Joseph Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 187)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant, New Britain General Hospital, has previously moved for summary judgment in the present action.   The factual and procedural history of this case are as set forth in the memorandum of decision on that motion:  “The plaintiff [Joseph Palmer] filed his six-count complaint in state court on or about May 15, 2005.   The plaintiff sued four defendants:  two members of the Newington police department, the Newington Ambulance Corporation and New Britain General Hospital.   Count three of the complaint alleged the use of excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by the two officers of the Newington police department.   The plaintiff also alleged that the police officers exceeded their authority under General Statutes § 17a–683.   The case was removed to the United States District Court in Hartford.   The police officers filed a motion for summary judgment on the federal claim contained in count three, which motion was granted by the court, Chatigny, J. Palmer v. Garuti, No. 3:06–CV–795, 2009 WL 413129 (February 17, 2009).   The court found that while the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was ‘incapacitated’ under the statute, the police officers were entitled to immunity for their actions.   The remaining state claims were remanded to the superior court.

“On May 5, 2009, the defendant New Britain General Hospital filed [a] motion for summary judgment.   On May 19, 2009 the defendant Newington Ambulance Corporation filed its motion for summary judgment.¹  The plaintiff filed a consolidated motion and memorandum in opposition.   Oral argument was held on September 14, 2009 ․

“The following facts, relevant to the motion filed by the defendant New Britain General Hospital, are not in dispute.   On May 25, 2003, in the early morning hours, the Newington police were called to Club 2001 on a report of an intoxicated person.   The plaintiff was taken into protective custody by the police, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–683(b).  He was transported to the hospital by Newington Ambulance Corporation.   The plaintiff arrived at the New Britain Hospital emergency room at 2:36 a.m. At 2:40 a.m., an emergency room nurse performed a triage assessment of the plaintiff.   In order to perform a triage assessment of the plaintiff, the nurse needed him to change into hospital clothes.   The plaintiff initially refused to change into hospital attire.   At approximately 3:10 a.m., a hospital nurse drew his blood for evaluation of his blood alcohol level.   Shortly thereafter, at 3:24 a.m., the plaintiff ran from the emergency department of the hospital clad only in the hospital gown.   Hospital security officers followed the plaintiff into a nearby park and he was returned to the hospital by an ambulance, arriving back at the hospital at 3:45 a.m. At 4:00 a.m., the plaintiff was examined by a physician's assistant.   The blood alcohol level test indicated that his was 0.12%. The plaintiff was released at 5:15 a.m.” Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4011575 (October 15, 2009, Keegan, J.).   The court denied the motion.

The defendant brought the first motion with respect to counts four through six of the complaint, which are against the defendant and sound in false imprisonment, assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively.   The plaintiff alleges the following additional facts in support of the counts.   He was handcuffed by the security personnel who followed him to the park.   He was also handcuffed to a hospital bed upon his return to the defendant's premises.   Furthermore, the defendant would not return the plaintiff's clothes to him until he signed a document, the contents of which were unknown to him.

The defendant filed its second motion for summary judgment on counts four through six, accompanied by a memorandum of law in support thereof and exhibits, on March 10, 2011.   The plaintiff in turn filed his opposition to the present motion on April 13, 2011.   The court heard the matter at short calendar on May 16, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Citations omitted.)  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ․ of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

The defendant again moves for summary judgment on the ground that it is entitled to immunity from civil liability under General Statutes §§ 17a–683 and 17a–689 and therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.   In support of the present motion, the defendant submits, inter alia, transcript pages from the plaintiff's July 21, 2006 deposition;  the ambulance, hospital and police records and reports that were completed to document the May 25, 2003 incident;  the local rule 56(a)(1) statement filed by the defendant in federal court;  the local rule 56(a)(2) statement filed by the plaintiff in federal court;  and eight affidavits given by medical and security personnel who were involved in the plaintiff's emergency room visit.   One of these affidavits was given by Louis Graff, who was the admitting physician during the plaintiff's emergency room visit and who attests that the plaintiff was treated as soon as possible under the circumstances.   The affidavits, the deposition transcript pages and the records and reports were not exhibits to the defendant's first motion for summary judgment.   The plaintiff opposes the present motion by arguing that the defendant has not submitted new evidence in support of the present motion and that the defendant has failed to meet its burden on summary judgment because it relies on an expert opinion in order to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact.²

The court begins by rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the defendant has not submitted new evidence in support of the present motion.   Even though the defendant refers to seven of the eight affidavits in its local rule 56(a)(1) statement, an exhibit to the defendant's first motion for summary judgment, the affidavits themselves contain detailed descriptions that were not included in the statement and therefore unavailable to the court that decided the first motion.   The court further notes that Graff's affidavit is wholly new to the record for the present action.

General Statutes § 17a–683(b) provides in relevant part:  “Any police officer finding a person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol shall take him into protective custody and have him brought forthwith to ․ a hospital.”  Section 17a–683(c) in turn provides in relevant part:  “A person who is brought ․ to a hospital shall be examined by a medical officer or his designee as soon as possible.   The medical officer shall determine whether the person requires inpatient treatment based upon the medical examination of the person and upon a finding that the person is incapacitated by alcohol.”   Finally, section 17a–689(b) provides in relevant part:  “Any medical officer or staff member of a ․ hospital acting in compliance with sections 17a–673 and 17a–680 to 17a–690, inclusive, shall be deemed to be acting in the course of his official duty and shall not be criminally or civilly liable therefor.” ³

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law.”  Hibner v. Bruening, 78 Conn.App. 456, 458, 828 A.2d 150 (2003).  “The process of statutory interpretation in no way implicates the fact-finding function of the jury but, rather, presents a pure question of law.   Consequently, it is a matter within the sole province of the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 836 A.2d 224 (2003).  “[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation and legislative history present legal questions properly resolved by summary judgment ․ Where the issues are purely legal and there is no disputed issue of fact, summary judgment is appropriate.”  (Citation omitted.)   Annelli v. Ford Motor Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 4001345 (June 7, 2007, Hurley, J.T.R.).

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181–82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).   “If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 182.

Judge Keegan noted:  “Whether or not the plaintiff was ‘incapacitated’ according to the protective custody statute, as set forth in § 17a–683(b), is not at issue.   The court is not concerned with the decision made by the Newington police officers to take [the] plaintiff into protective custody.   Nor is the court concerned with when the hospital made its determination that the plaintiff was no longer incapacitated by alcohol.   See § 17a–683(e).   The only operative question thus boils down to:  was the plaintiff examined by a medical officer—here, the physician's assistant—as soon as possible?”   Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. NNH CV 05 4011575.

She then concluded, after applying the relevant interpretive rules to the relevant statutes:  “The realities of our hospital emergency rooms, and the ever-changing scenarios presented therein, dictate against defining ‘as soon as possible’ with a fixed period of time and suggest a measure of deference to a medical officer's discretion as implied by the legislature's choice of statutory language.   That deference must be set within some factual context, which is lacking in the evidence presented.   In this case, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the plaintiff, upon being presented in the defendant's emergency room, was examined by a physician's assistant within 1 hour and 3 minutes of his arrival, despite his uncooperative behavior.   Nonetheless, it is the defendant who bears the burden of showing that there is no dispute that the plaintiff was seen as soon as possible given the circumstances existing at the New Britain General Hospital emergency room on May 25, 2005 at 2:36 a.m. Without any information other than the number of minutes that passed between arrival and examination, the court cannot say that the defendant acted within the course of its duty and is protected under the statutory immunity of § 17a–689(b).”

The evidence that the defendant has submitted in support of the present motion provides information other than the number of minutes that passed between arrival and examination.   In an affidavit, Louis Graff, the admitting physician when the plaintiff was admitted to the defendant's emergency room department, attests, based upon his personal knowledge, that “[p]hysical examination by the physician assistant was performed as soon as possible under the circumstances, because physical examination of a patient who is uncooperative and refuses to consent to the examination puts the patient at risk for physical harm and also puts the examining health care provider at risk.”   Def.'s Ex. 18 ¶ 27.

The affidavit of Ephrem Abraha, one of the nurses who participated in the plaintiff's treatment during his admission to the defendant's emergency room department, provides, in support of Graff's averment:  “When Mr. Palmer returned to the Emergency Department, a number of non-restraining efforts were made to calm him to prevent immediate risk of injury to himself and/or others, including one to one conversation, decreased stimulation, reorientation, comfort measures, camouflage, verbal limits/redirection, diversion, and consistent one to one attendance by a patient care technician ․ All non-restraining efforts to calm the patient failed, whereupon at or about 04:00 a.m. on May 25, 2003, the patient temporarily had two-point restraints applied to his right arm and left leg.”   Def.'s Ex. 5 ¶ 12, 13.   See also Def.'s Ex. 7 ¶ 13;  Def.'s Ex. 10 ¶ 13.   The evidence establishes that many, if not all, of the fifteen minutes between the plaintiff's return to the emergency room and the start of his medical examination by the physician's assistant were spent on making several and various attempts to calm and restrain the plaintiff.

Graff also attests:  “Persons brought to the Department of Emergency Medicine for any condition, including for evaluation of possible incapacity because of alcohol ingestion, are first evaluated by a triage nurse so that the acuity of their need for medical evaluation and treatment can be rapidly assessed ․ The hospital records ․ reflect that the patient did not change into hospital garb and allow the nurse to complete her triage nursing assessment until after 0309 on May 25, 2003 ․ Adequate physical examination by a physician or physician assistant to determine whether the patient was incapacitated by alcohol or by some other condition would have been impossible until after 0309, when the patient finally consented to remove his street clothes.”   Def.'s Ex. 18 ¶¶ 11, 18, 19.   The nurse who performed the plaintiff's triage assessment “assigned [him with] a triage acuity of ‘Urgent,’ which was the middle level out of three possible levels.”   Def.'s Ex. 4 ¶ 15.

Graff further provides:  “Besides physical examination and assessment to rule out other conditions that may mimic the signs and symptoms of alcohol intoxication, assessment and examination of a person for possible incapacity by reason of alcohol ingestion customarily requires testing and evaluation of a person's blood ․ The attending physician assistant ordered that Mr. Palmer's blood be tested for blood alcohol levels and for blood glucose levels, and the hospital records reflect that Mr. Palmer's blood was drawn for testing at 0310, when Mr. Palmer consented to having blood be drawn.”   Def.'s Ex. 18 ¶¶ 20, 21, 22;  see also Def.'s Ex. 6 ¶ 7.

Thus, the evidence submitted in support of the present motion establishes that the following events occurred between the plaintiff's arrival at 2:36 a.m. and the start of his medical examination at 4:00 a.m. Between 2:40 a.m. and 3:09 a.m., the plaintiff underwent a triage assessment, a necessary prerequisite to the medical examination to be performed in accordance with § 17a–683(c).  The plaintiff contributed to the duration of the triage assessment by refusing to change into a hospital gown.   The plaintiff only agreed to change into a hospital gown after the triage nurse called the defendant's security personnel for assistance.   Def.'s Ex. 7 ¶¶ 4–6;  Def.'s Ex. 8 ¶¶ 4–6;  Def.'s Ex. 16;  Def.'s Ex. 17.   The triage nurse assessed the plaintiff's condition to be at an intermediate level of acuity.   At 3:10 a.m., the plaintiff's blood was drawn, another necessary component of the medical examination to be performed in accordance with § 17a–683(c).  The plaintiff left the defendant's premises at 3:24 a.m. and did not return until 3:45 a.m. From 3:45 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., various of the defendant's medical and security personnel made several and various attempts to calm and restrain the “uncooperative” plaintiff.   Def.'s Ex. 18 ¶ 24.   He was finally placed in two-point restraints in order to facilitate his medical examination and promote his safety.   Def.'s Ex. 7 ¶ 13;  Def.'s Ex. 8 ¶ 13;  Def.'s Ex. 10 ¶ 13.

Again, on summary judgment, the movant “has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ․ To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  D.H.R. Construction Co., Inc. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1981).   The evidence submitted in support of the present motion, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, clearly shows that the plaintiff's medical examination occurred “as soon as possible,” per Judge Keegan's careful and proper interpretation of the statutory phrase.   Judge Keegan noted that approximately one hour passed between the plaintiff's arrival at the defendant's emergency room department and the start of his medical examination by the physician's assistant, discounting the time during which the plaintiff ran from the defendant's premises.   The present court notes that “the circumstances existing at the New Britain General Hospital emergency room on May 25, 2005 at 2:36 a.m.,” and thus the circumstances underlying the approximately one hour period specified by Judge Keegan, include the necessity of triaging the plaintiff and drawing his blood in order to perform the statutorily mandated medical examination;  the assessment of his condition at the middle level of triage acuity;  and the delay occasioned by his repeatedly belligerent, uncooperative conduct.   Given such circumstances, the court cannot determine how the conduct of the defendant's personnel may be characterized as noncompliant with § 17a–683(c), such that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the defendant's entitlement to immunity under § 17a–689(b).

The plaintiff's argument that the court may not look to Graff's affidavit in deciding the present motion is unavailing.   First, the plaintiff's characterization of Graff's affidavit as an “expert opinion” discounts the fact that Graff attests to giving the affidavit “based upon [his] personal knowledge” as both an emergency medicine physician generally and “the admitting physician when Joseph Palmer was admitted to the Emergency Room at New Britain General Hospital on May 25, 2003” specifically.   Def.'s Ex. 18 ¶ 6–9.   Furthermore, even if the court accepted the plaintiff's characterization of Graff's affidavit, it would still reject the plaintiff's argument.

The Appellate Court recently determined in DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn.App. 583, 612–14, 2 A.3d 963, cert. granted, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1053 (2010):  “Practice Book § 17–46 sets forth three requirements necessary to permit the consideration of materials contained in affidavits submitted in a summary judgment proceeding.   The material must:  (1) be based on personal knowledge;  (2) constitute facts that would be admissible at trial;  and (3) affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.   The requirements that the affidavit must be based on personal knowledge and contain facts admissible at trial do not mean, however, that expert opinions in the form of affidavits may not be considered in a summary judgment proceeding.   For the purposes of an expert's opinion, the expert's personal knowledge of facts is comprised of those materials on the basis of which he may properly render his opinion ․ These materials include those on the basis of which the expert forms an opinion, and include ․ hearsay ․ Furthermore, an expert's opinion is, for the purposes of [17–46], a fact that would be admissible at trial, assuming the expert is qualified to render such an opinion ․ Thus, an expert's opinion may be based on second hand sources, such as his training and experience, and information obtained by others ․ Although an expert's opinion must be based on facts, there is no rule of law declaring the precise facts which must be proved before [his] opinion may be received in evidence.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)

The plaintiff argues that Graff's affidavit is evidentially improper because it does not provide “sufficient facts” to form “the foundation for the expert's opinion.”   He also argues that the court may not dispose of the present motion on the basis of Graff's affidavit because, at trial, the jury would be free to disregard Graff's expert witness testimony.   The court rejects the first argument because the facts upon which Graff relies are a proper basis for the conclusions that he draws in his capacity as an emergency medicine physician.   The tenor of the plaintiff's argument suggests that the only proper factual basis for Graff's conclusions (and upon which the court could grant the present motion) would be a minute-by-minute account of every single circumstance and fact underlying the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department, above and beyond what is already provided by the evidence presently before the court.   This is an untenable standard, and the court will not adopt it in deciding the present motion.   The court rejects the second argument because it is clearly contrary to the applicable, binding appellate authority cited above.

Finally, the court notes that the plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing with evidence that genuine issues of material fact exist.   The plaintiff's opposition consists only of legal arguments and is unaccompanied by exhibits.   He does not add to or challenge the facts upon which the defendant relies in moving for summary judgment.   The court has already concluded that the defendant has met its burden of establishing with evidence that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the applicability of § 17a–683(c) to the present action.   Because the plaintiff has not met his burden in turn, he has not convinced the court to conclude otherwise.

Thus, the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact that it is immune from civil liability for the conduct of its personnel during the plaintiff's admission to its emergency room department on May 25, 2003.   The court therefore need not address the parties' arguments regarding the merits of the plaintiff's causes of action sounding in false imprisonment, assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁴  For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment on counts four, five and six of the plaintiff's complaint.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. “At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew his objection to Newington Ambulance Corporation's motion for summary judgment.   The court granted summary judgment on the motion.”   Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4011575 (October 15, 2009, Keegan, J.)..  FN1. “At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew his objection to Newington Ambulance Corporation's motion for summary judgment.   The court granted summary judgment on the motion.”   Palmer v. New Britain General Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4011575 (October 15, 2009, Keegan, J.).

FN2. The plaintiff also argues that the denial of the defendant's first motion for summary judgment is the law of the case and that the defendant must meet the evidentiary burden specified by Judge Keegan, discussed infra, in order to prevail on the present motion.   While the court believes that Judge Keegan's interpretation of the applicable statutory scheme is correct and adopts it in deciding the present motion, the court would still reject the plaintiff's law of the case argument.  “Where a matter has been previously ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance.”  Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982).   The doctrine is discretionary, however.  “A judge is not bound to follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is raised again he has the same right to reconsider the question as if he himself made the original decision ․ [O]ne judge may, in a proper case, vacate, modify or depart from an interlocutory order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon a question of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  General Electric Capital Corp. of Puerto Rico v. Rizvi, 113 Conn.App. 673, 681, 971 A.2d 41 (2009).   Furthermore, “[i]t is within the trial court's discretion to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment that has been previously denied where, as here, additional or new evidence has been submitted which was not before the court in ruling upon the earlier motion for summary judgment.”  Mac's Car City, Inc. v. American National Bank, 205 Conn. 255, 262, 532 A.2d 1302 (1987)..  FN2. The plaintiff also argues that the denial of the defendant's first motion for summary judgment is the law of the case and that the defendant must meet the evidentiary burden specified by Judge Keegan, discussed infra, in order to prevail on the present motion.   While the court believes that Judge Keegan's interpretation of the applicable statutory scheme is correct and adopts it in deciding the present motion, the court would still reject the plaintiff's law of the case argument.  “Where a matter has been previously ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance.”  Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982).   The doctrine is discretionary, however.  “A judge is not bound to follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is raised again he has the same right to reconsider the question as if he himself made the original decision ․ [O]ne judge may, in a proper case, vacate, modify or depart from an interlocutory order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon a question of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  General Electric Capital Corp. of Puerto Rico v. Rizvi, 113 Conn.App. 673, 681, 971 A.2d 41 (2009).   Furthermore, “[i]t is within the trial court's discretion to consider a renewed motion for summary judgment that has been previously denied where, as here, additional or new evidence has been submitted which was not before the court in ruling upon the earlier motion for summary judgment.”  Mac's Car City, Inc. v. American National Bank, 205 Conn. 255, 262, 532 A.2d 1302 (1987).

FN3. The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff's causes of action against the defendant are based upon the conduct of the defendant's medical and security personnel during the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department..  FN3. The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff's causes of action against the defendant are based upon the conduct of the defendant's medical and security personnel during the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department.

FN4. Even if the court were inclined to do so, it would still be inclined to grant the present motion.  “False imprisonment ․ is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”  Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 267, 440 A.2d 973 (1982).   There is no genuine issue of material fact that the medical and security personnel involved in the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department acted lawfully at all times.  “A civil assault is the intentional causing of imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact in another ․ A battery is a completed assault.   In order to establish liability for ․ assault and battery, the plaintiff must prove the defendant ․ intended to cause her harm and in fact did cause her harm.”   Hanson v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0480365 (July 20, 2007, Cosgrove, J.).   There is similarly no genuine issue of material fact that the medical and security personnel involved in the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department did not intend to cause harm to the plaintiff.   Finally, “[l]iability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  Morrissey v. Yale University, 268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004).   Whether conduct qualifies as extreme or outrageous is an issue of law;  see Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007);  and the court in the present action concludes that the conduct of the defendant's medical and security personnel falls well short of being “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” “atrocious” and “utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” especially given the plaintiff's own conduct..  FN4. Even if the court were inclined to do so, it would still be inclined to grant the present motion.  “False imprisonment ․ is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”  Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 267, 440 A.2d 973 (1982).   There is no genuine issue of material fact that the medical and security personnel involved in the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department acted lawfully at all times.  “A civil assault is the intentional causing of imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact in another ․ A battery is a completed assault.   In order to establish liability for ․ assault and battery, the plaintiff must prove the defendant ․ intended to cause her harm and in fact did cause her harm.”   Hanson v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0480365 (July 20, 2007, Cosgrove, J.).   There is similarly no genuine issue of material fact that the medical and security personnel involved in the plaintiff's admission to the defendant's emergency room department did not intend to cause harm to the plaintiff.   Finally, “[l]iability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  Morrissey v. Yale University, 268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004).   Whether conduct qualifies as extreme or outrageous is an issue of law;  see Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007);  and the court in the present action concludes that the conduct of the defendant's medical and security personnel falls well short of being “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” “atrocious” and “utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” especially given the plaintiff's own conduct.

Wilson, Robin L., J.