Donald Allegrini v. Town of Hamden (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 110)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Donald Allegrini, filed the present case against the defendants, the town of Hamden (the town) and Evelyn Hatkin, on December 10, 2010.   The operative complaint, filed on March 24, 2011, contains two counts.   Count one alleges negligence against the town.   Count two alleges negligence against Hatkin.

The following facts have been alleged.   On January 19, 2010, the plaintiff tripped and fell over a backpack in an aisle of the town's public library.   As a result of this fall, the plaintiff suffered injuries to his left elbow and wrist.   On that date, Hatkin was the chair of the town's library board.   The plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by the defendants' negligent failure to:  (1) remove the backpack, (2) warn the plaintiff of its presence, (3) inspect the premises and (4) adequately hire, train or supervise its employees.   The plaintiff further alleges that these acts or omissions “were ministerial to the extent there exists prescribed standards, regulations, rules [or] procedures requiring that library employees [or] other municipal employees perform their duties in maintaining the aisle of the library free and clear of debris and objects that constitute tripping hazards in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.”

The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2011 claiming governmental immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n.   This motion was accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law as required by Practice Book § 11–10(5) and an affidavit from the director of the library.   The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion on June 10, 2011.   The objection was also accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law.   This court heard oral argument on the motion at short calendar on June 13, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue․  Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

The defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment because of the doctrine of governmental immunity.   In support of this argument, the defendants filed an affidavit from Bob Gualtieri, the director of the town's public library, which states:  “there are no policies, procedures or directives, written or otherwise, regarding the maintenance of the aisles of the library.”   The affidavit further states that:  “there are no policies, procedures or directives, written or otherwise, regarding the inspection of, or placement of, backpacks brought in or in the possession [of] users of the library.”   In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendants are not entitled to immunity because the acts and omissions at issue were so “rudimentary” in nature that they did not require the exercise of judgment or discretion.¹

Section 52–557n(a) provides in relevant part:  “(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties ․ (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  ․ (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.”

“The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment ․ In contrast, [m]inisterial refers to a duty which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion ․” Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 118, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “Absent evidence that a policy or directive existed requiring the defendant to perform a particular duty, the conclusion that the allegedly negligent acts were discretionary in nature as a matter of law is proper.”   Haynes v. Middletown, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 07 5002146 (March 31, 2009, Jones, J., aff'd, 122 Conn.App. 72, 997 A.2d 636 (2010) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 569);  see also Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn.App. 844, 854–55, 804 A.2d 928, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941, 808 A.2d 1132 (2002);  Cousins v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 020467165 (February 13, 2004, Skolnick, J.).

In Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 881 A.2d 194 (2005), the plaintiff alleged that the “defendants were negligent in their:  (1) design, supervision, inspection and maintenance of the trail on which the plaintiff was injured;  (2) failure to warn recreational users of the trail's dangerous and unsafe condition;  and (3) failure to barricade or close the trail.”  Id., 50.   In that case, our Supreme Court stated:  “The plaintiff, in its opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, did not present any evidence demonstrating that a policy or directive existed requiring the defendants to perform these duties.   Absent evidence of such a policy or directive, we conclude that the defendants', in determining whether to supervise, inspect and maintain the trails ․ and when to mark, close or barricade the trails, if at all, were engaged in duties that inherently required the exercise of judgment.”  Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants negligently failed to:  (1) remove the backpack, (2) warn the plaintiff of its presence, (3) inspect the premises and (4) adequately hire, train or supervise its employees.   The affidavit attached to the defendants' motion for summary judgment demonstrates that no policies, procedures or directives govern these aspects of the library's operations.   The plaintiff has submitted no evidence to the contrary.   Absent such evidence, the actions of the defendants are, as a matter of law, discretionary and therefore sheltered by § 52–557n(a)(2)(B).  Consequently, there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be resolved in relation to the issue of governmental immunity and the motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff does not argue the existence of any statute, regulation, policy or procedure governing the conduct at issue.   Indeed, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that no evidence has been proffered in this regard..  FN1. The plaintiff does not argue the existence of any statute, regulation, policy or procedure governing the conduct at issue.   Indeed, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that no evidence has been proffered in this regard.

Wilson, Robin L., J.