IN RE: Gianna Q.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On October 20, 2010, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Kelley Q. and Anthony F. as to Gianna Q. The mother and father have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Neither parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

The statutory grounds alleged against respondent parents are (1) that the child was found in a prior proceeding on February 16, 2010, to have been neglected (Simon, J.) and the parents have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I)).

The mother is aware of these proceedings.   She is in Ohio where her three oldest children reside with the maternal grandmother who has adopted Gianna's older 14–year–old half-sister, and where Gianna's 12–year–old and 9–year–old half-sisters are in the guardianship of the maternal grandmother.   None of Kelley's four daughters are in her care.   She has told the DCF social worker that she is willing to consent to a termination of her parental rights and for Gianna to be adopted by her current foster parents, but she has not followed through with proper forms.   She has been defaulted for her failure to appear on February 3, 2011, and she did not appear for the trial although her attorney was present.

The child Gianna was born on February 7, 2009.   She is now two and a half years old.   She has been out of her mother's care since August 2009, when her mother moved to Ohio after leaving a Connecticut treatment program for women with children.   Gianna was placed in a non-relative, legal risk, pre-adoptive foster home on August 21, 2009.   The child has been in this home for two years and is thriving in this home.

The child has never been in the care of her biological father who has spent most of his daughter's life in jail, on probation, on parole or with charges pending against him.   Nonetheless, the presently incarcerated father is unwilling to sign a consent to terminate his rights and permit an adoption.   On the day set for a contested termination of his parental rights, he at first declined to talk to his lawyer, declined to come into court and refused to cooperate.   That conduct is consistent with the psychological evaluation conducted in this case (petitioner's exhibit Q).  After he was brought in to court, in the custody of the marshals and correction officers, he was given the opportunity to address the court and express his discontent, which he did.   The court indicated that there would be no continuance;  a recess was declared.

During the recess he talked to his attorney and he talked to the foster parents.   Thereafter, he agreed to have the case proceed.   He allowed admission of the documentary evidence without the need for testimony, and he agreed the court could resolve the matter on the papers.   It is noted that the foster parents who were in court informally allowed for some communication with the biological father through a post office box to be established.   Anthony understood that such an arrangement was not legally binding on the foster parents and would continue at the discretion of the foster parents.

I. FACTS

Exhibits A through T were admitted into evidence without objection and without the need for testimony from the social worker who was present.   A motion to correct the petition was allowed without objection.   Since the representations made in the social studies and other documentary evidence were not contested, the court accepts those representations to be true and correct.   The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

Respondent—Male Biological Parent

Anthony F., the male parent of the child, is presently incarcerated within the state.   His most recent eighteen-month sentence has been completed and he is awaiting extradition to Massachusetts, where, he told the court, he has an unexecuted sentence of two years pending resolution of his violation of probation hearing in that state.   This is not his first period of incarceration.   He has been incarcerated through the years.   The social study (Petitioner's Exhibit A and conviction record, G) indicate a record of arrests only in Connecticut, but based upon his representations, he has had convictions and incarcerations in Massachusetts where he presently has unexecuted sentence time on prior convictions.

He has been arrested for possession of drugs, petit larceny and shoplifting six times in Connecticut, (see Exhibits J, K, L, M).  He refuses to disclose his employment history or his drugs of choice.   He has no record of productive citizenship in Massachusetts or Connecticut.   He was not married to Gianna's mother, nor was he in a relationship with Gianna's mother.   Kelley, the mother, stated she was abusing substances at the time of conception and “made a mistake.”

Under Connecticut law, incarceration alone is not sufficient to terminate a parent's rights.   The child protection cases in Connecticut tend to view the whole parent-child relationship;  pre- and post-incarceration.   Incarcerated parents have the ability to participate in the child protection proceedings.   Counsel are appointed for them;  usually visitation is available to the incarcerated parent in prison, and they are transported to the proceedings to fully participate.   Anthony has had the benefit of all these opportunities.   He was aware of his right to visitation with the child.   He did not exercise visitation with the child until four months after he was incarcerated.   Since July 2010, he has once a month, one-hour, supervised visits with the child in prison.   That is the extent of his relationship with this child.   He has participated in the proceedings and was brought to court for his necessary appearances.

This court considers the history of the parent including their criminal history, their propensity to criminal behavior, anything indicative of general parental fitness, the nature and quality of the relationship between parent and child or children pre-incarceration, the age and needs of the child, the effect of the incarceration on the child, the impact psychologically and emotionally of prison visitation on the child, the degree of rehabilitation while incarcerated, an estimate of how long it may be post-incarceration for the parent to verify the quality of their rehabilitative efforts, an assessment of the parenting ability of the person, the length of time the parent will be incarcerated as it effects meeting the child's everyday needs and the inability to meet parental responsibilities.   A paramount consideration, of course, is the issue of stability and permanence for the child as well as the child's sense of time.

Using these considerations as a guide to analyze Anthony's parenting quotient, he fails.   Neither his pre-incarceration performance nor his post-incarceration performance has been adequate.  (See generally Exhibit A.) The social studies reflect there is no indication from any source that he has ever financially, spiritually or emotionally supported this child.   While he no doubt feels some affection for the child, he has never demonstrated any consistent parental competence or personal competence.   He has a history of substance abuse, unemployment and transience.   He is a persistent petit offender.   He is presently incarcerated and cannot demonstrate any stability in his life worthy of consideration as a child placement resource.   He is not in a position to provide for the care of this child.   He is a convicted felon presently incarcerated.   He has had no sustained crime free period in the past ten years although he does maintain that he has been substance free while incarcerated.   He has chronic addiction and personality issues.   He has an impulsive, restless and moody personality.   He is likely to be untrustworthy and unreliable.   (Petitioner's Exhibit Q.) The court appointed psychological evaluator suggest a psychoactive substance abuse disorder and a severe personality disorder with antisocial and histrionic features.

His history of employment is necessarily inadequate due to his frequent incarceration.   He has a history of inter-personal instability with intimate relationships.   A person with this kind of history will require ongoing, weekly individual, dual diagnosis treatment to rehabilitate himself to the role of responsible, self-reliant citizen.   Only then would he possibly be considered eligible to be a parental resource.   It would require a great period of additional time for him to satisfy any decision maker that he had fully reformed and rehabilitated himself.   Since he does not acknowledge these problems, therapy is unlikely to occur.

Gianna needs permanence now.   She is two and a half years old and has the right to be able to attach to her present caretakers with confidence.   There is nothing in Anthony's history that suggests he will be rehabilitated within a time frame that is appropriate considering the age and needs of Gianna.

DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate reunification.   They have provided case management services and ensured the safety of the child.   Due to Anthony's incarceration DCF was unable to provide the dual diagnosis counseling services necessary for Anthony's rehabilitation.   Following his imminent extradition to Massachusetts further efforts will be practically not possible.   The department did arrange visitation services for Anthony.   They did keep him informed as to the progress of the child and the developments in the case.   Anthony has been unable or unwilling to fully address or acknowledge his serious mental health and substance abuse issues.

Parental Failure of the father to Rehabilitate— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I)

The petitioner alleges that Anthony's parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B).  As the child has been previously found to be neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether the father has achieved or will achieve rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time considering the age and the needs of the child such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of this child.   The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.   Anthony has not previously demonstrated effective, consistent parenting nor does his criminal history, mental health issues and lack of life skills suggest the likelihood of meaningful rehabilitation within a reasonable time for this child.   The child needs permanent parenting within a reasonable time-frame.   Multiples of years which will be required for Anthony, is not reasonable for Gianna.   The petitioner has met her burden as to the male biological parent.

Respondent—Mother

Kelley is thirty-four years of age.   She has four children by three paternities.   She is a tragic parental failure, largely related to substance abuse and unaddressed mental health issues.   While she is a bright woman who is trained and certified as a nurses assistant, her felony conviction record likely is a serious obstacle to employment.

The petition alleges that she has no-ongoing relationship with Gianna.²  That is true.   When Kelley left the child in Connecticut, Gianna was a six-month-old infant.   Two years have elapsed.   Kelley has not visited the child.   She has not been in contact with DCF to inquire as to the well being of the child.   She has expressed her agreement to termination of her rights.   The court finds, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to this child that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent, Kelley, having met on a continuing, day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.

The court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to contact Kelley and to monitor her services in Ohio, but Kelley has failed to respond to all inquiries.   Accordingly the court finds that Kelley is unable or unwilling to benefit from services.

The petitioner has established these grounds by clear and convincing evidence.

II. DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings:

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondents, the court finds that DCF has attempted to offer services to the respondents as previously described.   The offer of services was necessarily limited due to Anthony's incarceration and to Kelley's removal to Ohio and failure to communicate with DCF.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF did make reasonable efforts given the lack of cooperation of the mother and the incarceration of Anthony.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds Anthony did engage in two programs while incarcerated.   Neither of these programs had the ability to address Anthony's monumental personality disorders.   He simply can not adjust his behavior to conform to civil demands.   He violated the specific steps to avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system.   Kelley was provided with specific steps for her parental rehabilitation.   She is not known to have complied with any of them.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child did develop a strong parental emotional bond with the foster family.   The child may know Anthony as a visiting figure but does not have a parental bond with the child.   Neither does Kelley have any psychological parental bond with the child.   Gianna views her foster family as her biological and psychological family.

(5) As to the age of the child, Gianna is two and a half.   The child's attorney recommends permanency which can only be achieved here through termination of the parent's rights.³

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that Anthony is presently confined.   The court further finds that Anthony is unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life.   Giving Anthony additional time would not likely enable him to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited within a time-frame suitable for Gianna.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989);  In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).   Kelley has made no effort to adjust her circumstances to accommodate her life to a parental role with Gianna.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Kelley Q. and Anthony F. to this child is in the best interest of the child.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for all children.   The child is now in a foster home where she is very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to her care and well-being.   They are willing to adopt her as soon as possible.

Anthony has been consistently unable to execute a responsible parental role.   This male parent is not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child at this time or at any time in the near future.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship with foster parents and biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents;  and their genetic bond to respondents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

III. ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Kelley and Anthony F. are hereby terminated as to Gianna.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Gianna.

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at 25 School Street, Rockville, CT 06066 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, S., J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The petition also alleges abandonment and failure to rehabilitate..  FN2. The petition also alleges abandonment and failure to rehabilitate.

FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․” In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․” In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

Foley, Francis J., S.J.