Eunice Medwinter v. Ann Marie Ransome et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a summary process action for possession of the subject premises at 413 Windsor Avenue, Windsor, Connecticut.   On August 2, 2011, the parties appeared before this Court for trial on the complaint.   The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant has failed to pay rent of $1,050.00 for the month of June 2011.   The defendant's amended answer admits the substance of the allegations of the complaint but asserts special defenses claiming no rent is due based on housing or health code violations and retaliatory eviction.

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and reaches the conclusions set forth herein by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

BURDEN OF PROOF

“While the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it.”  Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211 (1981).   The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential elements of their cause of action by a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Gulycz v. Stop & Shop, 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923 (1982).   Failure to do so results in judgment for the defendant.  Id. “․ [W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308 (1998).

STANDARD OF PROOF

The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is “properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394 (1981).

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM

To prevail on a claim for nonpayment of rent, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements:  (1) a rental agreement;  (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises;  (3) the address of the subject premises;  (4) the amount of rent due to the plaintiff from the defendant;  (5) when the rent was due to the plaintiff;  (6) the date of nonpayment;  (7) the service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date;  and (8) that the defendant is still in possession.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–15a et seq.

THE PLEADINGS

“The admission of the truth of an allegation [in a] pleading is a judicial admission conclusive on the pleader.”  Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 199 (1971).  “An admission in a pleading dispenses with proof, and is equivalent to proof.”  (Citation omitted.)  Patchen v. Delohery Hat Co., 82 Conn. 592, 594 (1909).

SPECIAL DEFENSES

“[A] special defense is not an independent action;  rather, it is an attempt to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint to demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn.App. 436, 447 n.10 (2005), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933 (2006).   The defendants have the burden of proving the allegations in their special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence.   Lodovico v. Mihalcik, superior court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–50130991 (August 17, 2010, Rittenband, J.T.R.).

THE PROCEEDINGS

“The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cavoli v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906 (2005).

“It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ․ it is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence ․” (citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).  In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540 (2000).  “The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact].”  Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123 (1981).  “[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530 (1977).

“[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible ․ it is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses ․ the trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness ․ the trier can, as well, decide what—all, none, or some—of the witnesses testimony to accept or reject.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Osborne, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291 (1996).   The trial court's function as the finder is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”  In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808 (1986).

ORAL TENANCIES

A parol lease for an indefinite period reserving a monthly rental is a lease for one month only.  Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 551, 7 A.2d 228 (1939);  Corbett v. Cochrane, 67 Conn. 570, 576, 35 A. 509 (1896).   The tenancy for each month is separate and distinct from that of every other month.  Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 607, 73 A.2d 295 (1950).   There is a new contract of leasing for each successive month;  DiCostanzo v. Tripodi, 137 Conn. 513, 515, 78 A.2d 890 (1951).   The right of tenancy ends with that month for which the rent has been paid.  Webb v. Ambler, supra.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and reaches the conclusions set forth herein by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

1. On or about June 1, 2010, the plaintiff, as landlord, and the defendant, as tenant, entered in to an oral month to month rental agreement for the use and occupancy of the subject premises;

2.  The plaintiff is the owner of the subject premises;

3.  The subject premises are:  413 Windsor Avenue, Windsor, Connecticut;

4.  The agreed upon monthly rental was $1,050.00 payable on the first day of each month;

5.  The defendant failed to pay the rent due on June 1, 2011 within the time allowed by law;

6.  On June 18, 2011, the plaintiff had a Notice to Quit Possession served on the Defendant to vacate the premises on or before June 23, 2011;

7.  The time given in the notice to quit possession for the defendant to vacate the premises has passed, yet the defendant has not vacated the premises and remains in possession;

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

The court finds that the plaintiff has established all the essential elements of the complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

SPECIAL DEFENSES

The defendant's first special defense asserts that no rent is due based on the conditions of the premises.   The defendant, in her second special defense, asserts that this eviction is sought in retaliation for the defendant's complaints to the landlord and municipal agencies regarding needed repairs to the subject premises.

DISCUSSION

Connecticut General Statutes § 47a–7(a)(1) requires a landlord to comply with all applicable building and housing codes as materially affect health and safety.  Ficocelli v. Sokolovsky, 2009 Ct.Sup. 3561, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Housing Session at Rockville, Docket No. CV 08 4010443 (Feb. 17, 2009, Sferrazza, J.).

When a tenant has in good faith requested the landlord make repairs to the tenant's dwelling unit, the landlord “shall ․ (2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition ․” Conn. Gen.Stat. 47a–7(a)(2).  Visco v. Cody, 16 Conn.App. 444, 454, 547 A.2d 935 (1988);  Liu v. Kukick, 2010 Ct.Sup. 6565, Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, Housing Session, Docket No. CV21–017962 (March 3, 2010, Young, J.).   Additionally, Connecticut General Statutes § 47a–7(a)(4) requires the landlord to “․ maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating and other facilities ․”

“Courts which have considered the relationship between General Statutes §§ 47a–7 and 47a–4a have uniformly concluded that where the premises have been rendered uninhabitable ․ the tenant is relieved from the obligation to pay rent and may raise the uninhabitability of the apartment as a defense to a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent ․ Whether the premises is uninhabitable to the extent that the tenant is relieved of the obligation to pay rent depends on the facts of each individual case and whether the uninhabitability is caused by the tenant.”  (Citations omitted.)   Housing Authority v. Williams, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. SPH 92006–65824 (October 8, 1992, Holzberg, J.).

Connecticut General Statutes § 47a–4a establishes, essentially, that no rent is due for any period during which the landlord has failed to comply with the responsibilities indicated in Subsection (a) of 47a–7 if that noncompliance renders the premises unfit or uninhabitable.  Carpentieri v. Gayle, 2009 Ct.Sup. 5831, 47 Conn. L. Rptr. 555, Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP–151240 (April 16, 2009, Gilligan, J.).

In the instant matter, the defendant has failed to establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the unresolved issues complained of are so serious as to constitute a serious health or safety hazard.   The testimony was clear that any hazard caused by electrical issues were resolved in April 2011.   Regarding the plumbing issues, the court, while crediting the testimony of the town sanitarian, Michael Pepe, is not allowed to engage in speculation or conjecture as to the potential hazards to the occupants.   Additionally, the plaintiff presented credible evidence that the defendant or other occupants contributed, to some degree, to the plumbing problems.   Accordingly, the court finds that the defendant has failed to establish this first special defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The defendants' second special defense sounds in retaliatory eviction, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §§ 47a–20 and 47a–33.   However, retaliation is not a defense to a summary process action brought because of nonpayment of rent.   Klobocista v. Zappia, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Docket No. HDSP–141135 (April 27, 2007, Bentivegna, J.);   Bordiere v. Ramirez, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. SPN 99 1031769 (December 23, 1999, Tanzer, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 359);  Smith v. Worsham, SPNH 8207–2132 (September 8, 1982);  Jacobson v. Johnson, SPNH 8207–2006 (September 8, 1982);  Mordecai v. Botwe–Asamoah, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. 8208–2228 (September 29, 1982, Foti, J.);  Maretz v. Apuzzo, 34 Conn.Sup. 594, 597 (1977).   Accordingly, in the instant matter, this special defense is inapplicable to an action based solely upon nonpayment of rent.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the following:

The plaintiff has proven the non-payment claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence;

The defendants have failed to prove their special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence;

The Court enters judgment for possession of the premises in favor of the plaintiff;

The Court finds an arrearage of $3,150.00, including August 2011.

The Court orders a final stay of execution through Sunday, August 28, 2011.

BY THE COURT

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.