IN RE: Hannah J.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On January 19, 2011, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Ashley J., and Edward C. as to Hannah.   The mother and father have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Neither parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of these children.   This court has jurisdiction.

Prior to the commencement of this contested action, the mother presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights to Hannah.   Having canvassed the mother, the court (Graziani, J.) found that she has been represented by competent counsel who was present with her when she executed the consent form.   The court further found that the consent had been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her action.   Her consent was accepted on June 8, 2011.

The Department of Child and Families (DCF) through counsel moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual grounds and to change the grounds to consent § 17a–112(I) of the mother.

The statutory grounds alleged against respondent father are (1) that the child was found in a prior proceeding on November 17, 2008, to have been neglected and the father has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I)).

The child Hannah is now four years old.   She has been out of her parents care three times, the most recent removal being in June 2010.   The child has never been in the care of her biological father who has spent most of his daughter's life in jail, on probation, on parole or with charges pending against him.   Hannah was placed with her paternal aunt, the father's sister, Jennifer.   The paternal aunt is eager to adopt Hannah.   She testified in court that when she asked her brother what should happen to Hannah, he replied that he wants Hannah to live with her and he wants her to adopt Hannah.   Nonetheless, the presently incarcerated father is unwilling to sign a consent to terminate his rights and permit the adoption.

I. FACTS

The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

Respondent–Father.

Edward C., the father of the child, is presently incarcerated within the state.   This is not his first period of incarceration.   He has been repeatedly incarcerated through the years.   The social study (Petitioner's Exhibit A and conviction record, D) indicate a prodigious record of 18 arrests between ages twenty and thirty.   He has been arrested for possession of drugs three times;  disorderly conduct and breach of peace five times;  burglary three times;  larceny three times, criminal mischief, resisting arrest, two counts of operating under suspension and has two convictions for operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs.   Exhibit E shows seven admissions to state correctional facilities within the past ten years.   While in custody he has been disciplined for causing a disruption, disobeying a direct order, and violating program provisions.

Under Connecticut law, incarceration alone is not sufficient to terminate a parent's rights.   The child protection cases in Connecticut tend to view the whole parent-child relationship;  pre- and post-incarceration.   Incarcerated parents have the ability to participate in the child protection proceedings.   Counsel are appointed for them;  usually visitation is available to the incarcerated parent in prison, and they are transported to the proceedings to fully participate.   Edward has had the benefit of all these opportunities.   He was aware of his right to visitation with the child but declined to visit during his last two periods of incarceration, perhaps for the best.   He has participated in the proceedings and was brought to court for his necessary appearances.

This court considers the history of the parent including their criminal history, their propensity to criminal behavior, anything indicative of general parental fitness, the nature and quality of the relationship between parent and child or children pre-incarceration, the age and needs of the child, the effect of the incarceration on the child, the impact psychologically and emotionally of prison visitation on the child, the degree of rehabilitation while incarcerated, an estimate of how long it may be post-incarceration for the parent to verify the quality of their rehabilitative efforts, an assessment of the parenting ability of the person, the length of time the parent will be incarcerated as it effects meeting the child's everyday needs and the inability to meet parental responsibilities.   A paramount consideration, of course, is the issue of stability and permanence for the child as well as the child's sense of time.

Using these considerations as a guide to analyze Edward's parenting quotient, he fails.   Neither his pre-incarceration performance nor his post-incarceration performance has been adequate.  (See generally Exhibit A.) The social studies reflect there is no indication from any source that he has ever financially supported his child.   While he no doubt feels some affection for the child, he has never demonstrated any consistent parental competence or personal competence.

He is not in a position to provide for the care of his child.   He is a convicted felon presently incarcerated.   He has had no sustained crime free period in the past ten years.   He has unaddressed addiction issues.   He is unwilling to engage in substance abuse treatment.   He has an impulsive personality with marked lack of judgment.   He was expelled from one technical school and subsequently dropped out of high school in the ninth grade.   Due to his multiple convictions for driving under the influence it will be years before he is eligible to drive again in Connecticut.   His history of employment is necessarily inadequate due to his frequent incarceration.   In counseling he was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance and with alcohol dependence.   He has a history of inter-personal instability with intimate relationships.   A person with this kind of history will require heroic efforts over several years to rehabilitate himself to the role of responsible, self-reliant citizen.   Only then would he possibly be considered eligible to be a parental resource.   It would require a great period of additional time for him to satisfy any decision maker that he had fully reformed and rehabilitated himself.

Hannah needs permanence now.   She is four years old and has the right to be able to attach to her present caretaker with confidence.   There is nothing in Edward's history that suggests he will be rehabilitated within a time frame that is appropriate considering the age and needs of Hannah.

Parental Failure of the father to Rehabilitate— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I)

The petitioner alleges that Edward's parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B).  As the child has been previously found to be neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether the father has achieved or will achieve rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time considering the age and the needs of the child such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of this child.   The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.   Edward has not previously demonstrated effective, consistent parenting nor does his criminal history, mental health issues and lack of life skills suggest the likelihood of meaningful rehabilitation within a reasonable time for this child.   The child needs permanent parenting within a reasonable time-frame.   Multiples of years which will be required for Edward, is not reasonable for Hannah.   The petitioner has met her burden.

II. DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings: ²

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF has attempted to offer services to the respondent.   In 2010, Edward was offered and attended individual counseling through the United Community Family Services of Norwich.   The therapist did not feel reunification would be the best option for Edward.   She indicated he had a long way to go in his therapy, he was not fully engaged and she was concerned about his impulsivity.   She reported he had difficulty taking suggestions.   He was subsequently reincarcerated and did not finish his therapy.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF did make reasonable efforts.   In fact Edward was close to reunification.   Edward at first contested his paternity.   A paternity test confirmed his paternity.   Edward had no relationship with Hannah at all, she was a stranger to him.   Hannah screamed at his presence.   Over time he developed a warm relationship with the child during supervised visitation.   DCF scheduled a reunification with the father to occur in June 2009.   All Edward had to do was stay out of trouble.   He could not do that.   Shortly before the scheduled reunification he was arrested and confined.   He failed himself personally and he failed Hannah as a parent, yet again.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds Edward did engage in appropriate services.   He simply could not adjust his behavior to conform to civil demands.   He consistently violated the specific steps to avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system.   His addiction to alcohol has been a very destructive force in his life.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child did develop a strong parental emotional bond with the biological father which was disrupted by his aggressive, intoxicated behavior in front of the child which resulted in charges of risk of injury, and other criminal offenses which, once again, resulted in arrest and confinement.

(5) As to the age of the child, Hannah is four.   The child's attorney recommends permanency which can only be achieved here through termination of the parent's rights.³

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that father is now confined and does not desire to maintain regular and consistent contact with Hannah while he is incarcerated.   The court further finds that the father is unable to assume a responsible parental role in the child's life.   Giving the father additional time would not likely enable him to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited within a time-frame suitable for Hannah.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989);  In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster mother or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Ashley J., by her consent and Edward C. to the child is in the best interest of the child.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for all children.   The child is now in a foster home where she is very well cared for by foster mother who is fully committed to her.

Edward has been consistently unable to execute a responsible parental role.   This male parent is not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the child at this time or in the near future.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship with foster mother and biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents;  and their genetic bond to respondents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

IV. ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Ashley J., upon her consent, and Edward C., without his consent, are hereby terminated as to Hannah.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Hannah.

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Willimantic, 81 Columbia Avenue, Willimantic, Ct 06226 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, Sr. J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Ashley..  FN2. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Ashley.

FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN3. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

Foley, Francis J., S.J.