Valerie Clark v. University of Bridgeport (2011)

Caption Date:

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Preliminary Statement

This action arises out of the plaintiff's termination from employment with the defendant.   In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's termination of her employment was a breach of her employment contract.   The defendant asserts that the plaintiff was an “at will” employee and seeks summary judgment as to count two.   For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Standard of Review

A party seeking summary judgment has the very heavy burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material facts which, under applicable principles of law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.  PB § 17–44;  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205 (2000).   Conversely, the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Id. This evidentiary foundation must be demonstrated with counter-affidavits and concrete evidence.  Pion v. Southern New England Telephone, 44 Conn.App. 657, 663 (1997).   A party's conclusory statements may not be sufficient to establish the existence of a disputed material fact, even if in affidavit form.  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583 (1996).

Undisputed Facts

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, the University of Bridgeport as the Head Volleyball coach and Head Softball coach.   In July 2008, she was offered a renewal of her appointment to those positions in a letter dated July 3, 2008.   The appointment was accepted and the letter was signed by the President of the University, the Director of Athletics and the Plaintiff.

On April 23, 2009, the plaintiff was terminated by the University.

Discussion

The dispositive issue for this motion is whether, as claimed by the defendant, the July 3, 2008 letter unambiguously provides that the plaintiff was an “at will” employee.   The plaintiff claims that the letter provides for employment for a definite term, thereby creating a contract under which she could only be fired for good cause.   Alternatively, the plaintiff claims that the letter is ambiguous on the issue and as such, a question of fact as to the parties' intentions remains for the trier.

A contract of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, is terminable at will.  Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 158–59 (2000).  “In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary.   Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697–98 (2002).   Unless the employment contract specifically obligates both the employer and the employee for a definite term of employment, the employment is considered to be indefinite and terminable at the will of either party.   24 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed.2002) § 66:1, p. 382.   Conversely, an employee under a contract for a determined term can be terminated only upon a showing of just cause for dismissal.  Slifkin v. Condec Corp., 13 Conn.App. 538, 549 (1988).

Employment agreements are interpreted as any contract.  Slifkin v. Condec Corp., 13 Conn.App. at 544.   The principles of contract interpretation are well-settled.   When the language of an agreement is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties will be determined from the ordinary meaning of the language used.  Tallmadge Brothers, Inc. v. Iriquois Gas Transmissions Systems, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 498 (2000).   Where the agreement is ambiguous, the intent of the parties is gleaned from the circumstances surrounding its making.  Id. at 495.

A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ․ [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ․ the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract ․ Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.   A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ․ Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.

Id. at 498, quoting, Pesino v. Atlantic Bank of New York, 244 Conn. 85, 91–92 (1998).  (Citations omitted.)

The court examines the July 3, 2008 letter agreement within these parameters.   The court finds internal inconsistencies and therefore ambiguity as to whether the contract was for “at will” employment or a contract for a definite term.   Specifically, the letter provides that the plaintiff was offered a renewed appointment “Commencing:  July 1, 2008” and “Terminating:  June 30, 2013.”   The letter then provides details as to the job description, benefits, and punitive measures available in the event the plaintiff is found to violate NCAA regulations to include “termination of employment for significant or repetitive violations.”   The letter also includes the University's expectations and identifies “important components of the University's evaluation of your job performance.”   It also provides for disciplinary action, to include “suspension without pay or termination” in the event the plaintiff violates rules, regulations and policies of the University.   The specific dates referenced as the commencement and termination of the appointment as well as the proviso for circumstances which would be grounds for termination suggest an intention to create a contract for a definite term and under which good cause for termination must be established.   See, Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, Dkt. No. HHD CV 09–5026050–S (Oct. 29, 2010, Peck, J.) (Term of 36 months rendered employment agreement contract for a definite term such that employee was not “at will”).

However, thereafter the letter provides:

University policy requires me to inform you that this position is “at-will,” which means that the University can discharge you or you can resign at any time, in which event you will be paid only through the termination date of your employment plus such severance pay to which you may be entitled as provided in the Handbook.

This provision clearly suggests an intent for the plaintiff be an “at will” employee.   Thus a genuine issue of material fact exists.   See, Ruiz v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., Dkt. No. CV 03–040 42 13 S, judicial district of Fairfield, (Hiller J., July 19, 2005) (39 Conn. L. Rptr. 710) (inconsistencies in the documents relied upon raised a genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment was denied).  “The function of the trial court is to determine whether an issue of fact exists but not to try that issue if it does exist.”   Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 433 (1975).

The motion for summary judgment is denied.

K. DOOLEY, J.

Dooley, Kari A., J.