Easter Seals of Greater Hartford Rehabilitation Center v. Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Facts & Procedural History

In the present action, the plaintiff, Easter Seals of Greater Hartford Rehabilitation Center, the claimant's employer, appeals the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (“board”), which found that the claimant, Alan Holubesko, was not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.

The defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (“administrator”), granted the claimant's application for benefits on April 7, 2010.   The plaintiff appealed this decision.   The Appeals Referee (“referee”) conducted a hearing de novo, made findings of fact, and reversed the decision of the administrator by its decision, dated August 13, 2010.   The claimant appealed to the board.   In its November 10, 2010 decision, the board adopted the referee's finding of fact with modification and reversed the referee's decision.   The board remanded the appeal to the administrator with respect to the claimant's ability to work and his availability for work.   The plaintiff now appeals the board's decision.

On February 8, 2011, the defendant administrator filed a motion for judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed because the board properly found that the claimant's separation was not voluntary.   On the same day, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on February 23, 2011.   On April 4, 2011, the court heard arguments on the motion.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 31–249b, the board certified the record to this court.   The court is bound by the board's findings of fact given that a motion to correct has not been filed.   See e.g., Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 114 Conn.App. 170, 176, 968 A.2d 971 (2009).   The board, in its November 10, 2010 decision, made the following findings of fact.

The plaintiff employed the claimant as a one-on-one program specialist from January 2009 through March 3, 2010.   On March 3, 2010, the claimant submitted a letter to the plaintiff resigning from his position as a program specialist.   The claimant felt pressured to submit the letter because he was unable to comply with the plaintiff's demand for updated medical documentation.   He was not scheduled to see his doctor until March 16, 2010, it had previously taken a month to get requested medical documentation, and the claimant's doctor told him he was tired of filling out the paperwork.   The claimant further stated in his March 3 letter that he was “open to considering future employment as a driver, on a per diem basis, when scheduling permits.”

The claimant was suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder related to his combat service, and from substance dependency.   The claimant was being treated at the VA hospital by a psychologist, a psychiatrist and a social worker.   On March 16, 2010, Gabriel Arimoro, M.D. provided medical documentation restricting the claimant to part-time work.   Dr. Arimoro certified that as of April 1, 2010, the claimant needed to leave his job because he was unable to cope with the job situation, and that he was still not physically and mentally able to work full-time as of that date as a result of his medical condition.

The claimant provided the plaintiff with a January 29, 2010, note from his doctor.   The doctor released the claimant for work with a reduction in his work load effective February 2, 2010.   The claimant met with Corrine Renaldi, his immediate supervisor, on February 2, 2010, to discuss what work he would be assigned.   The claimant informed Renaldi that he did not feel ready to return to work.   Renaldi told the claimant he needed to provide medical documentation that supported his need to remain on a medical leave of absence.   The claimant was also advised that his position as program specialist was 37.5 hours per week and could not be performed on a part-time basis.

Hugh Caldwell, director of day programs, and Renaldi met with the claimant on February 16, 2010.   During this meeting, the claimant expressed an interest in a per diem driving position which the plaintiff indicated might be available.   However, the claimant told Caldwell and Renaldi that he was not able to return to his job as a program specialist.   The claimant could not recall any other specific part-time position which the plaintiff offered at this meeting.

On February 25, 2010, the claimant left a telephone message for Renaldi.   He said that he has not decided what option he was going to pursue.   The claimant asked Renaldi to provide him with written confirmation of his employment status for the TVCCA energy assistance program.   Caldwell telephoned the claimant on March 3, 2010.   He asked him what work he was going to pursue and whether he had any medical restrictions.   The option to remain on medical leave of absence was still available.

The claimant felt stress from having to attend numerous medical appointments to obtain updated medical documentation from the VA providers when he was not scheduled for these medical appointments.   On March 17, 2010, the claimant had arranged to meet with Renaldi to discuss the per diem driving position.   When he contacted his former supervisor on March 15, 2010, she advised him that the meeting was not necessary because he had quit.

Discussion

“[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ․ [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact ․ Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 417, 828 A.2d 609 (2003).  “[A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 417–18.

General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A), in pertinent part, provides:  “An individual shall be ineligible for benefits ․ If, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer, until such individual has earned at least ten times such individual's benefit rate ․” Moreover, § 31–236–18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides that a voluntary termination is one by which “the individual committed the specific intentional act of terminating his own employment.”

“An individual leaves suitable work for cause within the meaning of [§ 31–236], When he leaves employment for reasons which would impel the ordinary reasonable person to leave and which provide the individual with no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment ․ As a matter of law, therefore, a claimant must show that no reasonable alternative to termination exists.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Arco Technology, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 25 Conn.App. 130, 135, 593 A.2d 154 (1991).

In addressing the plaintiff's appeal, this court's function is to determine whether the record establishes a logical and rational basis for the board's decision.   In its written decision, the board reasoned:  “Where an individual is forced to leave work because his or her health will not permit the claimant to perform the work and he or she has no options to continue in the employment, we have not considered the resulting separation a voluntary leaving.   See Ellis v. Meriden Public Health & Visiting Nurse Association, Board Case No. 187–BR–96 (Decision on Administrator's Motion to Reopen, 1/23/98).   However, the claimant must establish through substantial evidence that he or she can no longer perform his or her job duties as a result of his or her health or medical condition.   In addition, the claimant generally must request a leave of absence or demonstrate that a leave was not available or will not improve the claimant's ability to perform the functions of the job.   The individual must demonstrate that there were no viable alternatives that would enable him or her to remain employed.   This will generally require the claimant to explore alternatives by bringing to the employer's attention the nature of the health condition and the fact that he or she is not medically released to perform his or her job functions, but that he or she may be able to perform alternative work.”

In Ellis, the board specifically addressed the issue presented in the present case:  whether a claimant who leaves employment as a result of a non-work-related disability or health condition which prevents him or her from performing job duties is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.   After a thorough review of both Connecticut and out of state law, the Ellis board concluded:  “When an individual is forced to leave her work because her health will not permit her to perform her work and she has no options to continue in her employment, we cannot consider the resulting separation a voluntary leaving.”   The Ellis board articulated the claimant's burden in these types of cases, which requires the claimant to establish through substantial evidence that he or she can no longer perform his or her job duties as a result of a medical condition and that there were no viable alternatives that would enable him or her to remain employed.

In concluding that the claimant in the present case met this burden, the board found that the claimant's medical documentation and the description by both the claimant and his supervisor of the claimant's depression and post-traumatic stress disorder relating to his military service and his substance dependency supported its finding that the claimant was physically incapable of performing his full-time job duties for an indefinite period of time.   The board noted that at the end of March 2010, the claimant was still consulting a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and a social worker.   His psychiatrist recommended he work a reduced workload, yet the plaintiff would not allow the claimant to perform his job as a program specialist on a part-time basis.   The claimant felt pressured by having to attend numerous medical appointments in order to obtain updated medical documentation from the VA providers, which the plaintiff requested when he was not scheduled for the medical appointments.   As a result, he advised the plaintiff that he was resigning from the program specialist position.

Furthermore, the board noted that the claimant, in his March 3, 2010 resignation letter, stated that he was “open to considering future employment as a driver, on a per diem basis, when scheduling permits.”   He arranged to meet with the plaintiff on March 17, 2010, to discuss the per diem driving position, which the plaintiff suggested he might work.   When he contacted his former supervisor on March 15, 2010, she advised him that the meeting was not necessary because he had resigned.   Therefore, the board concluded that the claimant was still attempting to preserve an employment relationship even after his March 3, 2010 letter, but the plaintiff had no other options for him to continue in its employ.   In sum, the board found that the claimant's leaving work was not voluntary under its decision in Ellis and that he did not separate from employment for disqualifying reasons.

In it opposing the defendant's motion for judgment, the plaintiff argues that the board improperly concluded that the claimant met this burden.   Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the claimant failed to meet his burden of establishing by substantial evidence that his medical condition prohibited him from performing his job duties as of March 3, 2010, the date of his letter of resignation.   Further, the plaintiff argues that the board's findings clearly establish that the claimant had viable alternatives that would have enabled him to remain employed.

ANALYSIS

The court disagrees with the plaintiff.   The board's decision that the claimant met this burden is not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.   The plaintiff takes particular issue with the claimant's March 3, 2010 letter of resignation.   The board reasonably found, however, that the claimant felt pressured by having to attend numerous medical appointments in order to obtain updated medical documentation from the VA providers and as a result, advised the plaintiff that he was resigning from the program specialist position.   The board was presented with ample evidence that the claimant was suffering from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and substance dependency.   These conditions rendered him incapable of performing his duties as a program specialist, which was a full-time position that required him to work 37.5 hours per week and could not be performed on a part-time basis.   Significantly, on March 16, 2010, Gabriel Arimoro, M.D. provided medical documentation restricting the claimant to only part-time work.

Furthermore, the board reasonably found that the claimant, in his March 3, 2010 resignation letter, attempted to preserve an employment relationship with the plaintiff.   Subsequent to this letter, the claimant also arranged to meet with the plaintiff on March 17, 2010, to discuss a per diem driving position.   When he contacted his former supervisor on March 15, 2010, however, she advised him that the meeting was not necessary because he had resigned.

In sum, the board's decision that the claimant had met the standard articulated in Ellis v. Meriden Public Health & Visiting Nurse Association, supra, Board Case No. 187–BR–96, was reasonable in light of the evidence presented by this case.   The claimant demonstrated that he could no longer work full-time and additionally, that he sought viable alternatives that would have enabled him to remain employed.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's appeal is hereby dismissed.

The Court

Cosgrove, J.

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.