Encore Legal Solutions v. Douglas Deutermann (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Facts and Procedural History

The plaintiff, Encore Legal Solutions, filed a single count complaint on March 10, 2010, against the defendant, Douglas Deutermann.   The complaint alleges:  “On October 16, 2009, the plaintiff recovered a default judgment in the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County.   The amount of said judgment was $10,088.73 ․ Said sum together with interest remains due ․ Although demand for payment has been made, the defendant, Douglas Deutermann, has not made same and the plaintiff has been damaged.”   The summons indicates that the defendant resides at 97 Elys Ferry Road in Old Lyme, Connecticut.   The March 4, 2010 return of service indicates that the marshal left a true and attested copy of the original writ, summons, and complaint at that address.   On April 5, 2010, the clerk granted the plaintiff's motion for default based upon the defendant's failure to file an appearance.

On June 9, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment, which was denied by the court, Cosgrove, J., on June 21, 2010.   In denying this motion, the court stated:  “The Military Affidavit is insufficient because it does not contain a statement as to whether the birthdate and/or Social Security Number (please do not specify actual birthdate or SSN) was submitted to the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center.   As such, the Court cannot determine the reliability of the affidavit.”

The plaintiff filed a second motion for judgment on June 29, 2010, which included the military affidavit requested by the court.   The court, Cosgrove, J., again denied the plaintiff's motion on July 14, 2010.   The court stated:  “The Motion for Judgment is denied without prejudice as this court cannot rely upon a copy of a California default judgment to issue a Connecticut judgment.   Pursuant to Sec. 52–604, a judgment obtained by default is not entitled to full faith and credit.   Please submit updated affidavits to support a motion for judgment.”

On March 1, 2011, the plaintiff filed a third motion for judgment, which was denied by the court, Purtill, J., on the same date.   The court stated:  “Plaintiff must comply with the provisions of CGS Sec. 52–605.”   On June 1, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue/reconsider the denial of its motion for judgment.

Discussion

“The purpose of a reargument is ․ to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts ․ It also may be used to address alleged inconsistencies in the trial court's memorandum of decision as well as claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court ․ [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argument.  “(Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Opoku v. Grant, 63 Conn.App. 686, 692–93, 778 A.2d 981 (2001).

Moreover, “[t]he granting of a motion for reconsideration ․ is within the sound discretion of the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Mangiante v. Niemiec, 98 Conn.App. 567, 575, 910 A.2d 235 (2006).  “A reconsideration implies reexamination and possibly a different decision by the [court] which initially decided it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 577.   The plaintiff asks the court to reconsider its denial of its motion for judgment, as the plaintiff may file this action pursuant to General Statutes § 52–607, and not pursuant to § 52–605, as requested by the court.  Section 52–607 provides:  “The right of a judgment creditor to proceed by an action on the judgment or a motion for summary judgment m lieu of complaint instead of proceeding under sections 52–604 to 52–609, inclusive, remains unimpaired.”

In Seaboard Surety Co. v. Waterbury, 38 Conn.Sup. 468, 469, 451 A.2d 291 (1982), the court addressed this very issue.   In that action, the plaintiff obtained a judgment by confession against the defendant in New York. The judgment was never satisfied before the defendant moved from New York to Connecticut and as a result, the plaintiff filed an action to obtain a judgment on the New York judgment in a Connecticut court.   See id.

The court stated:  “The issue here concerns the exclusivity of our Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which is codified in General Statutes §§ 52–604 through 52–609.  Section 52–604 defines ‘foreign judgment’ as ‘any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, except one obtained by default in appearance or by confession of judgment.’  Section 52–605 authorizes the summary enforcement of a properly registered foreign judgment.   That section provides that when a judgment creditor files a certified copy of a foreign judgment in the court in which its enforcement is sought, and certifies that this judgment was not obtained by default in appearance or by confession of judgment, then ‘[s]uch foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state ․’ General Statutes § 52–605(b).”  Id., 469–70.

The defendant argued that § 52–605 permanently barred the enforcement of this judgment in Connecticut.   The court disagreed.  “[The defendant's] claim ignores the existence of General Statutes § 52–607 ․ which is dispositive of the issue ․ [Section] 52–607 preserved the common-law right of a judgment creditor to bring an independent action on the judgment.   This was a new action that was brought for judgment upon the foreign judgment.   This proceeding was not a proceeding under § 52–605 to enforce the foreign judgment itself.   Under § 52–605 a foreign judgment other than one by default of appearance or confession that was duly registered with a Connecticut court could be executed upon locally.   These two statutes therefore allow different remedies for a judgment creditor.”  Id., 470.

The court explained:  “The § 52–605 proceeding, by which a foreign judgment that is not obtained by default of appearance or confession is treated the same as a judgment obtained in Connecticut, is a codification of the common-law rule of res judicata ․ Under the common law, a final judgment that is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties in the same or any other judicial tribunal ․ The effect of § 52–605, therefore, is to establish a foreign judgment that is not obtained by a default in appearance or by confession as a domestic judgment that is conclusive of the defendant's indebtedness ․ Furthermore, the foreign judgment is not subject to collateral attack locally ․ but must be given full faith and credit ․ Under § 52–607 a foreign judgment creditor who could or did not rely upon § 52–605 can still proceed by an independent action on the foreign judgment, since this remedy remains unimpaired under the statutory scheme.   This independent action on the foreign judgment allows the debtor to attack collaterally the foreign judgment by establishing facts that would render the foreign judgment void ․ No such attack could be made, however, if the judgment creditor sought to proceed under § 52–605 on a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of that statute.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id., 470–72.

Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff's action to recover a debt was preserved by General Statutes § 52–607, and that the defendant's failure to attack the New York judgment entitled the plaintiff to recovery.   See id., 472;  see also Lease Corp. of America, Inc. v. S.A. Hotels, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0438547 (January 24, 2001, Burns, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 100, 102) (in reliance on Seaboard Surety Co. v. Waterbury, court concluded plaintiff's action to recover debt tried in the Michigan court was preserved by § 52–607, and defendant's failure to attack the Michigan judgment in this court entitled plaintiff to recovery).   In the present case, the court is similarly convinced that the plaintiff's action is preserved by § 52–607, and as a result, the plaintiff need not comply with § 52–605.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to reargue and reconsider the court's denial of its motion for judgment is hereby granted.

Judgment is rendered for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,088.73 together with costs in the amount of $360.37 for a total of $10,449.10.   Defendant is ordered to pay $35.00 per week until the judgment is paid.

Joseph J. Purtill, JTR

Purtill, Joseph J., J.T.R.