Frederick Payne v. State of Connecticut (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant moves to dismiss paragraphs 3d and 4d of count one in the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these paragraphs because the plaintiff's notice of his claim did not contain such allegations of racial discrimination or emotional pain and suffering.   The plaintiff argues in his memorandum in opposition to the motion that the defendant should have filed a request to revise pursuant to Practice Book § 10–35, as the defendant seeks to delete allegations from the complaint.   The defendant counters in its reply memorandum of law that because it is arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matters not authorized by the claims commissioner, the instant motion to dismiss is proper.

According to Practice Book § 10–31(a)(1), a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  “[A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived ․ [or jurisdiction] conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly ․ [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction ․ once raised, either by a party or by the court itself ․ must be answered before the court may decide the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Batte–Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 283, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

“When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ․ The claims commissioner, if he deems it just and equitable, may sanction suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable ․ This legislation expressly bars suit upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107–08, 856 A.2d 335 (2004).

In the present case, the plaintiff brought a one-count complaint alleging the defendant's negligence.   In paragraph three, he alleged that the state was careless and negligent in one or more of the following ways:  (a) the defendant failed to properly train and/or supervise its police officers;  (b) the defendant failed to prevent its employees from committing an assault against members of the public, including the plaintiff;  (c) the defendant, through its employees, forced the plaintiff to suffer injuries without just cause;  (d) the defendant's employees failed to treat the plaintiff fairly and equitably and in the same way they would have treated a Caucasian person;  (e) the defendant otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care in dealing with the plaintiff through its employees;  (f) the defendants did not take independent action to verify that the target of their investigation resided at 22 Shelter Street, Second Floor, New Haven, CT;  (g) the defendants failed to check with postal authorities to verify the residents of 22 Shelter Street, New Haven, CT;  (h) the defendants failed to check with the utility company to determine who received utility bills at 22 Shelter Street, New Haven, CT;  and (i) the defendants failed to conduct surveillance of 22 Shelter Street to determine who entered and exited the door marked # 22.   As a result, the plaintiff further alleges in paragraph four that he suffered emotional pain and suffering, among other injuries.

After reviewing the claims commissioner's memorandum of decision on May 21, 2009, the plaintiff's allegations contained in paragraphs 3d and 4d of the complaint were not brought before the claims commissioner.   In his memorandum of decision, there was no mention of any evidence that the plaintiff submitted to support his allegation of having been treated differently than a Caucasian person would have been treated or having suffered emotional injuries.   As a result such allegations are beyond the scope of the claims commissioner's May 21, 2009 memorandum of decision, which permitted the plaintiff to bring suit against the state.   Consequently, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss paragraphs 3d and 4d because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over allegations contained in these paragraphs.

Woods, J.

Woods, Glenn A., J.