IN RE: Desiree S. (dob 1/3/10) 1 (2011)

Memorandum of Decision on Petition to Terminate Parental Rights

On November 24, 2010, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) brought this petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Juanita S. and Dexter H. to their minor child, Desiree, who was born on January 3, 2010.   Upon filing of the petition, the court caused a summons to be issued to the respondent parents, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(a),² requiring them to appear on November 23, at 11:30 a.m., at which time the respondent mother appeared.   The respondent father applied for counsel in the clerk's office that day, but never appeared for the court proceeding;  the court, Dyer, J., found him eligible for counsel, which was appointed.   The matter was continued until January 6, 2011, for Mr. H.'s plea, at which time the court, Bentivenga, J., entered a default against him for failure to appear.   On April 26, 2011, that same court reentered a default against the respondent father, after noting that a proper military affidavit had been filed.   That same day the respondent mother submitted her written consent to termination of her parental rights, which the court accepted after a canvas.³

The case was scheduled for a default trial on July 14, 2011, before this judge.   DCF presented the testimony of social worker Stephanie Carvalho and introduced the TPR social study and addendum thereto into evidence.   The court also stated its intention to take judicial notice of all orders in the file, memoranda of court proceedings, specific steps ordered, the order of temporary custody (OTC), affidavits submitted in support of the OTC, and affidavits regarding diligent searches for the parties.   In summation counsel for DCF and the minor child urged that the petition be granted.

The court finds that the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters has jurisdiction over the pending matter.   No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of this child.   The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence, including the social study and other exhibits, and the testimony presented, according to the standards required by law.   The matter is now ready for decision, and the facts found herein were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I

ADJUDICATORY DECISION

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

A

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

As to the respondent mother, the TPR petition originally alleged abandonment ⁴ and failure to rehabilitate ⁵ as a ground for terminating her parental rights, but after the court accepted her written consent, the court granted the department's oral motion to add a count of consent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(i) ⁶ and the department is no longer pursuing those earlier grounds.   As to the respondent father, the grounds for termination pleaded by the petitioner are abandonment, failure to rehabilitate, and no ongoing parent-child relationship.⁷

To prevail in a non-consensual termination of parental rights case, DCF must prove at least one of these statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).   Only one ground need be established, however, for the granting of a TPR petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984).

Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to the adjudicatory date, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment by the respondent father.   With regard to the allegations of the respondent father's failure to achieve rehabilitation and no ongoing-parent child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of evidence in July 2011 on the issues of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that he may assume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time and whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship.

B

EFFECT OF FATHER'S DEFAULT

Since the respondent father has been defaulted for not appearing, the adjudicatory bases for terminating his parental rights are deemed and found to have been proven by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence.   Practice Book § 32a–2(a) establishes that child protection proceedings, including these petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.⁸  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, the entries of a default establish admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and conclusively determine that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has further considered the petitioner's evidence that addresses the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged.

C

REASONABLE EFFORTS

Termination of parental rights under § 17a–112(j) on non-consensual grounds, as has been pleaded here for the respondent father, requires the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.9

With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination of the parental rights of the respondent father pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1), the court finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

(1) Reasonable efforts to locate

DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent father, Dexter H., and caused him to be served with the neglect and TPR petitions and summons at his usual place of abode.   The DCF social worker had contact with him at least once during the pendency of these two proceedings.   Although Mr. H. never formally appeared before the court in the neglect or TPR proceedings, he did come to the courthouse and apply for counsel on the day scheduled for his initial appearance and plea on the TPR petition.

(2) Reasonable efforts to reunify

The TPR petition alleges that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Desiree with her father.   After the court granted an OTC a few days after the child's birth because the mother was incarcerated, the department social worker spoke with Mr. H., who told the social worker that he and the mother had agreed that the child should be placed for adoption.   Upon being informed that Ms. S. had changed her mind and wanted to keep the child, Mr. H. stated that he did not wish to be involved in Desiree's life.   Thereafter he has shown no interest in the child, not visited the child, and not provided any financial support, gifts, or other mementos for the child.   The court thus finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. H. was unwilling to benefit from any reunification services.   DCF never offered him any services, but in light of his insistence that he did not want to serve as a father for this child, no efforts were reasonable efforts.

D

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS1. Mother's Consent— § 17a–112(i)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent mother has knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights.

2. Abandonment by Father— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner has asserted, as a statutory ground for terminating Mr. H.'s parental rights, that as of the adjudicatory date, he had abandoned Desiree.   “In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the Court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).

A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.   “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date Mr. H. had abandoned Desiree within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   He told the DCF social worker on January 14, 2010, that he wants Desiree to be adopted and that he does not wish to be involved in his child's life.   He has not had any contact with Desiree since her birth.   He has never provided any financial support for her or given her anything.   He has never shown any interest, concern, or responsibility for his child.   This ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Failure to Rehabilitate by Father— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)

General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) authorizes terminating parental rights to a child previously found to have been neglected or uncared for if the parent fails to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of that child.  “Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).

“[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384, 784 A.2d 457 (2001).  “Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate;  it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [the child] a safe permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the] biological [father] ․ continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [the child].”  In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).  In re Joseph W., 121 Conn.App. 605, 997 A.2d 512 (2010).  “What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis,” depending on the age and needs of the particular child.  In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Sup. 145, 154, 562 A.2d 19, aff'd, 19 Conn.App. 20, 560 A.2d 993 (1989).

In conducting the inquiry as to whether the commissioner has proven a respondent's failure to rehabilitate by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must consider:

the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child;  and

whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child.

“The statute requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 173, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).  “Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child, and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting.”  Id. The crux of the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate is whether a parent has sufficiently addressed the problems and deficiencies in parenting that led to state intervention in the family so that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child's life, or will be able to do so in the reasonably foreseeable future.   The court must thus determine whether the petitioner has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that Desiree has been found neglected, and that Mr. H., had failed, as of the relevant adjudicatory date and the close of evidence, to achieve the required degree of personal rehabilitation.

There is absolutely no evidence about whether Mr. H. has any deficiencies in his parenting skills or abilities, or about his strengths and weaknesses as a parental care giver.   There is absolutely no information about his “rehabilitative status” as it relates to the needs of this child.   Moreover, there is no evidence as to whether he has, or has ever had, the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.   The court does not find the petitioner to have sustained its burden of proof as to this ground.

4. No ongoing parent-child relationship between father and child— § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).

The evidence establishes clearly and convincingly that Mr. H. has no ongoing parent-child relationship with Desiree and that it would be detrimental to her best interest to allow more time for such a relationship to develop.   General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) establishes an adjudicatory ground for termination of parental rights where:

there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․

Under this section, the court must “undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.”  In Re John G., 53 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).  “In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.”   (Citations omitted.)  In re John G., supra at 23.   This standard contemplates a relationship that has some positive attributes.  In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).

“To satisfy the second prong [of the analysis], the trial court [is] required to determine whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship ․ The ‘best interest’ standard, therefore, does not become relevant until after it has been determined that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists.”   (Citation omitted.)  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 22, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in the best interest of a child to permit further time for a relationship with his parent to develop include “(1) the length of stay with the foster parents, (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent and (4) the nature of the child's relationship to his or her natural parent.”  (Id.)

Mr. H. stated his intention to DCF not to be a part of Desiree's life early in the child protection proceedings and his actions since then have been consistent with that stated intent.   He has not seen the child since her birth.   He has shown no interest in her.   They have never had any relationship and his conduct shows that there never will be one.   Desiree is still an infant, and in some circumstances it might be in the best interest of a child her age to allow a parent with an undeveloped relationship more time to develop a parent-child bond.   But our courts have also long recognized the “well-known deleterious effects of prolonged temporary placement on the child.”  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982).   There is absolutely no reason here to believe that Mr. H. will ever change his mind about wanting to become part of Desiree's life, and it would thus be detrimental to her best interest to allow any more time for development of a parent-child relationship between the respondent father and this young child.   This ground for termination of his parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

II

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including June 15, 2011, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was concluded.

A

REQUIRED STATUTORY FINDINGS

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).¹⁰  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’   “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the department's petition to terminate Mr. H.'s parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining whether it is the best interest of Desiree to terminate the parental rights of the respondent father.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1)

As discussed above, DCF offered no services to Mr. H. because he refused to become a part of Desiree's life.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2)

As discussed above, the court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Desiree with her father pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order— § 17a–112(k)(3)

At the time of the OTC and neglect adjudications, the court ordered the customary specific steps for him to obtain custody of Desiree and also directed him to participate in parenting counseling to obtain the skills needed to provide safe and nurturing parenting.   By his conduct he has shown that he was not willing to do anything or participate in any services for the purpose of gaining custody.   Although ordered by the specific steps to do so, he did not keep DCF apprised of his whereabouts or household composition, visit Desiree, make himself available for a referral to parenting programs, submit to random drug testing, participate in substance abuse evaluation, sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers, or provide DCF with information about his grandparents or other relatives who might be possible caretakers.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to her parents, any guardian of her person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4)

Desiree has no relationship or bond with her father.   She is, to the contrary, closely bonded with the foster family that has cared for her since a week after her birth.   They are the ones she looks to for comfort and turns to if she encounters a stranger.   Her foster parents have, with the department's permission, taken her on trips out of Connecticut to California and Sesame Park. She is bonded not just to the foster parents but their extended family.

5. The age of the child— § 17a–112(k)(5)

Born on January 3, 2010, Desiree is 19 months old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return her to her home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6)

The respondent father made no effort to adjust his conduct or circumstances to make it in the best interest of Desiree to be united with him.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7)

Neither parent nor anyone else interfered with or prevented reunification of the other parent with this child.   Economic circumstances of either parent have not prevented reunification or a meaningful relationship with their child.

B

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD— § 17a–112(j)(2)

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.   In determining whether terminating the respondent parents' parental rights would be in Desiree's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including her interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [her] environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  her age and needs, the length and nature of her stay in foster care;  the lack of contact with or relationship with her birth parents;  the potential benefit or detriment of her retaining a connection with her biological mother and father;  her genetic bond to each birth parent;  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced Desiree's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Desiree is a 19–month–old child who has lived with one foster family for virtually her entire life.   She has thrived in their care, and they want to adopt her.   Her birth mother has agreed to termination of her parental rights, but Ms. S. and the foster family have entered into a post-adoption agreement, whose terms were not provided to the court, that will allow for some contact between Desiree and her birth mother.   Ms. S. has mental health issues, will be incarcerated for many years to come, and is not in a position to meet Desiree's needs now, in the immediate future, or for long afterward.   Her birth father agreed to adoption even before Desiree's birth and although he never formally submitted a consent so as to permit termination of his parental rights on such a ground, his words and deeds show that he will never assume a role as Desiree's parental caretaker.   Under these circumstances, upon consideration of all the evidence offered and the legal standards for terminating parental rights, it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Desiree's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Ms. S. and Mr. H. and permit her to gain permanence with a family willing and able to assume the role of being her parents.

III

ORDERS OF TERMINATION

The court having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights and having determined, upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of each respondent parent, it is therefore HEREBY ORDERED:

The parental rights of Juanita S. and Dexter H. to Desiree S. are terminated.

Pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m), the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for Desiree so that she may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parents.

On the date of trial, this court approved a permanency plan of TPR and adoption.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g), the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for Desiree, the permanency plan, and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before August 31, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. A written status report on implementation of the plan will be due by November 11, 2011.   A motion for review of permanency plan must be filed on or before April 10, 2012, and a hearing on such plan shall be held on May 22, 2012 at noon.

Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as an adoption of the child is finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when any adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of this child is ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing of the date when said adoption is finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128, ․”.  FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128, ․”

FN3. This court has taken judicial notice of the audio record of the proceedings that day and reviewed the recording of the court's default of the respondent father and canvas of the respondent mother.   The court, Bentivenga, J., was apprised of negotiations between Ms. S. and the foster parent to permit her to have post-termination contact with Desiree, but Ms. S. was advised that such agreement was not part of the TPR proceeding and could only be enforced, if a breach was claimed, by proceedings brought in civil court.   The court accepted the consent after conducting a thorough canvas of Ms. S. and finding by clear and convincing evidence that she had knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights, with full understanding of the consequences of doing so and after having been adequately and effectively advised by her attorney, and that her attorney had reviewed the consent with her and had been present for the court's canvas of the respondent.   See FTR, 4/26/11, at 3:51:30 p.m. 4:08.47 p.m. (FTR [For the Record] is the recording facility of the court monitor that digitally records proceedings before the court and notes the time of each oral utterance by hour, minute and second and that can be replayed by the court in chambers at any time.).  FN3. This court has taken judicial notice of the audio record of the proceedings that day and reviewed the recording of the court's default of the respondent father and canvas of the respondent mother.   The court, Bentivenga, J., was apprised of negotiations between Ms. S. and the foster parent to permit her to have post-termination contact with Desiree, but Ms. S. was advised that such agreement was not part of the TPR proceeding and could only be enforced, if a breach was claimed, by proceedings brought in civil court.   The court accepted the consent after conducting a thorough canvas of Ms. S. and finding by clear and convincing evidence that she had knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights, with full understanding of the consequences of doing so and after having been adequately and effectively advised by her attorney, and that her attorney had reviewed the consent with her and had been present for the court's canvas of the respondent.   See FTR, 4/26/11, at 3:51:30 p.m. 4:08.47 p.m. (FTR [For the Record] is the recording facility of the court monitor that digitally records proceedings before the court and notes the time of each oral utterance by hour, minute and second and that can be replayed by the court in chambers at any time.)

FN4. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) provides as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  ․”.  FN4. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) provides as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  ․”

FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) provides that “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence. that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․”.  FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j)(3)(B) provides that “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence. that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․”

FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”.  FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”

FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides that “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․”.  FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides that “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․”

FN8. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN8. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”.  FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”

FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”.  FN10. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.