Kerry Fairchild et al. v. LLC (2011)

ovv:MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE # 107

The defendant, Riverview Catering, LLC, moves to strike counts two, three, five, six, eight, nine, eleven, and twelve, as well as the prayer for relief for punitive and exemplary damages of the complaint dated November 16, 2010, filed by the plaintiffs, Kerry Fairchild, William Fairchild, Patricia Fairchild, and George Platt, because they are legally insufficient.

Counts two, five, eight and eleven allege intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the defendant contends that the alleged actions do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, and that the allegations as set forth are conclusory statements of law.   Counts three, six, nine and twelve allege negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the defendant argues that the complaint fails to allege that the defendant's conduct resulted in an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress, and that the allegations are also conclusory statements of law.   As to the prayer for relief for punitive damages, the allegations do not meet the standard for such an award.

FACTS

The plaintiffs, Kerry Fairchild, William Fairchild, Patricia Fairchild and George Platt, filed a twelve-count complaint for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the defendant, Riverview Catering, LLC.¹ The complaint alleges that the plaintiff, Kerry Fairchild, and the defendant had a contract for rental services of the defendant's catering hall to hold the plaintiff's wedding reception, and that the defendant failed to abide by the contract.   The catering hall was not prepared at the scheduled time.   The defendant had to ask guests, who were drinking during the cocktail hour, to get up and move so the table and chairs could be moved to the main hall.   The bridal suite was not ready and the bridal suite's bathroom was not operational.   The martini bar was not set up in a timely manner, and there was only one bartender for 276 guests.   Fried calamari was served which was not one of the bride's choice, while another selected hors d'oeuvre, pepper crusted sirloin, was not served.   No plates or utensils were set out for the hors d'oeuvres, and the hors d'oeuvres were not replenished.   The defendant, after numerous requests, only provided used amenity baskets.   During the dinner service, water and dinner rolls were not provided to each of the tables.   One bottle of red wine and one bottle of white wine were not placed at each table, as agreed upon.   The portions of the main meal were small, causing guests to complain that they were hungry.   Coffee and tea was not served until well after dessert had been served.

On July 26, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts two, three, five, six, eight, nine, eleven and twelve.   The defendant argues that counts two, five, eight and eleven, which allege intentional infliction of emotional distress, should be struck on the grounds that the alleged actions do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, the alleged facts do not substantiate the claim that the defendant knew or should have known its conduct would cause emotional distress and the allegations are conclusory statements of law.   Counts three, six, nine and twelve, which allege negligent infliction of emotional distress, should be struck on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts to show that the defendant should have realized its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff's emotional distress, and the allegations are conclusory statements of law.   The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  Id. When deciding a motion to strike, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “Practice Book ․ § 10–39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

I

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant presents three arguments for striking the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.   First, the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficiently that the defendant's conduct rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to satisfy this type of action.   Second, the plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that substantiate the claim that the defendant knew or should have known its conduct would cause emotional distress.   Third, the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant's outrageous conduct caused the plaintiffs to sustain severe emotional distress is a conclusory statement of law.

The plaintiffs argue the conduct was outrageous and extreme because it involved a wedding ceremony gone horribly wrong.   The plaintiffs reason that the conduct of not performing up to the required and contracted for services and amenities is legally sufficient to support this cause of action.   Moreover, the defendants knew or should have known that their lack of performance in their obligations to the plaintiffs at this wedding reception would cause the plaintiffs emotional distress.

“In order to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove:  (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;  (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;  and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 491–92, 998 A.2d 1221 (2010).  “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.   Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’  “(Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted) Cassotto v. Aeschliman, 130 Conn.App. 230, 234–35, 22 A.3d 697 (2011).   “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function.   In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ․ set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).

In the present case, the facts support an allegation of unprofessional and poor service, but not extreme and outrageous conduct.   A similar situation was addressed in DiBiaso–Senese v. Mystic Motor Inn, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 539768 (June 5, 1998).   In Mystic Motor Inn, the defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in the course of her wedding and reception on the defendant's premises.   Among the acts alleged by the plaintiff as constituting the extreme and outrageous conduct were:  “(1) [L]ack of direction afforded to wedding guests as to the site of the wedding ceremony and the receiving line following the ceremony;  (2) inadequate seating for guests;  (3) poor quality of food and its service;  (4) loss of electrical power and failure to allow use of an available generator;  (5) rudeness and lack of professionalism demonstrated by defendant's staff.”  Id. The court granted the motion to strike because the defendant's alleged actions did “not amount to the extreme and outrageous conduct that must be pleaded.”   Moreover, the allegations did “not support the plaintiff's legal conclusion that the defendant's acts constituted extreme and outrageous conduct.”  Id.

Like in Mystic Motor Inn, the allegations in this case do not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.   Poor service and inattention to details, even for a wedding reception, does not rise to the level of going beyond all possible bounds of decency.   The plaintiffs' allegations also fall short because they only allege that “[a]s a result of the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct, the plaintiffs] sustained severe emotional distress, due to the fact that one of the most important days of [their lives were] ruined because of the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct.”   This allegation is a conclusion of law that cannot withstand a motion to strike because it is not supported by any facts regarding the severe emotional distress sustained by the plaintiffs.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike counts two, five, eight and eleven is granted.

II

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant argues that counts three, six, nine and twelve are legally insufficient because the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to support their allegation that the defendant knew or should have known its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that any distress caused by its conduct might result in illness or bodily harm.   Additionally, the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff's emotional distress is a conclusory statement of law.

The plaintiffs contend that a wedding is one of the most important days in a person's life.   Therefore, the alleged conduct of the defendant would allow the average person to expect that the conduct would involve an unreasonable risk of causing such emotional distress and that distress would result in illness or bodily harm.   The actions of the defendant were such that it should have realized that its conduct, which subsequently led to emotional distress, might result in illness or bodily harm.

To establish a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs must allege and prove that:  “(1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress;  (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable;  (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm;  and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress.”  Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).   The Supreme Court has “continually ․ held that in order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 446.

A successful claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress “essentially requires that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants.   If such a fear were reasonable in light of the defendant['s] conduct, the defendant ․ should have realized that [its] conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and [it], therefore, properly would be held liable.   Conversely, if the fear were unreasonable in light of the defendant['s] conduct, the defendant ․ would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 447.

In the present case, the fact that the contract was for a wedding reception should be considered because it speaks to the unreasonableness of the risk and the foreseeability of the plaintiffs' distress.  “A contract for wedding services creates a rigorous expectation for contractual performance.”   Murphy v. Lord Thompson Manor, Inc., 105 Conn.App. 546, 554, 938 A.2d 1269 (2008), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 914, 945 A.2d 976.   As such, the plaintiff-bride has “every reason to believe that the [defendant] would perform its role according to the binding contract concerning arrangements for this important life event.”  Id. Thus, certain breaches of these contracts can lead to a finding of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

In Murphy, the plaintiff sued for, among other things, breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff's action was based on a contract with the defendant to have her multiday wedding celebration on the defendant's manor.  “In the two years following the signing of the contract, a Shakespearean drama of confusion and lost opportunities ensued that would result in the [defendant] contracting with another wedding party for the [same] date and the plaintiff holding her wedding at another location.”   Id., 548.   This outcome occurred after a series of miscommunications, including unreturned phone calls, an avoidance of the plaintiff's phone call by the defendant and messages sent by the defendant to the plaintiff's old e-mail address.   The defendant never once informed the plaintiff that it believed that the plaintiff was abandoning her wedding plans.   The defendant formed this opinion based upon its mistaken belief that the plaintiff had not signed the contract or to paid the deposit.

The Appellate Court focused on the conduct of the defendant in giving no notice to the plaintiff about her wedding plans.   Additionally, “[a]lthough the [defendant]'s “breach occurred approximately seven months before [the plaintiff's] wedding was to take place, it left her with limited options for alternative venues and the significant task of coordinating the details in light of a different venue and a different wedding day schedule, as well as informing 100 guests of the changes ․ In addition, the [defendant] informed [the plaintiff] that it had given her date to another couple on February 16, 2005, when in fact it did not have a contract with the second party until March 6, 2005.”  Id. Finding that “the cumulative effect of the conduct described ․ undoubtedly would risk causing any bride emotional distress,” the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the plaintiff as to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Id., 555–56.

The present case is distinguishable from Murphy.   Here, the allegations indicate that the defendant failed to perform as contracted during the actual reception.   Although there were obvious issues in the service given to the plaintiffs, the conduct of the defendant in the present case did not create the unreasonable risk, or foreseeability, of distress that was present in Murphy.   See, DiBiaso–Senese v. Mystic Motor Inn, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 539768, (court granted motion to strike a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on similar factual allegations as outlined above.)

Even construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts from which it could be found that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct, i.e., serving the wrong appetizer, having small meal portions, etc., involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that any distress caused by its conduct might result in illness or bodily harm.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs' allegation that “[b]y the defendant's actions they should have realized that their conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress and that such distress might result in illness or bodily injury,” is a conclusory statement of law.   No other allegations support this legal conclusion.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action in negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the defendant's motion to strike counts three, six, nine and twelve of the plaintiffs' complaint is therefore granted.

III

Prayer for Relief

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs have alleged no facts to demonstrate the reckless indifference or intentional wanton violation of rights necessary for the award of punitive damages.   The plaintiffs counter that they have met the standard required for punitive damages.

To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, the plaintiffs must show that “the [defendant's] behavior evidenced a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., 296 Conn. 315, 346, 994 A.2d 153 (2010).   The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate.   Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 420, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008).

A review of the complaint reveals that the plaintiffs have not alleged the reckless, intentional or wanton misconduct that is required to warrant the award of punitive damages.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike paragraph two of the prayer for relief is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12, as well as the prayer for relief seeking punitive and exemplary damages is granted.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court previously dismissed counts four, seven, and ten of the complaint.  (Swienton, J., April 18, 2011.).  FN1. The court previously dismissed counts four, seven, and ten of the complaint.  (Swienton, J., April 18, 2011.)

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.