027651 (“Semedo ”), Count I, ¶ 12(g)-(h), (j).  They also claim that Ms. Stanley negligently caused the collision and their resulting injuries and losses, in several alleged ways, including:  (1) by moving her vehicle from one lane of a divided highway to another without ascertaining that such movement could be made safely, in violation of § 14–236 of the motor vehicle laws of the State of Connecticut;  and (2) by being inattentive and failing to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other motor vehicles upon the highway.   Best Amended Complaint, Count III, ¶ 10(a)-(b);  Miller Complaint, Count III, ¶ 10(a)-(b);  Semedo Amended Complaint, Count II, ¶ 13(f), (h).  The defendants have denied or left the plaintiffs to their proof as to each essential element of each claim of liability and damages against them.

These cases were tried together to the Court on September 13, 2011.   After the parties stipulated to the admissibility of most of their pre-marked exhibits, argued a single motion in limine whose denial resulted in the admission of two additional exhibits,³ and stipulated to the ages and statistical life expectancies of the three plaintiffs, the plaintiffs presented live testimony from four witnesses:  Mr. Manish, Mr. Semedo, Mr. Best and Ms. Miller.   All parties then rested without presenting further evidence.

Based upon the above-described evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

LIABILITY

1. On March 1, 2007, Connecticut Transit was a corporation authorized to do business in the state of Connecticut which operated public transportation buses in the city of Hartford.

2. At all times relevant to these cases, Mr. Manish was an employee of Connecticut Transit who was regularly assigned to operate a large public bus for paying passengers on an inter-city route between downtown Hartford and downtown New Britain.   The route took him back and forth between the two cities four times each day, over city streets including New Britain Avenue in Hartford.   Having driven this route for many years, Mr. Manish was very familiar with its streets and intersections and their general surroundings.

3. At or about 2:12 p.m. on March 1, 2007, as Mr. Manish was operating a Connecticut Transit bus in a westerly direction on New Britain Avenue, to the west of Hillside Avenue and the east of Oliver Street, he was overtaken on his left by two vehicles.   The first such vehicle was a passenger vehicle of unknown make, model or description, which was then being operated by an unknown driver.   That vehicle passed the bus completely, drawing ahead of it by at least two car lengths before signaling for and slowing to make a left turn at the corner of Oliver Street.   The second overtaking vehicle was a silver Dodge Durango then being operated by Ms. Stanley.   The Durango had pulled ahead of but not completely past the bus before it too began to slow in response to the signaling and slowing of the vehicle turning left in front of it.

4. Shortly after noting that the Dodge Durango, which was then immediately to his left and slightly in front of him, had begun to slow, Mr. Manish saw it start to drift to the right as if it was going to pull into his lane.   At this, he promptly sounded his horn and swerved to the right side of his lane, which was clear and dry, in an effort to avoid any contact between the Durango and the bus.   He did not, however, apply his brakes or make any other immediate effort to slow the bus, which was then traveling at or about the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour.   As a result of its swerve to the right, the 9–foot–wide bus continued moving in a westerly direction in the 12–foot–wide right lane of New Britain Avenue, approximately 20 inches from the yellow dashed center line between its two westbound lanes, and thus about 16 inches from the snowcovered curb running along the right edge of the roadway in that location.

5. Despite Mr. Manish's sounding of his horn, Ms. Stanley abruptly turned her vehicle to the right for the admitted purpose of moving it into the right lane of travel.⁴  By so doing, she caused the vehicle to enter the right westbound lane, where it struck the left front corner of the bus, just behind its wraparound front bumper and ahead of its left front wheel, directly below where Mr. Manish was sitting.   The point of impact between the two vehicles was later determined by police investigators to be 20 inches from the centerline between the two westbound lanes of New Britain Avenue and 46.7 feet to the east of the east extended curb line of Oliver Street.⁵

6. Although the jolt from this impact did not cause extensive damage to either vehicle or push the bus any significant distance to the right, it prompted Mr. Manish to take evasive action by turning the bus sharply to the right, still without braking or slowing, to avoid any further contact with the Dodge Durango.   So turned, the bus rolled off the right edge of the roadway, up and over the curb and an adjacent icy sidewalk, onto a snow-covered lawn, across which it slid, despite finally braking, directly into a large tree.   The tree stood 7 feet to the west of the east extended curb line of Oliver Street and approximately 10 feet to the north of the curb line in that location.⁶  The final resting place of the right side of the bus after it hit the tree was approximately 2 feet to the north of that point on the tree that was nearest to the roadway.   The bus thus moved approximately 13.33 feet to the north ⁷ and 53.7 feet to the west ⁸ from its point of impact with the Dodge Durango to its final resting place by the tree, for a total distance of approximately 55.3 feet.⁹  At the rate of 30 miles per hour, or 44 feet per second,¹⁰ it would have taken the bus approximately 1.25 seconds to travel from its point of impact with the Durango to the tree.   At the rate of 25 miles per hour, or 36.67 feet per second, it would have taken the bus approximately 1.5 seconds to travel that distance.   This time frame and sequence of events was confirmed by two of the plaintiffs, Mr. Best and Mr. Semedo, both of whom heard the impact, felt the bus turn to the right, and saw it head directly towards the tree, into which it collided, throwing them and other passengers, including Mrs. Miller, violently about the bus, and thereby causing them serious physical injuries.

Ms. Stanley and Specialty Risk Services, LLC

7. Every operator of a motor vehicle upon the public highway owes a duty to her own passengers, as well as to the operators of other vehicles and their passengers, to exercise reasonable care for their safety in the operation of her vehicle.   Reasonable care, in this context, means the kind of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent person in all the circumstances surrounding her operation of the vehicle of which she knew or should have known by the reasonable exercise of her faculties at the time.   Circumstances affecting the safety of the operation of a vehicle upon the public highway include the width and configuration of the highway, the presence of intersecting streets, the presence and movement of other traffic upon the highway, the weather, and all other factors that might reasonably be expected to affect the operator's ability to perceive and/or respond to dangers or conditions of danger in or along her path of travel.   Breach of this duty of reasonable care constitutes common-law negligence, for which damages may be awarded to an injured person, if and to the extent that the breach legally caused that person's injuries and losses.

8. In addition to an operator's common-law duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others operating or riding in vehicles upon the public highway, she has a statutory duty to obey all statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles upon the public highway.   Violation of any such statute constitutes negligence as a matter of law, for which, as with common-law negligence, damages may be awarded to an injured person if and to the extent that it legally caused that person's injuries and losses.

9. In these cases, the plaintiffs have claimed that Ms. Stanley, the uninsured motorist, was negligent in operating her Dodge Durango in the westbound lanes of New Britain Avenue on March 1, 2007 in violation both of her common-law duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others upon the public highway and of her statutory duty to obey certain motor vehicle statutes at that time.   For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs that they have proved both types of negligence against Ms. Stanley by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

10. Part of an operator's common-law duty to use reasonable care for the safety of other persons using the highway is the duty to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other vehicles upon the highway in order to avoid colliding with such vehicles and causing injury to their operators or passengers.   The plaintiffs here claim that Ms. Stanley breached this common-law duty by failing to view her immediate surroundings with sufficient care and attention to see Mr. Manish's 40'-long Connecticut Transit bus in the lane beside her before turning into that lane and colliding with it.   Not only was the bus a large blue bus, being operated in broad daylight no more than five or six feet to Ms. Stanley's right when she initiated her unsafe lane change, but she had overtaken that very bus just seconds before she drove into its lane and struck it.   Any ordinarily prudent person in Ms. Stanley's situation, exercising reasonable care to look out for what was going on around her, would and should have looked to her right and rear to determine if that bus or any other vehicle was then being operated in the lane she was about to turn into.   Had Ms. Stanley taken such minimal precautions to protect the safety of others, she would surely have seen the bus, and could not reasonably have turned her vehicle into its path, thereby initiating the sequence of events that shortly led to, and was a substantial factor in causing, the bus's collision with the tree and the plaintiffs' resulting injuries and losses.

11. Ms. Stanley's heedless conduct in turning her Dodge Durango to the right and colliding with the bus also clearly violated General Statutes § 14–236, as each of the plaintiffs has specifically alleged.  Section 14–236 provides, in relevant part, that:

When any highway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, (1) a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical within a single lane and the vehicle shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has ascertained that such movement can be made with safety[.]

Here, since the relevant portion of New Britain Avenue was divided into two clearly marked lanes for westbound traffic, Ms. Stanley was required by that statute not to move her vehicle from the left lane to the right lane of travel on that roadway until she ascertained that such movement could be made with safety, which she manifestly failed to do.   Instead, for the reasons set forth in the Court's discussion of her failure to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other vehicles upon the highway, Ms. Stanley, who admittedly failed to see the bus before she turned,¹¹ obviously made an insufficient effort to determine if, having just overtaken it, it was still in the lane beside her, before she sought to move her vehicle into that lane.   Having failed to ascertain that she could move her vehicle into the right westbound lane with safety, she first drifted towards that lane, then turned abruptly into it, striking the front left corner of the bus, which by then had drawn almost even with it, with the front right corner of her vehicle.   She thus violated § 14–236, and thereby contributed directly and materially to the ensuing collision between the bus and the tree and the plaintiffs' resulting injuries and losses:

12. The Court rejects the counter argument of Specialty Risk Services, LLC, presented with great energy by its counsel in closing argument, that no finding of negligence can be made against Ms. Stanley because the plaintiffs have failed to prove exactly what caused her to move from the left lane into the right lane of New Britain Avenue when she did.   It suggests, in so arguing, that Ms. Stanley may have been forced to turn her vehicle as she did because of circumstances beyond her control, such as the sudden stopping of the vehicle in front of her or some other undisclosed emergency which may then have been occurring within her vehicle.   On this score, the defendant faults the plaintiffs for not calling Ms. Stanley to testify at trial in order to explain the situation herself.

13. The Court rejects the defendant's sudden stop hypothesis based upon Mr. Manish's credible testimony that he had seen the Dodge Durango slow almost to a stop behind the vehicle turning left onto Oliver Street before it turned sharply to the right and accelerated into the right lane towards the bus.   In light of this testimony, Ms. Stanley could easily have stopped her vehicle behind the left-turning vehicle had she chosen to, but she simply did not do so.   The Court also rejects the theory that there might have been some sudden emergency within the Stanley vehicle that caused her to turn to the right because the defendant has admitted, both in its answer and at oral argument, that Ms. Stanley's turn to the right was entirely voluntary, and Ms. Stanley's post-accident statements to police investigators and bus company personnel who came to the accident scene never hinted at such a possibility.   Had there been such an exculpatory explanation for her conduct, she would logically have offered it to at least someone shortly after the collision, but she did not do so.   Instead, since her only explanation for moving into the right lane and striking the bus was that she did not see the bus before she started her lane change, and the bus's substantial size and marked proximity to her car in the well-lighted conditions then prevailing made it impossible for any ordinarily prudent person to miss it if she made a reasonable effort to look and see if it was still in the right lane, where she had just overtaken it, the plaintiffs have proved both the common-law and the statutory aspects of their negligence claims against Ms. Stanley, and thus against Speciality Risk Services, LLC, by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

Mr. Manish and Connecticut Transit

14. As for the alleged negligence of Mr. Manish in operating the Connecticut Transit bus in the course of this incident, his duty of care for the safety of his passengers, including the plaintiffs, must be judged by the much higher, more exacting standard established for common carriers at common law.  “The duty of a common carrier of passengers ․ is only satisfied if it exercises the highest degree of care and skill which reasonably may be expected of intelligent and prudent persons engaged in such a business, in view of the instrumentalities employed and the degree of danger to be apprehended.”   Roden v. Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 408, 410, 155 A. 721 (1931).   Otherwise stated, the duty owed by a common carrier to his passengers is “to exercise the highest reasonable degree of care, vigilance and forethought consistent with the mode of conveyance and the practical operation of the road.   The standard of care is fixed by the law.   What conduct on his part is required to comply with his duty to exercise the degree of care required by this standard must depend upon the circumstances and will ordinarily be a question of fact for the trier.”  Maher v. Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 556, 155 A. 854 (1931).

15. The plaintiffs claim that Mr. Manish breached the exacting standard of care for common carriers in operating his bus in the course of this incident in several specific ways.   In their final arguments, however, they focused most of their attention on three common specifications of negligence:  first, that Mr. Manish failed to stop or turn the bus, although it was practical for him to do so, so as to avoid a collision with the tree;  second, that he operated the bus at a greater speed than was reasonable having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway;  and third, that he failed to apply his brakes in time to avoid the collision between the bus and the tree.   For the following reasons the Court agrees with the plaintiffs that they have proved each of these specifications of negligence against Mr. Manish, and that they have established a breach of the standard of care for common carriers, by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

16. When Mr. Manish, an experienced bus driver operating a 17–ton bus at approximately 30 miles per hour in the right westbound lane of New Britain Avenue, saw the first of the two vehicles that had just overtaken him signal for a left turn and slow to a stop at the corner of Oliver Street, he became aware or should have become aware of the possibility that the driver of the second vehicle, who had not yet finished passing him, might attempt to go around the turning vehicle on the right.   He also knew or should have known that if that occurred, his bus was still so close to the second vehicle that any turn it might make to the right would risk causing a collision with the bus unless he took steps to avoid it.   His immediate choices in this situation were thus either to maintain his speed, denying the second car any space in front of the bus to turn into, or to slow down and leave the second car some space to turn into, thereby lessening the chance of a collision if the driver of the second vehicle attempted to change lanes ahead of him without warning.   When Mr. Manish saw the second car slow nearly to a stop behind the turning car, he was temporarily justified in believing that it would not attempt a pass.

17. Moments later, however, when the second car started drifting to the right, Mr. Manish's calculus of decision making, as a person held to the very high standard of care applicable to common carriers, should have changed at once.   A prudent, intelligent person in his situation, upon seeing such a movement to the right, should then have become aware that the operator of the second vehicle was actually contemplating an immediate lane change which could cause a collision with the bus.   In fact, Mr. Manish clearly appreciated the risk of danger to himself and his passengers from such a lane change, for he promptly responded to the drifting Durango by sounding his horn and swerving his bus to the right, albeit not off the roadway, to avoid a collision.   He failed again, however, to apply his brakes and slow the bus down below the speed limit to make room for the car to his left to move over, or at least, and most importantly, to make it easier for him to turn, stop and control the bus if the other vehicle kept on coming towards him despite his warning.   Instead, relying solely upon the sounding of his horn to alert the other driver to his presence to avert a collision, he neither applied his brakes at once nor readied himself to apply them should the other vehicle turn into his lane.

18. When Ms. Stanley failed to hear or heed Mr. Manish's warning and turned abruptly to the right, crossing into the right westbound lane and colliding with the front left side corner of the bus, Mr. Manish's choices were extremely limited due to his earlier failures to brake and slow the bus.   He could have braked the bus hard while it was still on the clear, dry surface of the roadway and steered it to the far right edge of his lane to avoid going off the road toward the trees on the snow- and ice-covered surfaces to his right.   This choice would have borne the best chance of stopping the bus from careening off the road and into the trees.   Instead, he turned the bus abruptly to the right to avoid further contact with Mr. Stanley's vehicle, and thereby put the bus almost immediately in a precarious, off-road position where its brakes, once he finally applied them, were predictably ineffective to slow or stop it from barreling into the tree.   A prudent, intelligent person in Mr. Manish's position before the Dodge Durango collided with the bus, aware of the weight and speed of the bus and the looming presence of the tree line on the lawn ahead of him to his right, should not, in exercising the high degree of care and skill for the safety of his passengers as a common carrier, have put himself in this unenviable position by failing to brake and slow the bus when the first sign of trouble appeared in the lane to his left, upon the initial drifting of the Dodge Durango towards his lane.   Nor, having made the poor initial decision not to brake and slow the bus immediately, would a prudent, intelligent person in his position when he was struck by the Durango despite his warning, have made the further ill-advised decision to leave the relative safety of the roadway without first applying and taking full advantage of the stopping power of his six working brakes on its clean, dry surface.   Once he turned right, off the roadway, and began to mount and cross the snow-covered curb and the ice-and snow-covered surfaces beyond it, the proverbial die had been cast, as the braking power of the bus had been compromised by the slippery surface below.

19. The Court concludes that Mr. Manish failed to use the high degree of care and skill required of a common carrier for the safety of his passengers by the unfortunate choices he made not to brake and slow the bus when it was still on the roadway and not to steer the bus after impact no further than the right edge of the roadway to avoid sliding on ice and snow and crashing into the trees.   This conduct, although surely triggered by the antecedent negligence of Ms. Stanley in failing to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other vehicles upon the highway and changing lanes without ascertaining that she could do so with safety, was itself both a separate cause in fact of the eventual collision between the bus and the tree, and a substantial factor in bringing that collision and the plaintiffs' resulting injuries and losses about.   As Mr. Manish's employer, Connecticut Transit bears full legal responsibility for his proven negligence in performing his assigned duties as its employee.

Apportionment of Responsibility

20. There remains, of course, the question of what proportionate responsibility each defendant should bear for whatever damages the plaintiffs prove they are entitled to recover as fair, just and reasonable compensation for injuries and losses they have been legally caused to suffer due to the negligence of Ms. Stanley and Mr. Manish.   To make this determination, the Court must decide the individual contribution of each negligent driver for which one of the two defendants is legally responsible to the combined negligence, totaling 100%, by which the two drivers legally caused the collision between the bus and the tree and the plaintiffs' resulting injuries and losses.

21. There is no question that the action that triggered this unfortunate series of events was the negligence of Ms. Stanley, the uninsured motorist, for which defendant Specialty Risk Services, Inc., is legally responsible.   Her negligent conduct created the original emergency situation to which Mr. Manish was forced to respond in a matter of two or three critical seconds.   Ms. Stanley's lapse of good judgment in failing to look carefully about her to see what was there to be seen in the lane of travel she intended to turn into—a large blue bus which she had just overtaken—is inexcusable negligence of the most basic sort.

22. Mr. Manish's negligence in responding to Ms. Stanley's antecedent negligence would surely have been more understandable, and perhaps even excusable, had he not been an experienced bus driver operating a 17–ton bus for paying passengers as a common carrier.   Held, as he was, however to a markedly higher standard of care for the safety of his passengers than that which applied to Ms. Stanley, his failure to brake and slow the bus when trouble first arose in the lane next to him, or when the Dodge Durango first started drifting towards him, or even after the Dodge Durango had struck the side of the bus, were inexcusable breaches of the high standard of care for common carriers, who should have known that a slow moving bus on clear dry pavement is far easier to stop and control in the face of trouble than one moving at the speed limit, in close proximity to another moving vehicle.   In addition, his final decision to drive the bus completely off the roadway without first applying his brakes instead of steering it along the right edge of the roadway to avoid losing traction and control on the snowy and icy surfaces to his right, were significant breaches of that high standard of care.

23. On the basis of these findings, the Court concludes that each defendant's proportionate contribution to the sum of all negligence by which the parties legally caused the collision and the plaintiff's resulting injuries and losses was 50%.

DAMAGES

Mr. Best

1. Plaintiff Elbert Best, a 44–year–old African–American male with a statistical life expectancy of 27.8 years, suffered serious physical injuries in the collision between the bus and the tree, some of which are permanent in nature.   A cook now living and working in New Orleans, Louisiana, he was living in Hartford on the date of the collision and working as a delivery man and events worker for a catering company.   Apart from his well managed diabetes, his health at the time was good.

2. On the date of the collision, Mr. Best was riding as a paying passenger aboard Mr. Manish's Connecticut Transit bus en route to visit his brother in New Britain.   He was seated on the far right side of the back row of the bus when he heard the bus's horn sound, heard an impact on the left side of the bus, and felt the bus swerve to the right.   Looking up when the man sitting on the other side of the back row, plaintiff Edward Semedo, yelled, “Brace y'all,” he braced himself against the seats immediately in front of him and watched out the front window of the bus as it slid forward, without slowing or changing direction, into a tree.   When the bus hit the tree, he was jolted out of his seat and over the seats in front of him onto the floor in the rear well of the bus.   Mr. Best felt shocked, nervous and full of anxiety as he lay on the floor.   A little girl ahead of him was crying, and other passengers were upset.   Mr. Best stayed on the floor until EMTs arrived, feeling like he had been punched in the back, the right shoulder and the left leg.   He was taken to Hartford Hospital by ambulance.   When he was finally seen in the emergency room about 3–4 hours later, he reported injuries to his neck, his shoulder and his left knee.

3. Three weeks after he was discharged from the hospital, Mr. Best sought treatment from Dr. Michael Roback, an orthopedic doctor, on a referral by his girlfriend.   He had delayed scheduling his initial visit with the doctor because he had difficulty taking time off from work without being paid, which threatened his ability to pay his weekly rent for transitional housing.

4. Dr. Roback tested Mr. Best's range of motion, and ordered diagnostic tests for him, including x-rays.   At the end of an hour-long visit, the doctor prescribed medications for Mr. Best and referred him for physical therapy.   Mr. Best followed Dr. Roback's recommendation by participating in physical therapy for several months.

5. At some time thereafter, as his treatment continued, its main focus became his left knee, for which he was eventually sent for an MRI. Based on the results of the MRI, he was referred for possible knee surgery by Dr. Wasserlauf, a sports surgeon at St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center.   Dr. Wasserlauf performed surgery on Mr. Best's left knee at St. Francis in November 2007, following which he was on crutches for about two weeks.   Following surgery, he still had problems with his back and shoulder and left knee.   He still suffers unbearable pain in his leg when climbing the stairs, he suffers from lower back pain when lifting objects and even bending over to brush his teeth, and he experiences recurring stiffness in his neck.   Each and every one of these continuing problems is causally related to the collision here at issue, for none of them predated that event.   Dr. Roback prepared a written report concerning Mr. Best's post-treatment condition, opining that he has the following permanent partial disabilities:  8% to the lower back;  11% to the left knee and 5% to the upper back.

6. Mr. Best has incurred a total of $17,635.23 in medical expenses to treat his proven injuries.   He limits his claim for economic damages to those expenses, as he does not expect to incur any further medical expenses in the future in connection with these permanent injuries.   The Court finds that the medical expenses so incurred were all reasonable and necessary to treat the injuries legally caused to Mr. Best by Ms. Stanley's and Mr. Manish's combined negligence and the resulting collision between the bus and the tree.

7. Mr. Best has suffered and will continue to suffer physical pain as a result of his proven injuries, with resulting limitations on his ability to enjoy and experience the everyday activities of life without limitation of movement and pain.   For such pain, limitations and permanent injury, the Court awards him non-economic damages of $5,000 for his pain and suffering in the collision and the immediate post-collision period, when he was actively receiving treatment for his injuries, plus $47,500, calculated at the rate of $1,500.00 per year, for all the pain, suffering and permanent disabilities he has endured from the end of his treatment to the present and is reasonably likely to endure in the future by reason of the collision, until the projected end of his statistical life expectancy in 2039.

8. The Court thus finds that fair, just and reasonable damages for all of Mr. Best's injuries and losses caused by the defendants' proven negligence in this case are $70,135.23.

Mr. Semedo

9 Plaintiff Edward Semedo, a 56–year–old African–American male with a statistical life expectancy of 21 years, also suffered serious physical injuries in the collision between the bus and the tree, some of which are permanent in nature.   An inmate now serving a sentence at the Brooklyn Correctional Institution in Brooklyn, Connecticut, he was living in New Britain on the date of the collision and working as a cook at Applebee's Restaurant in Plainville.

10. On the date of the collision, Mr. Semedo was a paying passenger on Mr. Manish's Connecticut Transit bus, riding home to New Britain to prepare to go to work in Plainville;  when he heard a “thunk” at the front of the bus and “scraping going up.”   This caused him, he recalls, to look out the front window of the bus, where he saw that the bus heading directly towards a tree.   Calling for everyone around him to brace themselves for a collision, he too tried to brace himself against the seat in front of him, only to be catapulted over it to the floor when the bus struck the tree.   He felt neck pain, back pain and shoulder pain as he lay on the floor of the bus, and was temporarily unable to stand up.   When an ambulance arrived, he was transported to Hartford Hospital.   Fearful of hospitals due to the deaths of two close relatives in them, he left the hospital before receiving any treatment, found another bus, and headed home.

11. Over the next two weeks, Mr. Semedo experienced massive headaches and pain in his neck and back which made it hard for him to sleep.   Accordingly, two weeks later, at the recommendation of a friend, he made an appointment with Dr. Anthony Infantino to treat him for tingling in his shoulder and limitations in the range of motion in his neck.   Dr. Infantino recommended that he undergo physical therapy, which he did for several months.   Dr. Infantino eventually assigned him two 5% permanent partial disabilities—one for his cervical spine and the other for his lumbar spine—as a result of the injuries he sustained when the bus collided with the tree.   He also opined that Mr. Semedo will probably require from 6–8 treatments per year for acute flare ups of the condition resulting from his injuries.

12. Mr. Semedo has incurred a total of $4,598.34 in expenses to treat his injuries resulting from this collision, including expenses for ambulance and hospital services, doctor's visits and physical therapy, all of which were reasonable and necessary to treat the injuries he suffered in the collision.

13. Mr. Semedo's future medical expenses, if he incurs them as anticipated by Dr. Infantino, would cost him an estimated $130 per visit, for a total of $780 to $1,040 per year.   He testified that he intends to seek such treatment when he is released from prison within the next two or three weeks.   Mr. Semedo explained in his testimony that the reason he has not pursued additional treatment in the last four years is that he has been incarcerated for most of that time, and that treatment for relatively minor medical problems has an extremely low priority in our state prisons compared to deadly illnesses like AIDS and cancer.

14. The Court finds it unlikely that Mr. Semedo will pursue further treatment for his injuries more than three or four times each year after he is released.   The sum of $10,000, if invested in an account paying interest at the rate of 4% per year will be sufficient to generate the annual income needed to defray any such reasonable and necessary medical expenses over the course of Mr. Semedo's lifetime.

15. Mr. Semedo still suffers pain in his lower back and neck, for which he has been assigned separate 5% permanent partial disabilities by Dr. Infantino.   These disabilities will continue to cause him pain for the rest of his life, although the only activities he now claims he can no longer engage in are physical sports such as basketball, handball and football.   For his pain, suffering and disabilities resulting from the collision, the Court awards him $2,000 for the pain and suffering he endured in the collision itself and in the initial post-collision treatment period plus $12,500.00, calculated at the rate of $500.00 per year, for all pain, suffering and disability he has endured since the end of treatment and is reasonably likely to endure for the rest of his life, until the projected end of his statistical life expectancy in 2031.

16. In accordance with the foregoing findings, the Court finds that fair, just and reasonable damages for Mr. Semedo's injuries and losses, including $4,598.34 for past medical expenses, $10,000 for future medical expenses, and $14,500 for non-economic damages, total $29,098.34.

Ms. Miller

16. Finally, plaintiff Norean Miller, a 57–year–old African–American female with a statistical life expectancy of 26.3 years, suffered serious physical injuries in the collision here at issue, some of which are permanent in nature.   A certified nursing assistant (“CNA”) who at all times relevant to this case has lived in Windsor, Connecticut, Ms. Miller was going to her job at the Walnut Hill Convalescent Home in New Britain at the time of the collision, where she was personally responsible for caring for a caseload of 10–14 patients each day.

17. Ms. Miller was seated on the right side of the bus at the time of the collision, about halfway back on its right side, near the exit door.   Although she was unaware of any contact between the bus and Ms. Stanley's Dodge Durango when it occurred, she recalls looking up and seeing that the bus was going to crash into a tree in time to brace herself for the impact.   Although the collision did not knock her to the floor, it twisted her body in such a way as to injure her knee, causing her great pain which radiated up into her right thigh.

18. After she was discharged from the hospital, Ms. Miller experienced headaches for a few days and pain in her lower back and left ankle.   She did not return to work for three more days.

19. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Miller saw another doctor from the Hartford Orthopedic Group, to whom she complained of pain in her right knee, her left ankle and her lower back.   She reported to the doctor that she was experiencing pain when she lifted weights, which she was regularly called upon to do in her work as a CNA. In addition, she had pain in her ankle and lower back when she was walking.   She was referred by the Hartford Orthopedic Group to Shaw's Chiropractic, which gave her an out-of-work order after she reported great pain in her lower back, her knee and her left ankle.   During their initial examination of her, Shaw's detected muscle spasms in her back.   Thereafter, on doctors orders, she stayed out of work for three weeks.   The treatment by Shaw's while she was out of work made her feel better in the short run, but did not make her pain go away.   Upon checking with the Hartford Orthopedic Group, they recommended that she undergo physical therapy, and she complied.   This treatment also helped her temporarily, but her problems returned whenever she went back to work.   The persistent recurrence of pain when she worked ultimately caused her to quit the job she loved to work elsewhere, where there would be less lifting and less strain on her body.   She soon found work for a single elderly patient whom she now assists with all of the basic tasks of daily living except cooking her meals.   As an employee of Companions and Homemakers, she works and lives in the home of her elderly patient all but three days each month.

20. Although Ms. Miller's knee has gotten much better over time, her back and ankle have not improved since the end of her physical therapy.   The last doctor she treated with told her that her back would never get any better in the future than it was then.   He assigned her a 5% permanent partial disability for her back as a result of the injuries she suffered in the collision between the bus and the tree.

21. As for her left ankle, Ms. Miller still has problems with it while walking, standing, and performing normal work as a CNA, as well as when engaging in normal activities around her home, like cooking, baking and gardening.   All of the latter activities require that she stand.

22. Ms. Miller seeks economic damages for lost wages of $2,840.00, for the period from March 1 through April 9, 2007, plus two additional days of lost wages for a total of $227.20, less earned time for sick days of $1,036,00.   Her net claim for lost wages due to the injuries suffered in the collision is $2,031.20, to which the Court finds she is entitled.

23. Ms. Miller's economic damages for all medical expenses incurred by her for treatment made reasonable and necessary to treat her injuries resulting from the collision total $6,754.49, to which the Court finds she is also entitled under the evidence.

24. As for non-economic damages, the Court awards Ms. Miller $5,000 for the pain and suffering she endured in the collision and in the initial post-collision treatment period, plus $31,000.00, calculated at the rate of $1,000.00 per year, for her 5% permanent partial disability of the lumbar spine, as evaluated by Hartford Orthopedic Group, and the recurring pain in her left ankle, which were legally caused by the collision and will probably continue for as long as she lives.   In light of these findings, Ms. Miller's total compensatory damages for all injuries and losses she was legally caused to suffer as a result of the negligence of the defendants' agents' negligence and the resulting collision between the bus and the tree is $43,785.69.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that each defendant must pay each plaintiff 50% of his or her total compensatory damages, subject to the right of defendant Specialty Risk Services, LLC to limit its liability for damages to the limits of Connecticut Transit's uninsured motorist insurance policy, less payments due to other claimants in connection with this collision.   In addition, because of the plaintiffs' almost certain inability to recover all of the damages hereby awarded to them from against Specialty Risk Services, LLC, it is anticipated that Connecticut Transit may be statutorily required to pay a prescribed portion of each plaintiff's duly awarded damages which cannot be collected from Specialty Risk Services, LLC. The Court will calculate each party's final damages award in light of its foregoing findings and the above-mentioned contractual and statutory limitations and obligations at a hearing for that purpose to be scheduled at the mutual convenience of counsel forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 23rd day of September 2011.

Michael R. Sheldon, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although the plaintiffs' uninsured motorist claims actually name H.N.S. Management Co., Inc. d/b/a Connecticut Transit Company as the party defendant, they seek damages from, and thus are being separately defended by, Specialty Risk Services, LLC, in its capacity as the uninsured motorist insurance carrier for Connecticut Transit.   The defendant is thus denominated by the name of its insurer, Specialty Risk Services, LLC, with respect to those particular claims..  FN1. Although the plaintiffs' uninsured motorist claims actually name H.N.S. Management Co., Inc. d/b/a Connecticut Transit Company as the party defendant, they seek damages from, and thus are being separately defended by, Specialty Risk Services, LLC, in its capacity as the uninsured motorist insurance carrier for Connecticut Transit.   The defendant is thus denominated by the name of its insurer, Specialty Risk Services, LLC, with respect to those particular claims.

FN2. Although certain other parties were originally sued in one or more of these cases, no claims against such parties remain to be adjudicated at this time..  FN2. Although certain other parties were originally sued in one or more of these cases, no claims against such parties remain to be adjudicated at this time.

FN3. The motion in limine sought to exclude evidence of a report authored by risk management personnel for Connecticut Transit which concluded that the collision here at issue could and should have been avoided had the bus driver, Mr. Manish, taken steps to avoid it.   The Court denied the motion on the ground that admissions by parties are properly admitted even when the persons who made them are not competent to testify to the matters admitted therein..  FN3. The motion in limine sought to exclude evidence of a report authored by risk management personnel for Connecticut Transit which concluded that the collision here at issue could and should have been avoided had the bus driver, Mr. Manish, taken steps to avoid it.   The Court denied the motion on the ground that admissions by parties are properly admitted even when the persons who made them are not competent to testify to the matters admitted therein.

FN4. When interviewed by investigating police officers after the collision, Ms. Stanley admitted that she did not see the bus prior to attempting a lane change.   See Police Report, p. 2 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit # 2)..  FN4. When interviewed by investigating police officers after the collision, Ms. Stanley admitted that she did not see the bus prior to attempting a lane change.   See Police Report, p. 2 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit # 2).

FN5. These measurements were measured and recorded in the official incident report prepared and filed by investigating officers from the Hartford Police Department on March 1, 2007.  Id..  FN5. These measurements were measured and recorded in the official incident report prepared and filed by investigating officers from the Hartford Police Department on March 1, 2007.  Id.

FN6. The distance between the tree and the east extended curbline of Oliver Street was measured and recorded in the official incident report prepared and filed by investigating officers from the Hartford Police Department on March 1, 2007.  Id. that day.  Id. The distance between the tree and the right edge of the right westbound lane of New Britain Avenue has been determined by comparing that distance to the 9–foot width of the bus, using photographs of the bus standing by the tree after the collision which were introduced in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits # # 6e and 6f..  FN6. The distance between the tree and the east extended curbline of Oliver Street was measured and recorded in the official incident report prepared and filed by investigating officers from the Hartford Police Department on March 1, 2007.  Id. that day.  Id. The distance between the tree and the right edge of the right westbound lane of New Britain Avenue has been determined by comparing that distance to the 9–foot width of the bus, using photographs of the bus standing by the tree after the collision which were introduced in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits # # 6e and 6f.

FN7. If the left side of the bus, at its point of impact with the Dodge Durango, was 20 inches north of the yellow dashed centerline dividing the two westbound lanes of New Britain Avenue, its right side, which was then 9 feet further north, was 16 inches (or 1.33 feet) south of the curb running along the 12–foot–wide right westbound lane.   Further, if the final resting place of the right side of the bus upon striking the tree was 2 feet further north than the nearest point of the tree to the roadway, then the total distance the bus moved northward from the time it was struck by the Dodge Durango until it struck the tree was 13.33 (1.33 + 10 + 2) feet..  FN7. If the left side of the bus, at its point of impact with the Dodge Durango, was 20 inches north of the yellow dashed centerline dividing the two westbound lanes of New Britain Avenue, its right side, which was then 9 feet further north, was 16 inches (or 1.33 feet) south of the curb running along the 12–foot–wide right westbound lane.   Further, if the final resting place of the right side of the bus upon striking the tree was 2 feet further north than the nearest point of the tree to the roadway, then the total distance the bus moved northward from the time it was struck by the Dodge Durango until it struck the tree was 13.33 (1.33 + 10 + 2) feet.

FN8. The total distance the bus moved to the west from its point of impact with the Dodge Durango until it finally came to rest by the tree is 53.7 feet, computed by adding the distance from the point of impact to the east extended curbline of Oliver Street (46.7 feet) to the distance from that east extended curbline to the tree (7 feet), as those distances were measured by the investigating officer on the date of the collision and recorded in his police report..  FN8. The total distance the bus moved to the west from its point of impact with the Dodge Durango until it finally came to rest by the tree is 53.7 feet, computed by adding the distance from the point of impact to the east extended curbline of Oliver Street (46.7 feet) to the distance from that east extended curbline to the tree (7 feet), as those distances were measured by the investigating officer on the date of the collision and recorded in his police report.

FN9. The total distance traveled by the bus from its point of impact with the Dodge Durango until it finally came to rest by the tree (z) can be calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of distances traveled to west (x) and to the north (y) to traverse that distance.   The calculated result for z, when x = 53.7 feet and y = 13.33 feet, is 55.3 feet..  FN9. The total distance traveled by the bus from its point of impact with the Dodge Durango until it finally came to rest by the tree (z) can be calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of distances traveled to west (x) and to the north (y) to traverse that distance.   The calculated result for z, when x = 53.7 feet and y = 13.33 feet, is 55.3 feet.

FN10. The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the fact that a vehicle traveling at the speed of 30 miles per hour is moving at the rate of 44 feet per second..  FN10. The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the fact that a vehicle traveling at the speed of 30 miles per hour is moving at the rate of 44 feet per second.

FN11. Ms. Stanley made this admission not only to the driver of the bus, Mr. Manish, who so testified, but to both the investigating police officer;  see Police Report (Plaintiff's Exhibit # 2) and to the investigator for Connecticut Transit who conducted an independent investigation at the scene..  FN11. Ms. Stanley made this admission not only to the driver of the bus, Mr. Manish, who so testified, but to both the investigating police officer;  see Police Report (Plaintiff's Exhibit # 2) and to the investigator for Connecticut Transit who conducted an independent investigation at the scene.

Sheldon, Michael R., J.