Cristina Ramos v. LLC (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS

On October 14, 2010, a motion for default for failure to appear was granted against Capitol Specialty.   Thereafter, on November 24, 2010, a hearing in damages was held before the court.   The court's order was entered on March 9, 2011.   On April 26, 2011, counsel for Capitol Specialty filed an appearance.   Thereafter, on May 6, 2011, Capitol Specialty filed a motion to strike the second count of the third party plaintiffs,' Phoenix Management Group One, LLC's and Dennis Dean's, complaint.

On June 17, 2011, Capitol Specialty filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike (# 132) arguing that its appearance automatically sets aside the default previously entered.   The third party plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike (# 135) on June 24, 2011.   The third party plaintiffs argue that the default became a judgment on November 24, 2010, and therefore, the only remedy Capitol Specialty has is to move to set aside the default pursuant to Practice Book § 17–43.

II

DISCUSSIONAParties' Arguments

Capitol Specialty argues that pursuant to Practice Book § 17–20(d), the filing of its appearance calls for the mandatory opening of the default if judgment has not entered.   Capitol Specialty contends that no judgment was entered from the court's March 9, 2011 order.   Rather, the court decided only liability and with that the ability of the third party plaintiffs to obtain a judgment from Capitol Specialty as to damages and attorneys fees.   In other words, the wording of the March 9, 2011 order demonstrates that this was not a final judgment but a delineation that the law supported the claims of liability.   According to Capitol Specialty, as a result of the hearing in damages, the court was not in a position to enter judgment because the amount of the judgment was uncertain.   Therefore, when Capitol Specialty entered its appearance, a default but no judgment had entered.   Therefore, the filing of the appearance automatically set aside the default against Capitol Specialty.

Moreover, Capitol Specialty argues that Practice Book § 17–22 mandates that notice, including the terms of the judgment be mailed within ten days of the entry of judgment but no such notice was provided to it by the third party plaintiffs.   Therefore, even if a judgment was entered, the third party plaintiffs should not be permitted to benefit from it because they did not provide Capitol Specialty with the proper notice.

Finally, Capitol Specialty argues that Practice Book § 17–20(d) does not permit a claim for a hearing in damages to be filed before the expiration of fifteen days from the entry of the default.   In the present case, the default was entered on October 14, 2010, and the claim for a hearing in damages was filed on October 25, 2010, eleven days after the default was entered.   Therefore, Capitol Specialty contends that, to the extent the hearing in damages resulted in a judgment, the judgment should be vacated as the third party plaintiffs' claim for the hearing was improper.

Conversely, the third party plaintiffs argue that the default against Capitol Specialty became a judgment on November 24, 2010, pursuant to the March 9, 2011 order finding in favor of the third party plaintiffs at the hearing in damages.   According to the third party plaintiffs, Capitol Specialty did not file an appearance prior to the entry of a judgment on November 24, 2010, and did not appear for trial.   Therefore, pursuant to Practice Book § 17–33(a), evidence may be introduced and judgment rendered without notice to Capitol Specialty.   The third party plaintiffs contend that Capitol Specialty's failure to appear for trial at the hearing in damages prevents it from offering evidence or contradicting any allegations in the complaint.

Moreover, the third party plaintiffs argue that under Practice Book § 17–43, Capitol Specialty's only remedy after the judgment entered was to move to set aside the default within four months.   Capitol Specialty, however, failed to do so.

B

Analysis

Practice Book § 17–20(d) provides in relevant part:  “If the defaulted party files an appearance in the action prior to the entry of judgment after default, the default shall automatically be set aside by operation of law.”   The issue before the court is whether its March 9, 2011 order constituted a judgment.   After the hearing in damages, which occurred on November 24, 2010, the court issued an order on March 9, 2011, which stated in relevant part:  “[t]he court is ordering damages and attorneys fees the amounts of which shall be determined in the future.”

“A default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action ․ and entry of default, when appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant ․ If the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are sufficient on their face to make out a valid claim for the relief requested, the plaintiff, on the entry of a default against the defendant, need not offer evidence to support those allegations ․ Therefore, the only issue before the court following a default is the determination of damages ․ A plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to at least nominal damages following an entry of default against a defendant in a legal action ․

“In an action at law, the rule is that the entry of a default operates as a confession by the defaulted defendant of the truth of the material facts alleged in the complaint which are essential to entitle the plaintiff to some of the relief prayed.   It is not the equivalent of an admission of all of the facts pleaded.   The limit of its effect is to preclude the defaulted defendant from making any further defense and to permit the entry of a judgment against him on the theory that he has admitted such of the facts alleged in the complaint as are essential to such a judgment.   It does not follow that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the full amount of the relief claimed.   The plaintiff must still prove how much of the judgment prayed for in the complaint he is entitled to receive.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Catalina v. Nicolelli, 90 Conn.App. 219, 221, 876 A.2d 588 (2005).

“[T]he underlying purpose of a hearing in damages is to assist the trial court in determining the amount of damages to be awarded ․ [A]t the very least, [the plaintiff] is entitled to nominal damages ․ Further, [a] default in an action for legal and equitable relief admits the material facts constituting a cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 222–23.  “The entry of default, in effect, [is] the equivalent of the defendant admitting the allegations underlying the plaintiff's claim for damages ․ At a minimum, it [is] incumbent on the court to enter an award of nominal damages to reflect the fact that judgment could not be rendered in favor of the defendant.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id., 223–24.

“A judgment of default normally requires a two step process.   The first step is the entry of a judicial ruling of default, which constitutes a technical admission by the defendant of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint ․ The second step of the process is the hearing in damages, in which the plaintiff must still prove how much of the judgment prayed for in his complaint he is entitled to receive ․ It is normally only after these two steps are completed that a judgment on default may be rendered.”  (Citations omitted.)  Ratner v. Willametz, 9 Conn.App. 565, 574–75, 520 A.2d 621 (1987).  “With the entry of a default for failure to appear, liability is conclusively presumed.   The plaintiff must, however, prove his damages by a preponderance of the evidence.”   Soumpholphakdy v. Klavins, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 98 0583523 (May 7, 1999, Hennessey, J.).

In the present case, a judicial ruling of default was entered against Capitol Specialty on October 14, 2010.   On November 24, 2010, a hearing in damages was held before the court.   The court's order was entered on March 9, 2011, and stated in relevant part:  “Trial Completed—Decision Reserved ․ At the hearing in damages, the court determined to research the issues of whether a defendant can sue a third party defendant insurer for indemnification for undetermined damages and whether a defendant can sue a third party defendant insurer for attorneys fees ․ The court is ordering damages and attorneys fees the amounts of which shall be determined in the future.”   Capitol Specialty did not attend the hearing in damages and did not file an appearance until April 26, 2011.

There is no indication that the third party plaintiffs put on evidence at the hearing in damages to determine the amount of damages they were entitled to receive.¹  The court's order, however, awards damages and attorneys fees to the third party plaintiffs, the specific amount to be determined at a later date.   Because no evidence was taken to determine the amount of damages to which the third party plaintiffs are entitled, the court's March 9, 2011 order could not be a judgment.   Therefore, pursuant to Practice Book § 17–20(d), Capitol Specialty's appearance was filed before a judgment on the default and the default is set aside.

BY THE COURT,

Richard Burke

FOOTNOTES

FN1. According to the third party plaintiffs, they “made clear during the trial that [they] sought a declaration that the policy covered the plaintiffs' claim(s) for personal injuries brought against [them].   The trial was completed and this court entered an Order finding in favor of [the third party plaintiffs] and against Capitol Specialty ․” Third Party Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law (# 132), 2..  FN1. According to the third party plaintiffs, they “made clear during the trial that [they] sought a declaration that the policy covered the plaintiffs' claim(s) for personal injuries brought against [them].   The trial was completed and this court entered an Order finding in favor of [the third party plaintiffs] and against Capitol Specialty ․” Third Party Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law (# 132), 2.

Burke, Richard E., J.