Yolanda Hill v. Josue Castro (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS

On September 13, 2010, the plaintiff, Yolanda Hill, filed a complaint against the defendants, Josue Castro and Adelaida Castro, for negligence seeking damages she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.   In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On or about May 11, 2009, the defendant operator, Josue Castro, was driving a motor vehicle owned by the co-defendant, Adelaida Castro, on Boston Post Road in Orange, Connecticut when he attempted to change lanes.   When the defendant attempted to change lanes, he drove his vehicle into the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff alleges that she suffered various injuries as a result of the collision.

On March 23, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against both defendants on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to liability.   In support of the motion, the plaintiff submitted an uncertified, unauthenticated copy of the police report, an affidavit of the plaintiff and a memorandum of law.   On April 1, 2011, the defendants submitted a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.   The matter was heard on the short calendar on April 11, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553–54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010).   “The facts at issue [in the context of summary judgment] are those alleged in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 557, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).  “[T]he moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. HealthNet of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although there is a genuine issue as to damages.”  Practice Book § 17–50.

In support of her motion, the plaintiff argues that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability because it is undisputed that Castro was operating the vehicle negligently and that this “was the sole cause of the accident ․” (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, p.3.) The defendants argue in opposition that negligence cases are not appropriate for summary judgment and that genuine issues of material fact exist on the issue of liability.   Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact because “(1.) evidence of contact between two vehicles is insufficient to prove negligence;  and (2.) a police report is not adequate evidence to support a finding of negligence.”  (Defendant's Memorandum of Law, p.4.)

“Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984).  “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).   “Although the issue of causation generally is a question for the trier of fact ․ the issue becomes one of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, and summary judgment may be granted based on a failure to establish causation.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997).

“As the party moving for summary judgment, the [movant] is required to support its motion with supporting documentation ․” Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).  “[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, and the applicable provisions of our rules of practice contemplate that supporting [or opposing] documents ․ be made under oath or be otherwise reliable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 233–34 n.10, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006).  “[U]ncertified copies of documents to which no affidavit exists attesting to their authenticity ․ do not constitute proof or documentary evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Wright v. Infinity Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 020820231 (December 4, 2003, Booth, J.).

In support of her argument, the plaintiff has submitted her own affidavit and an uncertified, unauthenticated copy of the police report of the investigating officer.   In the plaintiff's affidavit, she merely restates what has already been alleged, that on May 11, 2009, the vehicle that the plaintiff was driving was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by the defendant.   The court in O'Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 306, 370 A.2d 933 (1976), noted that “[a] plaintiff cannot merely prove that a collision occurred and then call upon the defendant operator to come forward with evidence that the collision was not a proximate consequence of negligence on his part.”   The court had previously noted that “[c]ommon experience shows that motor vehicle accidents are not all due to driver negligence.”  Id.

The police report, containing statements made by the plaintiff and the defendant to the investigating officer, discloses that the “[i]nvestigation indicated that Oper # 1 attempted an unsafe lane change ․” and that there were “[n]o reported injuries and no photos or measurements obtained.”   The police report does not indicate whether the officer witnessed the incident on which he or she reported.  “[E]xcept for the portion of the police report containing the personal observations of the police officer, none of [the] statements would [be] admissible against the plaintiff because of the hearsay rule.”  Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 444, 476 A.2d 582 (1984).

In the present case, the plaintiff's burden on summary judgment is to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants' liability.   The only evidence offered by the plaintiff is that the plaintiff's car was struck by the vehicle operated by Castro, which is not a sufficient evidentiary basis to hold the defendants liable for negligence.   Moreover, the plaintiff cannot rely on the investigating officer's report because it is unauthenticated and does not contain the personal observations of the investigating officer.   Nonetheless, even if the police report was admissible, the defendant operator's statements contained in the report “that he attempted to move left to the eastbound lane ․ because he thought it was clear to do so ․” and that he “collided with Vehicle # 2 [the plaintiff's vehicle] which was in his ‘blind spot’ ․” merely demonstrate that the defendants' vehicle collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff has failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant operator was negligent in the operation of his vehicle.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the parties' evidence reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to liability.   Therefore, the court denies the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Woods, J.

Woods, Glenn A., J.